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FOREWORD
It is evident that entrepreneurship is a key factor of development. In the fast
developing countries of Southeast Asia, extensive research has been made on
entrepreneurs in big business, but the "spirit of enterprise" also exists among millions
of peasants, fishermen, artisans, shopkeepers etc. One of the merits of this seminar is
to take into account the wide variety of experiences which all have their impact on the
economic development. Another merit is to show not only the economic dimension of
entrepreneurship, but also the anthropological, cultural or geographical dimensions.
The Social Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University has always promoted
multidisciplinary research in the social sciences. It is also our policy to encourage the
dissemination and exchange of research results with concerned scholars throughout the
world. The seminars that have been organised over the past years also reflect both the
openness and forward looking character of our Institute, and the changing times in
South-East Asia: it is indeed a timely period to strenghten oui' efforts to promote field
research addressing emerging issues. I believe this view is shared by our partner,
ORSTOM, the French Scientific Research Institute for Development through
Cooperation.
In this respect, the International Seminar on "Entrepreneurship and Socio-
Economic Transformation in Thailand and South East Asia", held in February 1993,
was a landmark in our activity. Prepared by a Scientific Committee of the Institute and
members of the CUSRI-ORSTOM programme, it was designed as a meeting of
researchers and academics, interested in recent changes in the strategies of some key
economic actors. The theme was selected to focus on both the rapidly changing context
and the initiation of productive activites by actors in various walks of life.
Thanks to support from the Scientific Section of the French Embassy in Thailand,
the 'international seminar brought together about 140 participants, including about 30
guests and invited presenters. During this seminar, researchers associated with CUSRI-
ORSTOM programmes presented some aspects of investigations they have been
conducting at the Institute over the past years. Most of the papers reflected recent field
. research and special focus was given to the interrelations between economic and social
issues. Those papers are published here.
The aim of this publication is to encourage the dissemination of research on
Thailand and South-East Asia. We hope that it will inspire further studies and be of
benefit to an extended academic community.
Prof. Dr. Krayudh Dhiratayakinant,
Director of Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute
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Introduction
Xavier Oudin, Pascale Phelinas,
Jean-Christophe Simon, Jean-Yves Weigel
The economic success of Southeast Asia, and more particularly of Thailand, has been the center
of interest of observers of economic and social change. However the analytical framework provided by
existing economic theories on development and the role of entrepreneurship may prove to be inadequate
to account for the specificities of certain situations. The pattern of Thailand's economic growth in
particular, has been unusual. This seminar aims at describing some of these unusual patterns
characterized by the prevalence of extensive agricultural production systems, the role of micro-
businesses in promoting growth and absorbing manpower, the existence of a labour-intensive industry
etc.. Although these features characterize "extensive development", the extensive model has been
sharply questioned by entrepreneurs as'~ result of regional changes brought about by the emergence of
competitive countries, by the limitations of pioneer agricultural fronts and by the rise in labour costs,
. ' I
causing entrepreneurs to look for ways of improving their companies productivity. '
The arguments put forward to-explain the strong economic expansion of South East.Asia and
particularly Thailand, have often been limited in the sense of identifying only partial dynamics or even
being of a contradictory nature. Some examples are arguments suggesting the comparative culture or
philosophical advantages (Buddhism versus Confucianism in,these countries?), arguments proposing a
narrow view of South East Asian economics simply as relay points for advanced industrialized
economics, or arguments focussing on social stability (but understanding the role of migration in
emerging entrepreneurship). Finally the role of the State itselfcan be seen as both a rigid administrator
(e.g, "red tape" and protectionism) or a consensual facilitator of economic activities.
We have preferred to adopt a more systematic approach, by exploring the role and attitudes of an
essential socio-economic category, the entrepreneurs, and the part they play in development and in
promoting economic and social change. The term "entrepreneurs" is used in its widest sense to include
farmers, fishbreeders and urban micro-businesses. The role of entrepreneurs of Chinese descent is
examined, as is the impact of socio-cultural and philosophical factors on the spirit of enterprise. The
analyses also take into account the emergence of new attitudes and behaviour of entrepreneurs in the
manufacturing sector.
The Prevalence of Extensive Systems
up to the end of the 80's, clearing new farmland and opening up new fisheries accounted for the
strong growth of the agricultural sector (5.5% per year between 1960 and 1970, and 4.1 % between
1980 and 1990). One of the most significant features of agricultural performance was the extension of
areas cultivated at a sustained rate until 1975 (3.4% per year) followed by amore moderate scale (1.7%
1
per year). Consequently, the average size of agricultural holdings increased from 4 hectares in 1950 to
4.5 hectares in 1990, despite a high population growth rate. Land distribution did not change much
.over the same period either, large tracts of owned land remaining rare in Thailand. Finally, indirect use
of the land (tenant farming, metayage) developedlittleover time,accounting for only 11.6% of the land
cultivated in 1980 and 12.5% in 1988.
Thailand has a long history of settling farmland. The opening of the Kingdom to external trade
accelerated in 1855 with the signing of the Bowring Treaty with Britain, the main purpose of which
was to liberalize trade between the two countries. In the years thereafter, Thailand specialized in
exporting rice. This deliberately outward-looking economy was the point of departure for a long
movementof expanding rice cultivation areas to meet growing foreign demand. By 1950, all the land
that could be used for rice cultivation had been taken up in the Central Plains, as well as in the little
wooded, fertile northern and north-eastern plains. Even so, Thailand's opening up towards the outside
world did not lead to major innovations in rice producing techniques until 1950, in spite of the increase
in the amount of rice marketedand the economy's rapid monetarisation. Easy access to new farmland
and its low cost, explain the farmers' preference for extensive agriculture and the very low spread of
intensive farming.
After the second world war, innovation amongThai peasantsconsisted mainlyof selecting crops
that were more promising than rice. From 1945-1950, hillsidecrops (maize, cassava, sugar-cane, fruit
and vegetables) and subsequently aquaculture, developed rapidly.Whereas rice farming had taken over
the plains and valleys, the new crops invaded the wooded hills and mangroves in more worrying
amounts. The fishfarming pioneer front was extendedby clearing mangroves, first in the northern part
of the Gulf of Thailand, and thenon the easternseaboard,followedby the southernpart of the Gulf and
the AndamanSea coastl. Thus, the forest retreated thriceas fast between 1950 and 1991 (19.2 million
hectares) as it did between 1913 and 1950 (6.4 million' hectares). The total forest cover has dropped
from 75% of the country's entire surface area at the beginningof the century to less than 30% today. In
addition to the ecological problemsposed by this fast, massive loss of forest cover, the encroachment
of forest land raised and still raises the issue of the recognition of the land ownership rights of those
who have taken over this land.
A·similar phenomenon occurred in fisheries. Fishery production first took place in the entire
Thai Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (the Gulf and then the Andaman Sea) before edging out to
encroachon the EEZs of the ripariancountries, leading to the giddydevelopment of borderports.
Historically, all land in Thailand belongs to the King, but it was customary to allow any
subject to seek the right to occupy public land in order to cultivate it, a right which, in practice, was
always recognized. Between the end of the 19th and the middle of the 20th centuries, the occupants'
right of enjoyment was converted into ownership and legalized as available land became rarer and
disputes over legal ownership intensified. Several agrarian laws, enacted in 1901, 1936 and 1954
respectively, defined the conditions for the transfer of public land to private land. Three phases were
1- A similar phenomenon occurred in fisheries. Fishery production first took place in the entire Thai
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (the Gulf and then the Andaman Sea) before edging out to encroach on the
EEZs of the riparian countries, leading to the giddy development of border ports.
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recognized for the legal acquisition of land, Le. occupation, use, and legal appropriation, for which
three types of documents were issued. However, the issuing of title deeds lagged far behind the rapid
expansion of settled land. The lack of funds and administrative structures, the absence of cadastral
surveys and a central register for transactions.led to few of the eligible peasants being able to obtain the
rights they had claimed.
'Various agrarian laws also specified the types of land, principally forest area, for which no title
deeds could be conferred. But it was only after the enactment of the Law on Forest Protection in 1937
that attempts to classify forest areas into protected areas and areas for commercial purposes began.The
singular absence of enforcement of the forest conservation law encouraged "illegal" deforestation,
especially since the occupants of the land thus cleared were very rarely evicted. On the contrary, the
state recognized and legalized their rights by issuing special title deeds often giving holders rights
. which boiled down to a simple authorization to occupy the land. On the whole, in 1985, there were
still nearly 9.6 million hectares of untitled, cultivated land and 1.3 million hectares over which a
simple temporary right of occupation had been granted, Le. more than 30% of all the cropped land.
Thus, the relative abundance of land and the force of common law which, for more than 150
. years, had legitimized the de facto use of untouched land, greatly contributed to stabilizing the average
size of farms, preventing the formation of large landed properties and the exodus of the rural
"proletariatised" population towards the cities. Agricultural growth was initiated by a myriad of small
companies, whose objectives ranged from simple reproduction to intensive accumulation, even though,
further along the chain of production, the number of operators decreased and the fanners became more
formally structured into declared companies. In the area of fisheries, in 1985, 60% of the fishing
companies possessed only one boat. 70% of the boats had a gross tonnage of less than 5 tonnes and a
horsepower of less than 30 hp. The relations between the fishermen or artisan processors, skilled
fishfanners of the extensive or semi-intensive system on the one hand, and industrial fisheries,
,
aquaculturists or marine product processors on the other hand, may, in some cases, have strengthened
small market production characterized by the maintenance of precapitalist forms of payment for labour
(piecemeal payment on the trawlers and purse-seineurs), by the control that producers themselves have
over output and by the existence of lineal relations or quasi-wage relations.
In the secondary and tertiary sectors, the extensive nature of economic development was based on
the systematic use of local resources, labour and the adaptation of cottage industry forms of production
to the market. The country's industrialization did not take place to the detriment of small production
units, which, on the contrary, managed to adapt themselves to new forms of labour organization. On
the other hand, the penetration of new external markets, a prerequisite for industrial development,
resulted in the reclaiming of new land in the agricultural sector.
Thai industry developed as it result of the combination of import substitution and export
promotion. The rapid diversification of the manufacturing sector was stimulated by export prospects.
An international manufactures hub was created, facilitated by the open economic context and may be
seen in the wide range of manufactured goods among the country's main exports and in the diversity of
international investment sources. Industry took advantage of an extended local market, which guaranteed
most of the consumer products a good rate of return and offset export sales' crises.
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Industry was organised in two ways: on the one hand, by reinstating the cottage industry model
with its system of cooperation, supervision and on-the-job training in industrial workshops
(manufacturing furniture, jewelry, mechanical parts, etc.) and on the other hand, by introducing a
Taylorized system where repetitive tasks were fragmented, requiring little training and multipurpose
manpower (processing of agro-foods, textile production, electronics, etc.)
Entrepreneurs took advantage of three elements on which to base the beginnings' of the
manufacturing industry. First, a tightknit network, of stable business relations between the
entrepreneurs guaranteed easy supplies of capital good's and raw materials. From the start, industrial
activity was linked to domestic trade: both the origin of the entrepreneurs as well as the vitality of the
markets helped to start up simple, profitable activities in most of the sectors producing for individual
consumption. Activities requiring more developed techniques, (spinning, assembling household
appliances, automobiles) or a sizable capital input often benefitted from the collaboration of foreign
entrepreneurs (granting of licenses, technical support through the sale of second-hand machines, etc. ).
Secondly, they drew from substantial capital resources accumulated either in conjunction with
foreign flows or through solidarity systems within the Thai-Chinese community. Only in exceptional
circumstances did this fonn of capital accumulation lead to the constitution of large industrial groups or
support well planned industrial diversification strategies, since the entrepreneurs of the manufacturing
sector were often more concerned with the prospects of commercial activity, real estate speculation or
even investing abroad than in defining long-term industrial goals.
Finally, the relatively easy-going manufacturing sector, not demanding a highly skilled or stable
manpower, was supplied by a labour force of rural origin, which was unskilled and undemanding, and
which was temporarily integrated in industry, reproducing a peasant type of life and consumer style.
The modalities of labour mobilisation helped the transition of peasants from the rice paddy to
businesses and led to the development of wages for pre-industriallabour: on the one hand, piece work
or daily work remained standard practice in many branches, and on the other hand, given the age of the
employees, the industrial wage barely covered their personal consumption needs (but not those of a
nuclear family) leaving aside a small amount of savings to show solidarity with their family. The
small incomes weremade possible by the low cost of food and the workers' acceptance of slum-type
housing conditions and promiscuity usually found in the rural context.
This low cost of labour, together with other characteristics of the labour market, such as lax
labour legislation with regard to worker protection, was long considered an advantage in Thailand. The
minimum wage generally paid in the modem sector is decreed by the Ministry of the Interior on the
advice of an expert commission which studies the economy's capacity to bear a wage increase before
any proposal is made. ~is pragmatism leads to wages increasing only-as growthprogresses, and in
fact, even more slowly, which means that the share of wages in the national income remains relatively
insignificant (30fJ.' .ow wages have helped to avoid a clear segmentation of the labour market by
keeping th~ Income differential between the urban and rural environments sufficiently low so as to
limit the rural exodus, and by preventing the development of an "informal sector" which would have
only prov,ided ridiculously low incomes.
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Finally, seasonal fluctuations in employment, an essential characteristic of the labour market,
are pronounced. The labour market is stronglysubject to seasonal variationsand the resulting mobility
of the labour force. In the dry season, nearly five million farmers look for jobs in small firms or in the
modernsector, particularly construction. However, the supplementary incomes they earn through these
activities are no incentive for them to leave for good. On the whole, this system has not yet created a
large, urban, industrialproletariat.
The entire active population has alow level of general education: less than half have finished
primary school, which is one of the lowest levels in Asia. Despite the efforts of successive
governments to improve the level of schooling and vocational training, skilled manpower is still
inadequate.Moreover, the great workermobility is of little encouragementto companies to provide in-'
house training.
The maintenanceor even the developmentof small firms has certainly been one of the factors
contributing to the balanced development of the labour market over the high growth period. Small
companies use labour-intensive production systems: they benefit from the abundanceof low cost labour
and are able to absorb a large share of the available manpower. On average, wages paid by small firms
or for work done at home are lower than in modern companies, but they generally correspond to less
skilled jobs or position taken up by young workersat the beginningof their careers.
In 1990; almost half the active urban population was employed in non-wage jobs, or in
companies with less than twenty people. Although the major industries and service companies had
created'morejob opportunities, the absolute numberof newjobs offeredeach year by the modern sector
, '
would have been totally inadequateto absorb the demandfor newjob. Agricultureabsorbed the largest
share of job-demands (almost half between 1975and'1985, with this ratio dropping subsequently), the
rest being divided into equal parts betweenthe modern sector(large industries, modern services and the
public sector) and small companiesor self-employment-,
Rigorousaccounting is hardlypossible,firstlybecause these business categoriesare ill-defined,
and secondly,becauseof the seasonalnatureof someof thejobs
Two main factors explain the developmentof micro-companies; These are sub-contracting and I
growth of the domestic market. The sub-contracting system developed at the beginning of the
seventies, and spread to other sectors, like textiles. Its success can be accounted for its flexibility,
particularly as it allows seasonal workers to go back to their villages during the farming season. But
from the subcontractor's point of view, there are also other reasons'. The system is adapted to a labour
force which has a low level of educationand skills, and little knowledgeof modern economic circuits.
More particularly, work done at home or in small workshops is more suited to workers who are less
inclined to accept the constraints of industrial jobs. Industrial relations in small companies place
importance on a family or community spirit, and offer greater flexibility in the pace of work. These
companiesopen doors for young,unskilledrural labourers to enter into the urban labour market.
2- Rigorous accounting is hardly possible, firstly, because these business categories are ill-defined, and
secondly, because of the seasonal nature of some of the jobs.
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The subcontracting systemhas enabledsmall entrepreneurs to launch their businessesdespite the
lack of capital, and more particularly, withouthaving to outlay substantial working capital. In fact, the
main financial concern for small entrepreneurs is not so much the starting capital, which, in any case is
small and rarely advancedby the clientplacingthe order,but the lack of workingcapital. They therefore
depend on their customers (tradersor industrialists) for their supplyof raw materials,and only pay their
employees when they themselves have been paid (in effect making the workers put out an advance on
their working capital). Banks remain conspicuously absent from the system, as no special credit
scheme is available to micro-companies, unlike agriculture or fisheries. Moreover, subcontracting has
helped to spread international production standards, with its external market's demands for quality,
deadlines and labour organization to meet them implyinga full range of skills.
Nevertheless, the subcontracting system does have its limitations. Only techniques of a low
level of sophisticationare spread. The transferof know-how is also carefully rationed by the contractor,
who often deliberately fragments tasks toavoid a proliferation of competition. These practices, with
their many inhevent abuses related to working conditions and remuneration remain obstacles to the
developmentof small firms.
The growth of the domestic market is often overlooked analyses of economic development in
Thailand. Yet, it is a considerabledriving force, allowing the country to absorb external crises (like the
recent Gulf War) without too much damage. The expansion of the domestic market has been very
favourable to the development of small firms. In entire sectors like business or household services
(such as catering), small companies can find outlets and quickly adapt to market changes. Even in the
most export- oriented sectors, like textiles, the domestic market is of growing importance. The
building sector is another example of the spread of growth : unbridled construction in the country
certainly favours the large Civil engineering companies above all, but these often employ farmers
during the dry season, who move to the construction sites with their families. Many contracts are also
given to small companies, and the expansion of this sector has had an impact on the construction
materials sector, with its many small companies.
Thailand at a Time of Transition
The emergence of new competitors in Southeast Asia who are putting the same products on the
market is one of the factors which has led to recent changes in the Thai agricultural and industrial
production systems. The cost of labour is now higher in Thailand than in neighbouring countries.
Rural or urban entrepreneurs are obliged to increase labour productivity on their farms or in their
companies to remain competitive. This is becoming a major concern for decision-makers. With
competition growing stiffer between countries of Southeast Asia, Thailand must face the problem of
growing labour costs without seeing any significant improvement in its manpower's skills. Thus, one
of Thailand'scomparativeadvantagesis dwindling, withoutany apparentalternativesolution.
Similarly, the absenceof pioneerareas to attractnew households has deprivedThai agricultureof
its main advantage. At present, out of a total surface area of 514,000 sq. km., 320,000 are used for
agriculture, a figure considered to be the maximum limit for land cultivation. The transfer of land
ownership has changed; with peasants now preferring to bequeath all their land to a single child to
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avoid the transfer of unviable farms, Therefore, joint heirs are obliged 10 turn to wage-earning jobs,
which may not necessarily be agricultural. Moreover, the acquisition of land is tending to replace
traditional modes of access to land (through use or by legacy), and the unequal distribution of land
transactions, depending on size, seems to"imply that land will be accumulated by the most wealthy
operators. Tensions surrounding, the land market in areas near Bangkok have increased because of
competition between alternative land uses (agricultural/real estate) and the complementary development
of land speculation.
The questioning of traditional modes of access to land has exacerbated the problem of land
inheritance rights and the security these rights confer on the land. The assurance that a plot of land can
be worked over an extended period of time, guaranteed by inalienable rights is an encouragement for
investment and a prerequisite for the granting of bank loans. Of the eleven title deeds in existence in
Thailand, only three provide the guarantee, in practice, real rights over the occupied land. In theory,
those who are unable to produce these documents do not have access to bank loans and thus to
investment opportunities. Thus, most fanners who have obtained a bank or cooperative loan own title
deeds. Similarly, access to informal credit is always more ~quent for titled farms. These farms will be .
granted much higher amounts thanuntitled farms, whoever the lender. The same rule applies to the
duration of the loan, the funds being granted for a longer period if the borrower provides the desired land
collateral. Farmers without the collateral stipulated by lenders are doubly penalized because they can.
borrow less often than others, and under less favourable conditions. Iri other words, investing in new
production techniques will probably mean having 10overcome additional difficulties s~ch as access to
credit by a large number of farmers because of the inadequacy of the land title deeds they possess or
because they have none. However, the state can intervene to stimulate the emergence of intensive
production systems through a more flexible credit policy, as it did for fisheries.
The recent increase in the cost of access to land calls into question the contribution of
agriculture to growth and employment. Firstly, expanding the pioneer front was one of the traditional
ways of increasing farm production as there was little increase in output. But in the future, productivity
gains will depend on the adoption of more intensive farming practices. Secondly, the constant
enlargement of cultivated areas enabled the fanning sector to absorb a major share of available
manpower. The active farming population grew by more than 3% per year during the last decade and the
farming sector still employs 57% of the active population. Consequently, the rural exodus has been
limited.
The fat tor which most favours the process of intensification seems to be lower demographic
pressure as a result of the family planning policy initiated more than twenty years ago. The
demographic picture 'has undergone fast change. Fertility decreased at the beginning of the 70's both in
towns as well as in the countryside, dropping from 6.3 children per year per woman in 1965 to 2.5 in
1989. Total population growth fell from 3% per year on average between 1969 and 1970 to 1.9%
between 1980 and 1990. It is currently estimated at 1.5%.per year. The resulting change in age groups
,Le. a drop in the younger age group whilst there are still few over 65, has led to the majorityof the
population falling into the working category since 1975. Over the last 20 years, the active population
has increased significantly (4% per year) and it is only very recently that youngsters born after the
period representing a drop in fertility, have started to enter the job market, slowing down the growth in
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maripower. This has greatly contributed to the development of a labour-intensiveeconomy and helped
to limit wage increases despite the very strong demand for labour. Moreover, the drop in dependency
rates3has ensured that the community's resources are not swallowed up by education and health, but
can be used to improveinfrastructure and economic services.
The new demographic picture, which, in some sectors, may lead to a manpower shortage and
illegal immigration, is favourable to intensification, and is exerting pressure to increase wages.
Clearly, multi-occupations, whether urban or rural, seasonal or permanent, may offset the negative
effects of transition by providing workers with supplementary incomes while continuing to supply
small and large firms with a contingent of low- cost seasonal workers. Generally, mobility and the
capacity of entrepreneurs and wage-earners to adapt is an advantage at a time when new systems of
production are takinghold.
Thai entrepreneurs are between the devil and the deep blue sea: no longer competitive for low
value-added products compared with southern China, Vietnam or Indonesia, they have to distinguish
themselves by promoting production systems using an intermediate technology, or by relocating in
countries with labour-intensiveproduction systems. For example, in the fisheries and marine product
processing sectors, the difficulty in opening up new pioneer frontsas a result of greater control of their
EEZs by riparian countries (Vietnam, Burma, Malaysia and Indonesia), the emergence on the
international market of marine products of new competitors like China and Vietnam, and the over-
exploitation of resources, have all resulted in the intensification of the production systems 'observed
over the past ten years. Before, smallcatchesby unit of effort were sufficientlyprofitable thanks to low
labourcosts and strongexternaldemandfor the products.
In some fields, Thai entrepreneurs are participating in opening up pioneer fronts beyond their
borders (legal or illegal logging in Burma and Laos, fishing in Cambodian, Vietnamese and Burmese
waters) or relocating their industriesto these countries (agro-foods in southern China, textiles in Laos,
. ,
etc.).
But for those who have not opted for this solution, the main difficulty to surmount is
undoubtedly how to improve their technological know-how. To do this, they have·received some
support from the government, which, over the last few years, has promoted the development of new
productionsystems by allocatingcredit lines to adventurous entrepreneursor by granting tax incentives
to attract foreign companies whichcould provide the missing links in new chains of production. Thus,
numerous sectoral studies show a mastery of joint ventures of strategic points of technical processes.
This is partly explained by entrepreneurs' and employees' low level of skills. Taking up the challenge
will mean providing considerable,urgent trainingas competitiveeconomies rise up and workers claim
higher wages.
3- The ratio between the number of inactive and active members of the population. The rate of dependency was
104 inactive persons to 100 active persons in 1970, compared with 79 to 100 in 1990.
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This volume is structured in five main parts. The first section gives a general picture of the
economic and cultural context in which the entrepreneurs of Southeast Asia operate. The second
develops the specificities of growth in agriculture and fisheries in countries of the sub-region, dealing
particularly with issues like the links between land structure and agricultural performance, the.
importance of farmers' extra-farm activities, the emergence of new competitors following the economic
liberalization of communist countries (China, Vietnam), and the recent intensification of fishery
I . .
. production systems. The third part is devoted to small firms: it describes their characteristics, and
discusses how far the existence of the "informal sector" contributes to resolving the problem of under-
employment and poverty. The dynamism of modern industrial entrepreneurs and their capacity to adapt
to a constantly changing economic environment are analyzed in the fourth part, as is the role of
personal and family networks in capital accumulation. The fifth and last part highlights the importance
of the ethnic (Chinese immigrants) and religious (predominance of Buddhism) characteristics of
Southeast Asian entrepreneurs in the emergence of which is commonly known as the "spirit of
enterprise".
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I. INTRODUCTION

Conditions for a Successful Transition to an
Industrialized Country: Thailand as a Case:
A Preliminary Theoretical Framework
Luuk Knippenberg
Development in the so called developing countries only seems possible through total economic
integration in the world market combined with industrialization. There are perhaps alternatives, but all
alternatives tried out thus far have failed. Industrialization is the 'big datum' of our times, with which
each country and society have to come to terms, because of the success and expansion-thrift of it, not
only economic, but also political, military and cultural.
The opinions about the best way to stimulate this development differ: a complete opening up to
the world market or a combination of opening up and protection.
The developments in the so called NIC's seem to support the advocates of the second option.
Recent studies about the causes of the high economic growth of the Asiatic 'late industrializing
countries' stress the importance of political factors and the role played by the elite (Mackie, 1988;
Gereffi, 1990; Amsden, 1990). To say it in the words of Amsden: "The state is the principal initiator
of industrial growth" (Mackie, 1990, p. 12). Almost all authors agree that the successes of the Asiatic
NIC's would have been unthinkable without strong intervention by the state, as precursor, direct
participant and as guiding factor in the background.
Also Haggard (1990) has shown how in the four Asiatic NIC's (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore) growth coalitions were formed which outplayed other groups hostile to this
process. A similar development took place in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. (Hughes, Mackie,
1988).
Therefore, it seems that, for the construction of a theoretical model to explain the spectacular
economic development of the countries in Southeast Asia, the role of the state and especially the roles
of the actors within the state and their support need to be more stressed than is normally done.
Changes in the world economy form part of the explanation why certain countries experience
successful industrialization. But they do not explain why exactly those countries have succeeded and
others have failed.
Therefore, I want to consider the economic factors which lure a country into the so called global
shift, the factors which give a country a comparative economic advantage (factor conditions, demand
conditions, related and supporting industries and firm strategies; structure and rivalry) (porters, 1990,
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p. 71), and the economic factors which push firms to become multinationals (ownership-specific
advantages, internalization and location-specific factors 1) (Dickens, 1986, p. 133). Thereby, the fact
will be taken into account that the economic successes of the East-Asiatic countries partly can be
attributed to the vicinity of Japan and the particular motivational manners of Japanese firms to start
operations overseas.
However, for the crucial causes and reasons why countries seem to have been able to coriquer an
enduring spot in the world market as an industrial producer, I want to look at the national and intra-
. . .
national levels. I will look in the first place at the composition and strategies of, and relations
between, groups who are the bearers of the political and economic power. Thereby, the nationalpolicy
with respect to the above mentioned economic determinants will be given special attention.
The development of Thailand will beused as a case for two main reasons. The first reason is the
fact that the process of industrialization has old roots in Thailand. The different stages of the process --
the main bottlenecks and turning-points -- are clearly distinguishable. The second reason is the fact that
the transformation process in Thailand, although imposed from outside, was realized by indigenous
forces: Thailand was never colonized. This makes the development process of Thailand an ideal
research-case, out of which lessons can be drawn of use for other developing countries. Many of these
countries are facing problems which are reminiscent of problems Thailand has faced earlier: they have
only recently become independent and have to find - a better word is to invent - their own solutions to
come to terms with the industrialization process.
As the point of departure for my investigation of the relations between the 'power-bearing
groups' I will make use of the model developed by Evers (1988) of strategic groups, completed with.
Gellners' model of the transformation of and interrelations between production, coercion and power as
preconditions for the emergence of an industrial society (Gellner, 1982, 1988).
Evers defines strategic groups as persons connected by a shared interest in the maintenance and
enlargement of their shared possibilities of appropriation (Evers, 1988, p. 10). These possibilities of
appropriation are not confined to material goods, but can also relate to power, prestige or religious
goods. The presence of a shared interest makes strategic action possible, which means: the following
of a 'programme,' during a longer stretch of time, to maintain or enlarge the possibilities of
appropriation.
Strategic groups come into being where new possibilities for appropriation develop. In
Southeast Asia this process started with the implementation of colonial rule and the colonial economy
(integration in the world-market). Evers stresses that integration in the world market -- in his own
words: 'Kapitalakkumulation im Weltmasstab auf den Prinzipien kapitalistische Verwertung'- leads to
the development of new strategic groups. These strategic groups compete for the appropriation of a
part ofthe surplus that results out of the enlargement of production (Evers, 1988, p. 44).
Strategic groups are classified according to their economic type of appropriation (a typology of non-
economic types of appropriation has thus far not been developed).
1- These factors only start to play a role ina later stage of economic development anyway.
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Strategical groups follow two basic strategies:
1. Hybridization: Enlargement of the possibilities of appropriation into new fields by the
opening up of new sources of income.
2. The forming of coalitions, even ending up in symbiosis, by cooperation with other strategic
groups.
Both strategies lead, according to Evers, to a strengthening of class formation, which can be
understood as: The monopolization of social positions by means of the'control of strategic resources'
(Evers, 1980, p. 10).
The emergence, growth and decay of strategic groups is seen as a long term process. The same
is true for the changing configurations of cooperation and conflict between strategic groups
culminating in class formation. Both processes form the core of the analysis of strategic groups.
A strategic group which changes the political, economicand social environment for its own
use, through strategic action, demarcates the radius of action of other strategic groups in a later stage of
development. The hegemony of a strategic group can determine the political and economic system for a
long period of time (Evers, 1988, p. 12).
According to Evers, integration in the world market leads to the formation of strategic groups.
These strategic groups are characterized by the appropriation of surplus. Evers' theory about strategic
groups tells something about the way in which certain groups compete with each other for a share of
the social surplus, and about the way they do this: by moulding the political system in such a way'
that it fits their interests. However.the theory does not offer the instruments to detect the conditions to
be met by strategic groups, and the political system imperative for successful integration in the world
market. Evers only states that the conflicts between strategic groups have to result in class formation
and class struggle to make possible the necessary, totally new arrangement of economy , society and
rule (Evers, 1988, p. 59). With this remark he reintroduces the concept of class divisions and class
struggle, whereas the aim of the concept ofstrategic groups precisely was to-avoid this. In this way
Evers seems to reduce the role of strategic groups to a pre-phase of unavoidable class formation. This
takes him back to his starting point -- class theories and all the accompanying drawbacks: rigidity,
determinism, economism, etc. -- and it weakens the model precisely where its main strength should
lie: in the fact that it offers instruments to analyze societies which are not divided into two or more .
parts immersed in class struggles. Exactly where an explanation is mostly needed, namely an
explication why some countries succeed in combining integration in the world market with successful
economic development and other countries do not, he excuses himself.
" Nonetheless, with the help of a theory developed by Emest GeUner (1989), it is quite possible
to offer that kind of explanation.
Gellners starting-point is that there exists a fundamental gap -- in the political, social, cognitive
and cultural sphere -- between agrarian and industrial societies. According to him there is no
continuity, let alone some kind of a necessary historical development culminating in industrial society.
On the contrary, the industrial revolution was a coincidental and atypical process, caused by a
miraculous political and Ideological balance of power between groups within the non-economic
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segments of only one society (the British), exactly at a time where the technological potential was
availableand exactly at a time where at least some of theproducers were willing to exploit this unique
coincidenceof beneficial cognitive, ideological and political circumstances. The agrarian society is no
pre-phase of industrialsociety. It is a society whichcan exist for ever and which has no internal drive
to change into another kind of society. In fact, everything in an agrarian society militates against the
sheer possibilityof a fundamental change.
Industrialization not 0I1ly leads to a complete transformation of the society (see further on for
more details about the nature of this transformation), it also offers countries which have gone through
this process unmistakable economic, military and political advantages against countries in which this
process has not occurred.This was visible immediately after the industrialrevolution in England.
According to Gellner, industrialization has less to do with economic needsand the desire to raise
the standard of living of the population -- with the exceptionof the countries in Western Europe and
the United States -- than with political and militaryconsiderations: it is an effort to reach equivalence.
This is certainly the case in theso called developing countries.
Thailand is in this respect a good example. The first initiatives in Thailand towards
modernization and industrialization were taken in the second half of the nineteenth century, at the same
time as in Japan. The transformation was clearly imposed from above, in the process of which clearly
distinguishable groups out of the elite played a decisive role. The underlying reasons were clearly
political and military: the fear of being overrun by the colonial powers and the wish to control the
wholeof the nominallysubjectedcountry.
The ideasof Gellner link up with thoseof Barrington Moorejr., who investigatedand compared
causes of and roads to industrialization in the United Kingdom,France, Germany, Russia, China and
Japan (BarringtonMoore, 1966/1974). BarringtonMoore also concludes that the industrial revolution
in England was an unparalleled historicalevent and a clear historicalbreakpoint, the result of a kind of
balance of power between various groups which had the political and economic power. He also
concludes that industrialization was everywhere of a form aboveordainedprocess,except perhaps in the
United States. In the first industrializing countries, the United Kingdom and France, the industri-
. alization went on so smoothly (notwithstanding the fact that it was accompanied by revolutions and
harsh suppression .of large segments of the population) that it seemed to be some kind of natural
process. In Germany this was less the case; and in other countries investigated by Barrington Moore,
even more -- with theexception, as already mentioned, of the United States. Barrington.Moore couples
the 'naturalness' of.the process of industrialization and the political structure. He makes a distinction
between the democraticroad to industrialization (Western Europe -- with the exception of Germany --
and the United States) and the dictatorialroad (everywhere else). In the countriesof the last group, it is
a relatively small group whichenforces industrialization or tries to enforce it.
Gellner even goes one step further. According to him, the eccentric situation in England during
the period of the industrialrevolution -- the resultof specialand uniquecircumstances -- created a dual
illusion: the illusion that the economic sphere can be autonomous and independent of the political
sphere and the illusion that this situation is natural and that all other situations are a distortion of the
natural order.
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This illusion forms the core of classical capitalism. This vision created four other illusions,
also based on a reality not only historically conditioned and limited, but also ideologically branded as
natural branded presuppositions:
- the idea that there exists an invisible 'hand of the market' which regulates everything;
- the idea that economic development and democracy are a kind of Siamese twin;
- the idea that the destruction of a political order which is supposed to stand in the way of
economic development automatically leads to economic development (the catharsis of the revolution);
- the idea that models of economic development simply can becopied.
Industrialization is, however, no automatically emerging and developing process. It is set in
motion as a result of choices made. by and imposed from above by a small minority which holds
power. Its success is conditioned byhistorical and local circumstances and by the way these can be
orchestrated by the dominant groups. These circumstances and the strategies of the dominant groups --
out of which, in the course of this process, emerge strategic groups in the sense mentioned by Evers --
also condition the political, economic, social and cultural configuration in which that industrialization
takes shape. The 'magical hand' of the market and democracy are in no way necessary ingredients and
they are certainly not necessary prerequisites. If they are present, then they are not the causes (as
stipulated by, for instance, by the modernists), but the effects of those circumstances. The free market
mechanism and democracy only work in situations and places where there is only need for small
changes and where there already exists a great amount of cons~nsus about the necessary steps to be
taken ..
Thus, according to Gellner, whether or not, how and in which context and constellation
industrialization and certainly successful economic development take place is strongly historically and
locally conditioned, and hangs on the strategy of a small dominant minority.
The developing countries, labeled by Gellner as transitional states -- in my opinion a far more
fitting name -- are thereby in a particularly tricky situation. On the one hand, industrialization is at the
moment 'the big datum',the imperative imposed on all contemporary governments. On the other hand,
the industrialization process fundamentally demolishes the old social formations in developing
countries. This forces these societies to create a totally new social order, precisely in a time where, for
the first time in history, it becomes clear that social creation is impossible (a society is no creation of
the will). These countries face, therefore, an impossible task. Who are the ones who create and enforce
this new social order, or to use the words of Gellner: who are the 'ersatz-pre-social designers and
ratifiers of the Social Contract'? What are their models and tools? And who checks them?
Transformation towards an industrialized society seems the only possibility. But this does not
mean that industrialization is a necessary development: it is not the only possible development, not
even the most plausible or best realizable. To accomplish this transformation, specific prerequisites
have to be met and specific barriers have to be pushed aside. The chance that this does not happen or
only half happens is very great because the choices to be made on behalf of this transformation are not
the most logical ones (logical in the sense of rational and in the sense of being in an even line with
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the course of events or the status quo). Industrialization, and certainly successful industrialization, is
therefore rather the exception, not the rule.
The strength of Gellners' theory is not only that Gellner begins his analysis where others end,
but also that he explicitly describes the political, social, economic, cognitive and cultural
transformations through witch agrarian societies have to go to change into industrial societies. These
are historically traceable and verifiable transformations.
According to Gellner, there is no place in an agrarian society for purely rational economic
behaviour only aiming at maximizing profit. Such behaviour would deny, in a disastrous manner, all .
other mutual considerations and relations which also form part of every agreement. Agrarian societies
are characterized by scarcity. There is only a relatively small, storable and easy to appropriate surplus.
The relatively small surplus can only support a small non-productive group. The majority of the
population lives in submission, totally dedicated to production. A threefold division into producers,
soldiers and clerks is characteristic for most agrarian societies. The dependence on a relatively small
surplus makes conflicts about the division of that surplus endemic and these conflicts have an in built
tendency to escalate. As a result, these societies are characterized on the one hand by an in built
tendency towards instability and on the other hand by the need for political and ideological stability.
Not change but exactly the opposite is the adage. The outcome of this paradox is that in most agrarian
societies there is a small group or upper-stratum, which tries to completely monopolize power and
lives by creaming off the produced surplus. But this group is continuously threatened by internal .
fragmentation because it has only limited means to organize its power effectively. The paradoxical
situation that stability is absolutely required, but is at the same time very labile and continuously
undermined by centrifugal forces, makes the role of legitimacy as the cement of society very large, and
with this also the role of those who credit legitimacy. It leads to a legitimacy which not only stresses
stability and the status quo, but even sanctifies them: in a world in which conflicts are immanent an.d
endemic, the norms and values to check them have to be stable and transcendent.
In such a world, the stimuli for economic accumulation are very scanty. Not only because the
.power-holders are inclined to appropriate all surplus and leave the producers only just enough to keep
on functioning, but also because in a society where political power dominates production, producers
and traders are inclined to convert their resources as quickly as possible into political power. The
producers and traders are forced to spend their gains as quickly as possible and the only 'productive'
ways to do this is to buy themselves into the ruling circles or convert their wealth into religious goods
in order to gain the support of those who credit legitimatization. This explains, by the way, why rulers
in agrarian societies tend to prefer traders who are religious or politically stigmatized, for instance the
Jewsin medieval Europe or the Chinese in pre-modern Southeast Asia. or the Indians and Lebanese in
colonial Africa.
In these circumstances the clerical-military elite always profits, one way or another. It does not
matter whether or not new members enter or old members disappear, it even does not matter whether or
not the whole composition of the elite changes periodically. The whole political and ideological
organization of an agrarian society blocks the use of the surplus for the enlargement of production.
Everything in an agrarian society blocks the pursuit of economic growth.
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. An industrial society, on the contrary, is totally based and directed at continuous economic and
'cognitive growth.
In an agrarian society, a productive strategy dominated by a purely economic principle is an
impossibility and even an absurdity, except for some politically and morally stigmatized and isolated
groups who, because of that, are easily manipulated and therefore useful and who have no other
opportunities. Economic motifs are indissolubly tied up with and subjectedto other considerations.
In an industrial society, the maximization of economic profit is the overruling principle. And
that principle can be pursued without being restrained by other considerations. Characteristic of an
industrial society is the dominance of instrumentaleconomic rationality (the pursuing of one or more
separable goals). An instrumental rationaleconomic mentality requiresan instrumentalrational attitude
against nature. The two go together and reinforce each-other.Themaximization.of economic surplus
requires the presence of a big and growingsurplus. How and where this was realized for the first time .
has been briefly mentioned above. The point to be made here is that a continuous growth of the
. surplus, in other words a total and endless expansion of the market to the extent that whole societies
and even the international social system are dominated by it, requires a continuous cognitive and
technological expansion. Such a cognitive expansion not only requires a vision that nature is
understandable and transformable, but also a societyin which the old politicaland ideologicalforces do
not block such a cognitive expansion. In other words, it requires that the old ideological and political .
powers who formed the cementof the agrariansocietyand are opposed to change out of self-interestor
convictionhave lost their preponderance.
The industrialworld is characterizedby a totally -- not gradually -- different division of labour.
In the agrarian world, the essentialdivision was that between specialistsin power, specialists in ideol-
ogy, and producers. Within the last group there could be made several subdivisions, but this was less
important. The fist division was the crucial one. It was stressed, formalized and ideologically under-
lined. In the industrial world, such divisionsare, on the contrary,denied or concealed. There is no for-
malized division between the rulers and the ruled. Those who rule the state have to claim to be repre-
sentatives of the people, in one way or another. They have to do that because they can derive their
mandate to rule from nothing else. The difference between them and the population is gradual not fun-
damental. An industrial society is democratic in the sense that the notion of a separate political-mili-
tary class is considered to be improper.Producers are no longer politically castrated. What is true for
power, for politics, is also true for cognition. In an industrial society, power is and can no longer be
the enclosed and privileged domainof a minority.In a societybased on continuous economic and cog-
nitive growth, nothing other than cognitive frontiers can be imposed on that which is knowable and
that knowledgeought to beshared by everyone. Completecommunication and complete mobility are a
sine qua non: knowledge has to be mouldedin a code comprehensible for everyoneand unequivocally
transferable, and the occupational structure will continuously have to change and be changeable. This .
requires an egalitarian society in which status is closely linked to one's profession and in which func-
tions and status are not frozen but in a flux; in other words: it requires a society in which there is no.
room for unchangeable casts, estates and classes. In this respect Gellners' ideas clash with those of
Evers.
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The binding element in an industrial society is culture. This culture has to allow everyone to
communicate with everyone else, and this requires cultural homogeneity. There is no room for
fundamental cultural heterogeneity and layering, so typifying and useful in an agrarian society.
Cultural homogeneity needs a culture which can beuniversalized, standardized and homogenized.
The for this purpose, most suited cultures are the so called high cultures; cultures based on centralized,
literate religions. Cultural homogeneity also requires the presence of a universal, homogeneous
education-system, ,based on writing, obligatory for all the members of the society. This culture has to
be protected and the transfer of this culture has to be effected by a centre, devoted to this culture.
As a consequence, the presence of a state in an industrial society is more than just a condition,
it is a necessary condition. This state usually has the form of a nation-state.
Anation is a group of people convinced of sharing the same identity (culture), and who live
within or strive at a political entity which contains all -- and only those -- who share the same
identity. Culture is the only, 'natural' condition for political legitimacy. Fusion of will, culture and
politics is the norm. Gellner calls this nationalism. According to him, nationalism is a product of
industrialization, the result of the need for mobility, communication, equality, or in other words, the
result of the need for a fusion of will, culture and politics.
Evers and Gellner both point out that integration in the world market of agrarian societies has
great consequences for those societies. Both stress the role of groups of the elite by the
implementation of the changes which accompanies this integration in the world-market.
However, Gellner points at a complication which Evers ignores: the fact that it is not enough
to state that the transformation of an agrarian society into an industrial society leads to the emergence
of new strategic groups, what is necessary, is to explain how, where and why these groups come into
being. After all, everything in an agrarian society blocks the coming into being of strategic groups
which contribute positively to the economic development of an industrial Society. It is exactly in the
differences between the political, economic, social and ideological conditions of an agrarian and an
industrial society that the core ofan explanation why some countries realize successful economic
development and others do not has to be sought.
Integration of an agrarian society in the world market has consequences for the structure of
power, inothe~ words, for the nature and composition of strategic groups within that society and for
their strategy. Evers sees changes in the way the surplus is appropriated. Gellners also sees changes in
the whole mechanism of the appropriation. .
According to Gellner, successful integration in the world economy requires that the
appropriation of surplus becomes subordinated to the enlargement of that surplus and that politics
becomes subordinated to economics. This reversal requires a strategy which is in blatant contradiction
with the strategy needed in an agrarian society. Furthermore this reversal leads to a strengthening of
precisely those groups which have a subordinated position in an agrarian society: the producers and
traders, whereby the later have the benefit of already possessing a productive strategy, dominated by a
purely economic principle. This especially applies to those groups which before had no other means to
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survive because they were politically and otherwise excluded and stigmatized, like the Chinese in
Thailand.
Yet, contact with the world market also hands over to the existing dominant groups the
instruments to stabilize, strengthen and even enlarge their power-position. The industrial world not
only offers unprecedented possibilities for economic growth, but also unprecedented possibilities for
the employment of effective political power and control. As a consequence, groups which are dominant
in an agrarian society -- and for that reason the first to be confronted with the demands of the 'new'
times and the ones which have to introduce changes undermining their own positions -- are inclined to
develop strategies aimed at taking over the useful elements but preventing fundamental changes, which
is what happens in many developing countries. The army, the police-force and the bureaucracy, the
means to enforce coercion and control and to appropriate surplus on a larger scale and far more
effectively then ever before, are (re)organized and strengthened. Such a strategy is devastating for a real
process of industrialization and modernization.
However, at the same time even this pragmatic and selective strategy results in the emergence
of groups with new own interests and new strategies, namely groups within the army, police-force and
bureaucracy. So, this process in the end undermines the position of the original dominant groups. But
it does not lead to a strategy aimed at the enlargement of the economic surplus. The strategy of these
new groups is still characterized by the primate of coercion and appropriation of surplus. The role of
production stays that of milk-cow for the ruling political elite. It offers no leads for enduring
successful economic development. These new groups with their 'new' strategies can live on, as long as
they succeed in creaming off the domestic surplus in an increasingly efficient way, in order to pay the
ever rising costs of their apparatus, by expanding their resources of income (hybridization) or because
they are supported by foreign knowledge and capital. At the same time, their existence is threatened by
internal fragmentation and above all by the fact that they are confronted with an insurmountable
problem of legitimacy. They stand with one leg in the 'old' world and with the other in the 'new'
world. This deprives them of the possibility to change their power into authority. The 'new' character
of these groups makes it impossible to refer in a credible way to the old 'sacral' legitimacy, while what
they strive at and do is also not reconcilable -- at least during a longer stretch of time -- with what is
considered to be legitimate in the modem world: the claim to further the prosperity and well-being of
the people, the nation or the country.
In such SOCieties, economic growth and restricted industrialization can occur, but the drive to
pick the fruits of that growth and to let political priorities (power and status) prevail above economical
priorities result at a certain moment in the transformation of the economic surplus ID political capital
and status. As a consequence, the economy is structurally deprived of the economic capital necessary to
generate economic growth.
Continuous economic growth is only possible if the pursuit of economic growth for the sake of
economic growth has become the basic principle of a society, at which all political acts and strategies
of the dominant groups are primarily aimed. If there is to be successful industrialization, then, as
Barrington Moore has accurately expressed: The commercial and industrial leaders must be on their
way to become the dominant element in society' (Bairington Moore, 1974, p. 424).
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It is a road with many traps. If this modernization process has not been halted at an early stage,
there emerges in most cases' coalitions between influential political dominant groups and/or persons
and important commercial groups and/or persons if and when traders and industrialists have gained a
certain power. This a decisive phase. When the emerging industrialists and traders are too weak and too
dependent to obtain real decisive political power, and instead throw themselves politically in the arms
of dominant political groups or the bureaucracy, it is likely that the process of industrialization will be
hampered or smothered.
(In Thailand, the 'local' business and industry are controlled by Chinese. In their ranks the ,
indigenous economic strategic groups have to be sought. The position of the indigenous Chinese and
their relation with the political power-holders has changed over time from dependency towards more
autonomy and interdependency).
In any event, such power configurations are the beginning of periods in which authoritarian
regimes are in power and inclined to cream off the economic surplus instead of stimulating the
employment of this surplus to increase the surplus.
This seems to be the common situation in most developing countries.
Such a development still can lead to successful industrialization, at least if the commercial
interests succeed in getting the upperhand. This kind of authoritarian regime can even be helpful in the
short run to economic development, as far as they eliminate barriers and suppress opposition.
However, to come to successful and lasting industrialization certain conditions have to be met:
- rationalization of the political order. A strong central state has to be established; with a
strictly defined territory, a uniform administrative system, and a sufficiently strong army and police
force. (A characteristic trait of most agrarian states is the lack of a central authority which can really
enforce its power in the whole of the nominally subjected territory: the real power of the central ruler,
bureaucracy and army are limited; power has to be based on personal bonds);
- the creation of new bonds of loyalty, which involve the whole population: loyalty in the first
place with an abstraction, the state, not with a person. Gellner calls this the creation of cultural
homogeneity. According to him, this cultural homogeneity is essential: societies which do not succeed
in creating the necessary cultural homogeneity will fall apart and form new societies and countries in
which this cultural homogeneity can be created or appears to be possibly created. The instrument to
realize this is a national education system and nowadays also the mass-media.
- the leadership has to be able to resist pressures and opposition from the top, from groups
within, the elite and the bureaucracy, by paralyzing or coopting these groups. It has to be able to resist
pressure from below, from the population (they are always forced into industrialization and have to
bear the load and pay the price). The government has to be autonomous to a great degree. (In Thailand
for instance, at least until recently, decisive parts of the bureaucracy operated almost autonomously:
the so called technocrats, responsible for macro-economic planning. Their independence and financial
conservatism prevented all kinds of open-ended economic adventures, but also blocked the possibility
for areal industrial policy, andthereby also limited the operating power of the government).
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The key problem of each transitional society lies in the fact that the social structure has to be
fundamentally changed, without being clear how this has to be done. (In most cases, western educated
people take the lead, but their models are derived from a totally different society and do not cope with
the demands of their own society).
The key problem of each authoritarian government is that while it might control the counter-
forces from above and below, itis at the same time, strongly inclined to preserve the old social
structures because its power is built on them. The only way out is militarism.
How this process. exactly takes shape has to be investigated for each country by means of a
historical study. Such a study continuously has to examine which groups rise to the surface, which
coalitions they form, how they deal with the above mentioned specific conditions and how bottlenecks
aretreated.
These emergent dominant strategic groups have to undergo some essential changes for
successful economic development to be possible:
- their structure and strategy can no longer, in the first place, be directed at the appropriation,
consumption and reversion of economic surplus in political capital, but has to be aimed at the
increasing of that surplus;
- economic thought and action have to dominate political thought and action: politics as the
servant of economics;
- the role and space to manoeuvre for purely economic strategic groups have to become
continuously greater;
- not segregation but integration has to be the main aim of strategic groups: the creation of
consensus between strategic groups and, at a later stage, more and more with new emergent and even
non-strategic groups. The mech~ism of the market (divisibility, calculability and negotiability) also
has to replace the mechanism of coercion in the social and political interaction; a more often then not
occurring problem in this respect is the fact that strategic groups frequently owe their 'comparative
advantage' and lead for a large part to their exclusion and seclusion.
- the power relations between and within strategic groups have to become more institutionalized
and less personalized. The difference between the strategy of persons (and groups of persons) and the
strategy of institutions and ,firms has to become more fluid -- for instance: firms as an extension of a
person or family (Chinese variant: Yoshihara, 1988; Redding, 1990; Wu, 1980); firms as independent
entities with all their own facets of life, enclosing culture and identity (Japanese variant: van Wolferen,
1989); and persons who purely function as. an extension of purely economic functions of a firm
(American-European variant).
In other words, in an industrial society, based on economic growth, all power has to be aimed at
or culminate in economic power. The essential junctions of power have to be found in the economic
sector and power has to be wrapped up in (state) institutions and (business) firms.
An essential task of a historical study is to investigate in what way and to what extent there is a
shift from the primacy of politics to the primacy of economics, or perhaps more appropriately, in what
way and to what extent does the discourse of power become an economic discourse.
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Specific for the economic development of Thailand (and the other 'little tigers' in Southeast
Asia) was -- as already mentioned -- the role played by the 'local' Chinese. They formed and form the
economic strategic groups. Thailand is unique in so far as the Chinese are no longer formally
politically and culturally excluded. This gives Thailand an advantage compared with, for instance,
Malaysia and Indonesia concerning the successful industrialization necessary -- as mentioned -- for
cultural homogeneity and space to manoeuvre economically and politically.
However the economic preponderance of the Chinese in Southeast Asia perhaps also explains
why the process of transformation towards a thoroughly industrialized society has been slowed down,
at least until recently. This has, in my opinion, rightly been stressed by Yoshihara Kunio (1988).
According to Kunio, the business elite in Southeast Asia consists of 'ersatz-capitalists'.
They are 'ersatz- capitalists' because:
- they are dependent of foreign technological and commercial expertise and make no efforts to
acquire this knowledge;
- they consist for the most part of Chinese which often form a separate and politically and
culturally stigmatized group within the society in which they are active;
- they are 'rent-seekers'.
Apart from that, they are, according to Kunio, also capitalists in an outdated sense of the word:
they do not know a separation between property and management
. The thesis of Kunio has met a lot of criticism. However, he raises, in my opinion, a
fundamental point, as far as the Chinese 'entrepreneurs' are concerned. This point is that 'the Chinese
spirit of capitalism', to paraphrase the title of a very interesting book about the mentality of the
Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia (Redding, 1990), was and is very strongly conditioned by the
long exclusion and seclusion of the Chinese traders and businessmen, even in Thailand where they are
no longer officially excluded. The Chinese had be economically successful to survive; other means
were not open for them. For that, they had work together with and for foreign entrepreneurship,
thereby keeping a low profile, because these foreigners were technologically, economically, and in
many countries everi politically, superior. Also they had to work together with and for indigenous
political strongmen, keeping 'a low profile, in order to avoid being stripped of their economic wealth.
Thus, they could only really trust their own family and kinship, the only circle or network within
which they could operate on not strictly economic terms. Finally, they had to be rent-seekers because
they never could know when the political and cultural exclusion and seclusion would be accompanied
by economic exclusion, or the approbation of their accumulated wealth by others.
These Chinese 'entrepreneurs' were not so much driven by purely economic motives: the pursuit
of surplus in ord~r to generate surplus, as by the desire to survive: generate money in order to survive,
money which could be very quickly made mobile and moved away.
. The point Kuniomakes very clear is that this mentality can be a drawback in an environment
where the generating of surplus is the dominant principle and has to be accomplished by long term
investments, technological innovation, professionalization of the management, aggressive marketing,
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active political lobbying, and selective cooperationon equal terms with competitors from all over the
world.
Conclusion
All authors stress the importance of -- in the words of Evers -- strategic groups for the
economic development of Southeast Asia. Some of them go even further and stress the importance of
strategic groups for the economicdevelopment of each transitional society -- which I support. Some of
them even hand over a model to describe and analyze the transformation of an agrarian society to an
industrial society in these kinds of terms,
On the basis of the existing literature, the process of transformation of Thailand can be
understood in this sense: according to all relevant studies, the political. and economic process in
Thailand is supported and even beared by strategically operating and mutual rival or linked groups.
Perhaps a description and analysis of this process offers a starting point to understand the process of
the transformation in other transitional states.
Conspicuously absent in this scheme are the common men and women, the people, the
population. This has its reasons. In transitional societies (transitional in the above mentioned sense
and direction), the people or population becomes, for the first time in history, a real factor of power,
even the fundamental of the legitimacy of each regime (with the exception perhaps of certain Islamic
states). But the process of transformation and the directionof it are not initiated and determined by the
people.The changesare imposedon them. The difference between an agrarianand a transitional society .
rests not so much in the fact that thesechanges affect all membersof the society, as in the fact that all
segments of the society are forced to change radically, without really knowing in what way. This
makes the people a fundamental factor of power, but not so much an active one as more a passive one.
In a transitional society, the population has initially no political voice and is unable to indicate in
which direction the changes should go (it is a total social transformation, imposed from outside and
from above). At the same time, the success of the transformation depends on the extent to which the
whole of the people of a country can be involved culturally, socially, economically and even
politically (which is not synonymous with democratically). A major -- in my opinion in most cases
insurmountable -- problem is that this kind of from above imposed development contains all kinds of
seeds for a great division within a society between the haves and the have-nots, whereas in fact,this
kind of development, based on economic growth, requires homogeneity, consensus, unity and equally
shared possibilities in order to continue, In other words, it requires exactly the opposite of this sort of
great divide. The worst thing to happen is the emergenceof a structuralcleavage within society, which
cannot be denied or bought off. It fundamentallyundermines the legitimacy and the possibility of the
above describedform of economicdevelopment in the longnin.
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The Environment for Entrepreneurs
Kenneth D. Ramsing, Timothy M. Bergquist, Gerald W. Fry
Entrepreneurs represent the largest group of companies--small businesses--in the world. They
usually start with an idea, an invention, or a perceived need. Entrepreneurs are mainly concerned with
the day-to-day operations of the business. Simply trying to survive keeps them busy each and every
day which generallyprecludes taking the time to stop and think about business environmental factors
or strategic issues.At the extreme, manywouldconsider it a waste of their valuable time.
Yet it is these very environmental factors and strategic issues that will most often result in the
difference between success and failure for a small business.Entrepreneurs can understand operating
decisions because they are involvedwith them daily. But withoutan understanding of the environment
of the country in which they operate or of the strategic issues involved in long range planning, they
place themselves in jeopardy. It is only if a small business person perceives there is ample time that
they will examine these factors and issues, but then only after they consider the operating decisions.
This "operations view" is the one most often taken by entrepreneurs, simply because they are
worryingabout daily activities.Regretfully, this is a backward approachto doing business. Before any
entrepreneurs consider beginning their business, they must first consider the environmental factors of
doing business and the strategic issues that must be planned. Failure to do so has closed many
potentially successfulbusinessesbeforethey hadan opportunity to prove their value.
Figure 1 : Entrepreneurial DecisionContext
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MACRO-ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL
LEADERSHIP ..... ...
HUMAN RESOURCES
... ... INFRASTRUCTURAL
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In this paper we present a three-stage approach to conducting small business activities. These
are applicable anywhere, but we will examine them for particular application in Thailand. Stage 1
involves an eight-factor environmental model, stage 2 presents a three-issue strategic model, and stage
3 concerns the operating decisions that entrepreneurs make. All three are linked together and
interrelated. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of our approach, the Entrepreneurial Decision
Context, and provides the framework for this paper.
1. Environmental factors 1
. .
A number of models have been developed in an attempt to evaluate and assess he reliability and
accuracy of business and economic conditions in developing countries. These include both quantitative
models and qualitative models-. Unfortunately, although these models abound, their use by
entrepreneurs has been limited, probably due to their abstractness, difficulty of use, and general
unavailability. The multidimensional interdisciplinary analysis which is described herein is relatively
easy to use and is more intuitively "comfortable" for entrepreneurs to use. Furthermore, many of the
models which have been proposed are Western models which are often inadequate to understand the
rapidly changing contexts in Asia developing country (Koppel, 1992).
While all of he approaches described above have their value, we do not find them adequate 0
assess rigorously the invesment and political environment in any particular developing condition. Such
basically Western models are inadequate to assess the complex conditions in a country such as
Thailand. As an alternative we would like to propose and then apply an eight-factor qualitative
framework for assessing a nation's investment environment and related political climate. These eight
factors are described as follows and illustrated in Figure 2.
The E-Factor: This factor is closest to the conventional models referred to above. It is a set of
key aggregate economic indicators such as rate of inflation, movement of exchange rate, rate of real
economic growth, level of inequality, demographic size, level of debt burden, and rate of savings and
investment. The goal is not to aggregate artificially and mechanically these indicators, but to present
them in a friendly way to provide a clear visual profile of a country's economic performance currently
and over time.
The strength of a nation's economy is the most crucial indicator for assessing its investment
environment. In the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s Thailand had one of the fastest growing
economies in the world. Its economic development policies were based on a competitive export-
oriented, free enterprise philosophy, and a strong private sector which provides the major push for
growth. Over the past thirty years, Thailand has undergone a dramatic industrial transformation from
1- Much of the material of this section has been taken from a working paper subsequently from which an article is
to be published (Fry G.W, Ramsing KD. Setboornsarng S., forthcoming).
2- For quantitative models, see Davies (1962), Gurr (1970), Davies (1971), Scott (1976), Taylor (1980), Scott
(1985), Coleman (1990); as an example of the publications of the Association of Political Risk Analysis, see
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (1983); for qualitative models, see Haner (1985),
Porter (1990), De La Torre and Neckar (1988), Choudhry and Tankersley (1989).
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an agriculture-based economy to a mixed agriculture-, industry-, and service-based economy. In the
1960s, Thailand believed import substitution would spur development, but since the 1970s, the
emphasis has shifted to encouraging the growth of industries that manufacture goods for the export
market. The averagereal growthin GDP during the 19608 and 1970swasalmost7% per year.
Figure 2 : An Eight-FactorOctagon Model for Assessing InvestmentEnvironment
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The economy slowed down to an average of 5% in the ftrst half of the 1980s due to the oil
shock that triggered a worldwide recession. The Thai economy, however, bounced back and reached
take-off stage in 1987 with a 9.5% growth rate, and peaked in 1988 and 1989 at 13.2% and 12.3%
respectively. The growth declined slightIyto 10% in 1990 and 8% in 1991. Despite the overall
sluggishness of the world's economy as well as the adverse impact of the May unrest in Thailand,
economic growth is still expectedto reach a respectable 8% in 1992.There was, however,a decline of
earnings from tourism,one of Thailand's main foreign currency earners whichcontributesroughly 5%
of GDP, and the sector most adversely affectedby the May, 1992,military crackdown.
Underlying this remarkable Thai economic performance was the growth of exported
manufactures, foreign investment, and service. The growth in exported manufactures far outstripped
the export of traditional agricultural commodities. The share of the manufacturing sector in GDP
. increased from 12,5% in 1960 to 25,2% in 1990.Meanwhile the agricultural sector declined in share
from 39,8% in 1960 to 14,2% in 1990.During the first eight months of 1992, imports were up only
2,6% from the previous year, whileexports increased 15,2% (Handley, 1992).
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Despite the rapid growth of exports; the even greater growth in imports of capital goods for
industry resulted in a negative balance of merchandise trade. Earning from tourism and remittance
from oversea Thai workers, however, have been sufficient to maintain a positive overall balance of
payments. The country enjoyed one of the lowest external debt service ratios among developing
countries, standing at 10% in 1991 down from 22,7% in 1985. Inflation was kept under control
averaging only 3,7% between 1982-1991. The baht, tied to a basket of currencies dominated by the
US. dollars since 1984, was remarkably stable for the past several years.
The above.data actually reflect a low risk investment environment. The economic data over
time (shown in Table 1) for economic growth and trends in the Thai baht currency are analyzed with
respect to extent of variance, as an empirical measure of risk. The MIT economist, Lester Thurow,
places a strong emphasis on exchange rate stability (Thurow, 1992). Both for the period 1970-1991
and for the more recent period, 1985-1991, the coefficient of variation for fluctuation in exchange rate
is a remarkably low .108 and .025 respectively. The coefficient of variation for economic growth is
somewhat higher, .49 (for 1985-1991) and .43 (for 1970~1991), but still these figures suggest some
stability in economic growth patterns.
Historically ,most international investment in Thailand has been concentrated in the primary
production sector for local consumption. But from the 1970s onward, Thailand began aggressively
attracting export-oriented manufacturing investments, emphasizing industries that employ domestic
labor and utilize local resources. In the early 1970s, the major sources of international capital were the
United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany. However, in the 1980s, the pattern changed
significantly. Besides Japan, more advanced Asian NICs, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and even
Singapore, are fast becoming important investors. Between 1970-1989, Japan accounted for 39.6% of
net foreign investment in Thailand, while the United States accounted for 20%. In 1990, however,
Japan represented 44.5% of the total while the United States' share dropped to 9.3%. Meanwhile Hong
Kong accounted for 12%, Taiwan for 11.4%, and Singapore for 9.5%. The top investments are
industry (46.5%), trade and services (38.3%), electrical appliances (17.3%), financial institutions
(6.1%), and chemicals (6.9%) (BO!, 1991).
The major factors in Thailand's attractiveness for foreign investment are its low wages and an
abundant labor force. Wage rates are among the lowest in Asia. In Bangkok and six neighbouring
provinces, the minimum wage is $4.52 per day. Unionization is quite limited; only about 2.8% of the
industrial labor force, which accounts for less than 12% of Thai workers in 1990, was unionized
(Bureau of Inernational Labor Affairs, 1991). Strikes and labor unrest are extremely rare. The
country's labor force reached 32.7 million in 1992, according to the latest statistics from the National
Economic and Social Development Board-'. The low wages of the basic work force per se do not mean
competitiveness nor a positive force in attracting industry. The Thai work force is young, trainable,
and productive relative to wages. The special Thai skill in the manufacture and assembly of micro
products may derive from their centuries of experience in producing highly aesthetic silk and
3- Direct communication with the National Economic and Social Development Board.
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· handicrafts (Ketudat, 1984). Thailand is now one of the world's major producers of electronic
bearings, computer hard disks, and telephones(BOI, 1992).
Table 1 : Key EconomicIndicators
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991'
Population 36.4. 41.9 .46.7 51.7 52.7 53.6 54.5 55.4 56.7 57
Pop Growth Rate (%) 3.2 2.8 2.1 2.4 2.3 1.7 2 1.7 1.5 1.5
GDP Per Capita (Million US$) 401 526 771 1,014 1,063 1,165 1,319 1,478 1,626 1,650
GDP Growth (%) 6.9 7.7 4.8 3.5 4.9 9.5 13.2 12.3 10 8
Labor Force (Million) NA NA NA 27.1 27.3 28.6 29.5 ,30.3 31 31.8
Exports FOB (Million US$) 686 2,177 ·6,449 7,059 8,803 1,595 15,781 19,824 22,790 NA
Export Growth (%) 16 31.1 NA -3.8 24.1 31.7 36.1 25.6 15 NA
Imports FOB (Million US$) 1,148 2,850 8,352 8,391 8,415 2,019 17,856 22,772 32,520 NA
Import Growth (%) 0.75 10.3 NA -9.1 0.28 42.8 48.6 27.5 42.8 NA
Trade Balance (Million US $) -462 -673 -1,902 -1,332 388 -424 -2,074 -2,948 -9,730 NA
Over Balance of Payments -82 -51 -206 105 714 945 2,596 5,029 NA NA
Manufacturing as % GDP 14.7 17 18.1 22.7 20.6 24.1 24.9 25.1 25.2 26.1
Debt Service Ratio (%) NA 17.10 17.50 22.70 20.60 17.10 12.90 10.50 10.10 10.00
Exchange Rate (Baht; US$)' 20.8 20.38 20.48 27.16 26.3 25.74 25.29 25.7 25.59 25.22
SET Index NA 84.08 124.67 134.95 207 284.94 386.73 879.4 612.86 765.21
Consumer Price Index (%) 5 6:52 19.70 2.40 1.90 2.50 3.80 5.40 6 5.70
Saving Rate (%) 22.07 22.69 20.01 19.40 20.10 24.50 28.60 30.20 30.40 NA
Net Foreign Investment
(Million US$) 43 86 189 294 263 351 1,106 1,778 2,443 NA
Sources: National Economic and Social DevelopmentBoard, Bank of Thailand, Board of Investment,
SecuritiesExchange of Thailand, International Financial Statistics Yearbook
The P-Factor: This factor refers to a country's level of political development.Usually this term
is defined in Western, ethnocentric terms, with an emphasis on regular free and fair elections as a
mechanism for the transfer of political power and the selection of political leaders. Certainly, this is
usually the perspective of U. S. and European entrepreneurs. We believe that the entrepreneur must
consider the political development more broadly than is often the case. Actually we define this term
/ much more broadly to include such important dimensions as the way a system treats dissidents, its
approach to handling grievancesand insurgencies, the openness of its opportunitycomplex and access
to elite positions, its restraint in the use of arbitrary force, its treatment of minorities, its sense of
national unity and pride, and finally the liberty it provides its citizens to pursue their economic
interests and activities with minimalconstraints,
There are several alternative perspectives for interpreting and explaining Thai political devel-
opment. The prolific Thai political scientist Likhit Dhiravegin uses a circular model to explain Thai
political change (Dhiravegin, 1986).He sees the events of coup, constitutionalpromulgation, election,
conflict, and crisis as a vicious circle which repeats itself over time. The surprising political events in
Thailand in February 1991 and May 1992 certainly support Likhit's perspective. Also consistent with
Likhit's view is that of the former regent, politician, prime minister, and intellectual, Pridi
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Banomyong, who used the Buddhist concept of annijang (impermanence) in describing Thai politics
(Banomyong, 1972).Pridi himselfwas the politicalvictimof such impermanence (Stowe, 1991).
A competing Westernperspective is that of the linear model of political modernizationand de-
velopment. As Thailand develops economically and educationally, its politics will develop concomi-
tantly and there will be a maturing of Thai politics as it grows beyond coups and crises and the mili-
tary learns not to intervene in civilian politics.Recent Thai political events, particularly the February
coup of 1991and the militaryviolenceof May 1992,must lead to a serious questioningof overly sim-
plistic linear western models. A possible middle groundbetween these two perspectives is that of the
model of a spiral, incorporatingelements of both the linear and circular perspectives. Though events
such as coups, new constitutions, and crises do repeat themselves, over time there is movement to
higher planes of political consciousness and awareness. The remarkablepeople power display in May
1992 reflected a level of political consciousness, particularly among the middle classes and business
sector, that was unprecedented in modernThai political history. The bold decision of the Thai speaker
of the parliament (Dr. Arthit Urairat, a political scientist) in June to appoint the civilian Mr. Anand
Panyarachun as prime minister instead of the military'scandidate is a dramatic case in point. In turn
Anand's decisive move in August, 1992,to remove from power the key military leaders responsiblefor
the May crackdownalso demonstrated this new level of politicaldevelopment (Tasker, 1992).
If political development is defined narrowly in terms of the criterion of elections as the
exclusive means for the transfer of political power, then Thailand's level of political development
remains low and its system unstable. Such a view is, however,ethnocentricand highly superficial. In
reality, the Thai polity has many important elements of stability which persist despite the "Buddhist
impermanence." These central elementsof stabilityare a revered monarch; a professional and talented
civil service; a sense of nationhoodand strongnationalidentity; a tendencyto move toward the middle
path in response to extreme movements to the left or right (Ketudat and Textor, 1990); a military,
which despite its occasional abuses, contains progressive and professional elements; a far-sighted
approach to the treatment of dissidents and Insurgencies; and a flexible pragmatic bamboo foreign
policy and diplomacy.
The L-Factor: While highly subjective, this factor of the quality of leadership is extremely
important for the entrepreneurbecause it often impactson the way that business will be conducted, the
progressivenessof the management team, and the way that the country will view development. This is
a broad factor including the qualityof the presidentor prime minister, of key business and government
leaders,and of a broad range of technocrats responsible for a ~ide varietyof developmentprojects.
This factor must include the assessment of (1) the King and royal family, (2) partisan
politicians, (3) militaryand police leaders,(4) technocrats, (5) the business leadership, (6) government
officials, and (7) intellectualsand academics. To a large extent, it is the. leadership of the country that
will determine the politicaland economicenvironmentin which the entrepreneur will have to operate.
An assessment of this factor is often overlooked by the entrepreneur because there is' a sense that
nothing can be done about the macro climate. In many countries, the entrepreneur has actually joined
the "leadershipcircles" to imposeconsiderable influence.
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The B-Fahor: The entrepreneur must seriously consider this factor which refers to the
bureaucracy of a country. It requires an analysis of the bureaucracy's efficiency and effectiveness and
whether or not it is plagued by pathology. Further, it is important to know if the bureaucracy can
respondin timely ways to requests and needs, particularly of outsiders attempting to do business in the
country which is often the case with the entrepreneur. Central to this analysis is an assessmentof the
extent of pervasive and blatant corruption which adversely affects doing business in any given
country. Alsoof criticalimportance is thepromptness and fairness of the decisions which are made.
The "-Factor: This factor refers to the quality of human resources. Paramount to any
entrepreneur's success is the quality of the people. Ultimately, a business person will have to factor in
the quality of the human resource, either becauseof their direct involvement in the organization or
indirectly as a function of the nation in which theylive. A nation of unhealthy, illiteratepeoplecan not
be productive and competitive. Central to this analysis is the assessment of a country's basic
commitment to the development of quality human resources in terms of education, training, and
health. It is essential to determine the country's commitment to improving the quality of its human
capitalstock.
The recent Nobel laureate Gary Beckerand others have emphasized the critical importance of :,
human capitalin the development process (Becker, 1975). Jonathan Rauch,authorof a new volumeon
Japan, similarly stressesthecriticalimportance of human resources whenhe states:
My prejudice consists of the feeling that the most valuable and beautiful of all human
products is not material but intellectual: the stock of tested statements that constitute our
knowledge ... My prejudice is that making knowledge is humanity's most important endeavor,
and that to divert resources needlessly from this endeavor or misuse them is a shameful waste.
Similarly my greed lies in my single-minded insistence that we never know enough or learn
quickly enough....(Rauch, 1992).
Michael Porter in his major new book on competitive advantagealso stresses skilled human
. resources and the critically important role of universities in producing basic and applied knowledge
(porter, 1990).
Like manyof its Pacific Basin neighbors.Thailand has showna strong commitment to human
resource development. Thailand hasa long tradition of respectforeducation and teachers and a literate
culture dating back to the 14thcentury. Prior to modem reforms initiatedby King Chulalongkorn at
the turn of the last century, Buddhist monks served as teachers in a templeenvironment (Wyatt, 1969).
Teachersare highly respected throughout Thai society and therehas been a strongand growing social
demandfor education at all levels,including studyabroad.
The G-Factor: Most entrepreneurs undoubtedly take the factor referring to a nation's
commitment to "globalization and internationalization" for granted. Why else would they be in
. business unless they were interested in a broad enough marketplace so that their services and goods
can be sold? Of course, this maytake them merely to regional or subregional marketplaces.However,
the trend is distinctly towards globalization. This is truly the case for Thailand. The effective
development of a country's linkages with its regional and global partners and the nature of these
linkages with other economies becomes important in this analysis. Questions of whether or not the
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country is trapped in narrow dependentrelationsor if it has a broad array of international connections
plays an important role in assessing the nature of a nation's globalization. A nation's dependency on
the exports of only one or two products, or in contrast its success in diversifying its export products
.and markets and its openness to international investmentand the incentives it employs to attract such
capital inflows, are importantelements in any analysisby businessleaders.
Thailand has a unique position in that early on the country developed a commitment to send
studentsabroad for study, a strategyemphasized by King Chulalongkorn of Thailand in the late 1800s.
Currently Thailand ranks 14th among the nations of the world in terms of the absolute number of
students (6,630) it is sending to the United States for further study (Institute of International
Education, 1990). During the period between 1950and 1989, 1033 scholars from Thailand were sent
to the United States as Fulbright recipients alone. Thailand also has a been a major source of guest
workers for the Middle East, whose economic remittances have had positive economic effects,
particularly in certain rural areas (United Nations University, 1996). These people who have been
'educatedabroad now hold responsible positionsin all levelsof industry,government,universityaffairs
and the military. These are the people who are the country's facilitators of economic and social
developmentand whosedecisions have an impacton climatefor entrepreneurialenterprise.
Table 2 : The Diversity of Thailand's Export Markets
CountrY Valueof Thai Exports (lOOOs of Baht)
United States 111,756,000
Japan 87,860,000
Singapore 36,417,000
Netherlands 25,021,000
Germany 20,999,000
Hong Kong 20,189,000.
UnitedKingdom 19,099,000
Malaysia 14,934,000
China 13,880,000
Saudi Arabia 9,267.000
United Arab Emirates 8,510,000
Leadinz exnort markets in Latin Americaand Africa
Panama 3,095,000
Mozambique 1,938,000
Nigeria 1,553,000
Note: 25 Baht = $1.
Source: StatisticalYearbook Thailand 1990(Bangkok: NationalStatisticalOffice), pp. 259-269.
..Trade now represents 60 percent of Thailand's GDP and tourism is the country's major source
of foreign exchange. Reflecting the positive impact of such patterns, Thailand's real growth in per
capita income of 36 percent during the past four years ranks first in the world. In recent years, foreign
investment in Thailand has grown dramatically, contributing to such success. In May 1990, the
Chatichai governmentsignificantly liberalizedThailand's foreign exchange laws, contributing to such
economic internationalization (Corben, 1990). Also Thailand has aggressively opened new export
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markets in areas such as West Africa, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia (Tasker, 1990). Table 2
illustrates the diversity of Thailand's major export markets.
The I-Faeter: This factor refers to a country's climate for innovation, perhaps the heart of the
entrepreneurial spirit and success. The country's propensity to resist or block change, or the openness
to new ideas and approaches are critical dimensions in both the encouragement and the establishment
. of entrepreneurs. Questions such as, "are there incentives to encourage innovation?" and "is the nation
supporting the building of capacity for research and development which will enhance long-term
productivity and competitiveness?" are important benchmarks. For example, Singapore has been
investing heavily in a research center for artificial intelligence, indicating its commitment to long-term
research and development. Singapore also computerized its port activities with a highly innovative
tradenet system (King and Konsynski, 1990). Thailand has had a relatively successful climate for
innovations, often fostered by their excellent educational system. Currently, a number of businesses
and scientists are working with organization in the United States in a cooperative effort to develop
innovative activities in the genetic engineering, plant cloning, agricultural products hybridization, food
byproduct development, wood product development, and agriculture.
The CoFactor: This factor assesses a country's communications and physical infrastructure
including such dimensions as port facilities, telecommunications, and roads. In today's global
environment, communications for the entrepreneur is of critical importance. The Southeast Asian
country of Laos, for example, would score extremely low on this factor, while Hong Kong or
Singapore, in contrast, would score high.
Regretfully, Thailand's economic expansion has far outpaced the infrastructure development of
the country. Today, the number of automobiles in Bangkok exceeds the population of the city in the
late 1960s with relatively little development of new roads to accommodate the increased traffic. With
the growth of the city's approximately 6.3 million population estimated at 4.5 percent annually (about
half of which is worker-migration from Thailand's Northeast) there is speculation that even with the
advanced development of the transportation system in Bangkok that the road congestion at best will
return to the already high levels of 1988.
Thailand has approved the construction of a new international airport southeast of Bangkok to
relieve the pressure on the current Don Muang airport. However, it is not expected that construction
will begin within the next ten years. Further, the country has developed an expensive deep water port
facility called the Eastern Seaboard Project. However, there are currently inadequate railroad
connections and highways to connect the Eastern Seaboard deep water port with Bangkok, the enter of
commerce for the nation.
. 2. Strategic Issues
Many entrepreneurs are so embroiled in keeping their organizations viable that strategy is not
even considered. However, without a strategic view of their business, they are not going to know
where their business should go to accommodate the change of the future. Stepping back and taking a
larger perspective is vital for success in any business, but even more so in small businesses.
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An excellentdefmition of strategy, given by Wickam Skinner, defines it "as a set of plans and
policies by which a company aims to gain advantages over its competitors." (Skinner, 1969).
Operating decisions are tactical ways to implement strategy. This definition keys on the idea of
"competitiveness". After all, any entrepreneur started business because he/she thought they could do
something or serve a need better than anyone else-the competition. If unsuccessful, it is the
competition that will put them out of business. Companies competeon the basis of four key priorities:
quality,price, time, and flexibility. Entrepreneurs mustbalanceall four to remaincompetitive.
A strategicapproach involves coordination and linkagebetween the production, marketing, and
finance functions. In small businesses these are often accomplished by one person--the owner or
entrepreneur. Most often he/she concentrates on one function at a time, without thinking of the
interactions with the other two functions. The strategies for accomplishing the productionfunction, the
marketing function, and the fmancefunction must support the corporatestrategy and coordinate with
each other. A carefully written documentor plan listing the company'sgoals and strategies is vital to
providedirection to a firm, that is, a holistic approach to strategy development.
There are three general strategic issues that must be considered: structural, infrastructure, and
integration. Each covers a part of the strategic arena, but together they provide a comprehensive
picture of a company's strategy (Giffi, 1990). Figure 3 graphically portrays these strategic
interrelationships.
Figure3 : Strategic Issues
Structural
/"..
Infrastructural • .. Integration
Structure: Structural Issues have been called the "hard," or "brick-and-mortar," issues
regarding facilities, capacity, technology, control,and materials. Each needs to beconsideredas a part
of the whole approach and not individually.
All entrepreneurs considerthe structural facilities that they will need for their business. But the
I
way it is consideredwilldetermine if this is an operating or a strategicdecision. The choice of location
and size selected must bebased on long-term potential, not just short-term operations. For example,
locatingin Bangkokor its suburbs insteadof in an outlyingarea will impactmany other factors within
the firm. Whether it will be a large facility producing many servicesand products or one focused on
specific products and services will affect activities for many years. Locking oneself into specific
operationswith no flexibility can seriously hamperany chancesof successin the future.
The long-range capacityof a facility must also be carefully examined. Simply acquiring a site
that has only enough capacity for current operations is very short-sighted. Most entrepreneurs are
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starting out small, but strategic thoughts of expansion must beconsidered early. In addition, the right
mix of temporary and permanent capacity must also be brought into the strategic equation.
Further, a critical consideration is the type of technology and equipment to be used. Most
entrepreneurs can't afford large capital expenditures, but they must, at the very least, be planning
ahead to when they will employ the latest technology to produce the goods or services they will offer
to customers. As Thailand increases its prominence as an industrial force in Southeast Asia, employing
modern technology becomes ever more important. (This strategy is closely aligned to the I-factor
discussed earlier in this paper.) Technology has been a key ingredient in economic expansion in the
Pacific Basin, especially for the four Tigers of East Asia: South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Taiwan (Business Week, 1992).
Integration : As an entrepreneur begins offering services either domestically or globally the
issue of integration is too often an abstract concept..At this point, the degree of control and vertical
integration that entrepreneurs can exercise is somewhat limited. The optionis generally that they must
rely either on suppliers, mostly within the country, for input materials or make their own. Emphasis on
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Just-in-Time (HT) techniques willIimit the number of
suppliers a company will use. Small businesses especially are dependent on their suppliers, so close
cooperation with them is essential for survival.
The type of materials systems entrepreneurs use will directly affect their operations.
Transporting, storing, controlling, and securing materials are all issues that must be considered from a
strategic perspective. Too often these aren't even dealt with, except in an after-the-fact manner.
Transportation in Thailand, especially in Bangkok, is a major concern due to the poor road system.
Infrastructure: Infrastructural Issues are usually the "soft" elements of corporate management
policies such as human resources, quality, planning and control, performance measurement, and
organizational structure. Each must be, carefully considered in regards to how the company will
operate and function. Most often these issues are only thought of after the small company ~ows and
begins to employ many people.
Regrettably, human resource policies in entrepreneurial companies are mostly ignored. All
activities are generally handled on a personal basis, between just a few people. But even here, the
implications of expanding and contracting the workforce must be considered. The skills, on-going
training, and education of employees must be considered and evaluated early in a company's life.
Usually the entrepreneur will handle this personally, but rapid growth can quickly make this
impossible. Thailand is fortunate to have a 91% literacy rate and a well educated and skilled
workforce, Nonetheless, engineers and technical staff are in short supply. Although there have been
recent attempts to organize, unionization is limited and strikes are rare.
Quality is one of the four key competitive priorities in today's global marketplace. It should be
uppermost in'any entrepreneur's mind as he/she starts and grows a business. Literature and knowledge
of Total Quality Management (TQM) principles and techniques are widely available today. Careful
consideration must be given to their effective implementation in order to be successful. Most
entrepreneurs think they can control quality themselves, but they must recognize that other employees
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may not have the same standards. A continuous quality improvement process is critical for small
businesses.
Planning and controlling the production of goods and services is most often regarded as a
operating issue. However, even here strategic thinking is needed. The type of production or service
process will directly affect customer's perceptions of a company's products. The type of process must
be carefully considered before implementation. Newer concepts of JIT techniques, constraint theory,
and flexible manufacturing require study to be properly implemented. What works for one or two
people most likely will not work when many people are employed in producing the company's
products. Haphazard implementation and lack of proper strategic planning will generally result in the
demise of a small company .
. Performance measurement is usually again a minor concern for entrepreneurs. With only a few
employees a policy can be easily set, usually after the company has been in business for a while. But
being. able to measure performance and rewarding it appropriately is important to retaining highly
qualified people. People need to be rewarded for doing a good job. They also like to be paid
adequately for work performed. Thailand currently is taking advantage of a relatively low wage scale
which provides it an attractive competitive advantage. But like most other nations moving to an NIC
status, this could change rapidly. The reward system becomes more critical in a global marketplace as
wages and salaries rise.
Organizational structure is probably the last issue considered by most entrepreneurs in the
infancy of a company. With a few employees, there is usually little worry about lack of
communication or span of control problems. In the small company, management resides in the
entrepreneur, per se. But in the longer-term the organizational structure often beco~es a real problem.
How the company is organized will ultimately affect it as it grows. Entrepreneurs usually do not make
I' great managers, thus necessitating a more formal structure. However, Thailand now has an extensive
program of management education and training and is developing schools where entrepreneurs can
learn to be good managers.
Integration: Integration issues involve linkages with elements outside the company to the
general business/government environment and inside the company among the various departments. In
addition it relates to the mechanism for adapting to changing circumstances. Careful consideration of
these elements making it possible to adapt and change which is vital for entrepreneurs.
External integration concerns relationships with customers, suppliers, and other companies.
Customers are obviously the driving force for any small enterprise. It is incumbent on the entrepreneur
to develop loyal customers to stay in business. Suppliers are becoming more important as an integrated
part of a business and thus close working relations with them is also critical. Most entrepreneurs deal
directly with customers and suppliers themselves, but as their company grows others will often assume
this responsibility. Thus, an established policy for dealing with them is needed. Strategic alliances..
both with companies within Thailand and in the global community, must be carefully considered.
Many companies in the United States, Japan, Europe, and Asia are looking for businesses within
Thailand with which they can cooperate to enhance their own businesses. Unfortunately,
communication, especially the phone system, is poor in Thailand and this can hamper cooperation
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efforts. Thailand's recent decision, however, to join the Motorola-Ied Iridium project may help the
country to leap frog into the next generation of telecommunications technology.
Internal integration in small businesses is usually not even considered. With everything done by
one or a few individuals, there may be little need to explicitly consider this; However, clear corporate
goals and appropriate strategies are required for success. Long range planning must consider
integration within the company so that as the firm grows it won't flounder due to lack of
. .
communication and understanding between people. Integration of product and service design and
production processes is usually done simultaneously in small businesses. However, as they grow, these
often become fragmented.
Adaptive mechanisms in entrepreneurial firms are based on the people themselves. Most
entrepreneurs are readily able to adapt to changing circumstances. A great many things are changing in
Thailand today, and the pace will only increase. Careful consideration must be given to ensuring that
as a business grows it will continue to adapt to new situations. Using a systems approach will help as
will a continual emphasis on learning new technology.
By considering strategic issues as a whole, an entrepreneur is taking a long-term view towards
his/her business. Entrepreneurs are close to the customer, so they will do whatever it takes to satisfy
the customer. In this regard, they are in the same group as world class companies who have a customer
driven strategy (Deming, 1982).
But just having a strategy or considering all the environmental factors is not enough by itself.
Linking these with day-to-day operating decisions is necessary to make the difference between success
and failure.
3. Operating Decisions
Successful entrepreneurs will have to spend a great deal of their time, energy, and resources on
making sure the business works each and everyday. But what about tomorrow? Will they still be
here? Of .course some will not. In general, those who do survive also link the previously mentioned
environmental factors and strategic issues with their operating decisions. Figure 1 at the start of this
paper illustrates this relationship. The environmental factors will influence operations in terms of
people, leadership, culture, and communication. The strategic issues will determine facilities, quality,
. organization, and relationships outside the company that affect operations. In turn, the operations of
many entrepreneurs will affect the environment, strategy, and the country.
Conclusion
The world today is very much different for entrepreneurs than it was even as recently as the last
decade, especially in new technology growth areas such as Thailand and Southeast Asia. Simply
concentrating on day-to-day operations is insufficient for the successful growth of a small company. A
careful corporate strategyis required combined with a consideration of environmental factors. We
have presented an approach for entrepreneurs to employ to enhance their chance for success. An eight
factor environmental model provides the framework for examining the factors involved in a macro
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country evaluation while a three issue strategic model considers long-rang planning' concerns.
Linkages between all three areas are vital for success today in small businesses.
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11. RURAL ENTERPRISES

Presentation
Most South East Asian countries have experienced the last two decades a high rate of growth
coupled with a rapid expansion of their external sector. All ASEAN countries except Singapore'and
Brunei engaged in a process of diversifying their agricultural production and exports.Theoreticallyand
empirically, the growth of exports has beenwidely recognizedas the key factor engineering successful
economic developmentand striking agricul":""aI performancein these countries. The recentemergence
of some South East Asian economies as highly dynamic exporters stimulated questions about the
underlying sources of export growth. Whether economic dynamism is externally driven or internally
generatedhas been widelydiscussed amongeconomists.
It seems to be that, as far as primary and food-processed exports are concerned, both foreign
demand and the relative price of exports compared to other major competing countries significantly
determinedSouth East Asian agro-foodexports.Nevertheless the evolutionof the internationalproduct
cycle explain a substantialpart of manufactured exportsof these fast growingeconomies. With the rise
in incomes and wages in Western countriesand Japan, some industrieswere relocated in Asian Newly
Industrialized Countries of first generation. But rising wages and loss of competitiveness in labor-
intensive commodities have forced these countries to move toward the production and exports of
increasingly sophisticated manufactured products, creating opportunities for second generation NlC's .
like Thailand and the People's Republic of China to greet those more labor intensive industries.
Moreover, a favorable investmentcode for the foreign investmentsallowed many countries, in
particular Thailand, to derive profitfrom the internationalization process of big Japanese, Americanor
European companies. The recent changes in the structures of the South East Asian agro-industrial
.complexes, denoted both a process of vertical integration, of horizontal diversification and of
internationalization. Their conquest of external markets,overcoming the weaknessesof small markets
has spread in a context of oligopolistic competition. The increasing openness of the economies has
created opportunities for these industries to benefit from the use of modem technology and modem
management approaches. Buta specificity of these big agro-industrial companies, for instance in
Thailand the Charoen Pokphand (C.P.) or Saha Pathanapibul Companies, is the fact that they are not
only the consequences of a delocalization of foreign companies but also of the dynamism of the
domestic capitalism. Sometimes decisive incentives from the State Departments have contributed to
technologicalacquiring. It was the case, for the developmentof Thai fisheries or of the Filipino shrimp
culture (M.N. Delmendo and J.A Llobrera) until 1989.
,The export-growth orientation has recently spread to some centrally-plannedeconomies of the
South Asian's area. The changes now taking place in these economies are in the line of economic
liberalization ald opening to the outside world. His difficult and maybe premature to come up with
precise estimates of theses changes. Two papers, from Xiaosha and Nguyen try to draw some lessons
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from countries that have embarked on the process of economic liberalization, namely China and
Vietnam. It is now widely recognized that central planning is singularly ill-adapted for agricultural
production. There is therefore an enormous potential gain in agriculture from economic liberalization .
in these countries. In Asia where the efficiency of small scale farming is obvious, there is an
immediate jump in output when central planning is dismantled. This has been the experience of China
since the late 70's. The more recent experience of Vietnam seems to confirm this view, with a spurt in
output and exports (rice particularly) as a result of current round of reforms, Among all the reforms
.taken on, the land allocation policy had a great influence on the agricultural performance, However the
initial spurt maybe difficult to sustain and whether the present economic reforms in Vietnam will lead
to a,long-lasting growth remains to be seen.
The growth of Thailand's external sector, especially the natural resource-based industries, is the
most recent visible change in the Thai economy. The high level of exposure on the international
market had important implications for the agricultural sector's overall performance and structural
change. In terms of product diversification, there has been' a continuous trend to increase the
importance of processed food exports over primary exports, grouping numerous export items including
canned fruit, canned se~ood, frozen fruits or vegetables and others. The agricultural sector played thus a
crucial role in the development process, not only acting as a reserve of labor force to meet the
increasing demand of the manufacturing sector, but acting too as an engine through the expansion of
the food processing industry.
In Thailand land under cultivation has been expanding faster than labor until the late 1970s.
This has been the fundamental source of comparative advantage of Thai agriculture. As land has
became scarcer from 1980 onwards, its comparative advantage in crop production has declined as shown
by the drop in the share of agriculture in exports and the correlative increase in the share of
manufactured exports. The crucial issue of land abundance versus land scarcity is widely discussed in
the paper of P. Phelinas. Increases in the area under cultivation due to population pressure, shifting
cultivation in remote areas, expansion of upland crops in response to new export opportunities have
been the primary factor responsible for the growth of agricultural output 'and export. The dramatic
increase in land use has been possible only at the expense of forest land. Deforestation thus largely
explain why the nation's average farm size has not decrease over time and that prominent concentration
of land ownership and correspondingly high level of tenancy is not observed. This fact has many
important ramifications since farmer's relation to the land, its control and use are essential factors in
their entrepreneurial behavior. The main effect of lack of secured access to land is to cause uncertainty
regarding the benefits farmer can obtain from investment he may undertake, and is expected to be
positively related to farm productivity. Output and agro-food export's growth, thus, occurred largely
through the clearance of forest land by an increasing number of relatively small farms, lacking often
full and unrestricted land rights.
. The strong growth of agricultural output in South East Asian countries has usually not enabled
the agricultural sector to absorb the increasing labor force, nor to provide year-round employment for
the farmers and their families. The growth in the agriculturallabor force, in the face of limited capacity
of agriculture for labor absorption has created a strong demand for off-farm employment, a "push"
factor in the rurallabor markets. In Southeast Asia available evidence suggest that farm households are
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highly dependent upon off-farm activities for employment and income. The income sources are highly
diversified, and non-agricultural sources of income are sometimes sizable. This issue is addressed in
several papers: D Kermel-Torres and P Shar in India an Northeast Thailand, J.Y. Weigel in a contextof
land speculation in the case of the shrimp farming in Thailand.
The availability of relatively attractive off-farm jobs opportunities acted as a "pull" factor. This
availability extended to a wide range of employment types, ranging from rural or agricultural-related:
employment to include urban-manufacture jobs. The demand for "hired" labor within the agricultural
sector has increased for two main reasons: first, as the rural economy became more monetized, the
transaction costs has been reduced by using money instead of inter-household labor debt; secondly, the
rythm of agricultural work has become more synchronized and the labor requirement higher with the
use of new varieties (higher yielding or pest resistant) and the extension of irrigated I~d leading, to
substantial increases in cropping intensities. The widening of off-farm jobs opportunities to non-
agricultural sector has been partly possible through fast growth of manufactured exports accompanied
sometimes by decentralization of these export-oriented manufacturing enterprises (in textile
particularly). But the importance of domestic demand mainly generated by growth in per capita
incomes in the rural sector itself should not be minimized.
The development of non-farm enterprises in rural areas is viewed by Kong Xiaosha as one of t~e
more promising approaches for stimulating rum employment in China. Expansion of the rural non-
farm enterprise sector has offered the potential of an economically viable method of providing
employment for rural households, supplying consumption needs to the local community, raising
agricultural productivity through provision of inputs, and thus reducing the pressure to migrate to
crowded urban areas.
The sectorial analysis of Thai fisheries shows the existence of very differentiated production and "
marketing systems. The dual structure of Thai marine fishery is an illustration of the coexistence of
various types of production system, this of coastal shrimp production in Mekong Delta introduced by
Nguyen Anh Tuan and Nguyen Than Phuong is an other one. This dualism reflect the various
entrepreneurship rationales, which allows the maintenance of extensive systems as shown by J.Y.
Weigel in the case of the shrimp culture in Thailand. The restructuring of the fishery sector is
accompanied with more autonomy of each type of production unit (big companies or small scale
operators), .and with more important linkages between them, including the subordination of family
households to large enterprises for instance.
The linkages between rum small scale operators and large companies in the fisheries sector are
ambivalent. In the one hand, they could indicate the control of some parts of the chain of production
by an indirect process (for instance by the subcontracting) which might be analyzed as a substitute for
vertical integration. Subcontracting allows a quicker adjustment to the movements of the demand and
avoids for the big companies too high internal transaction costs. But in other hand, the subordination
of the small operators to the large enterprises is sometimes accompanied by a strengthening of the first
ones, showing the interest for the big companies in the use of an important part of the rural farming
population. The use of this working population is less costly because of the preservation of lineage or
quasi-wage earning relationships.
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·Self-governed or linked to somelargeenterprises, the rural small scale operatorstook part in the
recent growth, as their numberand their part in the value added creation testify to it. These operators
are often organized on a family basis, releasing low profits and self-subsistence yields. But they
sometimes managemore important enterprises of which the main goal is to maximize their profits and
which implementa workingout technology thanks to an important investment and employ a sizeable
staff-of wage-earners. The recent changes of the" structures are linked to a significant capital
accumulation which allows the small enterprises to do new investments, leading to an increase of the
enterprise size and a real conversion in the working out technology and laborrelationships.
The changesconcerning the small scaleoperatorsaffect the modesof employmentand of labor
remuneration: the evolution could lead to the wage-earning generalization,or at the opposite to the
maintenance of untypical modes of employment and labor remuneration. This upholding is often
connectedwith the necessity of a higherworking force flexibility.
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Rural Township Entreprises: Choice of Industrialization
Course for Developing Agricultural Countries
Kong Xiaosha
Introduction
. As an element of the rural non-agricultural economy, rural enterprises have fully manifested
their vitality in the course of industrialization in developing agricultural countries. They have
contributed dramatically to the industrialization of these countries. The road of agricultural
development to achieve income through high commercialization that has been taken by nearly all
countries of ASEAN has been one of diversification and a foreign oriented economy. The exceptions
are Singapore and Brunei, whose natural resources and geological conditions are particular.
With statistical figures, this paper describes the growth of rural enterprises in the countries of
ASEAN and China, as well as its effect on the state economy. The economic and social factors that
affect the growth of rural enterprises are analyzed and the experiences are summed up. The author
suggests that rural enterpris~ managing non-agriculturalproduction are undoubtedly feasible in the
course of industrialization for developing agricultural countries with a dense population.
1. The Experience of ASEAN Countries
1.1 The Agro-Export Model
All ASEAN countries are engaged in a process of diversifying their agricultural production and
exports. In Malaysia, the monoculture of rubber has been turned into crops such as palm oil, coconut,
cocoa, rubber and timber. In Thailand, the former monoculture ofrice has been changed. Crops, such
as corn, rubber, sugar-cane, bean, and new activities (poultry, animal husbandry and fishery) have been
developed. In Indonesia, coffee, oil palm and timber are exported. Fishery, animal husbandry and
poultry has also been developed. In the Philippines, coffee, oil palm, banana, pineapple and cotton
have been developed since the 1970's. A large quantity of coconut, banana and pineapple have been
exported. Fishery, animal husbandry and poultry are also developing rapidly.
. Nevertheless, for these four developing countries, the.share of agricultural output in the national
output and the proportion of agricultural exports in the total exports value have shown a tendency to
decrease. This, however, does not mean the decline of agriculture; the relative growth of agriculture is
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still of essential superiority in the economic development in these countries. In 1961-1987, the
average increase of agriculture in Thailand was over 4.2%.
1.2 The Importance of Non-Agricultural Activities
In many Asian countries, non-agricultural activities through rural enterprises have developed
rapidly. A large number of enterprises connected with the primary processing of agricultural products,
building materials, foodstuffs, farm tools and materials, furniture, household handicrafts, and'
transportation of agricultural products and commodities have grown rapidly in rural areas.
In India, one fifth of the labor force (16.5 million people) were employed in rural industry, with
an annual output value which took about one fourth of the total national income (77.8 billion rupees)
in 1989. In the Republic of Korea, there were 1,734 rural enterprises in 147 rural industrialization'
promotion zones (RIPZ) employing 257,000 people in. 1989. The proportion of non-agricultural
income for peasants is actually 40%. In China, 92.6 million people were employed in rural township
enterprises in 1990, which took 22.1% of the total rurallabor force and 16.4% of the total labor force.
The annual output value of these enterprises (958 billion yuan) took 59.l % of the total output value
of rural communities and 24.6% of that of the whole nation. In the Philippines, a 1% growth in
agricultural output is related to an increase of 1% in the employment rate of rural non-agricultural
activities (FAO, 1990).
1.3 The Impact of RuralEnterprises on Labor Absorption and Incomes
The development of the non-agricultural economy has paid a very important role in absorbing
rural surplus tabor, in widening the income sources of peasants and in changing uneven urban and rural
development. Small enterprises and household handicrafts have been able to absorb more labor than
large scale enterprises, and their output of unit fixed assets has been much more than that of large
enterprises (Zhao Wenlieu, 1992).
Thus, the pressure of excessive urban population density has been lightened. This has produced
a cushioning effect on the strained urban phenomenon. The social trauma caused by rapid urbanization
has been avoided. In 1987, the urban population took 21% of the total population in Thailand. This is
much smaller than that in some countries of Latin America, such as Chile, Brazil and Mexico, where
their urban population took 70-80% of the total population (WORLD BANK, 1989).
Because of the development of rural township enterprises, the life of peasants has been
improved. The process of agricultural growth and exports diversification has resulted in an increase in
peasants' income. More and more workers are being employed for the processing of agricultural
. products, transportation, and buying and selling of commodities in the countryside. As the income of
peasants has increased, the expenses for agricultural equipment, intermediate inputs, maintenance of
farm tools, as well as current consumption articles has also increased.
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2.. The Chinese Experience
2.1 The Contribution of Rural Enterprises to National Industrialization
After the reform and the opening to the outside world of China in the late 70's, the government
established a series of encouraging p?licies so that rural enterprises grew rapidly in the 80's..From
1980 to 1988, the total output value of rural enterprises registered an annual average increase of
33.2%. Its proportion of the overall social output value rose from 7.7% up to 26.0%. The amount of
tax paid by rural enterprises to the state registeredan annual average increase of 31.4%. Its proportion
of the state revenue rose from 2% up to 12.8%. In 1990, the account of foreign exchange created by
rural enterprises was $ 13 billion; taking 23.7% of that of the whole nation (Chinese Agriculture
Almanac, 1991).
From 1980 to 1988, the rural enterprises share of the increase in national output was 31.3%;
the proportion of the increase in industry was 35.9%; and the proportion of marketing or light
.industrialproducts was 45-50%. Between 1978 and 1988, the percentage of the total national output
increase contributed by rural township enterprises in various industries was as follows: 67% of raw
coal; 13.6% of electric power generated by small hydraulic power stations; 38.7% of cement; and
58.7% of paper making. In 1985-1988, the percentage of the increase in the n~tional revenue
contribu_ted by rural townshipenterpriseswas 50.9%.
Rural enterprises in the developed zones of East China grew more rapidly than those in
backward zones of West China. In 1990, the total output value of rural enterprises in provinces of
West China was 46.8 billion yuan, taking only one third of that in Jiangsu province which is in East
China (Chinese AgricultureAlmanac, 1991);
It should be pointed out that rural enterprises substitute for the state to cover some
expenditures, such as for investment in agriculture, the remuneration for employed rural labor, and
welfare services. In addition, rural enterprises generally grew without investment from the state and
only have a share in their own achievements. Therefore, the contribution made by them to,the state
revenue is "pure".
The increase of agriculturalproductivity marked a great decrease of rural surplus labor and an
increase of peasants' income. In 1986.1988, the contribution of rural enterprises to the increment of
peasants' net income per-capita was 43:5%. In 1988, the savings deposits of peasants' families in the
whole country was 20.5 times of that in 1978 (Ministryof Agriculture). Rural enterprises can provide
more jobs for the rural unemployed. This became an important force for upholding the stability of
society. If there were no rural enterprises growing rapidly, which have-absorbed nearly 90 million
people from the rural surplus labor pool, the situation facing us today would have been more serious
and moredifficult.
2.2 The Characteristics .of Rural Township Enterprises
Both private ownership systems, in the forms of collectives, households andindividuals,and
combined ownership of state-run enterprises with collectives coexist. Rural enterprises cover a wide
range of businesses, such as food processing, pharmacies, paper making, textiles and clothing,
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building materials, mining and smelting, farm machineryand vehicle repairing, machinery parts and
electronic elements production and assembly, etc., as welI as trade, transportation, and building
construction.
Many rural enterprisesare in cooperation with large or middle scale state enterprises and act as
workshops for some parts or assembly. Trade, industry and agriculture are combined. Manufacture,
supply of raw materialsand sale of productsare closely linked.In the east region, many rural township
enterprises have contact with some foreign trade departments and develop production for export. In
recent years, this foreignoriented tendency has been quiteevident.Somescatteredsmall enterpriseshas
been changed gradually into a link, or even the backbone, of export systems or bases in cooperation
with middlescale enterprises.
In China, there were4.63 millionworkers in rural enterprises in 1989engaged in production for
export. It was estimated that more than one million peasants took up the primary processing of
exports by means of householdhandicrafts. It was calculated that the income of the peasants from the
production of exports in the wholecountry was up to 6 billion yuan.
. .Most rural enterprises in the coastal area of China are foreign oriented. In the early 90's, the
domestic marketweakened and had to be compensated by the foreign market. In Zhejiangprovince, half
of more than 600 productswhich receivedawardsfor excelIence from either the State, the Ministriesor
the province entered into international markets. In 1990, there were 15,000 foreign oriented rural,
enterprises with a total output of more than 10 billion yuan. Rural enterprises in inland and remote
border provinces (or regions) are now striving to developexports. The quality of both enterprises and
their products is enhanced. According to estimated data, 60% of the nationwide patent applicable
technology has been adoptedby rural township enterprises.
2.3 The Constraints on ChineseEconomic Development
and the Role of Rural Enterprises
The restriction of insufficientfunds on economicdevelopment has been mitigated. China, as a
large and low income country in the course of industrialization, has two basic characteristics of
economic development. One is the exceeding lack of funds. Another is the exceeding ampleness of the
labor force. It is a key factor in Chineseeconomic development that the labor force should compensate
for the lack of funds to a certain extent. The Chineserural enterprisesare restricted by the low level of
rural incomes and the capacity of peasants' to accumulatefunds. Only the mode of production giving
priorityto the abundanceof laborcan be adopted.The employmentcapacityand the utilizationratio of
fixed assets in rural enterprises are larger than those of state enterprises. Therefore, a way of
compensating Jack of funds with labor force has been taken by rural enterprises.This accords with the
demandsof national development.
Before the 70's, the policies for the growth of rural enterprises had not been implemented in
China. The rural population was restricted and could not work on the move. The countryside was
isolated from cities. Consequently,as industrialization was carried forward the dual economic system
was enhanced. More and more rural surplus labor was detained in rural areas. The productivity of
agriculturealmost stagnated,even decreasesappeared. There were two extremes. One was agriculture
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with continuous growth of surplus labor and. continuous decline of productivity, the other was
continuously expanding industry supported by a high accumulation ratio. The consequence was that
high industrialization based on undeveloped agriculture and a low income per capita was brought about
too early. The national income was low. The most difficult problems ofeconomic development in
China were where to get money and how to deal with surplus labor. Under the old economic system,
these two problems had been puzzling us for several decades.
There are still ~any problems in the growth of rural enterprises in China. In some rural
enterprises, the level of technology. is low, the consumption of materials is too high, the quality of
some products is poor and serious pollution has resulted from the production of some rural enterprises.
The state has taken many measures to solve these problems, e.g., the scientific and technological level
in some rural enterprises has been raised through the implementation of the Star Programme and the
Torch Programme of the State. The government has also encourages rural enterprises in combination
with large or middle scale state enterprises to develop new products with new techniques in cooperation
with research organizations or universities.
3. The Conditions for Rapid Growth of Rural Enterprises
Based on the experiences, one of the main reasons for the rapid growth of rural enterprises is the
ability of production to join the international division of labor, or ability to sell products on the
international market. The development of exports and the exploration of international markets can not
only enlarge the market of commodities, but also promote technical innovation by rural enterprises.
In the late 70's, in China, the reform of the economic system was implemented by the State.
The conditions of agricultural production were improved between 1981 and 1988, the increasing speed
of mechanical power consumed in the places where rural enterprises were developed was greater than
the nationwide average increase. The electricity consumed in rural areas increased by 42%. The
consumption of chemical fertilizer, the area of effective irrigation and productivity all increased. From
1980 to 1987, the agricultural output per rurallaborer increased by 65%. The grain output increased by
166%. Rural enterprises have grown rapidly. This has supported agriculture. In recent years, national
investment tended towards industry and investment granted by the State for agriculture has been
decreasing. Under these circumstances, the funds derived from rural enterprises are a fundamental
support for agricultural development.
Attention paid by the State and state policies are other important conditions for the 'rapid growth
of rural enterprises. In the late 70's, the "Decision on the Problems of Speeding up Agricultural
Development" and the "Regulation on the Problems of Developing Rural Enterprises in Communes
and Production Teams" were published by the CPC and the State Government. It was proposed in
these documents that rural enterprises should have considerable growth. Planting and animal husbandry
should be actively developed. Agrotechnology and subsidiary products should be strenuously developed.
Agricultural and raw material industries should be set up. Teams of building construction,
transportation, loading and unloading, repairing, catering and other service trades should be organized.
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.Many preferential tax policies were established. The Financial Ministry published an
announcement on "Mitigating and Exempting Rural Enterprises from the Income Tax of Industry and
Commerce". These policies and regulations have supported and promoted the growth of rural
enterprises, and have paid an important role in providing the guarantee of legitimate rights and
guidance to the healthy development of rural enterprises.
Most of today's developing countries are agricultural nations with dense populations. In China,
the population is 1.3 billion. InThailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are burdened with
the pressure of a large population. In order to realiz~ industrialization under such circumstances, some
developing countries adopted in this century a policy of tending towards industry and ignoring
agricultural production and the demand of rural surplus labor for jobs. This resulted in a disequilibrium
between urban and rural development. Agricultural production stagnated, and many peasants poured
into cities. This resulted in many social problems which were very difficult to deal with. Some
countries, on the other hand, drew lessons from this and turned down a road of self-development of
agriculture. The agro economy flourished and a stable and solid foundation was provided for urban
industry so that the course of industrialization was promoted.
Conclusion
The diversified economy has brought a growth of industry, and commercial and financial
markets in rural areas in the countries of ASEAN, where the agro economy became vital. Incomes and
standards of living of agricultural populations have increased, and the condition of education has been
improved; At the same time, the pressure due to an excessive density of urban population has been
lightened so that social trauma resulting from too rapid urbanization has been avoided.
. Being affected by state policies, rural enterprises in China developed rapidly in the 1980's. The
development of rural enterprises in China was due to the disequilibrium between urban and rural
economic development and the low incomes of peasants, to a large surplus of labor in rural areas and
the limitation of funds, and the lack of.land and limited absorption capacity for rurallabor in cities ..
Since China is a vast territory, the speeds of economic growth and rural enterprise development
were considerably different in many regions. The contribution of rural enterprises to the
industrialization of China has not only promoted the economic growth of the whole country, but also
changed the integrative structure and operating process of the state economy. It has been possible to
narrow the gap between rural and urban economic structures in the course of the growth in order to
become extricated from the predicament of a dual economy.
Rural enterprises are an inevitable choice in the course of industrialization for developing
agricultural countries. This may bean enlightenment for us: In a large social system, the best overall
benefit can be obtained from the harmonious development of all-industries and trades.
54
Entrepreneurship Development Promotion under the
Impact of Agricultural Policy Reform in Vietnam
. Nguyen Xuan Nguyen
Introduction
Since 1981, Vietnam has been in deep socio-economic transformation. A lot of renovation
policies have been issued with the aim of promoting market oriented economic development. Within
the agricultural sector, rural households have been stimulated to take part in the production of
cooperatives: a system of piece-work has been used, replacing a system of working by norm.
Moreover, farmers have been allowed to own their production means which were formerly under the
cooperative's ownership. It is the first important step to break the egalitarian system of income
distribution that has existed since 1960.
Since 1988, farm households have been considered as independent production units replacing
former production cooperatives. Every rural family has been able to buy all the equipment it needs and
has the right to use their product as they wish and to run any activities.according to their abilities. The
services offered by cooperatives or other servicing organizations to farmers could be accepted on
negotiation between them.
For developing country like Vietnam where nearly 80% of the population lives in rural areas
and gets its livelihood mainly from agricultural activities, the impact of econ?mic reforms has been
tremendous. Rural society has been shifting from a self-sufficiency economy into a market economy,
and since 1988 Vietnam has changed from a food-importing country into a food-exporting one: 1.4
million tons of rice was exported in 1989, 1.6 million tons in 1990, and 1.1 million tons in 1991.
The main purpose of this paper is to show the impact of the main policy reforms on the
agricultural sector.' .
1. The Policy Reforms
1.1 Land Allocation Policy
Before year 1981, all cultivated land was under the management of cooperatives. Only 5% of
land was given to rural households for family consumption, but these areas had contributed 60% of
household income.
55
From 1981 to 1988, cultivated land had progressively been given (for one crop season) to .
working-teams or cooperative members but the production decisions were still taken by the
cooperative's managers. Since 1988,'allagricultural land, as wellas forestry land, has been allocated to
rural households according to the land resources in each cooperative, village or community and
depending on family size and production capacities. Agricultural land has been given to households for
5 or 10 year and forest land for 20 to 50 year periods. In the fishing sector, fishermen have been given
an area of water surface to run shrimpand crab cultures.Up to now 500,000 hectares of water surface
area havebeenallocatedto fish farmers.
The number of farm households in Vietnam has been continuously growing at an annual
average rate of 2.8% from 1978to 1991and there are actually9.6 million farm households. There are
6.9 million hectares of agricultural land in Vietnamand 19 million hectares of forestry land, of which
only 9.1 million hectares have been covered by trees.With the high growth rate of population, the
averageareaof landper household decreased from 1.86hectares to 0.74 hectares between 1978-1990.
Table 1 : Agricultural Land per Farm Households by Region in 1990.
Source:General StatisticalOffice, Statistical Data of Agncultural Development, 1991.
This policy of "giving land using rights to farming households" has guaranteed no landless
within the rural population, but the number of small proprietors has increased. Moreover, a
differentiation of land holding size has appearedfrom region to region. Thus, farm households located
in the regions with limited land resources would get less area of land than those in the region with
morelandresources.
In the Red River Delta and along the North Coast, farmers owning small plots are not able to
produce enough to meet the needs of their four or five person families. Attention should thus be paid
to entrepreneurial creation in thoseregions where land area per household is less than the country wide
average, in order to improvefamily incomes.
Land allocation policy has had a great influenceon productivity. Average rice yield increased
from 2.08 tons per hectare in 1980 up to 3.09 in 1990; maize yield reached 1.51 tons per hectare in
1990from 1.1 in 1980.Production of food crops (in paddy equivalent)per agricultural worker and per
capita improveddespiteannualpopulation growthof 2% during this period.
Number of households Azriculmral Iand area (ha.) Land holdinz size (ha.)
North Mountain and midland 1,540,700 1,209,000 0.78
Red River Delta 2,486,400 811,400 0.32
North Coast 1,414,400 756,500 0.53
South Coast 924,900 546,300 0.59
CentralHigh Land 290,000 375,900 1.23
North East of the south 560,000 8,000,000 1.42
Mekong River 138,000 2,441,900 1.14
Whole Country 9,359,100 6,942,200 0.74
..
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Table 2 : Production of Food Crops per Agricultural Worker and per Capita.
Source: General Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Data.
Year Kg.per worker Kg.percapita
1980 1018.3 288.4
1988 1028.2 307.2
1991 1187.8 320.8
.. . .
1.2 Credit and Price Policy
The price policy was changed only towards the end of 1988. The system of differentiated
\
consumer prices and low procurement food prices has been abolished. All production inputs and
outputs can now be bought and sold at market prices throughout the country; except electricity,
cement, steel and petroleum oil. Rural households can now sell their surplus in the market without
any constraint.
Before 1990, banks were not allowed to lend credit to independent households, but only to
cooperatives and state enterprises. Household demand for credit has relied on the informal credit market
with very high interest rate (10% per for monthly). Hence, many rural households are indebted and
some have to sell their crop before harvesting. The credit policy for farmers was promulgated in 1991.
One year later, 18% of rural households had borrowed from 0.5 to 1 million dong. All of these loans
were short-term loans but they have helped farmers to buy seed and fertilizer, pigs or cattle, etc. Most
of them have repaid in time. Unfortunately, poor households owning small area of allocated land could
not have access to this credit due to the lack of assets to mortgage.
Besides this, initiative of establishing self-supporting credit groups in villages has attracted the
attention of many organizations. In January 1992,20 self-supporting credit groups were established. In
Dong Song district, they have collected 230 million dong, 17 tons of paddy and 82 tons of fertilizer
from 181 members and lent it to 300 other households for a six month period with monthly interest of
7%. The results have shown that repayments were on time and many households have improved their
income or at least prevented a decline in income.
2. The Rural Labor Force Structure and Farm Households Incomes
2.1 The Structure of the Rural Labor Force
It is notable that during the past 15 years, the structure of the labor force in Vietnam has not
changed as expected. Inspite of government efforts to promote investment into industrial
development1, mainly into state owned enterprises, job creation has not met the requirements of the
increasing labor force.
1- Nearly 45% of annual government fixed investment has been given to industry and only about 20% to
agriculture of which 70% was for irrigation projects.
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Table 3 : Labor Force by Economic Branches as a Percentage of TotalLabor Force.
Source:General StatisticalOffice, AnnualStatisticalData.
The industrial workers share of the total labor force has .decreased. especially in the state .
industrial sector: in 1990, employees in state enterprisesrepresented 2.5% of the totallabor force but
3.4% in !979; the industriallabor force has slightly decreasedfrom11.2% of totallabor force in 1976
to 10.9% in 1990. Nearly 85% of the rurallabor force are engaged in agricultural production; 7.9% is
working in rural industrial sector and 7.2% is involved in service sector. The agriculturallabor force
has decreased too but still has the highest share of the totallabor force: from 68.6% in 1976 down to
58.5% in 1990. This does not mean that part of the agricultural labor force has moved to industrial
sector. Most of them have stayed in rural areas and run other activities like technical services, small
traders, handicrafts, etc.
The rural population has increasedby more than 13 million person from 33 million in 1976 up
to 46.7 million in 1991. Thus, the growth of the agriculturallabor force has been quite high: from
12.6 million people in 1976 up to 18.3 million in 1991.Urbanization has taken place very slowly and
the urban populationaccounted for 21.6%of the total Vietnamese population in 1990.
Year Azriculture Industry Other Total
Total State industry
1976 68.6 11.2 2.8 20.2 100
1980 64.2 11.2 3.0 24.6 100
1985 60.6 10.8 2.9 28.6 100
1990 58.8 11.2 2.5 30.0 100
1991 58.5 10.9 ·30.6 100
.. ..
Table 4 : Rural and UrbanPopulation as a Percentageof TotalPopulation (1976-1990).
Source: General StatisticalOffice, StatisticalData of Agncultural Development, 1976-1990.
Year . Rural nonulation Urban population
1976 79.4 20.6
1980 80.9 19.1
1985 80.8 19.2
1990 78.4 21.6
..
2.2 Pluriactivity of Fanners and Farm Household Income
In 1989, average monthly income per capita of rural households was 21,428 dong, of which
55.8% came from agricultural production, 6.3% from forestry and 24.7% from others' activities.
Income from agriculturalproductionof farm households in the Red River Delta and along the Central
Coast of the South, where land.area per capita is smaller than in other regions, has been lower in
comparison with others.
The distribution of rural households by main occupation shows that rice farmers have the
highest share among rural households (75%); 11.4% of rural households are non-agricultural
households and 13%havesecondary off-farm activities.
Rice fanners have lower income (19,567 dong per month) than rural households with non-
agricultural activities (25,133 dong), and non-agricultural households have the highest incomes
(35,885 dong). The distribution of rural households by occupation and income (table 7) shows that,
only 5.8% of rice fanners get high income, 60.1% of them fall in the sub-middle and low income,
categories. On the other hand, 29.2% of non-agricultural households belong to high income families
and only 4.2% of them are low incomes'ones. Non-agricultural households have thus higher incomes
than agricultural households. This is due to the fact that income from non-agricultural activities is
usually higher than that from simple rice growing.
The appearance of villages specialized in new occupations is one of the notable features of rural
entrepreneurship development in Vietnam. Some villages are focusing on one production activity and
their products are sold throughout country and sometimes exported. There are now about 200 villages
like this producing porcelain, pottery and earthenware; weaving silk; making iron construction;
producing malt, rice noodles, cassava or flour; making timber furniture; sewing garments: producing
alcohol; and pig breeding. Every village like that has created thousands of new jobs for themselves and .
for people in surrounding areas.
Table 5 : Monthly Income per Capita of Rural Households by Region.
Hoang Lien. HaNam Binh Dinh DacLac HauGianE Whole %
Son Ninh sample households
Rice Farmers 17,499 17,190 17,570 18,387 24,641 19,567 75.3
Fanners with
non-agric occupation 24,422 21,564 19,652 33,411 34,862 25,133 13.3
Non-agric households 42,982 30,583 22,634 43,815 ,35,046 35,885 11.4
High income 53,368 48,0~5 52,818 58,224 58,318 56,414 8.1
Sub-high income 33,635 33,857 34,160 34,116 35,263 34,526 10.3
Middle income 23,905. 23,753 23,867 24,144 24,987 24,251 26.5
Sub-middle income 14,319 14,908 14,779 14,828 15,770 14,923 45.6
Low-income 7,882 8,377 8,045 7,059 8,557 7;724 9.4
Whole sample 18,789 19,203 18,659 21,104 27,285 21,428
. Source: General Statistical Office (interview of 6,457 households m 5 provinces) 1989.
Table 6 : Distribution of Income by Source and by Region.
Hoang Lien HaNam Binh Dinh DacLac HauGiang Whole
Son Ninh sample
From Agriculture 60.8 54.9 49.5 65.1 53.5 59.7
From Forestry 15.5 0.4 10.5 11.2 11.2 6.3
From non-awe sources 8.5 30.5 29.1 16.6 31.5 24.7 .
From other sources 15.3 14.1 11.0 7.0 15.0 . 9.3
Total 100.0 100;0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: General Statistical Office (interviews of 6,457 households m 5 provinces) 1989.
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Table 7 : Distribution of Rural Households by Level of Income and by Occupation.
High Sub-high Middle Sub-middle Low Total
income . income income income income
Rice farmers 5.8 8.7 25.4 48.1 12.0 100.0
Farmer with non-agric occup 13.8 13.8 29.5 41.5 3.3 ·100.0
Non-azric households 29.2 19.1 25.6 22.0 4.2 100.0
Source: General Statistical Office (interviews of 6,457 households m 5 provinces) 1989.
During the transition period and in spite of many difficulties that new independent rural
households are facing, most of them express their support for recent economic reforms: 93.5% consider
that recent economic reforms are good and 49.7% expressed that their life has been improved since
renov~tion in 1989. My study on rural entrepreneurial development- has shown that 74.7% households
have engaged in new farm and non-farm activities, 4.3% are non-agricultural households and 21% are
rice farmers. 58.5% of rural households consider that their life has been improved, 30.3% have
explained that their life has not changed and 11.3% think their life is worse.
3. Constraints to Rural Entrepreneurship Development
New activities like bee-keeping, shrimp and crab culture, gardening, mushroom growing,
handicrafts, etc. have been stimulated and they have brought a lot of additional income to rural
households. A large amount of money has been invested in rural business. But due to unstable market
. consumption, many households have not been able to sell their products at profitable prices and many
of them have returned to cultivate some profitable cash crop such as tea, coffee, etc.
With low in quality and small quantity, the production of independent households is hardly sold
at high prices and some have to sell their products (especially winter crops like tomatoes, vegetables,
cabbage, potatoes) at under production cost. So instead of increasing production of these products, rural
laborers are trying to create other jobs: women specialize in trade and feeding livestock andpoultry:
men are making bread or becoming technicians maintaining services.
The creation of new activities has attracted new and young rural households, but due to the lack
of capital and skills most of them are still self-employed ~nd many are trying to leave the countryside
and to become wage-earners. The diversification of rural entrepreneurship could be improved if more
attention was given to the problem of the rural credit market. 40 to 70% of rural households consider
the lack of capital as the main reason for undeveloped off-farm activities.
Conclusion
In Vietnam, after four years of a market economy, independent rural households have
demonstrated their abilities to develop a lot of entrepreneurial activities despite many difficulties. It
2- Survey of 300 rural households realized in December 1992 on 5 villages of Van Mon district, Ha Bac
province; (60 km. north of Hanoi). '
60
could be hoped that in coming years, with assistance in training and extension from social
organizations, rural entrepreneurs will contribute much more to economic growth.
;
Agricultural production has maintained the largest share of the gross social product and national
income during the period of economic transformation, Almost all rural households are small farmers,
.the area of land that they have been allocated is too small to improve their income. With annual
population growth rate of 2% the number of farmer households will increase from 9.6 million to 11
million by the year 2000 and land area per capita will decrease rapidly. Therefore, despite wider
urbanization, the promotion of entrepreneurship within the rural population is an essential problem
that has to be considered now..
Experience has shown that stimulating entrepreneurship development within the rural
population is the most appropriate approach to improve rural household living standards and
promoting everyone's initiatives and efforts would bring a remarkable contribution to national
economic growth. It is difficult to predict how long the transformation from centrally planned
economy into market economy will take to complete, but economic reform in Vietnam during the last
ten years has been bringing better opportunities for development, especially in agricultural production
as well as in entrepreneurial activities in rural areas.
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Rice Entrepreneurs Facing Land Constraints
Some Empirical Evidence
Pascale Phelinas
Introduction
Thailand is still an agriculturalcountry with the agricultural sector employing 57% of the labor
force. The growth in agricultural production has been mainly due to a rapid expansion of the cultivated
land area (2,2% per year over the last decade). This dramatic increase has been possible only at the
expense of forest land, which decreased at a rate of 2,1%per year during the eighties. Of a total area of
320 million rai, 200 million rail are at least now being used for agriculture, It is now widely
recognized that the nation's land frontier has been approached and that land resources have become
increasingly scarce.
This fact has many important ramifications since farmers' relations to the land, its control and
use are believed to be essential factors in their entrepreneurial behavior, The agrarian structure and
especially land tenure can affect many "farmer-entrepreneur" decisions on farm investment, production
techniques, and thus farm productivity and income distribution. Some authors have pointed out that
the main effect of lack of ownership and secured land is to cause uncertainty regarding the benefits the
farmer can obtain from investment he may undertake. Thus, investment is expected to be negatively
related to the level of uncertainty regarding tenure (Feder, 1988; Onchan, 1985). Lastly, disparities in
land holdings usually coincide with disparities in incomes and access to other factors of production.
This paper will explore the patterns of land ownership and landholdings among rice farmers,
from a survey conducted in 1991 on a sample of 300 rice farms 2. Moreover, it will discuss many
beliefs about these patterns by examining the equality of land ownership, the occurrence of land
transfers (rents, sales, purchases) and the nature of landlord-tenant relationships. As far as possible we
will provide some insight into the trends of these patterns over time, based on historical series
available.
1- One rai is equal to 1600 square meters or 0,16 hectare.
2- The sampling method is given in annex.
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1. 'Population Pressure, Forest Depletion and Land Holding Size
The combination of a rising rural population and a land base naturally limited should lead to a
reduction in the average size of holdings. Although the labor force in agriculture grew at a rate of 2,9%
per year since 1970, the average size of land holdings has not shown any decrease over time. According
to the statistics of the Office of Agricultural Economics, this size varied from 25,6 rai in 1950 to 28,2
in 1990 and the amount of cultivated land per agricultural worker increased until about 1980.
There are two possible explanations for this trend. First, farmers may be able to compensate for
the lack of land due to population pressure by partitioning land 'unequally among their heirs. It seems
that common practice in Thailand has been to give equal rights to the land to children, although there
are some regional variations and sometimes preference for the child who takes care of the parents
(Sanit and Prisana, 1988). But with the gradual end of the land frontier, there is a tendency to give all
the land to one child mainly because "farmers are reluctant to divide their holdings below what they
consider economically viable sizes" (Mehl, 1986).
This would mean that the "excess" population is forced to migrate to places where there is still
some land available or to find wage earning work inside or outside the agricultural sector. There is no
clear empirical evidence showing a strong rural exodus nor a dramatic increase in landless farmers
(Stifel, 1976; Onchan, 1990). But in many cases the time devoted to non-farm and off-farm activities
has been adjusted according to the land available: as farm size decreased, off-farm work (and sources of
income) increased.
Migration has occurred on a large scale throughout the country and especially in the Central
Plain. It is thus obvious that the main factor that has offset the effect of population pressure on land
in the past twenty years is the depletion of forest land. From an area of 190 million rai in 1960, the
forest has actually been reduced to an area of 90 million rai, despite repeated measures taken to protect
forest. This result is often explained by the lack of coherent land policies and the large number of
agencies operating under different laws and regulations (TDRI, 1990). According to the Royal Forestry
Department, the annual rate of forest encroachment has slowed down since 1980 to 2,9 million rai
compared to 4,5 millions before. This fact arises mainly from the lack of fertile forest land to clear,
but also from the strengthening of protective measures.
The massive expansion in the land area under cultivation does not mean that the problem of
farm size is not serious in certain areas or for a substantial fraction of farmers. Although the mean size
of rice holdings (28,5 rai) is close to the national average, 37% of rice farmers are operating small
holdings of 15 rai or less. Marginal holdings (5 rai or less) considered as "near landless" holdings
represent 9% of total holdings. Region wise, the Northern region has proportionately larger holdings
than the Central Plain and the Northeast. The distribution of land operated is quite unequal: 66% of
farms operate only 36% of the land area.while the top 2,3% of farms operate 13,6%.
64
Table 1: Distribution of Land Holding by Size, 1991.
Farms Area
Size class (Rai) Frequencv Percent Cum Percent Rai Percent Cum Percent
< 15 111 36.9 36.9 1053 12.3% 12.3%
16 - 30 89 29.6 66.4 2039 23.8% 36.1%
31 - 50 71 23.6 90.0 2781 32.5% 68.6%
51 - 100 23 7.6 97.7 1522 17.8% 86.4%
101 + 7 2.3 100.0 1168 13.6% 100.0%
Total 301 100.0 8563 100.0%
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
Table 2 : Frequency Distributionof Land Holdings by Size and.by Province, 1991.
Size class SuphanBoo Pitchit Roi Et Total
< 15. 32 19 60 111
16 - 30 42 25 22 89
31 - 50 22 29 20 71
51 - 100 3 20 23
101 + 1 5 1 7
Total 100 98 103 301
Average rai 25.8 41.8 18.3 28.5
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
2. Concentration of Land Ownership: Land Sales and Land Purchases
If the average rate of population growth is the same among large and small landowners,
families with.initially larger land endowments would be better off than the others. Partitioning by the
smallest holders tends to produce holdings.too small to provide a living, pushing them into the circle
of debt. Some authors have argued that in an economic system based on private property, the demand
for credit leads to mortgages and the alienation of land from small cultivators to big landlords and
money lenders (Singh, 1988). Thus, disparities in the ownership of land should increase over time,
with the main cause of ~ownward mobility being land sales by smaller to larger owners.
The first thing that must be said is that there are actually very few large landowners among rice
farmers, and inequality in the distribution of land ownership, though it exists, is quite away from the
picture described above. Almost 16% of families own no land at all. Those owning less than 15 rai
(36%) account for only 13,3%of the area owned. At the other end of the scale, the 2,7% of households
that own more than 100rai account for nearly 19%of the area owned.
This pattern of land ownership prevails among the three provinces under analysis, though with
some variations: 11% of landless households stand in Roi Et against 55% in Suphan Buri. This
finding is consistent with the differences in growth of the rurallabor population, the lack of free and
cultivable land in the Central Plain (Ramsay, 1985)and, accordingly, the price of land. The percentage
of large own holdings is the highest in Pitchit : 65% of those who own more than 50 rai.
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Table 3 : Distribution of Land Ownership, 1991.
Farms Area
Size class (Raj) FreQuency Percent Cum Percent . Rai Percent Cum Percent
No land 47 15.6% 15.6% 0.0% 0.0%
< 15 108 35.9% 51.5% 968 13.3% . 13.3%
16 - 30 68 22.6% 74.1% 1499 20.7% 34.0%
31 - 50 49 16.3% 90.4% 1939 26.7% 60.7%
51 - 100 21 7.0% 97.3% 1493 20.6% 81.3%
101 + 8 2.7% 100.0% 1355 18.7% 100.0%
Total 301 100.0% 7254 100.0%
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
Table 4 : Distribution of Land Ownership by Province, 1991.
Size class SuphanBuri Pitchit Roi Et Total
No land 26 16 5 47
< 15 38 15 55 108
16 - 30 17 26 25 68
31 - 50 12 22 15 49
51 - 100 6 13 2 21
101 + 1 6 1 8
Total 100 98 . 103 301
Averazerai 26 42.5 18.8 ·28.6
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOMfield survey: nee farmers.
The change in the overall degree of concentration is not easy to assess since empirical data are
lacking. An interesting work on the Central Plain pointed out that there is no evidence that rural
conditionshad gravelydeteriorated duringthe twentieth century (Stifel, 1976). The rate of "involuntary
turnover" of land has not been high northe trend worsening. The ownershippattern did not worsen and
the rate of land losscausedby mortgages declined
During the survey, farmers were asked to report about their last land sale and purchase. The
distribution of land purchases among classes of land ownershipdoes not highlight any predominance
of big owners: 5% of those who own more than 101 rai purchased 16,4% of the total of purchased
land, the remainingpart being equallydistributedbetween size groups. But in relative terms the largest
owners (over 51 rail reported land purchases more often than those owning small holdings. Not
surprisingly, there is a positive relationship between the land actually owned and the average area
purchased, those owning more land havingpurchasedthe largest areas. This tends to indicate that land
purchase is a predominant means of 'personal farm land enlargement compared to inheritance. There
would be thus, a tendency for land to accumulate in the hands of wealthier families more able than
others to buy land.
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Table 5 : Distribution of Land Purchases by Size of Holdings, 1991.
Area owned Average area Percentarea Frequency Percentof Percentof
(rai) purchased purchased purchases size class
No land 20.0 2.7 4 4.2 8.5
< 15 7.1 4.6 19 19.8 17.6
16 - 30 13.4 13.2 29 30.2 42.6
31- 50 50.3 37.5 22 22.9 44.9
51 - 100 44.6 25.7 17 17.7 80.9
101 + 96.6 16.4 5 5.2 62.5
Total 30.7 100.0 96 100.0
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
Land sales were few. Almost50% were by farmersowningactually no land or less than 15 rai.
Thus, land sales are likely to exacerbate landholding inequality. Nevertheless, it is interesting to stress
that in relative terms the frequencyof land sales is slightly higher for big owners than for small ones.
One interesting question that often arises is the reason for the sale of land. Theoretically, sellers of
land would only be better off if they could earn a higherreturn from the proceeds of the land sale than
from self-cultivation or land rental. The supply of land for sale will thus be small where non-
agricultural investment opportunities for rural residents are limited. In that case, land sales must be
limited mainly to distress sales. The Agricultural Land ReformOffice (ALRO)reported problems with
buying land in the land reform areas due to the reluctance of landowners to sell land (TDRI, 1990).
Nearly 65% of land sales in our sample can be considered as distress sales of which 80% were from
farmers owning small holdings. The most frequent reason for land sales were loan repayment, and
secondly family needs.
Table 6 : Distributionof Land Sales by Size of Holdings, 1991.
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
Area owned Average Percent Frequency Percent Percentof
(rai) areasold areasold of sales size class
No land 14.3 13.8 6 16.2 12.8
< 15 11.9 22.9 12 32.4 11.1
16 - 30 19.6 28.3 9 24.3 13.2
31 - 50 23.0 11.1 3 8.1 6.1
51- 100 12.4 9.9 5 13.5 23.8
101 + 44.0 14.1 2 5.4 25.1
Total. 16.9 100.0 37 100.0
..
It is worth to underline the fact that 27% of those who sold land were transferring it to other
family members (close or distant).Converselynearly40% of the purchasesoccurred between relatives
and another third between neighbours; This result is consistent both with the pattern of land
inheritanceand the closing land frontier. When the plot inherited is too small to be efficient, "it is not
uncommon for one of the children to buy from the other siblings their fragments of the farm" (Mehl,
1986).
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3. Land Tenure: the Role of Land Rental Market
,
It is often believed that population pressure and concentration of land in a few hands tend to
increase the proportion of tenant farmers compared to owner farmers. However, among Thai rice
farmers, owners and tenants cannot be identified as mutually exclusive social classes. Landlord-owner
farmers refers to those farmers who rent out part of their holding and cultivate the rest themselves,
sometimes with.rented-in land. Owners are farmers owning all the land they cultivate. Owner-tenants
own at least a share of the farm land base while tenants rent in the total amount. Other farmers are
those who rent in freely some land from parents or those who rent out freely some land to their
children; this was observed in 12 cases and is usually equivalent to inheritance of land.
The level of tenancy is low: only 14% of households operate as full tenants, more than a half
own all the land they farm, about 21% have expanded their farm land base by renting additional land. A
few-farmers (7.3%) are able to rent out part of the land they own. The average area cultivated is the
largest among owner-tenant farmers (39 rai) while the smallest is among tenant farmers (2i rai), but
the dispersion is not very high.
Table 7 : Land Tenure, 1991.-
Suphan Pitchit Roi Et Percent % of area Average Arearented!
ultivated area area cultivated
Landlord-owners 12 2 8 7.3 6.5 25.3 53.2
Owners 35 53 74 53.8 49.5 26.2 0.0
Owner-tenants 25 22 15 20.6 28.3 39.0 53.4
Tenants 25 14 4 14.3 10.5 20.9 100.0
Other 3 7 2 4 5.2 37.3 0
Total 33.2 32.6 34.2 100.0 100.0
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
There is a danger to identify tenancy as an indicator of rural poverty. As noted by Stifel, "the
family's demand for land expands as children grow old enough to assist in the farm work (...) and
contract in the latter phase of the family cycle as both obligations and stamina decline". Renting land
appears as a method of farm enlargement or land access among those whocannot afford to buy land.
Conversely the farmer who has "excess" land compared with family labor will find it more profitable
to rent out land than to manage a large operation because of the scale of diseconomies arising from the
use of hired workers (in the sense that a daily paid worker has no incentive to work hard). Thus, total
area cultivated will depend significantly upon the size of the family more than upon the ownership of
the land. The rental market of land will tend to transform the pattern of ownership holding into a
distribution of operational holdings which more closely correspond to an efficient distribution.
Thus, owners who rent out their land do not necessarily join the ranks of the "unscrupulous
absentee landlord" as is often believed. The breakdown of tenancy contracts according to owner's
occupation shows that in 38,2% of cases, the class of non-operating owners have non-agricultural
occupations. They are usually merchants or civil servants. However, most of these cases concern
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Suphan Buri and are of minor importance in the two other provinces: Owners with agricultural
occupations repre~ent by far the most jmportantcase: 61,8% of the contracts and 63,5% of the land
rentedin. The largestshareof thecontracts hasoccurred between farmers (33%), and represents 26,8%
of the land rented.Pure landlords are renting 35% of the land, and the area rented by contract is high.
This last class appears to havea limited role for farmers whoneed to rent some land.
Table 8: Distribution of Tenancy Contracts by Owner's Occupation, 1991.
Suphan Pitchit RoiEt Rrequency Percent Averagerai %of
Boo ented land
Merchants 11 7 2 20 18.3 19.3 17.0
Civil servants 11 1 12 11.0 22.3 11.8
Others , 2 4 1 7 6.4 17.9 5.5
Nonagricultural 24 12 3 39 20.2 34.2
23.5 11.8 2.9 35.8
Farmers 11 13 12 36 33.0 16.9 26.8
Landlords 16 10 1 27 24.8 27.4 34.9
Agricultural 27 23 13 63 21.4 61.7
24.8 21.1 11.9 57.8
Total 54 36 19 109
50.0 34.3 15.7 100.0 100.0
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
As far as landowner-tenant kinshiprelations are concerned, data in table 9 distinguish between
rice farmers whorent in landand rice farmers whorent out land.The resultsare very similar for these.
two sub-groups. More than half of the contracts (56%) have been established between family
members: 14% between close relatives and 40% between distant relatives: Very few farmers are
renting land from acquaintances (13%) or people they do not know. As for land transactions, this
pattern of tenancycontracts is explained by the fragmentation of the farm in smallerand smaller plots
over time and correlated with thesharp increase of landprices. When purchasing land is too expensive,
the siblings who want to work the land rent in the other's holdings.
Finally,data on the location of the ownersof landcompared to the location of the land (thus of
the tenant)provide evidencethat absentee landlords has been limited in extent. More than half of the
owners live within the same district as the tenant they are involved with. Only two owners live in
Bangkok. This seems to supportthe conclusion thatThailand does not havean urbanrentierclass, and
consistent with the view that land has beenof minorconcern among the traditional elite becauseof the
veryfavorable land-to-people ratio(Kemp, 1981).
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Table 9: Distributionof Tenancy Contracts by Owner-Tenant Relation, 1991.
Farmers renting in Farmers renting out
Frequency Percent Average %of Frequency Percent Average %of
rai rented rai rented
land land
Close relatives 17 15.6 22.7· 17.4 2 9.1 40.0 16.1
Distant relatives 42 38.5 21.3 40.3 11 54.5 19.1 46.2
Neighbors 33 30.3 18.0 26.8 7 31.8 24.6 34.7
No relation 15 13.8 19.8 13.4 . 1 4.5 15.0 3.0
Other 2 1.8 23.5 2.1
(
100.0 100.0Total 109 100.0 21 100.0
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey .: nee farmers.
Table 10 : Distribution ofTenancy Contracts by Geographical Distance
between Landlowner and Tenant, 1991.
Owner-tenants and tenants Farmers rentinz in Farmers renting out
Frequency Percent Frequencv Percent
Same sub-district 43 39.4 5 22.7
Same district 15 13.8 6 27.3
.Same province 17 15.6 4 18.2
Same region 6 5.5 5 22.7
Different regions 26 23.9 2 9.1
Bangkok 2 1.8
Total 109 100.0 22 100.0
Source: CUSRI-QRSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
4. Land Prices: an Absolute Constraint to Land Property
Theoretically, the price of land is related to its productive potential over a long horizon. From a
practical point of view, the value of land is obviously related to a wide range of factors: productive
quality, availability of water, distance from market, title status, etc. During the survey, farmers were
asked to assess the market value of the land they own. It is implicitly assumed that land owners are
accurate in assessing the value of the land they own. This is true when the land market is sufficiently
active, as is confirmed in the case of rice land.
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.Tables 11 and 12 record the mean prices of land. The data are broken down by district and by
registration status. Land prices are indeed prohibitively expensive: the estimated value given by
farmers of their own land range from 61,000 baht per rai in Suphan Boo to 35,000 baht in Pitchit and
10,500 in Roi Et. Of particular interest is the effect of suitability of land for other crop cultivation on
the price of land. Anthropologists argue that farmers give their paddy land higher values than land
devoted to other crops because the central role of rice in Thai cultural and social life (Mehl, 1986).
This seems to hold true only for the twotamboens in Suphan Boo where rice land is worth more than
a mix of rice land and upland, but in Pitchit and Roi Et the opposite relation is true. These findings
are consistent with the fact that land values reflect the economic benefits which are generated by land,
since crops like sugarcane, cassava, maize.and fruit trees are highly profitable. In Suphan Boo, the
higher value of paddy land derives from year-round irrigation allowing double-cropping and avoiding
the risk of water shortage.
Table 11 : Distribution of Land Value by Secondary Activity (Bath per Rai), 1991.
Province Suohan Boo Pitchit Roi Et
District Yan Ya~ Kraseaw Taveam Taluang Mava Paiao
Rice only 62381 79286 22429. 30048 9963 10233
Frequency 21 7 7 21 27 45
Rice and other crops 59409 55087 32865 52500 12389 11250
Freauency 22 23 26 21 9 10
Total average 60860 60733 30652 41274 10569 10418
Freauency 43 30 33 42 36 55
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
Table 12: Distribution of Land Value by Type of Document (Bath per Rai), 1991.
Province Suphan Boo Pitchit Roi Et
District Yan Yao Kraseaw .Taveam Taluana Mava Pajao
Secure title 62122 60733 31143 43346 10682 10643
Frequency 41 30 28 39 33 42
Unsecure title 18500 10000
Frequency 2 1
Untitle 35000 27900 6000 9333 9667
Freauency 2 5 1 3 12
Total average 60860 60733 30652 41274 10569 10418
Frequencv 43 . 30 33 42 36 55
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: nee farmers.
It is eminently clear that legal title is an important factor explaining differences in land values.
In each tamboen, land with secure title (Chanot, Nor Sor 3, Nor Sor 3 Kor) is in some cases two to
three times more expensive than land with insecure title (Baichong, Sor Kor 1) or without any
document proving ownership of land. It is now widely recognized that ownership security enhances
capital formation by providing better incentives to invest and improved access to credit both from
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institutional and informal sources. The most important benefit of having a title is its use as collateral
for loans, since the incidence of eviction of squatter fanners in forest areas has been quite infrequent.
Conversely, title insecurity causes lower farm productivity due to lack of investment incentives and
limited access to credit (Feder and Others, 1988). Thus, as farm productivity is related to land
ownership security, titled land must have a higher price than untitled or unsecured titled land even if
"land markets tend to over-estimatethe social value of titled owned land while they under-estimate the
social value of untitled land (Chalamwong and Feder, 1985).
, As direct access to land comes about through individual ownership, the arrangements under
which land is rented define the conditions(thus the price) of indirectaccess to land for those owning no
land or too small pieces. Rental agreements vary according to individual circumstances and the major
form of tenancy contract is fixed-rent in kind. Fixed-rent in cash is more common in Pitchit than in
any other province. Actual rents are determinedby a large number of factors, including the quality and
productivity of the land, the availability of irrigation facilities, etc. Not surprisingly, land rentals are
higher in the Central Plain than in the Northeast.The average rental in cash is around 400 baht per rai
and per season with a relatively high degree of variation between provinces from 560 baht inSuphan
Buri to 250 bath in Roi Et. The average rental in kind amounts to 165 kg per rai, ranking from 182
kg in Suphan Buri to III kg in Roi Et.
Table 13 : Land Rentals by Province, 1991.
Kind Cash
First croo Secondcrop First crop Secondcrop
Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average
Province rent rent rent rent
Suphan Buri 44 182 33 181 13 559 11 565
Pitchit 3 125 27 344 5 158
Roi Et 12 III 5 254
Total 59 165 33 181 45 396 16 437
Kind : kg per rai
Cash: bath per rai
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: rice fanners.
Dry season rental rates are, on average, not very different from rainy season rates even though
the rainy season crop may have higher profit potential than the dry season crop. As far as the owner's
occupation is concerned, there is no evidence that landlords exploit their tenants (who in many cases
are relatives and friends) by charging rents above competitive norms compared to other owners.
Rentals in cash are more expensive when the land is rented in from fanners, but rentals in kind are the
lowest. As expected, agreed rentals are lowest under contracts established between close relatives and
the highest in case of no relationshipespecially when the rent is paid in cash.
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Table 14: Land Rentals by Activity of the Owner, 1991.
Kind Cash
First cron Second cron First cron Second crop
Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average
rent rent rent rent
Non agricultural 22 167 14 190 18 424 7 494
Farmers 19 149 7 184 12 426 3 392
Landlords 14 190 . 10 175 12 351 6 394
Unknown 4 139 2 141 3 294
Total 59 165 33 181 45 396 16 437
Kind: kg per nu
Cash : bath per rai
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: rice farmers.
Table 15 : Land Rentals by Relationship between the Fanner and the Owner, 1991.
Kind Cash
First crop Second crop First crop Second crop
Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average Frequency Average
rent rent rent rent
Close relative 7 143 5 150 8 309 1 500
Distant relative 24 173 16 172 14 318 4 251
Neighbor 17 171 9 214 14 445 8 430
No relation 11 162 3 200 9 509 3 730
Total 59 165 33 181 45 396 16 437
Kind: kg per nu
Cash : bath per rai
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM field survey: rice farmers .
.Conclusion
Land is the central factor of production in agrarian economies like Thailand: the entire rural
population (81% of total population) makes its livelihood from it. Hence, the income of this
population depends not only on the efficiency with which the land is used, but also on the distribution
of the land. There is thus a question of how the limited land is distributed among different groups of
the population. The objective of this paper was to examine the nature and the distribution of land
ownership among a sample of rice farmers and how they have changed over time.
It has been shown that inequality in the distribution of land ownership, though significant, does
not support the hypothesis that land is concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy landlords. Rather, a
continuous spectrum of peasant subclasses was found, ranging from full tenants to landlord-owners.
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Although big fanners may have been acquiring more land for cultivation, there is still no proof that.
land markets have strongly worked against small and marginal fanners rather than in favor of them.
There was no empirical evidence showing that a large number of fanners "had been pushed into the
ranks of the rural proletariat because of seizure of their land by unscrupulous landlords or speculators"
(Singh, 1988). Clearly, conversion of forest areas into'agricultural areas have helped to overcome the
strong population pressure on land.
Where tenancy is concerned, it is argued that this is a socially useful market response which
provides opportunities for a more efficient employment of family resources. Those owning "excess"
land compared to family labor will rent out land to those lacking land or enough land to earn an
adequate livelihood. There is thus a potential market for the rental of land, which would tend to make
operational holdings more equal and closer to optimal operational size than ownership holdings. This
does not mean that, on an individual basis, tenancy is a panacea and has nothing to do with poverty.
Land which is not owned tends to produce less income mainly because the access to credit, especially
from institutional lenders is impossible. Yet in the absence of land rental markets, the members of
households who cannot afford to buy land would be driven into the classes of landless laborers.
Whichever way the country is developing, land will continue to be a fundamental factor. Both
population pressure and the closing land frontier will continue to alter the agrarian structure, probably
toward a more inegalitarian pattern. When new land was continuously being brought into cultivation
this helped both to reduce the incidence of poverty and to sustain agricultural growth. Since vacant
land will no longer be available, the comparative advantage of agriculture will decline unless new
technology is brought in. If Thailand resists moving from an agricultural to an industrial base, the
supply of land will be exhausted and the economy will come up against grave difficulties to follow a
sustainable path of growth.
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ANNEX
Selection of the sample.
The sampling design of the survey proceeded from three guidelines.
First, the probability of learning anything about rice farmers' behavior is higher in those
regions with the highest percentage of domestic production. An examination of regional rice
production shows that over the ten year period of 1980 to 1990 the region of North-East and Upper
Central accounted each for 33% of total rice production, the region of North for 28%.
Second, what works in one location may not work in another, even in the same country,
because the ecological setting is different or because farm households face different constraints on their.
decision-making. We tried to find representative agroclimatic zones that are reasonably consistent
. internally and have significantly differentcropping patterns from zone to zone to capture all the
diversity the analyst can hope to cope with. Each of the three provinces selected are in different agro-
economic zones defined by the Ministry of Agriculture: Suphan Buri in Central Plain (rice,
sugarcane), Pitchit in the North (rice, soybean, groundnut, corn, mung bean) and Roi Et in the'
Northeast (rice, cattle, buffalo, kenaf, silk, cassava).
Third, sample size didn't have to be too large because of limited resources available. As a result,
the spatial focus of the study has been restricted to one province in each region. Therefore, a pragmatic
trade-off was made by which the most northern and northeastern sectors of the three regions were
discarded, as well as some provinces with specific characteristics.
Districts and villages were selected with the help of the provincial Department of Agriculture to
ensure that the zones of survey had not been affected by bad climatological conditions for the year
considered. Arandom sample of 300 farm household was then constituted according to the lists of
farmers available at the Department of Agriculture.The total sample divide into approximately equal
sized sub-samples of 100 farm household in each of the selected provinces.
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Entrepreneurship and Dynamics .of Rural Systems:
A Comparative Study on Southern India
and North-Eastern Thailand'
Doryane Kermel-Torres and Philippe Schar
For many developing countries, the prospects for the next few decades are very closely linked
with the evolution of their rural environment, both in its ability to meet the needs of the national
community, especially in relation to food, and in its diversification of activities. In two countries
which are apparently very diverse in many ways, rural areas and agriculture play a key role in
development. More than 70% of the population is still rural and just over 65% of the working
population are employed in agriculture.These two indicators, although they are fairly generalized and
may therefore mask some processes of multi-activity already underway, nevertheless show how vital an
issue diversification is, both for the evolution of the national economy and its relationship with the
international scene and also in relation to the growth of non-agricultural rural activities and "urban"
activities by workers who are maintaining a toe-hold in the country.
By entrepreneur we mean any rural actor engaged in a process of diversification for which he
owns some of the means of production (agricultural land, tools or machinery, livestock, etc.),
However, for those who can only contribute their labour, work on rural sites, or as salaried
agricultural, artisanal or industrial workers represent the only available opportunities for diversifying
their activity. For rural inhabitants facing insecurity and under-employment, these types of work either
retain them in rural areas or draw them into urban areas. Thus the definition adopted cannot ignore the
ambivalence of established dynamics which lead some actors to be both entrepreneurs in the sense used
here and also to resort to activities in which their role appears to be simply of an executive nature.
These aspects must be considered, in as much as they represent rural strategies and are the expression
of all-encompassing dynamics, resulting from processes embarked on by others, either entrepreneurs in
the private sectoror government agencies, in rural systems or further afield in regional or metropolitan
areas.
We have chosen to examine the entrepreneurial phenomenon in a comparative study, believing
that entrepreneurship reveals national contexts and social dynamics at work in two different societies
1- This analysis is the result of research carried out in collaboration with the Universities of Coimbatore and
Mysore in India and the University of Khon Kaen in Thailand.
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and more especially in what have been defined as rural systems2 . When we compare these areas
from different viewpoints, in an attempt to assess the processes that underlie the emergence of an
entrepreneurial dynamic, we must consider not only the specific characteristics of physical
environments, but also social and economic formations; all evolve and change under the influence of
external forces, especially that of the State and the market. North-eastern Thailand and southern India
are geographical regions; the districts of Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu state) and Mandya (Karnataka state),
and the province of Khon Kaen are adininistrative areas.
1. Opportunities for Entrepreneurship
1.1 Types of Diversification
The different systems chosen for this analysis are to be found at different points along a
diachronic scale of evolution, the elements of which relate to agricultural risk management, regional .
industrialization, diversification trends and openings onto national and international areas. All these
variables influence not only the intensification and capitalization of agriculture which can in turn
produce surpluses for reinvestment in rural systems, but also social and economic structures. By
comparing these areas and the different forms of diversification undertaken, and structuring them around
specific internal and external characteristics, we can specify the underlying dynamics. For these rural
systems, however, we could by no means reconstruct the past or attempt to predict the future simply
from observations made today.
The Coimbatore rural system bears the indisputable hallmark of industrial-style entrepreneurial
dynamics. From the beginning of this century, major landowners have diversified their activities by
investing surpluses in the building of factories. Initially based on the transformation of raw cotton,
this industrial activity, know-how permitting, has undergone diversification and specialization in
response to the requirements of industry and agriculture (Schar 1992). This exceptional trend must be
seen in relation to the very early opening up of this region to international markets. One effect of this
was the emergence, towards the end of the 19th century, of a speculative and, for that time, highly
capitalistic form of agriculture. In this drought prone area (mean annual rainfall about 600mm), the
cultivation of cotton has developed using irrigation from wells. This crop has provided large financial
surpluses. During the 1950's, sugar cane gradually gained ground over cotton, as electric pumps
became readily available. In this rural system, however, irrigation no longer produces crop
intensification, owing to over exploitation of the groundwater, and the cultivation of cotton has re-
emerged. As they were witnessing an increasingly uncertain future in agriculture and were once again
encountering agro-ecological risks, landowners with sufficient surplus have created more and more
industrial implantations within the rural system since the beginning of the 1980's, either producing
goods directly for the market or subcontracting for Coimbatore factories.
2- See Collective CNRS Research Project "Dynamique des systemes ruraux : les enjeux de la diversification.
Une approche des Tiers Mondes".
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The Pollachi rural system has an annual precipitation which is only slightly greater than that of
.Coimbatore (average 8oomm/year). The majority of rural investment is still attracted. by the
possibility of agricultural intensification using a dual irrigation system with wells and canals, the
latter being developedat the end of the 1960'sfrom a series of dams. Pollachi is an average-sized town,
where the industrialization process is partly associated with the deconcentration of activities from
Coimbatore. It affects mainly the urban and peri-urban areas and is considerably less diffuse than was
the earlier system in the heart of the rural areas. The groundnut, which was the main cash crop at the
beginning of the century, has now given way to sugar cane and coconut; especially the latter which
.requires less water and is less labour-intensive than the former (Schar 1989).In Pollachi, more so than
in the Coimbatore system, the wider range of agro-artisanal activities has given rise to medium and
small-sized units where coconut and sugar cane fibres are transformed. A striking feature of both these
rural systems is the shortage of labour, which is constant and not only during peak seasons of the
agricultural calendar. The functioning of the two sytems does not involve much migration beyond their
boundaries.Work-related mobility,on the other hand, is very well-developed,with pendular movement
for urban, industrial and construction-based work and circular movement for specialized agricultural
workers.
The rural systems in the Mandya district, while diversified in their own specific way, do
highlight banal entrepreneurial logics typical of the Indian context. Given the scale of rural
industrialization in the Coimbatore region, however, these logics are quite likely to be overshadowed
in the Coimbatore rural system. It was towards the end of the 1930's, with the introduction of canal
irrigation, that climatic conditions ceased to be a restriction for part of this pluvial rural system
hitherto suitable only for dry crops and with few possibilities for commercial agriculture. The
widespread growth of sugar cane, along with the installation in Mandya of a sugar factory, built with
public funds, introduced the land owners/growers to a capitalist-type mode of production. Nowadays,
the units wherejaggery (raw, unrefinedsugar, sold throughoutIndia) is produced and also sugar cane
production are still buoyant areas of activity, even for those among the land-owningclass who have for
decades drawn substantial profit. This profit however has not been put to use in the rural system in
entrepreneurialactivitiesother than agricultureor in those linked with agriculture,but has been directed
towards commercial activities in urban areas. For the well-to-dopeasants, agriculture still seems quite
profitable enough to give rise to a variety of diversificationactivities, depending on the availability of
labour and surplus funds, from public aid and the private sector, ranging from market gardening to
coconut groves, dairy cattle.to silkwormsbreeding.In the 1970's, the combined effect of irrigation and
widespread public incentives effectively opened up new prospects for this type of production. The
production channels, however, remain very clearly delineated according to both social differentiation
and segmentation of labour, thus restricting farmers to the role of producers of raw materials (cocoons)
while transformation operationsare reservedfor specializedsocial groupsin defined geographical areas.
As was the case in the Coimbatore rural systems, though on a much more modest scale, the
increase at the beginning of the 1970's in the availabilityof electric pumps in the Mandya pluvial mral
system (annual rainfall about 700 to 900mm) enabled some farmers to establish spatially selected cash
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crops, combining coconuts, market gardening and silkworm breedingf on a scale compatible within the
same system, and opening up the area to regional, national and even international markets. In this
system more so than in the preceding ones, the artisanal and service type of entrepreneurial dynamics
highlight traditional activities: small businesses, activities by specialized castes (blacksmiths,
launderers, etc.), mills for hulling cereals, brickyards, rope-making from agave fibres, etc. Little
innovation was forthcoming, however, under the combined effect of the low level of local production,
the industrial lethargy of the nearest urban centres and despite generous encouragement from the State
for the creation of small industries in rural areas. It is true that even for the most well-off and the most
innovative landowners, there has only recently been any available surplus. Productive investment
strategies are directed first and foremost to areas where the agro-ecological risk is of manageable
proportions, towards agricultural activities which are still considered promising. In both systems, the
preeminence of the agricultural sector governs job opportunities for some farmers and for landless
families. In the pluvial system, the different types of mobility, which indeed are governed by the
specific networks of each village do highlight the recurrence here and there of under-employment
(Landy 1992). The sugar-producing area of the irrigated rural system first fixes an immigrant
population, then mobilizes "local" labour, and attracts "specialized" seasonal workers from
neighbouring dry areas: but even here, agricultural diversification is not sufficient to maintain year-
long stability in job opportunities .
. . Throughout the 1970's, parts of the low lands of the Khon Kaen area were put under canal
irrigation. This led to intensification in rice-growing strategies and to agricultural diversification, but
there, irrigation did not have as much impact on the introduction of commercial agriculture as in the
Indian systems already described. In north-eastern Thailand, commercial agriculture dates back to a
much earlier period, in the 1950's, with much encouragement from the private sector and in an area
which was still isolated and marginal. Cash crops such as kenaf, cassava, sugar cane were factors
which stimulated agriculture to turn towards more international markets, and as these crops were grown
in accordance with the topographical features of the region, they are still appropriate there today,
whatever type of system may be introduced now.
In the Nam Phong system, those producers who were able to, brought in a succession of
different forms of agricultural diversification onto the irrigated land; abandoning one crop, maintaining
another, in accordance with fluctuations in the market and relations with the commercial and industrial
. sector. Some of the diversification initiatives which stand out for their innovative techniques are cattle
farms, and to a lesser extent, dairy farms, these with impetus from the Isaan Kiao programme, and the
production of vegetable seeds. Despite their different dynamics, these forms of diversification represent
a high level of integration into the vertical, commercial and transformation structures for rural
entrepreneurs who provide the labour and, depending on the sector, some of the inputs, land included,
which are necessary for the production of these goods. This is a vital feature in all systems, irrigated or
not, and linked as it is with the specific features of social and economic formation and the limited level
3- In. this system, silkworm breeding, as here defined, cannot be considered as a diversification strategy'
except when using "improved" varieties of mulberry and silkworms. Silkworm breeding with local
varieties is a traditional activity in certain villages. .
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of rural wealth, it helps to explain the weakness of the industrial style entrepreneurial dynamics in the
Khon Kaen rural systems, with the exception of those concerning traditional activities (village rice
mills, small units for transforming kenaf and cassava). The fairly recent development of the Khon
Kaen metropolitan area, and even of the Isaan region, through the setting up of agro-industrial units
has served to strengthen or create markets for agricultural products. It has not, however, modified the
nature of production relations nor the mode of transformation by generating new types of rural
industrial entrepreneurs.
Given the restrictions inherent in the local conditions (6 dry months a year), strategies for
agricultural diversification are limited to those which, in the context of the pluvial system, can use
run-off from light irrigation from collective reservoirs in the dry season. In the range cif products
adopted there may be a few which are more widespread in-the irrigated rural system (soya, vegetable
seeds), but these dynamics only serve to highlight even more clearly the current accent on socio-
economic differences. In a system such as this where seasonal fluctuations are so pronounced both
inter- and intra-annually, investment strategies in fruit tree cultivation, for example, or the purchase of
a motor-pump, or a small van, take on even greater importance. Or take the exploitation of silkworm
breeding for the textile industry, which, under the combined influence of government agencies and
private factories, seems, for the hybrid varieties of silkworm at any rate, to be moving towards a .
segmentation of activities, thus breaking with the traditional scheme of things. Here, migration
dynamics are very seasonal, though not exclusively so, and are inextricably linked with rural strategies
which cannot be fulfilled by the employment opportunities offered by the town of Khon Kaen and by
the few industries that have recently been established in the rural areas, nor the opportunities provided
by the second rice harvest in the irrigated rural system. Here, the effect of migration is also felt in
relation to other variables concerning village or family matters. In this area where seasonal migration
does not predominate, migrating into town, to work on a building site or for a manufacturing company
in Bangkok may provide the opportunity to acquire know-how and contacts which can then be put to
lateruse in the rural systems by subcontracting.
. 1.2 Incentives and Constraints of Intervention by the State and the Private Sector
The workings of the State and likewise that of the market, will have been felt, interacting
closely together to provide encouragement or constraints for the initiatives of potential rural
entrepreneurs. This interaction has had an important role in the development of these two countries and
we shall pause to look at some aspects in relation to agricultural sectors and rural areas in order to
better appreciate its nature and underlying philosophy. The influence of industrial sectors which have
no bearing on the agricultural sector, or are only loosely associated with this sector, should
nevertheless not be neglected, in as much as, apart from their impact on employment, they may be
able to instigate entrepreneurial processes. In both countries, it is this double advantage which has
stimulated incentives for setting up and delocalizing industrial units. The mode of enforcement of those
policies respects specific features inherent in the mode of intervention adopted in each country.
.The tool commonly used by the Indian State is to award credit and investment subsidies
according to a complex scale of charges; this takes into account types ofproduction, zones (whether
they are backward or not), categories of industrial units (differentiating small industries from cottage
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and village industries) and the social categories of the entrepreneurs, according to "scheduled" castes".
These incentives are a clear reflection of some of the ideologies that have stamped the economic and
.political development of India since Independence. One refers to the thought of Ghandi, who, in
wanting to valorize local resources to the full, both men and produce, favoured the small-scale
industrial and artisanal sector. Although there is often some disparity in their application or even mis-
appropriation, these measures have not prevented the development of keen competition with the
manufactured "urban" products, which have caused traditional artisanal activities in many Indian
villages to be restricted. Moreover, the Integrated Rural Development Programme, which aims to
encourage diversification in rural activities and give the poorest access to production means, has clearly
highlighted the difficulties involved in encouraging any form of entrepreneurial dynamics in rural areas,
other than those closely associated with the agricultural.sector.
Thailand has also adopted incentives to industrial decentralization, in order to make investment
in rural areas a more attractive proposition. Again, the provinces are zoned to give a sliding scale of
tax relief and financial reductions and, at least in the area which includes Khon Kaen province, agro-
industries benefit from higher exemptions (Bangkok Post, 1988). This is proof, if proof were needed,
of the Thai government's intention to strengthen its policy of industrialization for export by including
the diversification of basic agricultural products. As evidence of the importance accorded by the State to
industrial activity in the context of rural development, under the Sixth Plan the Ministry for Industry
has been integrated into the panel of ministries responsible for coordinating their actions (Judd, 1989).
However, although in the Khon Kaen province the Installation of agro-industrial units in particular has
speeded up over the last few years as a result of public encouragement to delocalize, and for certain
branches of activity this has been combined with restrictions on operating in their original areas, from
observations limited to this same province, we might question the true impact of all these measures to
"launch" new rural industries.
While it is keen to promote private dynamics and investment, the Thai State is also very
supportive, providing some of the infrastructure needed for the market to function and for rural areas to
develop. On top of the "heavy" infrastructure put in place in Isaan (road network, irrigated areas, etc.)
the State is also seeking to find a synergy with the private sector, in the context of sector-based and
integrated agricultural development programmes. Sericulture, for instance, is encouraged through the
provision of means which are indispensable for breeding the type of hybrid silkworm whose silk is
highly prized by the private capital textile industries getting supplies from the north-east of the
country. Agreements struck by the private sector with producers are not always respected and although
village communities may make innovative efforts in a traditional activity, this does not guarantee
market stability. Generally speaking, the Thai government does not intervene very much in internal
trade or the pricing structure Ifor agricultural produce, except in a few instances of price support for
paddy or monitoring the fixing of the purchase price of sugar cane from producers. Some "central
markets" for paddy, like that in Khon Kaen, are attempting, with varying degrees of success, to obtain
better terms for the producers in transactions, but the marketing of agricultural produce is generally
organized by the Sino-Thai commercial network.
4- H.Guetat-Bernard, to be published
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This contrasts strikingly with the high level of State intervention seen until now in India in
marketing and pricing policies. The Indian government is suspicious of market forces and sees itself in
the role of "organizer" and "protector", even though aspirations to be sole "director" have had to be
abandoned. It is often in evidence in respect of price controls for some products (cereals, refined sugar
cane, silkworm cocoons, etc.) and its. virtual omnipresence can also be seen in the setting up of
"regulated markets" (like the jaggery market in Mandya) in which committees have the role of
supervising, to varying effect, the openness of transactions and protecting the interests of producers.
. .
As this example shows, the State does not set itself up in competition with the private sector, but it
has erected a kind of protective barrier around its activities. The correction of social inequalities is
clearly a stated aim of Indian politics and it is to this end that aid is awarded on a sliding scale
according to social criteria. Without evaluating the effects of institutional credit, we can nevertheless
underline what we feel to be an important feature of the official modalities for awards. Subsidies and
interest rates vary in India according to the area of land held by an agricultural producer and whether he
belongs to a scheduled casteS. The Indian system based on categorization according to a social group
exactly matches the practice of "mutual guarantees" which is still widely used by institutions in Khon
Kaen province to award a loan in the context of programmes in which the government has an interest.
.Although the government confirms its encouragement for producers to organize themselves into
groups, this system too puts some constraints on potential entrepreneurs.
2. Entrepreneurial Activities, Social Organization and Labour Mobility
In order to appreciate the effects of entrepreneurial dynamics in rural systems, the researcher
must take into account processes which encompass the entire functioning of the rural system.
Entrepreneurs, as defined here, can bevery revealing of social, political and economic situations. They
participate in these movements in which they are, in fact, also "vectors", in both Indian and Thai rural
systems. In both countries, these systems have been affected by the expansion of capitalism,
monetarism and the diversification of the economy, which have not only given rise to these
entrepreneurial dynamics, but have also transformed modes of production and social relations.
Although these all-encompassing processes can be interpreted as forming part of a homogenization
logic, they also reveal contradictory trends in terms of diversification, social diversification in
particular, by playing on a combination of forms of intervention and modes of functioning in the rural
systems. It is pertinent at this point to ask some questions in order to provide guidance for analysis of
the intended and induced effects of entrepreneurial activities: how have they penetrated the social and
economic formations of the rural systems considered, and what relationships have they helped put in
place?
The elements selected to establish the diachronic evolution form a grid for analysis and in this
way evolutions observed are not "confined" to the rural systems, but can be considered as resulting
5- There are 3 categories: "big farmers", "small farmers" and "marginal farmers", The listed castes concern
the low Castes ("scheduled castes" or SC) and members of tribes ("scheduled tribes" or ST). The .latter
criterion is found in all government programmes and it entitles to a higher subsidy and a lower lending
rate. This preferential treatment is not usually granted for short term agricultural loans.
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jointly from endogenous and exogenous dynamics. This is done not solely because the entrepreneurial
processes within these systems are closely correlated to "external" demands and impulsions, but also
because they need to consider the impact of dynamics conducted elsewhere and by others.
The availability and monitoring of the workforce thus constitute elements of the utmost
importance, for they both influence strategies for diversification activities and justify the nature of
social relations and of the organization of agricultural labour. From the Coimbatore rural system,
where the outstanding feature is urban and rural industrialization; to the Khon Kaen pluvial system,
characterized by a degree of agricultural diversification and fluxes in migration, by way of the Mandya
'irrigated system, where diversification trends are still governed by sugar-based activities, the one factor
which crosscuts all these systems is an increase in the wage-eaming class among the rural populations.
Its composition varies from one rural system to another, depending on the nature and strength of the
forms of diversification undertaken, both inside and outside the systems themselves, and on the specific
features of the social and economic formations.
A social polarization of wealth emerges much more clearly in the Indian rural systems than in
those of north-east Thailand. This can be seen especially in the fact that a proportion of the population
has no land, and this proportion varies from one village community to another. Here too these slight
differences are acceptable as can be seen by comparing the Indian rural systems: the level can be as
high as a third of the population in the Coimbatore and Pollachi systems, and in the Mandya irrigated
system, but the proportion drops to about 10%, and even less in the Mandya pluvial rural system. The
strength behind capitalism and agricultural intensification has generated processes which have resulted .
in the building up of reserves of manpower which, through large, are nowadays insufficient. Taken in
the national context, a smaller proportion of the population of the rural systems of Isaan is totally
without land; despite intra-regional variations, this situation is similar to that in the pluvial systems
in southern India. Nevertheless, this feature does not indicate an absence of social differentiation, as can
be seen from the scale of land and income distribution, whether or not the latter originates from the
agricultural sector. Although, unsurprisingly, there is great demand in both countries from. those
without land to work, the size and the viability of farms also brings onto the employment market
small Thai producers, who may be both land-owners and tenant farmers, and likewise small and
marginal Indian producers.
. The capacity to embark on agricultural diversification may in some cases create incongruities
between unit size and family status on the employment market. Thus some large land-owning families
in the Mandya pluvial system, since they cannot diversify their agricultural activities, have become
dependent, in the same way as marginal producers in the irrigated rural system, on working on other
farmers' land. Similarly, for the producers of Khon Kaen, socio-economic differentiation still depends,
although only in part nowadays, on farm size and the distinction between land that is na-lum,
favourable for paddy-fields, and that which is na-don, turned over to traditional cash crops. Thus
pressure on the employment market may exceed the land-owning status of certain rural dwellers, and it
also depends on the offers of employment that emerge as a result of entrepreneurial processes in rural
systems and in the regions and metropolitan areas. These variables determine, in turn, the social
relations of production.
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· Extreme examples of social exploitation suchas bonded labour have now virtually disappeared
in the Indian rural systems. Nevertheless, they have not been replaced in the different systems by
similar types of production relations. There are still somepermanentagricultural workers,but they are
limited in numbers in some farms in the Coimbatore and Pollachi systemsand in the Mandya irrigated
system. Such workers, however, are simply a relic from days gone by, and they have disappeared
completely from the Mandyapluvial system due both to the lack of irrigation and the reduction in the
size of farms (Landy 1992). In the Coimbatore and Pollachi systems and in the Mandya irrigated
system,a class of agriculturalworkers has emerged, giving rise to social relationsof production which
are in keeping witha diversification in entrepreneurial activities.
In the Coimbatoreand Pollachi systems, the development of an industrial sector, recruiting the
workers it needs from families who had traditionally worked in the fields, has been a major
contributoryfactor to modifying preexisting production relations. It hasencouragedthe emergenceof a
class of workers who are free to choose their work in either the agricultural, artisanal or industrial
sector. They are also an independent workforce, who rely, as much as possible, on the laws of supply
and demand,and manageto receivesubstantial wageincreases whenthe needfor labourbecomesmore
urgent. There are employment opportunities outside the agricultural sector for members of rural
families who make themselves available on the labour market, and in this way they can increase and
diversify their income, as well as guaranteeing regular income throughout the year and thus freeing
themselves from the socio-economic grip of landowners. However, not all landless or micro-farmers
families have benefited from these changes: the most socially deprived groups seldom have the
relations necessary for.finding a place in industry, even in a rural industry, no matter how small.
Comparing the two systems, we can see a gradation of situations according to the spread of rural
industry: less advanced in the Pollachi system, the industrial entrepreneurship has marginalized to a
much lesser extent the production relations which are similar to those in the Mandya irrigated rural
system. Thus in Pollachi, these relations are of a very ambivalent nature, and will probably only
develop along with the penetration of industrialization. The industrial type of entrepreneurial dynamic
in these rural systemshas, remarkably, and in contrastwith the Mandyarural irrigated system,led to a
progressive disintegration of the feudal tieswhich boundtogether different economic groupsengaged in
agriculture.
In Mandya, where agricultural intensification has been possible by the use of irrigation on a
vast scale and where agriculturaldiversification is still sufficiently lucrative, compared with the risks
involvedin attractingsurpluses for reinvestment, entrepreneurial dynamics have maintainedproduction
relations which could be classed as post-feudal or pre-capitalist. Since employment opportunities
outside the agricultural sectorare extremely limited, those seeking workare very heavilydependenton
the agriculturaJ sector.This sector, however, is characterized by 'seasonal fluctuations, even though the
advent of irrigation has enabled the workload to be spread over a greater period. This dependence
enables landowners, the major employers in this sector, to maintain patron/clientrelationshipsdespite
a growing monetarization in salaries. This trend can be seen in the salary advancesawarded (without
interest) to seasonal migrant workersor villagers in exchangefor an agreement to work for the lender.
This system ensures landowners sufficientworkersat peak times in the fanning year, and, at the cost
of constantdebt over severalyears,gives the borrowers a financial safety marginduring the off season.
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This system may guarantee work for migrant workers specializing in operations connected with the
production of jaggery; but it provides no guarantees for local workers who need to reduce their intra-
annual insecurity owing to a reduced non-agricultural offer (Landy 1992). The existence of a salaried
class which appears to be more free than the one mentioned above, as there is no dependence on salary
advances, leads to a system which does not always function entirely according to market dynamics:
despite seasonal fluctuations in offers of employment, salaries appear to be constant. They have
increased, but although they are higher than salaries in the rural pluvial system, they have not
increased in proportion to the increase in productivity of the land: potential immigration has certainly
contributed to containing any rise in the wages.
The characteristic feature of the Mandya rural pluvial system is the concentration of agricultural
work into only a few weeks of the year. Some forms of agricultural diversification that have been
undertaken have in places broadened the scope for work: silkworm breeding and particularly market
gardening have extended the working calendar beyond the few months devoted to dry food crops. The
impact of entrepreneurial dynamics in the agricultural sector is also felt in the increase in the number
of wells. These require maintenance and upkeep, which provide some work in the dry season. Workers
are also taken on in the brickyards, in rural building sites or in the small towns. Elsewhere, however,
in areas of coconut groves, there are fewer and fewer work opportunities for a day labourer. Within the
rural system, the position can vary considerably from village to village, according to local work
opportunities and the socially or spatially selective movements of migrant workers. The impact of
seasonal migration, especially into the irrigated rural system.Is lessened by virtue of the fact that there
.are "specialized" migratory networks who consistently use their own preferred routes to move between
this more promising system-and the more distant dry areas. In the Mandya pluvial system, the scarcity
of non-agricultural employment and the wide seasonal swing in the supply of agricultural work
produce under-employment in the dry season and a shortage of manpower in labour-intensive periods.
This problem may restrict movement towards agricultural diversification, especially. in market
gardening, but overall it does not give rise to clientelism to such a great extent as in the irrigated
system: the deficit in manpower covers only short periods, and can be alleviated by increasing the
number of female workers. As a general rule, this problem is overcome nowadays by mutual
cooperation between villagers for certain agricultural tasks, such as the cereal harvest.
This type' of cooperation, which traditionally gave a certain rhythm to work in the paddy-fields
in Isaan, has now almost disappeared. In villages where it still continues, mainly for rice threshing, it
has taken on connotations of compulsory reciprocity, which it never had before (Phongphit &
Hewison 1990). The penetration of monetarization and the intensification of socio-economic disparities
are factors which can explain this change, further intensified by the high level of work mobility typical
of the Khon Kaen rural systems. This mobility, which can be seen as a gamut of movement and
strategies, is in any case, an expression of the limit of non agricultural employment opportunities in
the rural systems or in Khon Kaen. The scale of mobility and the type of agricultural diversification
encountered tend to regulate production relations at local level. As in the Mandya pluvial system, a
significant factor in the Khon Kaen pluvial system is the seasonal nature of agriculture, but in this
case it generates considerable seasonal mobility; caused by the attraction of the area beyond the rural
system. The labour market is characterized both by the need for a large workforce during the paddy
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season, which return of seasonal migrant workers is unable to satisfy in all cases, and by under-
, employment during the six months of the dry season. The fluctuations in-wages, according to supply
and demand, are less important than in the irrigated rural system. The cassava harvest, which can be
extended throughout the dry season, does not interfere with work in the paddy-fields nor with the
cutting of the sugar cane, and it can thus benefit from the availability of manpower. This is a typical
, feature of the functioning of the Isaan rural systems and its impact on the employment market is
similar, whatever the specific features of the system in relation to the agricultural risk. Agricultural
diversification undertaken to date has not increased to any significant extent the employment potential
in the rural pluvial system: seed-production arid silkworm breeding workforces are mainly family
based. For those who are taken on for the sugar season in the Central Plain, or for 6 months in
Bangkok factories or building sites, or even for 3 years or more in the Middle East, these employment
opportunities outside the rural system help to diversify and stabilize income sources within the system
and lessen the impact of clientelism relations. These do exist, however, especially for those who
cannot count on receiving'a money order, through consumer credit, the sale of agricultural produce or
the granting of na-lum plots for rent from.ownerswith landholding over and above what the family can
run.
Low lands in the Nam Phong system have been put under irrigation, and it is now possible to
increase and regulate the supply of agricultural work. Unlike the Mandya irrigated system, however,
this system has not managed to fix immigrant workers: a smaller workforce is needed and the work is
carried out partly by the populations of bordering pluvial systems and partly by those families whose
land is not irrigated, or not to any great extent. It is for this reason that a few seasonal migrations do
take place towards the Central Plain, the Bangkok metropolitan region or to tourist centres. Generally
speaking, when a large workforce is required, salaries are higher than those earned in the pluvial rural
system. This varies locally, however, depending on the mobility dynamics of the population and the
types of agricultural diversification in hand. Thus, intensive paddy cultivation and agricultural
diversification have enabled some farmers to exploit an "educarional capital" by obtaining semi-skilled
work in factories, but it then becomes essential to take on non-family members to work in the paddy
fields, and this is paid for in part by thechildren of the family, who are settled outside the area, for a
variable period". Moreover, production relations may evolve when pressure on the supply of work
increases heavily, affected by entrepreneurial dynamics such as dairy farming: the recruitment and
supervising of day labourers become too arduous for the rice-grower, and he looks to other forms of
relations. As more and more contracts becomeavailable for work on the paddy harvest and the tenancy
system develops, there is more scope for families with less land capital to increase their income. They
have' not modified 'to any great extent, however, the terms of the tenancy system, by sharing the
production costs, for instance', or extending the use of the plot beyond a single season. Contrasting
social situations within the system and at the boundariesare an asset for those who are in a position to
indulge in entrepreneurial strategies.
6- As in the other types of mobility, the amount sent back to parents in the villages decreases or may even
cease altogether when the migrant marries.
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The social organization of work in its different forms has an undeniable effect on production
relations. Work under contract, carried out by individual workers or teams, is the preferred method for
owners concerned about recruiting workers and the stability of the level of productivity. The jaggery
producing units in the Mandya irrigated system function using teams of seasonal migrant workers,
whereas the sugar cane and paddy harvests are in part allocated to contract workers and local teams. In
the Khon Kaen systems; it is common practice to work in teams under the leadership of an
intermediary for the cassava harvest: in this way, workers are able to make the best use of local
opportunities during the agricultural slack period, and land-owners do not have to worry about the'
administration of the harvest while losing some of their profits. It is the Coimbatore system, however,
which has the most structured social organization: there are specialized teams employed by dealers,
teams with a leader who is responsible for contracts and for sharing out the pay fairly between team
members and also day labourers, hired through employment agents interested in the amounts paid in
salary.
With these forms of organization, workers have considerable power 'to make demands regarding
wages and the organization of their work, which in the Mandya irrigated system or the Khon Kaen
systems even the specialized teams do not enjoy. It is therefore not surprising that it should also be in
the Coimbatore system that reprisals from land-owners who also own industrial workshops should be
expressed mostvigourously: efforts to keep certain village families dependent on agriculture, attempts
to reconstitute waves of immigration, to mechanize agricultural operations; all these factors not only
represent a manpower shortage, but also express the fear of urban trade unionism reaching the rural
system. Strategies adopted in the other rural systems are generally more diffuse and in keeping with
social relations, combining, to varying degrees depending on the system, a market style of functioning
with clientelism relations. Mechanization appears to be more developed in the Khon Kean rural
systems than in the Mandya rural systems: this is yet another particularly dynamic instance of
mobility in work.
Conclusion
The comparative approach through a similar frame of analysis has enabled to appreciate the role
of different factors leading to entrepreneurial development. The functioning of these dynamics and their
impacts vary greatly according to he different rural systems. Nevertheless, the guided and leading effects
of the development of entrepreneurial activities are an important clue in he analysis of he rural
transformation. They have to be seen at two different levels. At the rural system level, it is important
to look at the impact of those entrepreneurial activities on the evolution of the social and spatial
organization. At the family level, staring an entrepreneurial activity means a will of social and
economic improvement as well as a will of correlating he different activities held by the members and
the family structure.
To start a business or not (and what) is however not strictly subordinate to entrepreneurial or
economic opportunities but is widely linked to other factors. the rural actors strategies and aims have
to be seen within he family setting and he social networks that may influence the wiIJ of a
diversification and the options held. The economic factors, the capital resources and the production
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tools which cand be used, play an important role in the process of diversification, but the social
networks, the family structure, the level of education or the spatial mobility of the members set up
either advantages or restraints that hear on the strategies.
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Entrepreneurial Rationale in Rural Areas .
the Case of Shrimp Farming
Jean-Yves Weigel
Introduction
Within the same sectoral but macro-economic environment, different types of entrepreneurship
may develop. In other words, a favourable macro-economic environment, which is the same for all and
whose variables may be the stimulating call of an external market or the mode of operating a
production chain, gives rise to not one, but several entrepreneurial responses. Thus the development of
a new product and the insertion of Thailand in the world economy for that product may be brought
about by the coexistence of different but obviously interactive production systems, resulting from the
choices made by corporate heads. Our study, instead of merely reporting on these facts, is designed to
grasp the reasoning behind the choices made by the players in entrepreneurial ventures, and to review
the consequences of these choices on the entire production chain and on the strategy of newcomers.
Shrimp farming provides the optimal analytical framework in that, on the one hand, it
incorporates several types of entrepreneurship, and on the other hand, its recent and very rapid
. ,
development may be considered as having affected the options of the newcomers and even modified
those of the old timers. And the spectacular growth of this sector, which has made it one of the top
sectors in the Thai economy (Baht 12 billion in exports in 1990 and about 80,000 direct jobs), was
indeed accompanied by the constant restructuring of the different segments of the aquacultural
production chain and its macro-economic environment.
1. The Different Strategies to Mobilize the Factors of Production
(Land and Capital)
A positive response by the head of a holding to farming innovations, in shrimp farming for
instance, depends on his capacity to mobilise new land, capital or labour resources, or to distribute the
resources already being used differently. This mobilisation or reallocation takes place not just on the
basis of the characteristics of the holding, but also depends on exogenous factors.
Thus, the mobilisation or allocation modalities, the land available, the ways and means of
using manpower and its cost, the shrimp farmer's financial situation and the conditions of access to
loans will determine the entrepreneur's choice of one production system as opposed to another.
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But obviously, this choice is made by taking into account a set of factors over which the
entrepreneur has little or no control, such as the attraction of an internal or external market.the
possibility of benefitting from technological transfers, the existence or reduction of bottle-necks in the
different stages of the production chain, the cost of the factors of production, the setting up of a credit
line, etc.
In shrimp farming, a distinction is usually made between three main types of production
systems: extensive, semi-intensive and intensive (relating to the nomenclature used by the
Department of Fisheries). A brief description of the characteristics of the different systems of
production may be useful here.
-Extensive shrimp culture, which represents the first Thai stage in this context, is practised in
ponds, sometimes natural, but most often artificial, watered by the tide, with a sluice gate to retain the
water and the trapped fry until the next tide. This is therefore a system which requires hardly any
inputs, but at the same time, the output is low.
-The semi-intensive system is, by definition, heterogeneous, because it combines both the
extensive and intensive systems depending on the farmer; the fry and the feed come from both the
natural environment and are injected into the pond by the supplementary addition of post-larvae and
industrial feed. This combined practice explains the very high variability of annual yield, depending on
the degree of intensification of the artificial pond: from 0.5 to 3 tons per hectare during the two or
three annual cycles of three to four months each, a supplementary addition of industrial feed, varying
from one to seven, and especially; a daily water renewal rate of 5% to 20%.
-The intensive system in Thailand was based on the Taiwanese model, and is characterised by
high densities, requiring inputs in the hatcheries or nurseries, and therefore, the addition of industrial
feed, fertiliser and various chemicals to maintain an adequate level of water quality, veterinarian
products to prevent disease and the use of aquaculture equipment to provide oxygen and renew the water
daily (the rate of renewal varies between 10% and 30%). However, even more markedly than in the
semi-intensive system, the intensive system covers a wide variety of different situations, depending on
the level of investment or operating costs, and thus records a wide range of annual yields, which can be
anything between three and thirty tons per hectare.
The 1990 OaFs census (Department of Fisheries) relating to the shrimp culture households and
companies allowed us to know the whole figure of shrimp farms. This census, like the former ones,
was classified by type of production system (extensive, semi-intensive and intensive) and by cultivated
area (shrimp farming). We choose a sample of shrimp farms by province, following the importance of
each production system: 61 extensive shrimp farms, 73 semi-intensive ones and 212 intensive
holdings. Our field work was conducted in 1991, through questionnaires distributed among a
representative sample of 346 shrimp farms along the entire coastline. This survey was completed by
interviews of 54 entrepreneurs all along the chain of shrimp production and marketing.
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As a result of our field workl , we make the following distinction within the intensive system:
titled holdings-, untitled holdings-, and tenant-farmer holdings. A breakdown of shrimp farms accord-
ing to land ownership status highlights the very small number of untitled or tenant farmers in exten-
sive or semi-intensive farming, whereas the three forms are equally represented in intensive farming.
. Table 1 : Distribution of Shrimp Farms by Land Tenure and Production System (1991).
Titled Tenant Untitled
Intensive 36% 33% 31%
Semi-intensive 80% 7% 13%
Extensive 85% 7% 8%
Source: field survey 1991.
Table 2: Shrimp Farms Area by Land Tenure and by Production System (1991; in hectare).
Titled Tenant Untitled Averaae
Intensive 3,17 2,00 2,33 2,50
Semi-intensive 6,33 4,83 5,17 6,17
Extensive 7,67 7,50 6,50 7,67
Source: field survey 1991.
Tenant and untitled farmers develop a much smaller surface area than titled farmers. The most
significant difference between them is to be found in intensive farming and may be explained by the
very great pressure exerted on shrimp farming land, which, in turn, has repercussions on the lease or
cost of using untitled land. Firstly, the tenant or untitled intensive farmer has to pay a very high rent
per hectare. Secondly, there is a considerable price to pay for access to the land, which is presented as
the price of servicing the plot, but which, in fact, is far higher than the true value, since it includes all
the profits and informal costs related to illegal servicing (for instance when the land is mangrove .
forest). We shall see that these extra costs in using untitled land induce greater intensification and lead
to a higher loan being contracted than for other forms of intensive farming, where the costs appear in
the holding's fixed operating costs.
Generally speaking, shrimp farmers' strategies seem to be aimed at maintaining or improving
their economic gains while reducing the risks. To this end, they seek to counteract the constraints of
the production system they have adopted and to capitalise on production factors: this behaviour is
described by many authors and is not just true of aquaculture. But shrimp farmers divide the overall
production risk into partial risks to cover each separate factor of production and test their control over
each individual factor, for example to see how far the new technologies are more risky than existing
technology.
1- Conducted with the help of Abha Siriwongs (CUSRI).
2- Where the owner can mortgage his land.
3- i.e. those encroaching illegally (for example on mangrove forests, without being legalized), or
temporarily enjoying the right of usufruct. The distinction made between titled and untitled farmers in
agriculture is used here. CfG. Feder and alii (1988).
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An analysis of land assets and other fixed assets shows that intensification is related to land-
ownership status: the weaker the ownership link, the greater the intensification to compensate for the
cost of access to the land. Thus, within the intensive system, the value of each hectare of fixed assets,
other than land for shrimp tenant or untitled farmers, was an average of almost Baht 300,000, or more
than twice that of "intensive", titled shrimp farmers and more than ten times that of "semi-intensive"
or"extensive" farmers.
Table 3 : Land and Others Fixed ASsetsby Production System (1991; in Baht; by hectare4)
Extensive Semi-intensive Intensive Intensive Intensive
(titled) (titled) (titled) (tenant) (untitled)
Land assets
Owned land 510000 600000 840000 - -
Tenancy title or use - - - 54000 38000
Total 510000 600000 840000 54000 38000
Others fixed assets
Serviced plot, pond construction 1900 9700 57000 131000 151000
and water circulation system
Building 2600 6500 22000 50000 51000
Equipment 3900 6400 25000 55000 60000
Transportation 6500 3200 16000 35000 34000
Total 14900 25800 120000 271000 296000
Total 524900 625800 960000 325000 334000
Source: field survey 1991.
The value of land assets owned by titled farmers could explain an apparent under-investment
attitude in relation to the optimum bio-economic potential. The owner of these assets, benefitting
from land speculation, makes a hefty profit of the value added in any case, without having to run the
risk of intensifying the shrimp farming process. Nonetheless; the value of land assets per hectare is
greater in the intensive system than in in the semi-intensive or extensive systems, and is Baht
840,000,600,000,510,000 respectively, the difference being due to land development (servicing and
landscaping for aquaculture). Measured, not in terms of the value of land assets, but in terms of the
cost of leasing the land, the difference between the systems adopted is even greater: on average and by
hectare, Baht 38,000 for the intensive system, 8,000 for the semi-intensive system and 6,000 for the
extensive system.
According to our surveys, thedevelopment over two years of land assets and other fixed assets
by shrimp farmer category highlights the value added earned in property by titled farmers. Similarly, a
comparison, two years later, of the purchase price and rent of land, regardless of their very high
amounts, which generally affects all regions, albeit unequally, confirms the gains made by titled
farmers from land speculation.
4- During the survey: 1 bath =0,04 US$
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Table 4: Change in Inventory of Assets by Shrimp Farm and Production System
(1988-1991; in constant Baht, based 1991)
1988 1991
Extensive
Land assets 170ססoo 4830000
Others fixed assets 66000 70000
Semi-intensive
Land assets 150ססoo 4560000
Others fixed assets 151000 160000
Intensive <titled)
Land assets 160ססoo 3420000
Others fixed assets 365000 390000
Intensive (tenant)
Land assets (tenancy title) 42000 75000
Others fixed assets 493000 540000
Intensive (untitled)
Land assets (land use) 34000 69000
Others fixed assets 607000 682000
Source: field survey 1991.
Table 5: Change in Land Price and Rent by Region (1988-1991;
by hectare; in constant Baht, base 1991)
Source : field survey 1991 (32 rmssmg values).
Purchasing mice Renttintensive system)
1991 1988 1991 1988
Eastern part 61ססoo 346000 aococ 28000
Inner part 196ססoo 168ססoo 53000 43000
Central part 982ססoo rsocoo 43000 33000
Southern part ssoeoo sacooo 30000 18000
Andaman sea 41ססoo 28ססoo 21000 12000
. .
On the other hand; untitled farmers have to pay a large access fee, which encourages them to
intensify by taking out loans (the possession of a title deedis not a prerequisite for obtaining a loan).
aut in such cases, the shrimp farmer will go deep into debt to develop his activity, and thus runs a
higher risk, given the numerous hazards of shrimp farming (epizootics, pollution, etc.), than the
farmer who is not obliged to intensify. On average,untitled and tenant "intensive" farmers have similar
debts of around Baht 270,000 per hectare, 65 % of which is tied to institutional credit, which is more
.than twice that of titled"intensive" shrimp farmers. At the other end of the scale are those who practice
the extensive system, characterised by much lower debts, of less than Baht 10,000 per hectare, 26 % of
which is tied to informal loans.
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Table 6 : Debt Outstandings by Type of Loan and Production System
(1991; by hectare; in Baht)
Institutional loans Infonnalloans Total
Extensive 2000 5700 7700
Semi-intensive 14500 . 12000 26500
Intensive (titled) 83400 37900 121300
Intensive(tenant) 182000 80000 262000
Intensive(untilled) 176500 94000 270500
Source : field survey 1991 (25 rmssmg values).
2. Extensive Production System Holding and Intensification.
Ideally, to understand the reasoning behind the selection of a new system of aquaculture, the
choice must be related to the constraints affecting all the economic activities of the entrepreneur in
question. While not adopting such an approach,which wouldrequire too cumbersomean investigation,
mention should be made of some indicators, such as the 'rate of pluri-activity' or the annual income
drawn from other activities, which may explain the rationale,which must often be sought outside the
strict framework of the activity under consideration. Our surveys indicate that the number of other
activities decreases with intensification since, while 81% of extensive farmers have one or two
additional activities besides aquaculture, the percentage drops to 23% for the farmers practicing the
more intensive system.
Table 7: Distribution of ShrimpFarmers by Numberof Complementary Jobs
(1991; by production system).
None One More than 1 Total
Extensive 19 68 13 100
Semi-intensive 29 59 12 100
Intensive (titled) 58 . 32 10 100
Intensive(tenant) 69 23 8 100
Intensive(untitled) 77 20 3 100
Source : field survey 1991 (21 rmssmg values).
Thus, on average, an extensive farmer declares an annual income of Baht 31,000 from other
activitiesbesides aquaculture,as opposed to Baht 12,000for an intensivefarmer and Baht 25,000 for a
semi-intensive farmer. The 'pluri-activity'of extensive farmers reveals their refusal to take the risks
related to intensification (debts, risks of production, possibly having to mortgage their land), while
seeking to better distribute the risks involvedby engaging in several activities such as aquaculture and
rice cultivationor aquacultureand fisheries; our surveys show that in the extensivesystem, the income
from aquaculture is lower than from other activities. However, in the few cases where another activity
is practised by "intensive" farmers, -they generallyearn morefrom it than extensive farmers, probably
because their activities are more specialised, and correspondto a higher level of education. Thus, they
are usually less involved in primary sector activities, such as rice cultivation or fisheries than
extensiveor semi-intensive farmers.
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Table 8: Distribution of Shrimp Fanners by Main Complementary Job
(byproduction system)
Extensive Semi-intensive Intensive
Agricultural activities (rice,orchard,plantation) 47 39 18
Fishery 29 24 8
Mechanic, craftsman,food processing 9 14 32
Wholesaler, retailer 7 11 26
Government employee - 2 5
Private sectoremployee 3 3 8
Others 5 7 3
Total 100 100 100
Source : field survey 1991.
Over the past five years, the extensivesystem has not undergoneany major changes, as can be
seen from the figures for the numberof holdings, theiraveragesurfacearea, their yield per hectare and
the development of their fixed assets. From 1988 to 1991, the number of extensive shrimp farms
remained stable (2,900 to 2,800), their average surface area increased by only 4% (from 7 to 8
hectares), theiryielddropped by only 14 % and theirfixedassets(otherthan land or financial) increased
by only 6%. This stability in the number of "extensive" holdings and their overall configuration'
points to their viabilityand the fact that they remain outside the process of intensification,
Table 9 : Change in Numberof Farms, Area, Yieldper Hectareand Fixed Assets
(extensive production system)
1988 1991
Numberof farms 2910 2819 '
Area(hectare) 20113 22343
Yield/hectare 349 316
Fixedassets/fann (BahO 66000 70000
Source: field survey 1991.
The extensive fanners' refusal to intensify is confirmed by the small number of extensive
holdings which moved towards the semi-intensive or intensive production systems. In fact, there is
very little shifting between production systems, even if the number of semi-intensive holdings that
! opted for the intensivesystemis slightly higher.
Thus, there was practically no moving from one production system to another: the original
choice was maintained. It follows that the current intensive boom, therefore, does not stem fromthe
, conversion of holdings practicing another system of production, the crucial year of the boom being
1987: whenthe number of "intensive"holdings was multiplied by five and total output by intensive
farmers increased six-fold. The driving force of this development was the setting up, by the
government, of a sectoral credit policy through the main institutional credit supplier, the Bank of
Agriculture and Cooperatives (BAAC); the amount earmarked by the BAAC for the development of
shrimp fanning increased from B~t 246 million in 1986 to Baht 1,911 million in 1991.
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Tabie 10: Change in Production System.
% of oresent farms
Extensive shrimp farming system
From extensive to extensive (area extending) 10
From extensive to semi-intensive 5
From extensive to intensive 3
No chanze 82
Semi-intensive shrimp farming system
From semi-intensive to semi-intensive (area extending) 8
From semi-intensive to extensive 1
From semi-intensive to intensive 11
Nochange 80
Intensive shrimp farming system
From,intensive to extensive (area extending)
-
. .
From intensive to semi-intensive 4
From intensive to intensive 9
No-change 87
Source : field survey 1991. "
A breakdown of holdings, according to the date of their establishment, confirms that "intensive"
farms came about recently, since 70% of them were created after 1986. But the details of their
establishment also indicate that it was the tenant and untitled farmers who were established the most
recently. The shortage of land for aquaculture, strong demandand the refusal of the extensive or semi- .
intensive farmers to give up their activity, led the newcomers to encroach on mangrove forests -
without obtaining any proper title to the land.
.
Table 11 : Distribution of Shrimp Farms by Date of Creation (by production system; %»
Before 1980 From 1980 From 1987 From 1989
to 1986 to 1989 to '1991
Extensive production system 44 43 8 5
Semi-intensive production system 15 68 12 5
Intensive production system (titled) 5 33 48 24
Intensive production system (tenant) 5 15 23 57
Intensive production system (untitled) 2 19 26 53
Source : field survey 1991 (28 missing values).
An analysis of operating costs and average incomes according to the production system adopted
indicates the heavy land development burden borne by the newcomers, which took the form of a rent
qn the case of tenant farmers), or interest rates5 (for the untitled farmers) : this additional land cost
5- Our surveys show that the latter were obliged to incur much higher debts to pay for' access to the land,
which was labelled serviced land, but which in fact, was overpriced since it included all the profits and
informal costs related to illegal encroachment (for example when the land was mangrove forest),
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may be estimatedat Baht 130,000 per hectareper year, an extra cost which gave the intensive titled
farmers a comparative advantage. This initialhandicap obligedthe newcomers to intensify to earn the
sameprofitsas titledintensive farmers, while running a greater risk,and with very little addedvalue for
the land
Table 12: Annual Production andRevenue per Hectare (byproduction system;1991; in Baht)
Revenue Intensive Intensive Intensive Semi-intensive Extensive
(titled) (tenant) (untitled)
Production sold 394800 489000 576000 86000 21000
Consumed on farm 20400 17400 19200 15000 10000
Gift 25800 23400 21600 18000 6000
Changein inventorv 4200 6000 9000 1000
Total 445200 535800 625800 120000 37000
Source : field survey 1991.
Table 13:Annual Operating Costsper Hectare (byproduction system;1991; in Baht)
Intensive Intensive Intensive Semi-intensive Extensive
(titled) (tenant) . (untitled)
Variable costs
Labor 48000 50000 60000 8000 4000
,
Feed 120000 126000 132000' . 22000 2000
Fuel and electricity 66000 60000 58000 8000 4000
Post-larvae 42000 48000 54000 11000 1000
Maintenance 6000 5500 6000 4000 2000
Medicine,fertilizers,pesticides 12000 14000 14000 8000 3000
Miscellaneous 6000 10000 12000 4000 2000
Total 300000 313500 336000 65000 18000
Fixedcosts
Lease (land andequipment) 12000 50000 6000 9000 1000
Interest 30000 48000 158000 12000 3000
Repairs 12000 18000 12000 4000 1000
Depreciation 36000 52000 58000 16000 5000
. Miscellaneous 6000 7000 6000 4000 2000
Total 96000 175000 240000 45000 12000.
Total 396000 488500 576000 110000 30000
Profit/hectare 49200 47300 49800 10000 7000
Source : field survey 1991.
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Naturally, the annual profit of shrimp farms varies, depending on the production system and the
fanner's land-owning status: we estimated it at an average of Boot 120,000 for the intensive system,
and Baht60,OOO and 50,000 for the semi-intensive and extensive systems respectively.
Within the intensive system, the best results were obtained by titled fanners, who, on average,
obtained a profit which was 1.5 times higher. Nevertheless, the sample of "intensive" holdings is
characterised by a greater variation in the return on investment,which is not always higher in capital-
intensi ve holdings, and shows up the difficulties that they have to overcome with regard to their
accumulation capacity. In these cases, labour productivity does not grow in equal measure to
compensate for the drop in capital productivity: this may be explained by diminishing returns of
scale, and the lack of skilled manpower to adapt to new technology.
The gains obtained from the extensive system, especially when income from other activities and
land value added are included,show the current viability of this system, which explains its resilience.
Conclusion
The analysis of shrimp farming brings out the viability and the coexistence of several
production systems. This coexistence is explained by the various alternatives which eritrepreneurs are
faced with when making their choices, in light of the possibilities of mobilising the different factors of
production as well as in view of factors outside the holding, which, as it has turned out" have been
favourable over the last five years of the shrimp boom in Thailand, but which might be less so in the
near future. However,the possibilities of mobilising the factors of production are changing, depending,
for example, on the availability of certain factors, such as land for aquaculture : this isillustrated in
. the tremendous difference in the position of a land owning rice fanner who converted to shrimp
fanning five years ago, and the untitled newcomer, who has to pay a substantial amount to even gain
access to land.
The inequality of the situation highlights both the maintenance of the extensive system and the
process of intensification. The degree of intensification is dictated by the necessities which different
categories of entrepreneurs are obliged to bow to : according to our surveys, when it is possible to
establish a viable holding with a low or medium level of intensification, this solution is generally
adopted. More particularly, the possibility of passive accumulation stimulated by land speculation,
which the titled fanner can benefit from, slows down the degree of intensification. Again, the
possibility of exercising several lucrative activities helps to maintain the extensive system.
These entrepreneurial strategies take account of the risks of intensifying, particularly the cost of
mobilising the necessary factors of production and thus, the debts that must be incurred to do so. But
while Asian and world demand for shrimps has kept Thai aquaculture buoyant over the past five years,
the emergence of very competitive big producers (like China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Central America)
may change the basics of the problem. It is the intensive fanners, who are in the front line, because
they are most vulnerable to changes affecting the entire chain of production: they will thus have to
reduce their costs and obtain better yields. To do this, they will have to improve their control over
technological constraints to ensure an adequate return on investment and to limit the effects of
pollution. They may be assisted in this approach by directive government action.
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Small-Scale Aquaculture Entrepreneurship
with Particular Reference to Shrimp
Farming in the Philippines
Medina N. Delmendo and Jose A.. Llobrera
Introduction
Aquaculture in the Philippineshad been in practiceas early as five centuriesago. The farming
system used started with trapping and holding of milkfish and shrimp seeds brought in by tidal water
insidethe ponds whichwereallowed to grow on natural food.
The development and expansion of brackishwaterfishponds wasquiterapid although the levels
of production per unitarea wasconsidered low.These wereinfluenced by the declining 'outputfrom the
capture' fisheries; government support accorded to the industry through liberal credit terms and the
improvement in aquaculture techniques. In a span of 50 years, from 1940 to 1990, the area of
developed brackishwaterponds increased by about 300 percent, from 60,000 ha to 222,000 ha and'
production by about 1,000percent, from 21,000 mt to 268,000mt (metric tons).
The development of shrimpfarming that startedsometime in 1970'wasrelativelyfast. This was
stimulated by the increasein worlddemand for shrimp; development of improved shrimp hatcheryand, '
growout technologies and by the availability of formulated feeds for commercial growing of shrimp in
ponds. Between the period 1984 and 1987 saw the most rapid expansion of shrimp farming due to
lucrative prices and high international marketdemand. As of 1989some 23,446 ha of brackishwater
ponds havebeendevotedto shrimpfarming (Table1).
The production of shrimps fromaquaculture was about 45,740 metric tons in 1991. This is
equivalent to 15,7% of the total aquaculture production. Shrimpsconstitute the top foreign exchange
earner for fisheryexportsof the Philippines over the last five years (Table2).
There are three distinctpractices in shrimp farming in the Philippines. These are the extensive,
semi-intensive and intensiveoperations. The major technical differences in these farming methodsare
shown in Table 3.
Extensive method of shrimp culture predominate and represents70% of the 23,446 ha. Semi-
intensive and intensive methods of farming account for only25%and 5%.
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The contribution of semi-intensive and intensive farms to the total shrimp production from
ponds was very significant. In 1989 an estimated volume of 36,656 metric tons of shrimp were
produced from ponds.
Posadas (1988) reported that without considering the time value of money all shrimp farming,
systems, the extensive, semi-intensive and intensive operations are profitable. Otherwise, the extensive
system is not economically profitable. Under static market conditions after discounting net present
value; the extensive semi-intensive and intensive operations are economically profitable. The semi-
intensive shrimp farming system is the most stable as it can be profitable even if the market price of
shrimp drops or the costs of production increases by as much as 20% A comparative analysis of the
economic returns of different shrimp farming operations is shown in Table 1.
Intensive shrimp farming is a capital-intensive and high risk venture. A case study of intensive
farms in the island of Negros, Philippines, where most of the intensive ponds are located (Stockwell
and Williams, 1988), showed that the average capital cost of development per hectare of intensive
shrimp farming was US $ 25,000; of this amount, 34% accounted for the purchase of equipment.
Production costs averaged about US $ 14,000 per hectare per crop. Feeds accounted for about 60% of
the cost; postlarvae, 17%; and labor and administration, 4%. The average return was 47%.
1. Socio-Economic Aspects of Brackishwater Aquaculture
Very little information is available on the socio-economic aspects of aquaculture in spire of its
centuries of practice. This may be because of its lesser contribution to the national economy compared
to agricultore. Brackishwater aquaculture has a different type of tenural structure compared to
agriculture since most of the land areas sed are public mangrove areas which are leased for a period of
25 years. However, the leaseholder has an option to own the land if the investments made to develop
the leased area had been substantial. Majority of the area that have been developed into brackishwater
f~shponds are leased from the government. There are also privately owned lands which weredeveloped
into fishponds by landowners ..
1.1 Structure in Brackishwater Aquaculture
There are three distinct functions recognized in brackishwater aquaculture operations. These are
ownership, capitalization and overall management, and daily caretaking. Individuals who perform these
functions are identified as owner, capitalist and caretaker (Danhaeuser, 1986). An owner is one who
owns the fishpond and leases it for a fixed rate to others for a certain period of time. The capitalist is
one who leases the pond from the owner; he finances the operation of the fishpond, manages it and
employs a caretaker of his choice. A caretaker undertakes the daily maintenance and shares the net
income with the capitalist. There is also the owner/capitalist who finances ~d manages the operation
of his own fishponds and shares the profit with the caretaker. A capitalist/caretaker is a capitalist who
undertakes his own daily caretaking of the farm and pays lease to the owner and keeps the net income.
The owner/capitalist or the capitalist may hire a manager who will be responsible for operating the
farm with ttie caretaker. Both the manager and the caretaker will share in the net income.
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·1.2Share-Cropping in Small-Scale Aquaculture
Small fishponds in the eastern and central portion of Lingayen Gulf in Pangasinan Province
average i.s ha. In some fishponds, the owner operates the pond himself and employs occasional labor
only for harvesting and major dike repairs. In others, the owner employs a caretaker to carry out the
day to day operation of the fishpond. The share of the caretaker is usually one-third of the net income
while the owner who provides the land and capital keeps two-thirds (Danhaueser, 1983).
Aquaculture leases in small-scale farming operations also exist. Lease contracts up to 20 years
are practiced by imine landow'nerswho do not want to invest any more capital. Under this situation the
leaseholder puts up the capital and appoints his own caretaker or he operates the facility himself to
retain the net income. If the leaseholder employs a caretaker, the net income is usually shared 50:50
where 50% goes to the 'leaseholder and the other 50% to the caretaker.
1.3Labor-Capital Relations in LargeScaleAquaculture
. Large aqua-farms of 300 to 400 ha may besub-divided into production units or blocks of 15, 20
or 25 ha units, complete with nursery ponds, transition and grow-out ponds per unit. The size of pond
compartments varies depending on the production system employed by the owner. Caretakers are
employed for each production unit and are supervised by the owner. The owner finances the operation
and takes care of procurement of inputs and marketing of produce. Under this production arrangement a
two-tiered labor relationship exist: owner/capitalist-caretaker.
The owner may hire a manager and delegate the full responsibility of supervising and
, ,
coordinating the production activities in the entire farm. The owner is mainly responsible for financing
the operation of the farm. The manager is the representative of the owner to the caretakers and vice-
versa. He is in charge of procurement of production inputs, marketing of produce and paying the
caretakers. Trustworthiness of the manager is therefore very essential. Under this aqua-farm production
arrangement, there is a three-tiered labor relationship: owner / capitalist-manager-caretaker.
Large scale aqua-farms are also leased as a whole or in units or blocks of at least 20 hectares
under the same arrangements as the small scale fish farms. The owner ceases to have anything to do
\ .
with the production activities. The leaseholder will assume the full responsibility and risk of operating
the farm. He provides the financial requirement of the farm, hires his own caretakers and manages the
farm himself or hires a manager. If the leaseholder manages the farm a three-tiered relationship exist:
owner-Ieaseholder/ capitalist / manager- caretaker. If the leaseholder hires a manager a four-tiered
relationship exist: owner-leaseholder/capitalist-manager caretaker.
The rate of share-cropping in small scale farms do not apply to large scale aqua-farms. As
commonly practiced in the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga in Region 3, the manager is usually
paid a monthly salary/allowance of Philippine Pesos (P) 1,000-1,500 and the caretaker P 500-800 with
a pre-agreed profit-sharing scheme. In computing for the profit the lease of the land is usually valued
and included in production cost whether the capitalist is the owner or the leaseholder. All expenses
towards production including lease per year and the salaries/allowances given to the manager and
caretakers are summed at the end of each year and deducted from the total sales of produce for that year;
The balance or profit is shared 50:50, where 50% goes to the capitalist who could be the owner or the
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leaseholderand the other 50% the production crew.The profit sharing among productioncrew are as
follows: the manager usually gets two shares and each caretaker, one share. Assuming that there are
four caretakers then there will be a total of six shares, two shares for the managerand four shares for
the caretakers. The manager gets 2/6 of 50% and each of the caretakers will get 1/6 of 50% profit
share. If the owner or the leaseholder is also the manager, he will get 2/6 of 50% share in addition to
the full 50% of profit he getsas the capitalist. Therecouldbeotherprofitsharing schemespracticed but
each formulamustbe pre-agreed by all partiesat the startof the venture.
Thereare instanceswhere insteadof a profit-sharing rewardsystem,fixed wagesare paid to the
managerand caretakersas one wouldin corporate farms. This type of administration in large fishponds
do away with tenancy. Usually, the manager and the caretakers are from another place or region.
However, such laborarrangement couldbecomea sorespot amongthe localresidents.
Wherefixed wagesare paid, veryoftenpondproduction suffersbecausethe salariesare not high
enough to give incentivefor the manager and caretakers to work hardand ensure good harvest. On the
other hand, if salariesare very high, the manager and caretakers wouldnot feel motivatedto work hard
because withor withoutproduction they wouldstill receivethe same salary.From experience, a reward
system based on production in additionto fixed wages is mosteffectivein motivating production crew
to work hardand ensuregoodproduction.
1.4 Productivity versus Aqua-Farm Labor Management
Studies on whetherproductivity of brackishwater fish farms are influenced by tenancy is rare.
However, an author (Librero et al , 1977) reported that highest yields are found in privately owned
fishponds; leased production units are secondand the last are those that are leased by the government.
Their studyalso reportedthatas farmsize increases (above5.0 to10.0 ha) the productivity decreases.
Trust and confidencebetween the caretakers and pond owner or leaseholder are crucial to the
successof production. Ownersor leaseholders dependso muchon the caretaker to come up with good
harvestat the end of each production cycle after giving the necessary production inputs. In most cases,
the caretakers are relatives of theowneror leaseholder. A closesocialbondpre-existbetween themand
usually, this relationextendsover generations.
. . .
1.5 Changes Brought about by Shrimp Farming in Labor Structure
Shrimps used to be a secondary crop of brachishwater fish farms wherein natural stocks of
shrimp seeds enter the ponds through tidal inflow. This condition has changeddrasticallyover the last
20 years as shrimpbecamea primarycash crop.
With the tremendous amountof investment required to develop fishponds for semi-intensive and
intensiveculture of shrimps,fishponds haveto be ownedor leasedfor a period long enough to recover
investments and make a profit. The first brackishwaterponds to be convertedand developed for semi-
intensiveand intensiveshrimpfarming are in areas whereownership and tenurecan be assured. Many
privately owned ricelandsand sugarlands along the coast were also convertedto fishponds. In Negros
Island where sugar is the main crop, many landowners converted part of their plantations along the
coast into semi-intensiveand intensiveshrimp ponds at the height of shrimp industry expansion that
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coincided with the decline of world market price of sugar. Shrimp farming was looked at by sugar
planters as a very profitable diversification of business. By the end of 1987 more than 1,000 ha of
semi-intensive and intensive ponds were developed in Negros Island alone.
In the process of this development, dislocation of farm labor in sugar plantations took place. It
was reported that 7-8laborers work a 5 ha sugarland for the caring and maintenance of the crop while it
took only 3 laborers to work an equal size of shrimp farm (Primavera, 1989). Aquaculture farm
caretaking needs a special skill and experience which the sugarland workers do not have unless they are
given some form of training or given the practical exposure to shrimp fanning operations.
In most semi-intensive and intensive shrimp farms, the traditional labor-management/capital
relationships were replaced by a corporate farm structure. Managers, technicians and laborers were hired
as regular employees on fixed salaries. An incentive scheme based on production performance were
adopted, either as a fixed percentage of profit or based on salary.
In areas where ownership and tenure cannot be ensured because ponds are just leased from
private owners and the government, the extensive method of shrimp culture predominate. In the
provinces of Bulasan and Pampanga, where most of the shrimp ponds are leased and consequently
employ the extensive method of fanning, the traditionallabor-management/capital relationships were
. preserved. The same ponds that were used for milkfish have been shifted to shrimp with very little
modification. Many farms that adopted a corporate structure failed to sustain production and reverted
back to the traditional structure.
2. Small Scale Entrepreneurship, Role of the State
and Prospects of Shrimp Farming
As shown in Table 1, shrimp fanning requires substantial capital investment for development
and operation. For example, a 5-ha fishpond could beconsidered small scale in terms of area. However,
if this area were developed into an extensive or semi-intensive shrimp farm, the cost of development
could cost at least P 750,000 and a working capital of at least P 80,000/ton of shrimp produced. These
costs are not small to a typical Filipino household and has to borrow capital if it were to engage in
shrimp fanning. Private owners fishpond could mortgage the property to the bank. However, fishpond
operators who lease their'ponds from private owners or from the government could not mortgage the
property.. This is one reason why most of the fishponds leased from government are usually
. underdeveloped and remain to be operated on extensive method of culture.
Thus, shrimp farming in the Philippines has been dominated mainly by entrepreneurs with
assets, access to capital and technology or have prior experience in business. Individuals who own the
farm or other real estate assets could either mortgage the property and avail of loans for development
and working capital. Individuals who have the money but do not have the land could go into a joint
venture with someone who has an existing fishpond or land that is suitable for a shrimp farm, In some
cases a technical person who has the know-how could participate in a shrimp farm venture using his
expertise as equity to the project.
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Up until 1989, the Philippine Government has given liberal incentives to shrimp culture
projects and other related activities through credit and tax exemptions. This resulted in the formation of
many business partnerships and corporations for the purpose of engaging in shrimp growout and
hatchery, feed mill and processing plants. Several large corporations fully or partially integrated their
operations and. dominated the shrimp farming and exporting industry. Owners of small farming
operations organized themselves into cooperatives in order to vertically and horizontally integrate their
operations.
The rapid expansion of shrimp farming in the Philippines catalyzed the emergence of small-
scale entrepreneurship in shrimp hatcheries and allied businesses and service sectors like equipment
supplies, shrimp fry dealerships, spawner collection and technical consultant services. Many small-
scale hatcheries were established by individuals with training and experience in shrimp fry production
and had access to capital. Skilled technicians without the capital, tied-up with capitalists and
established small-scale hatcheries. This is the main reason why so many small hatcheries are located in
Panay Island, where a major shrimp research laboratory and a fisheries college is located.
In the regions of Bulacan and Pampanga, where extensive shrimp farms predominate,
entrepreneurship emerged in support services and allied businesses. In these part of the country, boats
are the main mode of transporting supplies and products to the ponds and market The produce are sold
at auction halls. Individuals including managers of fishponds invested in boats which are rented out for
P 500-1,000 per trip to haul harvest from the ponds to the auction halls. Likewise, many invested in
specially designed boats rigged as pumps and rented out for P.5OO-1000 per 8-hour operation to pump
water out of the ponds during harvest and pond preparation when tidal flushing is not possible.
Collectors of natural feeds, shrimp fry brokers and operators of auction halls operators also proliferated
in response to the expansion of shrimp culture. Auction hall operators even extended credit for working
capi~l just to ensure that the producer will use that auction hall during the next harvest.
The drastic decline in prices of shrimps in the world market that was experienced in 1988-1989
made heavily capitalized intensive shrimp farming operations unprofitable. The extensive and semi-
intensive shrimp farming operations were not so badly hurt by the crash in world price of shrimp and
today are still operating profitably. Many shrimp hatcheries closed due to low demand for shrimp fry
coupled with problems with diseases during production of post-larvae. Several processing plants and
dealers hips of pond equipment and supplies were also affected and were forced to close due to poor
business.
The price of shrimp has improved and supply does not seem to be a problem at the moment.
Farms which can produce at a lower cost are still competitive. It is expected that companies engaged in
integrated operations would be able to retain the major share of the international market and the
smaller, extensive and semi-intensive operations would be able to tap the domestic market. Already,
more farmed shrimps are becoming available in the local market at prices that are within the reach of
the consuming public. As the domestic economy improves, domestic consumption of farmed shrimp
is expected to increase thereby allowing the profitable operation of extensive and semi-intensive
shrimp farms.
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Table 1 : Comparative Features of Extensive, Semi-Intensive and IntensiveSystems
of ShrimpCulture. (Adapted from lAC, 1989).
Extensive Semi-Intensive Intensive
A. Assumptions
Farm size 7 ha 7 ha 7 ha
Stockingrate 2-5/m2 5-15/m2 15-30/m2
Survival 70% 70% 70%
Average bodyweight 38 g 35 g 30 g
Crops/year 2 2.5 2.5
PToduction/crop!ha 798 kg 2.45 tons 6.3 tons
Materials/ha/crop
Fertilizer.organic 1 ton 1 ton 1 ton
Inorganic 200 kg - -
Lime 1 ton 2 tons 4 tons
Teaseed cake - 200 kg 400 kg
Power(kw/h) - 1,000 3,000
Labor(man-days) 120 240 480
FCR 1.2 1.6 1.6
. Development cost/ha P 150,000 P 200,000 P 500,000
Initial investment/ha P 200,000 P 428,000 P 1,145,000
B. Economic Indicators*
Payback period(yr.) 2.7 1.7 1.95
Average rateof return (%) 30 56 47
Net presentvalue
PI50/kg, static 264 2,340 4,281
P140/kg +/- 7% 181 1,681 2,585
P140/kg +/- 20% 272 292 (985)
Internal rateof return (%)
PI50/kg, static 30** 57** 46**
P140/kg +/- 7% 23** 47** 36**
P140/kg +/- 20% 9 25** 13
* Undiscounted :
Paybackperiod - no. of years to recoverinitial investment plus interestfrom expectedearnings.
Average rate of return - ratio between annualprofitsexpected and valueof projectafter depreciation of
investment.
Discounted :
Net presentvalue - difference between presentvalueof projectearningsand cost; 0 is negative value
Internal rateof return - discounted ratewhich equates present valueof projectbenefits and cost.
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Ill. SELF-EMPLOYMENT
AND SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES

Presentation
Small-scale enterprises have retained much attentionparticularly in countries where the private
or public modern sector was incapableof supplyingemploymentfor a fast growing labour force. Most
studies on the informal sector were done with the objectiveof setting up alternativepolicies where the
modern sector failed to lead the economicgrowth. The case of Thailand is then specific.The economic
.performances of Thailand, which are described elsewhere in this book, offer a context which is very
different from the countries under adjustment policies. But despite their rapid development,
manufacturing industry and services did not stream all the available labour force to the factories. On
the contrary, employmentin the manufacturing sector remains low, and even with the recent growth of
services, a majority of people are still engaged in small scale activities, as self-employed or hired
workers. In 1990, the manufacturing (modem) sectoremployedless than 10%of the total labour force.
More than half of the urban labourforce was engaged in "informal" activities,
So, despite the performances of the Thai economy,the main source of employmentremains non
modern activities, and mainlyagriculture. In the period of 1978-1988, there were about 16 million new
jobs on the labour market, that is an increase of 50% of the labour force. Agriculture supplied nearly
half of these jobs, while the remaining was equally shared between the modern sector (including
government'spositions) and small scale activities. Thus, in a country where investment in the modern
sector is the driving force of the economy, small scale industries and self-employment still have an
importantrole in supplyingemploymentand incometo the population.
When one talks about self-employment and small scale entrepreneurs in the context of
entrepreneurship and socio-economic transformation of Southeast Asia, one thinks of three major
themes.
First is the entry point of entrepreneurs or the makingof the entrepreneurs. Connected with this
first topic are also issues like how can a small entrepreneurbecomebig. Here of course, one deals with
the attributes of the entrepreneurs, the education and training, the experiences, the marketing, the
buildingof managementskills and financing, This is the main topic discussed in Xavier Oudin's paper,
who also shows that the average educational level of the small entrepreneurs is not below the one of
the workers of modern factories. However, as nowadays modern factories at least require secondary
education, the situation could be changed in the future, with many people rejected in informal
activitiesas those engaged in "survival" occupations whoare describedby Barbara Igel.
Second, from the economic development perspective, the roles of self-employment and small
scale entrepreneurship are sometimes discussed within the context of the role of the "informal
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sector"1. But in developing countries, the more important issue is that of the poor self-employed in this
sector and that is where some papers of this section focus. Here, development economists are
interested in how to deploy the informal sector as a means to solve or reduce the problem of
unemployment, underemployment and poverty. How can the informal sector develop as the
"backward", "lowproductivity", "low income" sector, or the ghetto where the "reserve army of the
unemployed" is congregated.
The different papers highlight some various aspects of this question, and might sometimes seem
conflicting. While Xavier Oudin insists on the success of small scale entrepreneurs who are better off
than factory workers, Barbara Igel, looking at the slum economy, sees evidences of "survival"
occupations of slum dwellers-, Voravidth Charoenloet examines the situation of garment shophouse
owners and workers, and gives a mixed description of their conditions, especially working conditions.
The reason for this apparent conflict is that the authors examine different segments of the "informal
sector", and it is not surprising that their findings on the income of people engaged in this kind of
activities are not uniform. This raises the question of using the concept of "informal sector" to
understand the social transformations in a fast developing economy.
I . .
The third theme is that of government intervention. What roles can the government play to
make small entrepreneurs, and the self-employed in the informal sector grow and become a part of the
dynamism. The government's intervention is necessary in many areas, and may not be desirable in
others. One of the question is how to achieve a right balance and a right mix of government policy
interventions. H.B. Solignac-Lecomte and Naruemol Bunjongjit, although they do not make any
proposal for government intervention, give an account of how small scale enterprises behave in
relation to the regulations. The study sho~s a good acceptance of regulations by small entrepreneurs in
three countries, but not especially in Thailand. Here again, the concept of "informal sector" seems to
be open to criticism. The definition on an institutional basis (the enterprises of the informal sector are
defined as activities which do not follow the regulations or are not registered) once was part of the
main trend of thought on the informal sector, and this inspired government action.
Howeverthere is a need to improve labour conditions, as Voravidth Charoenloet mentions. It
appears clearly from the firidings of the different papers that there is an urgent need to upgrade social
welfare in theses segments of the Thai society.
1- The self-employed may not necessarily be in the informal sector, such as the case of self-ernployment among
highly professional occupations such as lawyers, architects, and so on. ' .
2- One of her main findings is that the slum economy is much linked with the urban economy (not with the rural
areas), and is fairly integrated in the society. We are far from the "marginalized" people of the Latin American .
slums.
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Education and Career Patterns among Small Scale
Entrepreneurs in Thailand
Xavier Oudin
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the growing urban labour force not employed in modem
factories, services or the administration has become a major concern of the governments of developing
.countries. The so-called informal sector, once considered a social pariah, has been surveyed and
analyzed, and is now seen as a socially useful "sponge" of unemployment. This shift is one of the
benefits brought about by the greater emphasis international agencies have placed on the informal
sector: the ordinary labour of million of people has been acknowledged by their governments as being
socially useful.
Soon after the discovery of this social phenomenon, the need for government action was
brought to the front stage. Beyond the ordinary social welfare policies, one of the major fields of
intervention of governments in the informal sector is training and education. Under the auspices of the
International Labour Organization (LL.O), many projects of training or upgrading the skills of the self-
employed, workers or small entrepreneurs in the informal sector have been established throughout the
world.
Early research on this topic noted the low educational level of people engaged in the informal
sector as well as their lack of skills, low productivity and low incomes. In comparison, the formal
sector was supposed to attract well-educated and trained people with higher salaries. Hence the
theoretical background of the dualistic economy, where the barrier of the technical level in the modem
sector would reject the surplus of labour in an informal low income-generating sector.
Data has been found to support this theory, consisting generally of evidence gathered from a
very specific segment of the informal sector, that is low-income areas. In Thailand especially, research
on the informal sector has generally b~n conducted among selected low-income households, in order to .
gather data to be used for social welfare policy. Although the quality of these studies might be
excellent and the objective of these policies be laudable, it cannot be used to prove anything about the
characteristics of the informal sector, since the conclusions are already contained in the premises: it is
obvious that the average income of a sample of households selected based on their low earnings will be
low! And such a population is likely to be poorly educated, not well-prepared to meet the needs of a
modem economy, etc.
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The objectiveof this paper is to examineentrepreneurs in small-scale industries, who indeed are
in the informal sector whatever definition is chosen, by looking closely at their educational and
training backgrounds. After a discussion of the educational level in Thailand, focusing on the labour
force (section I), we shall see the characteristics of entrepreneurs in small-scale industries in this
respect (section 2). Then, we shall try to analyze the impact of their educational and career
characteristicson their success, through their income (section3).
1. Education and Training Background of the Labour Force
Lagging behind many other Asian countries in education for many years, Thailand has made
considerable efforts to upgrade the educational level of its population. This policy has been crowned
with success: Thailand has now one of the highest levels of literacy in Asia. However, the legacy of
the past is still be evident.
1.1 Education Levelof LabourForce in Thailand
Since 1992primary educationhas been compulsoryin Thailand.Enforcement of education laws
took decades, while full schooling of children was achieved only in the 1960s. In 1962, compulsory
schooling was raised from four years of primary to complete primary (six years). However, the 4th
year ("Prathom4") continues to be the basic educationlevel attained by the majority of the population.
. Thailand now has one of the highest literacy rates of Asia. This is due to the stringent policy
set up by the Government after the 1932 revolution. While these considerable improvements have
favoured primary school enroIIment,the rate of schooling in secondary schools remains low, as
compared with neighbouring countries.
Tablel : EnroIIment Ratios in Selected Asian Countries, Mid 1980s
Primary Secondary Hil!her % adults literate
Thailand 97 30 20 91
Malaysia 99 53 6 74
Indonesia 118 42 6.5 74
Philippines 106 65 38 86
India 92 41 9 43
VietNam 102 42 na 88
Enrollment ratios are the ratio of pupils on the total population of an age group. In pnmary, It can be
over lOO, since childrenabove the age limit are enroled.
Source: Jee-Peng Tan, AIain Mingat (1989) except for Viet-Nam. Data based on UNESCO sources.
For VietNam, World Bank, (1990)and GeneralStatistical Office (1991).
The Thai school system is characterized by a very low enrollment ratio in secondary school.
While enrollment in primary school is satisfactory, there is a drop at the start of secondary school with
half the children leaving the system.On the other hand, the drop at the other end of the system (end of
secondary) is low, ascompared withother countries.
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This unique situation holds heavy consequences for the educational level of the labour force. As
Charles N. Myers and Chalongphob Sussangkam (1991) point out, "The current secondary enrollment
ratios are below the sixth Plan targets, the lowest in ASEAN, less than half of what they were in
Korea when GNP per capita in Korea was at Thailand's current level, and less than half of what they
are now in Sri Lanka which has about a third of Thailand's current per capita income. While increases
in these ratios according to the Seventh Plan target will improve the situation considerably, there are
long lags before the improvement will have significant impact on the average quality of the Thai labor
force. This is because improvement in the education system only affects the new entrants into the
labor force, and there are still a very high proportion of those with low education in the current Thai
labor force." (p. 31)
The structure of average education levels of the labour force reflects the general situation with a
lag of one generation, therefore at a lower ~yerage level. In urban areas where the educational level is
much higher, less than half of the entire labour force has an education level beyond primary. Among
production workers, the education level is especially low: less than 30% have studied beyond primary.
We shall later compare this group (urban production workers) with our sample of entrepreneurs.
Table 2 : Percentage of Labour Force Having Completed Primary School, by Gender,
in the Whole Urban Labour Force and Selected Categories, 1988
Source: Labour Force Survey, 1988, 3rd round, National Statistical Office.
UrxIer Lower Upper Lower Upper Tertiary
lorathom 4 Drimarv I primarv secondary secondary
Whole labour force, males 5.3 33.3 13.4 16.8 14.9 16.3
Whole labour force, females 7.3 37.2 14.2 9.1 13.9 18.3
Production workers 6.1 46.2 19.2 13.5 10.3 4.7
Sales workers 12.4 42.9 14.8 9.1 14.2 6.7
. .
Improving general education remains a major concern of governments, but since full schooling
of children has been almost achieved, emphasis is now being given to the secondary school as well as
to matching of education to the needs of the economy.
Besides general education, Thailand has had to face dramatic challenges in training its labour
force. In the last twenty years, the economy grew at one of the highest rates in the world. Over the
same time period, the total labour force has doubled, from 16.7 million in 1970 to 32 million in
1990. Vocational training, which is fairly developed in Thailand, has to adapt very quicklyto the needs
of economy.
2. Education and Training among Small Entrepreneurs
We shall now examine the situation of education and training of entrepreneurs of small
enterprises. The data are drawn from a random survey made by the ORSTOM and CUSRI project on
some 735 entrepreneurs of individual enterprises in five selected activities in urban areas of Thailand.
The five activities are: garment making, metal production including aluminium, restaurants- either
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inside buildings or the street, wooden furniture production, and electrical appliance repairs. Further in
the text, these five activities are merely referred to as garment, metal, .restaurants, wood and electric.
Some results for the first three activities, focusing on the behaviour of entrepreneurs vis-a-vis the
institutional background, have already been published (Naruemol Bunjongjit and Xavier Oudin(l992)).
The referred publication contains information on the methodology and scope of the survey, as well as
detailed information on the characteristics of the entrepreneurs.
Small entrepreneurs of these five activities do not represent the "informal" sector of Thailand.
Beyond the limitation of activities and the exclusion of rural areas, the sample is representative of all
.kind of entrepreneurs, provided their enterprise is not registered as a company. No assumption has been
made prior to the survey, such as the size of the enterprise, the level of income, technological
characteristics, etc., to draw the sample. Thus, the sample consists of self-employed or home workers
with no employee at all or only family helpers (55% of the sample have no employee or only family
labour), as well as small enterprises with employees. But the sample is not weighted by activities. No
correction has been introduced in order to give a weight to each activity proportionally to their
importance at the national scale (which could be estimated from various sources). For this reason,
most results are presented here by activity. Finally, the sample is representative of urban areas at the
national scale (the sample was weighted by main region, proportionally to the estimated whole
population of individual enterprises in each activity).
2.1 Results for Thailand
As in other countries, available data show low average levels of education among people
involved in informal activities. Data differ according to the unit surveyed. When the unit consists of
members of households, the average level of education is lower. When the unit is defined as the
entrepreneur alone (i.e., the head of enterprise, including one-person enterprises), the levels of
education are higher. This is the case in the CUSRI-ORSTOM survey. In table 4.where we consider
average duration of schooling, the Department of Labour and ILO survey gives quite high figures:
more than 9 years on average 'for entrepreneurs (end of lower secondary level). This is due to the fact'
that a two-step sampling gave more weight to entrepreneurs in units with at least 5 employees (see
tables 3 and 4).
Though difficult to compare because of the various methods used to draw the samples and
differences of definition of.the informal sector, these data are to an extent consistent. They show that
the average level of education of people involved in informal activities is not much below that of. the
labour force. If we consider the whole labour force, including rural areas, 6% of the labour force never
attended school, and 37% have attained upper primary or over. When considering entrepreneurs,
including self-employed and home-workers, it cannot be assessed that these people fall into the
informal sector because they are blocked from entering the modem sector due to their insufficient levels
of education. Further evidences on incomes will later support this idea. But first, a closer look at the
educational level of entrepreneurs in small-scale activities is needed.
118
Table3 : Education Levelof Different Categories of Entrepreneurs and Workers,
from Several Surveysin Thailand
Survey Dateof . J>lace Pop No. % min. % not
Notes
survev surveved cases educated* educated
NIDA 1981 Bangkok Households in slums 1851 20.3% 8.6% , a
NESDB, ILO-Artep 1986 Bangkok Self-employed 235 37.0% 13.2%
in 2 sub districts
TOR! 1990 Bangkok Headsof households e: 373 36.5% 10.7% b
I+- 4 towns in small activities w: 153 38.5% 6.9%
CUSRI-ORSTOM 1991 Urban Headof individual entero. 735 53.6% 4.6%
Urban LabourForce 1988 58.7% 3.9%
Production workers - 47.7% 3.4%
Notes: * Above4th yearof pnmary; e: employers; w: workers.
a: The sampleis made up of households in selected slumareas. The households must haveat least one
person working in the informal sector (self-employed, casual workers, workers in units with less than
10personsor earning less thanminimum legal wage).
b: From a sampleof households, headsof households engagedin activitieseither as self-employed or
as a worker, provided that the activity does not employ more than 10 people. Bangkok's weight is
70% of the starting sample. 80%of households weredrawn in slum areas.
Sources: NIDA, see Suwatee (1982); NESDB, see: ILO-ARTEP (1988); TDRI, see: TDRI(1992);
UrbanLabourForce: see table2.
Table4 : Average Duration of Education of Different Categories ofEntrepreneurs
and Workers in Selected Surveys
a: Sampleof 300 enterpnses m SIX activtues, dividedinto twosub-samples: one for enterpnses with 0
to 4 workers(131 cases), one withenterprises with 5 to 20 workers (169cases). Source: see above. '
Survey Date of Place Pop surveyed No. Entrep. Workers Notes
survey cases
Dept.of Labour, ILO 1990 Bangkok Enterprises with less e: 275 9.1 y 6.7 y a
than 10 workers w: 1753
CUSRI-ORSTOM ·1991 Urban Headof individual entero ' 735· 7.0 y
... ..
2.2 Discrepancies between Genders and Ages
The distribution of entrepreneurs by schoolattainment varies tremendously by age, showing the
, ,
improvement of theschool system nationwide over the last 30 years. Two-thirds (68%) of male and
threequarters (77%)of female entrepreneurs older thanfifty have a levelof education belowor equal to
prathorn 4. Among younger entrepreneurs (under 31), the figures are 16% and 24 % respectively.
During the same period, those who have at least reached upper secondary level are more than 40% .'
amongyoungermales, and one third (34%) of theirage categories amongfemales.
Beyond the dramatic improvement of education levels that has affected the whole population;
these data show a strong discrepancy between males and females, except among the youngest
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entrepreneurs. This gap between genders is evident in other aspects of small-scale activities, females
having generally a smaller level of business and turnover.
However, improvement in education is clear. It is faster for females, who start from a lower
·level (5 years of schooling among the elder), and overtake the mates in the youngest generation, with
an average of 8.4 years (8.2 for males). Since there are still fewer females with higher degrees and more
.with low degrees, the higher average duration of schooling suggests that females take more time to
reach a given attainment, but also that the ones who carry on lengthy studies do it longer than their
male counterparts.
2.3 Family Background and Education
In addition to gender and age, family background is one cause for major educational gaps
between entrepreneurs. Due to the improvement of education in Thailand that we have described, access
to primary school is now possible for everyone, whatever the social background. However, a social
gap --that is the disadvantage of being the child of a farmer-- appears at the end of primary school. The
children of farmers make up 44% of our sample. They also comprise 44% of entrepreneurs who have
completed primary school, but are only 30% of those who studied upper secondary school, and 8% of
those who went beyond secondary school. Comparing this share at different levels with the share of
each social group in the whole sample, we can set up a ratio that can measure the advantage or
disadvantage of each social group at different educational levels.
While in primary school, all social groups are represented according to their share in the
sample, but a gap appears from this point and widens as we look at higher levels. The farmer's ratio
goes down to 0.6 at upper secondary level, and to 0.2 at higher level. By contrast, children of industry
. workers, and even more so children of government employees are over-represented in higher educational
levels.
By comparing the ratio of all groups to that of children of farmers, we can compute an "index of
selectivity", the relative probability of entering the next stage of education as compared with farmers .:
Thus, children of government employees are nearly three times more likely to attend upper secondary
school than children of farmers. The probability of entering university is 30 times higher than
entrepreneurs from farmers' families. The gap in the population of entrepreneurs is however narrower'
.than the one for the whole population. Jee-Peng Tan and Alain Mingat (1989), from whom this
method is drawn, compute a share of enrollment in upper secondary level and university level of 0.3
and 0.2 respectively for people from farming families (in the case of social equity, the ratio should be
. 1, that is more than three and five times respectively).
. It can also be shown that despite a dramatic improvement in school enrollment in all groups of
society, which benefited much to people from farmer families as far as primary school is concerned,
the gap between social groups does not shrink with time for females. Average duration of schooling is
similar for younger male entrepreneurs from all family backgrounds, while there is a gap of nearly two
years between elder children of farmers and others. This gap has disappeared in younger groups,
showing that nowadays, social background is no longer a cause of discrepancy in this class of small-
scale entrepreneurs.
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But things are different as far asfemaleentrepreneurs are concerned. The gap between daughters
of farmers and others is widening due to the presence in the sampleof many female home-workers in
garment, but more,street workers in restaurants..
Table 5: Average Duration'of Schooling by Gender, Ageand SocialBackground
Parents Males Females
Not farm. Farmers !1 Not farm. Farmers !1
Under 35 10.3 10.5 .-0.2 10.7 7.7 3.0
36-42 9.1 8.4 0.7 8.0 6.1 1.9
Over42 8.4 6.5 1.9 6.6 6.1 0.4
Including duration of vocational school.
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM-OECDSurvey, 1991
2.4 Acquisition of Skills
In addition to improved education, entrepreneurs need skills to succeedin their businesses. The
source of acquisition of skills can be divided into two main systems: 1) schools (including vocational
school in the national school system) or specialized institutions, either public or private; 2) on the job
experience, either through a specific period of training (apprenticeship),or through work without
specific training.
On the job --or infonnal-- training is by far the main source of acquisition of skills for small
entrepreneurs. Not surprisingly, formal training --especially public vocational school--is more
common forpeople witha higher levelof general education.
Table 6 : Sourceof Acquisition of Skillsby Level of Education
Prathom4 or less Comp.primary Uppersec. & over Total·
or lowersec.
No. % No. % No. % No. %
No training
(by oneself,withfriends...) 160 46.8· 98 42.8 74 45.7 332 45.3
Apprenticeship 139 40.6 73 31.9 19 11.7 231 3~.5
Vocational school 0 0.0 5 2.2 47 29.0 52 7.1
Long term training in
vocational private instil. 22 6.4 20 8.7 12 7.4 54 7.4
Short term training courses 21 6.1 33 14.4 10 6.2 64 8.7
Total 342 100.0 229 100.0 162 100.0 733 100.0
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM-OECDSurvey, 1991
The importance of apprenticeship in Thailand's informal sector is one of the striking results of
this survey.Thereare more" former apprentices amongyounger entrepreneurs thanamongolder ones. In
garmentand metal,the activities wherethis kindof training is the mostwidespread; apprenticeship has
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been the source of skill acquisition for 45% of entrepreneurs under 35 years old, but for those aged 42
and above, it was 36%.
In these two activities, people with a low level of education are more likely to have been
apprentices (53% of those with a level of prathom 4 or less). In the same way, 53% of farmers'
children also are former apprentices (32% for the other): Finally, apprenticeship is more often a type of
training addressed to males (52% are former apprentices against 28% of females).
". Furthermore, when entrepreneurs, are asked what has been the most useful training for their
present job, apprenticeship receives the higher rate of satisfaction, as compared with technical
education.
Apprenticeship appears definitely as a way to obtain ski.llsfor people who suffer a disadvantage
in their family or education background. In this sense, it has been (and probably still is) a powerful
tool of integration of disadvantaged people into the labour market. Apprenticeship is also well adapted
to managerial. training for small entrepreneurs since it teaches more than technical skills. While
apprentices, young boys and girls are often initiated into all the aspects of the management of the
enterprise. Nowadays, many entrepreneurs still train apprentices. This function of informal
entrepreneurs as trainers should be fully recognized and encouraged.
3.' Factors for Success of Entrepreneurs
Having seen that the education level of entrepreneurs in the informal sector is not a factor that
would prohibit them fromentering the modem sector, it is worth considering the benefit ·they receive
from being educated. This is possible inside our sample only, and we shall consider the benefit from
education and individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs relative to the others.
3.1 Measuring the Benefit of Education and Training
.It is widely hypothesized in all areas of the social sciences that education and training bring
benefits. In industrialized societies and in most of others, the "benefits" can be measured by wealth.
.This value is held so strongly nowadays, that any training program of education or training for skills
is considered as an investment (and a cost) and must return benefit under the form of better income for
the recipients. In economics, the theory of human capital has formalized and elaborated this basic idea.
The basic idea is still very simple. It consists of examining the effect of a difference in
investment (here, ed.ucation is the investment) on the income, among several individuals. Two factors
however make the relation between education and income more complex. The first one is that there are
several kinds of investment in education and training: besides general education, there are specialized
. courses, vocational training for different kinds, on-the-job training, and other work or educational
experience that is not necessarily formal. The impact of these different factors is likely to be unequal.
All career experiences, not necessarily educational, should also be taken into account, all the more
since we have seen that on-the-job experience is the first source of skill acquisition for entrepreneurs.
The second thing is that income is the effect of many other factors that are not at all or
indirectly related to education and other individual characteristics. The income of entrepreneurs is
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calculated here from the enterprises' accounts. It is the difference between all receipts and all expenses
of the enterprise. All factors that may influence the different steps of the calculation have thus an
impact on the income. For instance, better equipment is likely to raise production, and as a
consequence, the income of the entrepreneur.
Statistical techniques provide tools to deal with these problems. Using multiple regressions
allows us to study the effects of different variables on the variance of the revenue. We shall first
consider the importance of individual characteristics (education, training, experiences... ) as compared
with economical factors (labour and capital), but shall not comment on function of production. Then
we shall examine more precisely the effect of education on revenue. We shall conclude by presenting
some typical career paths depending on some characteristics we have seen.
3.2 Importance of Individual Characteristics in the Success of Entrepreneurs
Many different factors contribute to the value of revenue. Two of them, labour and capital,
which are essential explanations of the process of production, have retained the attention of economists
in economic theory. Among other factors, we shall focus on individual characteristics of the
entrepreneurs, that is, their social background, their education and training, and different stages of their
work life.
As expected, employment and capital (defined as the value of all machines, tools and vehicles
used by the enterprise, but not including buildings or land) are the main variables that determine the
level of production of small enterprises. Employment has the strongest effect, and this is not
surprising in labour-intensive industries with a low level of capital. Depending on the activities,
employment can account for 25% (restaurants) to 70% (garment) of the variance of the revenue. It
should be noted also that labour productivity increases significantly with the size of enterprise. Though
trivial, this result simply shows that these small-scale enterprises are rationally managed.
.Additional factors will therefore explain the difference in revenue between entrepreneurs whose
enterprise has the same characteristics of employment and capital. Though somehow significant, the
effect is weak, given the importance of economic factors. The level of education appears as the third
factor in explaining revenue for all activities. In garment (more precise analysis shows more effect of
education among male entrepreneurs) and electric, the effect of education is the strongest.
The next individual factor taken into account in the model is migration, meaning that all other
things being equal (i.e., for enterprises of the same size and entrepreneurs of the same education), those
who have migrated from their province of origin tend to get higher revenue. This is the return of a kind
of dynamism for the entrepreneurs who leave their birthplace to work.
Employment and capital, or the size of the enterprise itself, depends on ability, educational
background of the entrepreneur and other non-economic factors. Here again, education is part of the
explanation for the size of the enterprises. To summarize, it can been shown that enterprises with
better equipment are generally owned by people who are younger and better educated than the average.
In other words, the biggest enterprises in the sample are not the result of a long and patient
accumulation, but rather the evidence of a different kind of entrepreneur, probably-better introduced into
the modem circuits of the economy. Age, experience and even technical knowledge are not of any use
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for greater success, while being younger, better educated and having contracts with modem enterprises
have positive effect on success (working as a subcontractor is a positive factor of success).
When considering only non-economic factors, we still can explain between 10 and 30% of the
variance of the production, depending on the activities. This means that regardless of the enterprise's
size, production is determined by the factors, in descending order, of education, migration, training and
miscellaneous experiences. Among them, the length of time spent as a wage worker or farmer has a
negative effect, meaning that the longer the individual remained in this stage, the lower his revenue
(these effects are however marginal). The relations are quite different between activities, and while we
cannot go into detail, we can provide a few examples. In metal, 15% of the variance of the production
is significantly explained by non-ecconomic factors. The first is education (number of years of
schooling, for 8%). Then come different stages in the career, with a negative effect (having wage-work
experience or having been unemployed is more characteristic of those with lower revenue).
3.3 Effect of Formal Education on Success
Formal education (i.e., school) proves to be the main non-economic factor that affects the
success of entrepreneurs, as measured by the performance of their enterprise.
Direct effect of education on the income of the entrepreneurs can be seen from the results shown
in table 7:
Table 7: Average Yearly Income of Entrepreneurs by Activities and School Attainment
Prathom 4 or less Comp.primary Upper sec. & over
or lower sec.
Garment 72000 120000 277000
Metal 238 ()()() 294000 519000.
Restaurants 108 ()()() 131000 201000
Wood 545000 233000 986000
Electric 58000 127000 135000
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM-OECD Survey, 1991
However, the eff~t of education is neither linear nor automatic. This means that it cannot be
. assessed that supplementary schooling brings in all cases a supplementary income. Rather the data
above show an effect of education on income by stage. They show that after a certain level of
education, the income tends to be higher. In electric repair for instance, those who have gone to school
beyond the 4th year of primary have, on the average, an income twice as high as those with less
education. But after this level, supplementary income due to a higher school attainment tends to be
very small. In restaurants, the gap starts after lower secondary level.
The case of wood is extreme. Under lower secondary, there is no relation between school
. attainment and income (some experienced and older entrepreneurs with a prathom 4 level have reached a
higher level of income than less experienced entrepreneurs with.a primary degree). But the difference
can be seen clearly among entrepreneurs with an upper secondary --or higher-- level.
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The figures above do not take into accountdiscrepancies due to gender, social background or
experience. It can be shown however that the general trend of higher income matched with better
educationremains when these characteristics are taken into account. For instance, incomesby gender
and by school levelamong garments' entrepreneurs are as following:
Graph1: Yearly Production by Gender andEducation Attainment in Garment Industry
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In garment industries, males have more than one "step" advantage, i.e., males of the first
category(prathom 4 of less) earn a bit more than females who havecompleted primary,etc. The same
pattern happens when considering those who have migrated as compared with those who never left
their province. In both 'cases, one can see a better income with a better educational level, but the
general level of income is higheramong those who have migrated, whateverschool attainment they
have reached.
This patterncould be checkedin furthersub-categories, by age, socialbackground, etc. In fact,
the trend we have seen by gender is not repeated whatever characteristic we consider. For instance,
amongentrepreneurs witha givenlevelof education --say lowersecondary--, income does not change
significantly with age. In other words, older, educated entrepreneurs do not earn more than younger,
educatedones. The same thingcan be seen with socialbackground. As we haveseen previously, there
.is an importantgap in schoolaccess between children of farmers and others. But when we considerall
the entrepreneurs of a given level of education, there is no more difference in income by social
background.
These are very important results. It showsthateducation is a definitive advantage, which neither .
experience nor training out of schoolcan replace. It also tends to prove that school is the only way to
overcome the disadvantages of being born in a farmer family. In other words. school has been a
powerful means of overcoming social differences.
On the other hand, it shows that acquiring general knowledge is a condition for success. But
this does not necessarily constitutea goodevaluation of school. As we have seen, once a certain level
is reached(beforecomplete primary, except in thecase of wood, whereit is higher), additional studies
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in secondary do not bring a definitive a1vantage (exceptions to this are the few who completed
university degrees, and who now range among the highest income in the sample). Undoubtedly, while
a general educational background is a condition for success, the knowledge itself is not necessarily.
useful, nor is further vocational training,as we will examine in the next section.
3.4 Effect of Technical Training
Unlike general education,vocational training--whateverkind of training it is-- does not seem a
major factor in determining the successof entrepreneurs. There is no directeffect: people who have had.
vocational training in an institution or who have been apprentices do not have higher incomes than the
others. Technical training thus seems to be overall neutral.This can be interpreted as an equal benefit
from whatever kind of training entrepreneurs have had, including training on the job. In other words,
those who had technicalcourses from institutions do not enjoy any advantagesas compared with those
who acquired skills on the job, including those who worked as apprentices. However, there are some
specific cases wheretraining and success can berelated, and theseare examined hereafter.
People who have been engaged in vocational training generally have had longer work
experience. However, this is not a positive factor since it indicates that it took them longer to reach
the position of entrepreneur. This is because institutions train people at technical skills only, and the
recipients tend to enter wage-workerpositions, rather than. be self-employed. They are not trained, in
either case, to run an enterprise.
Apprenticeship does not bring better benefits than institutional training, as measured by the
level of incomeof the entrepreneurs. As for thosewho attendedvocationaltraining, apprentices tend to
continue in their career as wage workers. On average, this kind of experience is not favourable for
success. (To be exact, it should be noted that the number of years of such an experience is not --or·
even negatively-- related to the levelof income, but a short experience as a wage-worker can be useful).
This does not mean than apprenticeship is not useful. If we take into account the social cost of
differentkinds of trainingas comparedwith their rate of return, apprenticeship would certainly be well
ranked, as compared with public vocational training. As a matter of fact, the social cost of
apprenticeship is nil. For people coming from poor families, apprenticeship is a substitute to school --
or at least to vocational school--, and gives returns faster than other kinds of training (apprentices are
generally paid after a few weeksof work).
3.5 A Path to Success
The effect of education and other work experiences in determining the success of entrepreneurs
can be summarized in a unique factor, the time it takes to become an own-account worker. This is the
duration between the end of formal studies (including vocational courses) and starting at one's own _
account. Generally, those who did not study long held positions such lis family helper (sometimes in
agriculture)and wage-worker a long time before being able to start their own enterprise. On the other
hand, those who finished at an older age spent less time in various experiences before starting their
own enterprises. It did not take them long to become self-employed. The graph below shows the
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average duration of different stages of education and career, by gender, in two patterns: on the left,
those who got to the position of own account in no more than 12 years, on the right, the others.
Graph 2: AverageDuration of Different Stagesof Educational and Work Career,
byPattern of Careerand Gender
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On average, entrepreneursfalling into the ftrst pattern have spent 10 years at school (including
vocational), while the averageof the secondgroupspent in under6 years (in both cases, females have a
lesser duration at school). Duration in other positions is of course shorter in the ftrst category, due to
. the criteria to deftne it. Duration as a farmer (or at home, especially for females) is negligible in the
ftrst group. This actually means that very few entrepreneurs in this group ever worked as a farmer.
Experience as an apprentice is also lower in the ftrst category(20% have at one time been apprentices,
45% in the second category), because apprenticeship is more typical of a low education profile. It can
be seen in the chart below that the time spent as an apprenticeor family helper in the second category
nearly ftlls the gap of school duration. It clearly indicates the role of this kind of training as a
complement to school, for those who did not have the chance (often because of their family
background) to continue in school.
As a result of their short duration of work experience before becoming own-account workers,
and despite a longer durationat school, people in the first group havebecome.entrepreneurs at a much
youngerage than the others, nearly 10 years before,on average. The average age of starting as an own-
account worker is 23 years old in the first case, 32 years old in the second case. Despite their relative
youth, more entrepreneurs in the first cat~gory now have longer experience as head of enterprise (or
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self-employed). Thus, the length of life --and stability-- of the enterprise is not merelya result of the
age of entrepreneurs (though within each category, it is related to age), but is also related to the
educational andcareerprofile of entrepreneurs;
The better-educated entrepreneurs in the firstcategory, who were veryyoung whenthey started
their enterprise, are also more successful than others. They have on average bigger enterprises and
better results.
Table8 : Average Sizeand Income of Enterprises, by CareerPatterns of theEntrepreneurs
Pattern 1 Pattern 2
Tot. emnlovrnent Income* Tot. emnlovment Income*
Garment 5.0 ' 129000 4.6 102000
Metal 6.7 401000 4.8 259000
Restaurant 2.5 155000 1.8 117000
Wood 6.8 892000 5.0 295000
Electric , 2.2 129000 1.7 89000
* Average yearly grossprofitof theenterpnse
Source: CUSRI-ORSTOM-OECD Survey, 1991
Education allows entrepreneurs to reacha certain levelof income earlier. In this sense, it can be
considered a veryprofitable investment.
Conclusion
The entrepreneurs in urban small scale industries havean educational level comparable to the
rest of the labourforce, and especially with production workers. There is no evidencein Thailand that
entrepreneurs workin the informal sectorbecause a lack of education preventsthem from entering the
modem sector (someof them werepreviously wage-worker in modem factories). The average income
of theseentrepreneurs is also higherthan the average salaryof the,modemsector.Thus, not only does
education bring benefits, but so does the entrepreneur position. The distribution of income is,
however, very unequal. There is also specific segments of the society, where people run'informal
activities, that would not allow for an optimistic diagnosis.
Within the group of small entrepreneurs, a better education is also a main advantage. It helps
the individual to reach the entrepreneur position earlier and to achieve a decent level of income.
Especially for children from farmer families, education, evenat a lowlevel,has been a powerful means
of social -- or at least income-- upgrading. The same thingcan be concluded for the position of small
entrepreneurs in general. Far from beinga supplementary barrierto socialmoves.the "inf0rn:tal sector"
in Thailand, as represented here by self-employed and smallentrepreneurs in urbanareas, seems to be
on the contrary a wayof moving upward socially.
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Informal Sector . the Economy of the Poor?
Voravidh Charoenloet
With the adoption of export-led growth in 1985, the integration of the Thai economy into the
world economic system greatly accelerated during the 1987-1990 economic boom. The boom during
this period was mainly supported by three factors of foreign markets, foreign capital and foreign
. tourists (Charoenloet 1:1991). The engine propelling this growth came from the manufacturing and
service sectors (phongpaichit: 1990).
Although industrialization has been gaining rapid momentum, indicating a growth of about
17.0% from 1989, it has been very unbalanced. The growth of the agricultural sector has been lagging
behind, averaging 3-4% a year since the last decade. The capacity of the industrial sector to absorb
labour is limited; about 8 to 10% of the labour force lit present is employed in manufacturing. Rapid
growth in the Thai economy has not led to the "trickle down" effect, but has tended to generate
increasing concentrations of wealth among the rich (share of wealth among the affluent, the richest 20
.percent, rose from 49.3% in the last decade to 55.6% in 1988), the hyperurbanisation of Bangkok and
the rnarginalisation of the poor. As a result, many have had to find alternative employment in the
"informal sector", ranging from street vendors, garbage collection, and motor-bike hiring to
manufacturing.
It is estimatedthat not less than 30 million people throughout the country are engaged in some
kind of informal activity. They operate either from the home-base or row house shops. Some,
especially in the ready-made garment industry, produce for the export market. This paper will focus on
some of the findings drawn from" Shop-house Ready-made Garment Manufacturing: A case Study of
the Informal Sector in Bangkok", conducted by the Commission for Peace and Justice.
,During the early phase of industrialization, textile manufacturing consisted mainly of import-
substitution industries. The major investment in textile production came from the Japanese. It was
hoped that these industries would create linkages, especially "upstream" ones. However, the activities
of spinning, weaving and finishing are relatively capital-intensive and rely on the import of machines
and synthetic fiber. This development has not been very favourable whether considered in terms of
employment generation or reduction in a country's trade deficits. However, with the current boom in
exports, there has been a shift from textiles into the labour-intensive fabrication of ready-made
garments. The export value of ready-made garments amounts to two-thirds of the total value of all
textiles exported, or 87,690 million boot, in 1991. For three consecutive years (1989-91), it ranked'
first on the list of major income earners for the country. Producers of ready-made garments include
.domestic as well as foreign investors, among which investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan has been
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increasing significantly in recent years. This coincides with the strategy of relation of labour-intensive
industries away from the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) toward the Association of Southeast
Asean Nations (Asean) as a cheap base for producing export goods. At present, of the 3.2 million
workers employed in the manufacturing sector, about 1.3 million ~ork in textile factories and 800,000
in the ready-made garment industry.
1. Subcontractors in the Ready-Made Garment Industry
At present, the Thai government has no formal policy on workers in the "informal sector", but
in the Seventh Plan, the emphasis is given to the development of the subcontracting system and its
"spill over" into the countryside. Subcontracting is viewed by the government as one way to solve the
problem of the market as well as to check on the quality of the, products. The spread of the
subcontracting system will lead to the dispersion of small, decentralized production units. This will
create employment opportunities, provide new sources of income to farmers and actualize the
government's programme of rural industrialization. Thus, it is suggested that modem business has a
network of subcontractors as its foundation. However, from our study on the emergence of informal
activities, especially the shop-house, the situation is not that "idealized". Small is not always
beautiful: small undertakings which come into existence quite spontaneously as a result of the export
boom may appear vigorous, but our case study proves that the market mechanism may not be that
beneficial, whether considered from the view-point of the owners or workers in these small
establishments. Certainly, there are many producers now striving to obtain contracts producing for an
external market that is highly volatile, uncertain and uncontrollable. As a result, the strategy used to
organize subcontractingis "defensive flexibility", i.e., to cut down on labour costs.
The rapid growth of garment-making industries and exports in the context of the world recession
translates into fierce competition in a shrinking world market. Trade in textiles and ready-made
garments is one of the areas heavily regulated under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA). Thus, in
recent years, many firms in the textile and garment business have pursued the strategy of flexibility,
i.e., to pass from the regime where labour is considered "fixed" or "rigid" to one in which it is
"variable". This has resulted in the laying off or termination of certain positions once occupied by
"permanent workers" where the firm has to bear "fixed" costs (wage, welfare and seniority), and instead
relying more on hiring temporary or out-workers to accomplish the same task. Trade unions in
Thailand have been successful in campaigning against the hiring of temporary workers and the
government has accommodated their demands by making such a practice illegal when extended beyond
a certain period of time. Despite these actions, the rapid expansion of garment industries has led firms
to rely more and more on subcontracting out certain lines of production to small-scale producers or
home-based workers as a way to achieve cost-minimization.
According to certain studies, informal activities originated from the subcontracting system
organized by firms in the formal sector. But "subcontracting" or "contracting out" orders may be done
by tradirig firms engaged directly in export. Although subcontracting is quite preponderant in the
garment industries, our interviews with some small producers reveal that such a system is not always
preferable to expert seamstresses. The reason given ate that it lacks flexibility and is subject to strict
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quality control. A shop-house owner complained that subcontracting a piece of work from the factory,
such as attaching shirt-collars or patching up jean pockets is not very enriching. In the long-run it
tends to rob them of their skills as they have to specialize in a single task, and thus makes them very
dependent on the factory. What small producers would prefer is to compose the whole dress and not
just parts of it. It is also difficult to organize workers along the factory line, as the informal sector
functions solely on the family and patron-client relationships. Therefore, small producers prefer to have
orders contracted out by trading firms, usually those located at the Baiyoke Tower. These firms are
engaged in the direct sale of ready-made garments, both for domestic and export markets, and have a
network of "subcontractors"; the shop-house owners in Din Daeng or Huay Kwang districts. These
"subcontractors" are supplied with raw materials, especially cloth. After completing the task specified
by the order, the subcontractors are paid ona per-piece rate. The costs and the risks due to the
uncertainty of the market are spread among these many small producers'or subcontractors.
2. The Informal Sector: Poor Entrepreneurs Struggling to Survive?
At present, informal shop-house producers of ready-made garments are but an outcome of the
strategy of "defensive flexibility", i.e., cuts in labor costs. This excludes these small-production units
from playing a complementary role in the formal sector of the economy, i.e., as a flexible production
unit, highly specialized, using skilled labor to produce high-quality goods. The small informal
producers in Thailand may thus be surviving at the subsistence level.
The informal garment-making industry does not pose much of a barrier to entry. The initial
investment in opening a row-house shop is small, between 30,000-50,000 boots --enough to purchase
a two-storey house, and 2 or 3 sewing machines. However, the determining factor that differentiates
between the first or second hand-shop is the acquisition of skills. Most successful owners of row-house
shops have accumulated post experience working as employees in tailor-shops. This gives them skills
needed in designing and pattern-cutting as well as personal contact in obtaining stable orders. The
problems facing these small informal producers are the uncertainty of the order as well as the low piece
rate paid by trading firms, With the proliferation of small producers in garment-making in Bangkok,
this tends to drive down the piece price. These small producers have less liberty to play a role in the
market. They are highly dependent on a certain number of trading firms for providing product outlets
and supplying raw materials. Cloth supplied to subcontractors cannot be bought directly from the
market. The supply of this raw material is restricted.due to a monopoly organized between the textile
factory and the ready-made garment factory or trading firm. Receiving no aid from the system, these
small shop-house producers can hardly be capable of improving their position in the market. Since
many of these small producers compete for the same orders and are unorganized, the trading firms prefer
to negotiate individually and to play one against the other. Small producers thus cannot have much
bargaining power nor a fair share of the market. Trading firms capture a large margin of pro~it as can .
be shown in the figures below.
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Table 1: Comparison of Responsibilities. Duties and Income Received
within the Shop-House Garment Manufacturing Cycle
Baivoke shop owner (tradinz firm) Shoo-house owner Workers
Arranges market contracts; Organizes sewing of garments; secures Use labour to
purchases raw material (cloth) eouinment (sewing machines); uses labour .produce zarments
Retail sale: cost/piece: Sewing cost/piece: first contract shop Payment/piece 6-7 Baht
short sleeve shirt 120-130 Baht 15-16 Baht, sub-contract shop 13-14 Baht
The income of a shop-house owner depends very much on the order he contracts from the
trading firm, This source of income is uncertain because it depends on the external market. When in a
period of difficulty such as thatduring the 1991 GulfWar, trading firms may be inclined to postpone
cash payments for the finished work or instead prefer to pay in kind, i.e., by the number of pieces
fabricated or an open-dated cheque. Many of the shop-house owners are forced to accept this situation in
order to retain contracts with the trading firm. They have no other alternative but to adapt.
In the production process, a shop-house owner is often constrained by the need to make ends
. meets. His major concern is to have enough cash in hand to cover general expenditures in the shop-
house, and also to pay his workers in due time money to be sent to their parents. For it successful
shop-house owner, two conditions are necessary for the survival of his business: the management of
rotatingfunds and the management of human relations.
To constitute the rotating fund, shop-house owners lack access to easy credit. So, many have to
compete for orders and force down prices for the piece-sown just to have cash in.hand. ASa result, the
growth of small producers tends to be concentrated in certain areas and not to the dispersion but cluster
of small undertakings. In fact. the concentration of producers. especially near the market. can be viewed
as a strategy to reduce costs. e.g. the cost of transport. but it also creates a sense of security. There is
one fairly common characteristic of mutual assistance among shop-house garment producers. When
one of their friends or workers. wants to start the business, they are helpful in giving advice and
sometimes advance money. They consult with one another on how to design. change patterns or
technical problems. They borrow from each other when short of cash. To hold together as a group can
also provide advantages. by enabling them to have access to credit from Credit Union (a cooperative)
but also by helping them to find orders. Thus. the growth of the informal sector in town is but a
recent phenomenon of hyperurbanization rather than dispersion of activities as one might expect.
Owners of shop-houses in the ready-made garment industry typically base their operations in
popular areas such as the districts of Din Daeng and Huay Kwang, where costs are relatively low for
room rentals or labour. Each shop-house owner has his own network of labour which he can rely on.
Workers come from his-or his wife's-family, typically young (under 18) and with limited education
(completing only compulsory primary level education). In order to work, they are not required to have
prior skills or experience, since dress sewing skills can be acquiredthrough apprenticeship. Most
young women workers do not choose to work in a shop-house, but are forced by their parents. Many
of these workers thus lack motivation in taking up this work seriously as a career. The rotation of
labour in and out of the shop-houses is high. Thus. for a "successful" shop-house owner. the
management of human relations is very important. The workers must be encouraged to work as a
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group, usually in pairs, by creating a sense of belonging to one large family. Shop-house owners and
workers eat, live, and work together. Problems are shared and workers must be convinced that they, as
daughters, have the obligation to earn money they can send home to their parents. Work must be
shared fairly. As the income of workers depends on the number of pieces done in a day, too much
difference in earnings can lead parents to withdraw their son or daughter from the establishment. A
shop-house owner must also be ready to assert his authority, especially when it is related to the
behaviour of his workers in general.
Work-hours in the shop-house are typically long, 12-15 hours a day. The pace of work is slow
in the morning and quickens at the end of the day as workers strive to finish the number of pieces
assigned for the day. Work is irregular depending on the order. As the revenue of the shop-house owner
and his workers depends on the number of pieces completed, when there are many orders coming in,
work hours may run from the morning till midnight. Long hours of work have negative consequences
on worker's health and they may complain of back-aches, cramps, ulcers and respiratory problems.
These workers lack social protection and proper health care as they have no social status as workers.
Subcontracting is, thus, a disguised form of wage payment. It can degenerate into a system of self-
exploitation and the exploitation of the workers: low pay and long hours of work.
Differing skill levels can be the basis for the distinction between the first or second hand shops.
Greater skills can give the first hand shop not only the option of choosing with which trading firm to
work but can also allow the shop to negotiate the price of each order. Shop-house owners can earn
about 20,000 to 30,000 boot a month (net income), much higher than income earned by working in a
factory. This disparity has encouraged some workers to leave the formal sector to become a patron.
Although they lack experience in sewing, such skills may not now be too much of an obstacle to
entering the business. Skill in cutting cloth and pattern-making are now becoming an integral part of
trading firms, while small shop-house owners are becoming just simple producers (sewers). Many
complain of loosing their skills by being made to specialize in certain jobs such as shirt-making or
sewing. In recent years, we have seen the proliferation of these small producers in the informal sector,
competing for a limited number of orders and, in this process, driving down the price they can charge.
The aim of the informal sector is, thus, not to maximize profit as one would find in the formal sector,
but rather "to survive".
To conclude, we have seen that the informal sector of the ready-made garment industry has come
into existence spontaneously with the opening of the domestic market. Facing international
competition, many factory and trading firms in the formal sector have relied on subcontracting as a
strategy to reduce costs. This has led to the agglomeration of subcontractors whether they be the
homebase workers or small shop-house owners which physically concentrate in areas close to the
market. Entrance into the informal sector does not pose much of a barrier today: requiring little capital,
using family labour and bringing acquired skills; there can emerge a new entrepreneurship with the
capacity to organise and take risk. However, recent evolution may not support these positive aspects.
As informal sectors are left alone to the freely play of the market, subcontracting often results in the
adoption of "defensive flexibility", Le., to reduce labor costs. Competition among small-producers
leads to a fall in prices, self-exploitation and the exploitation of workers. Beneficiaries are usually
factories or trading firms in the formal sector, which tend to capture a larger share of the profit. For the
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informal sector to play a moreconstructive role and not one in which survival is the only purpose, an
alternative option may be as follows:
1. It should be organizedto play a complementary role to the economy. The domestic market
should be activated more, so that shop-houses do not depend solely on the external market, which is
unreliable.
2. Local communities must step up their role in providing access to technology, to bank credit
or intermediate products as wellas provide greater assistance in upgrading thequalityof theproductand
marketing.
3. Shop-house ownersshouldbecome organized in order to havebargaining power.
4. The government can play an important role in skill formation, not only technical skills in
sewing, but also skills in designing, management and marketing.
5. Informal workers shouldbeprotected underthe labourlegislation and coveredby someform
of socialwelfare.
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The Economy of Survival in the Slums of Bangkok
Barbara Igel
1. Analyzing slum economies with the informal sector concept
Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, with its rapidly growing population - from 3.5 million
inhabitants in 1970 to at present about 8 million! - is a showcase for regional and local disparities
caused by rapid urbanization. Bangkok's population grows by 3.6% per year. Two thirds of Thailand's
urban population live in the central region, and 90% of them in Bangkok. About 44% of the gross
national product and 77% of manufactured products are generated in the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan
Area, and more than 90% of all jobs in industries are concentrated here. Every year more than 100,000
persons searching for employment migrate to Bangkok (Pakkasem, 1987). The registered supply of
labour grows by more than 80,000 workers per year. Only a few of them are employed by medium and
large scale industries equipped with modern technologies. More than 70% of the employees in
Bangkok are found in the trade and services sectors.
Apart from these regional imbalances, local disparities are being aggravated. In 1983, 448 slum
areas, inhabited by 1.2 million persons had been counted in Bangkok. In 1985, a new survey found
1,020 slum areas with an estimated population of 2.4 million. Therefore, today about 33% of
Bangkok's population lives in slums.
Despite their heterogeneity, informal economic activities share some common characteristics:
they escape from economic policy controls, do not pay taxes, lack registration, maintain contractual
relations beyond the official legal order (which often even conflict with the law), and impart
professional skills outside of recognized education and training systems (Paul, 1985).
There is no doubt that informal economic sectors and slum areas are not congruent, neither do
all informal entrepreneurs and their employees live in slums or squatter settlements, nor do all slum
inhabitants work in informal enterprises. Based, however, on the above mentioned data on the pace of
urbanization, the forecast that the informal sector could, in the future, be the dominant mode of
economic activity in the urban areas of developing countries may very well come true. Therefore, the
thesis that the informal sector is the economic parallel to the informal settlements in slum and squatter
areas (Baldeaux, 1983) seems to beplausible.
1- Henning/Jenssen/Kunzrnann (1978). The actual figures are estimates which include non-registered
inhabitants in slum .areas. In 1985, Bangkok had a registered population of 5.26 million, see Thai Rath,
19.9.85 and Pakkasem (1987)
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It is obvious that for slum households, fundamental links exist between the generation of their
survival income and their habitat. For low income households, improving the habitat has to take a
back seat to the necessity of generating a sufficient income to satisfy their basic needs. Likewise, the
style of living - the social and spatial organization of the habitat - is determined by the necessity to
secure the daily survival minimum. Consequently, a habitat and form of housing is chosen which
guarantees the safest income. By ignoring these fundamental links, conventional housing policies and
programmes had to fail.
However, recent programmes which aimed at improving the living conditions of slum residents
- like sites and services, self-help housing construction, and upgrading projects - have also perceived
dwelling as a purely physical problem, and thus neglected the social and economic fabric and networks
of entrepreneurs and households living in the slum. Physical slum reconstruction resulted in a
destruction of the living base through increased rents and lack of space for small business enterprises.
Resettlement to the outskirts caused the loss of social relationships and regular clients.
Reconstruction projects in slums and resettlement programmes for slum residents can only be
successful if they manage to remedy existing defects while preserving the values of these settlements
for their inhabitants, i.e., not endanger or even destroy their economic survival base. Manifold
experiences show that not upgrading projects planned from outside, but rather a stimulation and
promotion of the economic development potential existent in the slums can improve the living
conditions of its residents.
This study explores, in five of the far more than one thousand slums in Bangkok, some options
to strengthen the development potential of the economy Ofsurvival. During three empirical surveys
between 1985 and 1988, five slum areas in Bangkok- were researched by collecting primary data and
applying the method of participant-observer evaluation. The surveys focused, in particular, on informal
economic activities and their contributions to the households' survival income, as well as on the
interweaving of economic activities between the slums, other urban sectors, and rural areas which had
been established through the economic self-organization of slum residents.
2. Microenterprises in the slums of Bangkok
The employment opportunities of slum residents in Bangkok are determined by the location of
their settlements, as most of their income sources depend on their proximity to business firms and
households in the formal sector. Here the fundamental connection between the needs of income
generation and habitat becomes evident. The way of life is determined by the daily struggle to secure
the minimal survival income.
Residents of slum settlements close to large food markets find work as coolies; produce and sell
candies and other sweets; trade vegetables, fruits, fish and meat; and collect paper, cardboard and plastic
bags for recycling. Inhabitants of slums in the vicinity of factories producing such goods as canned
2- The slums researched are Soi Ban Baat with about 200 households, Trok Tai with 49 households,
Rimbueng Makkasann with 334 households, Rot Fie Asoke with about 250 households, and Chumchon
Pattana in the outskirts of Bangna with 43 households.
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fruits, soft drinks, ice, cement and steel tubes are employed as day-labourers. Squatters who have lived
more than two decades on land belonging to the State Railways of Thailand ate employed as
conductors, gatekeepers, technicians, and workers repairing tracks.
Other jobs of the slum residents are less dependent on the location of the settlement, such as:
- Taxi drivers, construction workers, street-sweepers, sewer men, garbage men, mobile sweets and
beverage stalls at central bus stations, mobile noodle and rice cooking-shops, flower and .
newspaper vendors; employees on fixed contracts (watchmen, drivers); employees in the public
sector, like bus drivers, conductors, electricity meter controllers, policemen, and soldiers.
- IUegal activities, like beggars, prostitutes, gamblers, and drug dealers.
- Activities within the boundaries of the settlement, like letting out rooms, selling electricity,
grocer's shops and food stalls inside the slum settlement.
Criteria as simple and clear as possible are selected to record and analyze the economic activities
of slum residents, and to delimit informal from formal employment. They are based on recognized
characteristics found in the majority of other studies on the informal sector.
The most important criteria is the self-generation of activities by the entrepreneur and his
family. The search for employment and income is considered as the essential cause for the informal
sector's emergence. The informal entrepreneurs' behaviour is determined by their search for means to
survive, also called the "Economy of Survival"3. The main purpose of founding an enterprise must be
the creation of employment and income generation opportunities for oneself, and maybe one's
relatives, whereas later on some non-family-members can be employed. The employment of these
external workers is also considered as informal.
A second important criterion to distinguish the informal from the formal sector is the fact that
informal businesses escape froin economic policy controls because they are not registered or legalized
by an industrial or commercial board.
The third feature of informal economic activities is a high level of risk and insecurity which the
decision-makers face due to the many events beyond their control that seriously affect their enterprises
and cause great variations in their income. Elwert mentions, in this context, the strata of the
"unsecured" (Schicht der "Ungesicherten", Elwert et al., 1982). The sources of risk are mostly irregular
demand for informal prod~cts and services, the'iUegal nature of the enterprise,lacking access to credit,
subsidies and financial incentives, and lack of insurance in case of illness, unemployment, or old age.
The contribution of informal employment to the survival income of slum residents is
determined by applying these three criteria in the analysis of microbusinesses operated by inhabitants
of the five researched slums. The findings of the operational analysis of 413 microbusinesses owned by
the slum residents can be summarized'[ as follows:
3- Herrle defines the informal sector as the Economy of Survival or Okonomie des Uberlebens", see Herrle
(1983). .
4- For the details of this operational analysis see Igel (1988).
139
- Commercial enterprises, with 44.8% of the 413 explored businesses, hold the first rank, followed
by food processing with 20.8%, services with 18.4%, and other manufacturing businesses with
16% (see table 1).
- 334 businesses offer their products and services at locations outside of the slum settlements,
whereas 79 entrepreneurs sell their goods exclusively to their slum neighbours. Their markets are
small, mostly cooped in andeasy to survey.
- They have no marketing relations to bigger private business companies or the public sector. Only
26.6% hold a legal operatingpermit,
- Two thirds of the microbusinesses are headed by women; 44% of these women are the main
income earner in their family.
- Only 15% of the microentrepreneurs have been trained specifically for their job. About half of
them are migrants who had moved to Bangkok to search for better employment opportunities.
- Most of the goods produced by the microbusinesses are oriented towards satisfying basic needs;
73% of the 337 manufacturing and trade enterprises supply primary sector goods. The production
technologies applied are labour-intensive, except in a few cases (5.5%). All raw materials,
commodities and equipment used in the production process are local products and mainly purchased
from small retailers.
- The microbusinesses show a wide spectrum of functions and structures, which is reflected in great
variations of investment capital and operating revenues.
- The majority, or 55% generate an income per person which is higher than the minimum wage in
Bangkok. Most of the 21.4% of entrepreneurs who earn considerably less than the minimum wage
rate are incidental income earners and work comparatively few hours per day.
- The age under the present head of the microfmns and a dominance in ownership by the head of the
enterprises indicate potential for long-term persistence of these informal businesses. This potential
for further development, however, is constrained by limited markets, harassment by the public
administration, and missing access to financial resources in formal credit markets.
Other important development constraints are, in many cases, the social obligations which
successful owners of the microfinns have to fulfill towards their relatives. The payments to non-
employed family members frequently cause a substantial outflow of capital and limit the scope for
necessary investments.
- The microentrepreneurs have no access to financial resources, with the exception of savings
within their extended families and the informal credit market, where interest rates of up to 360%
per annum are charged. In 81% of the microbusinesses the owner has generated the initial
investment capital out of his family's savings. Investments after the establishment of the business
are comparatively small. Except in one case, the microbusinesses had invested only -in the
substitution of equipment which was worn out.
,- The 413 researched microfinns employ altogether 489 persons or one third of the roughly 1,500
workers living in the five slum areas; 116 work in food processing enterprises, 80 in the
manufacturing sector, 194 in trading and 99 in service firms,
140
- The average investmentper workplaceequals Boot6,470, which covers a range from Boot 2,078
to 33,256 in food processing, Boot 850 to 12,400 in the manufacturing firms, Boot 125 to 16,000
in trade, and from no investment at all up to Boot 19,600 in the service sector. The average
floating capital of Boot 5,152 per worker and per monthS is strikingly high when compared with
the average investmentcapitalper worker.
Table 1: Supplyof goodsand services
Branch Number Share in percent
Food processinz 46 20.8%
Other manufacturers 66 16.0%
- Basedon primarysectorgoods
+ Clothes and shoes 8
+ Woodproducts 15
+ Paper bags, garlands, toys 30
- Basedon industrial goods
+ Motorcycleworkshop 1
+ Bicycle workshop 1
+ Metal wares 12
Trade 185 44.8%
+ Food 63
+ Newspapers 41
+ Sweets, soft drinks 12
+ Flowers 32
+ Scrap materials 32
+ Others 7
Services 76 18.4%
+ Transport 20
+ Laundry 18
+ Hairdresser 3
+Landlord/-lady 23
+ Prostitute 12
- The value added which equals turnover less cost of raw materials and stocks on hand varies
considerably,and can only be estimated. The collection of relevantdata was difficult due to lack of
record-keeping by the microentrepreneurs. In the foodprocessing microbusinesses, the value added
ranges from 15.7% to 53%, and manufacturing showsa spectrumbetween 33.3% and 89.5%6.
5- This average amount of floating capital for raw materials, working materials, products in store, wages to
be paid, unpaid bills less liabilities, 'and cash is derived from the individual estimates by the heads of the
micro-businesses of floating capital necessary for one week of operation. The rate of exchange for US$ 1
ranged in 1985/86 from Baht 25 to 26.
6- All 86 food processing enterprises together produce a value added of Baht 4,565,958 per annum (70 rice
and noodles cook-shops Baht 3,465,350 and 16 candy producers Baht 1,100,608). The other 66
manufacturers achieve an annual value added of approximately Baht 3,643,680. Thus the candy producers
realise the highest average value added of Baht 68,788 annual per production unit, followed by other
manufacturers with Baht 54,383. The rice and noodle cook-shops achieve an average of Baht 49,505
annually per unit.
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The microbusinesses owned by slum residents shall be classified as belonging to the informal
or to the formal sector. Based on the three criteria which determine the informality of an enterprise,
namely self-generated employment, lack of registration or other legalization, and a high degree of risk
and insecurity (like official harassment due to illegal production location, high fluctuation of demand,
exclusion from formal subsidized credit markets, minimum-wage legislation and social security
programs), around 94% of the researched microbusinesses can be classified as informal. Indeed, all 413
microbusinesses comply with the criterion of self-generated employment with regard to their owner,
and only 3 enterprises employ workers who are not members of their extended families. Likewise, all
microbusinesses are excluded from access to the formal credit market, government subsidies, social
security programs and guaranteed minimum wages. However, only about two thirds suffers from
pursuit due to their illegal status (around 30%) or extreme variations in demand for their products
(about 32%). The criterion of risk and insecurity is not met by about one third of the firms.
The 390 households which own the 413 microbusinesses have been surveyed with the purpose·
of ascertaining the contribution of income generated in the informal microfirms to the whole
household income. Twenty-three. households operate two different microfirms at the same time. The
average household size is 4.4 persons out of whom 2 are working.
The total income per household of the 390 slum families ranges from Baht 450 to 30,000 per
month. The average monthly income the households earn in the informal sector is Baht 3,540. For
176 families, an average of Baht 2,255 income from the formal sector comes in addition to the income
from the informal sector, making an overall average monthly income of about Baht 4,784. These
income data elucidate that formal employment contributes an important part to the families' income
even in those households which operate an informal microbusiness. In 38 households (9.7%) the
income from formal sources is considerable higher than earnings from informal sources. Fifty
households (12.8%) earn almost equal formal and informal incomes. 125 households (32.3%) receive a
clearly higher informal than formal income whereas the majority, or 176 households (45.1%) earn their
living solely within the informal sector. Besides, taking into account that in about 30% of the cases
the investment capital for founding the microbusiness had been earned through employment in the
formal sector, while the sales of two thirds of the microbusinesses depend on the purchasing power of
their customers outside of the slum settlement, it becomes evident that the informal sector alone
cannot be considered as the "engine of a self-sustaining development process" in these slum areas, as
assumed by Baldeaux (1983).
3. The economic survival territory of slum inhabitants
Following the insights gained from the previous discussion - that the informal sector concept
can catch only parts of the very complex economic activities found in the slums settlements - the
model of the economic survival territory shall be introduced. The concept of the economic survival
territory (EST) enables us to distinguish and fully analyze the slum residents' complex and diverse
income generation activities, and the related streams of goods, money and migrating people. The EST-
model does not focus on a supposed dichotomy between an informal and formal sector, but rather looks
at the entire activities of the slum households which, caused by a striving for secure employment and
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income opportunities, lead to strategic actions directed towards a combination of different income
sources.
The fundamental ideas of the EST-model are based on the paradigm of the
"Uberlebensokonomisches Territorium" developed by Maennling (1984) which lays hold on the spatial
shape of socio-economic exchangerelationsbetweenpoor rural and urban populationgroups.Owing to
the centralization and departmentalization of the public administration measures, the fight against
urban poverty has in most developingcountries remained confined to less efficient, singular projects,
such as sites-and-services, in contrast to comprehensive rural development programs. Insufficient
interdisciplinary cooperation between the different academic disciplines which deal with regional
development theory led to research studies about migration focusing mainly on the extent, structure,
short-term course and individual motivesof the migrants.Thus, they give only disconnected facets of
economic survival activities of poor population groups which do not relate to the regional context of
their establishedexchangenetworks.
The central thesis of the EST assumes that rural-urban migration in developing countries has
caused poor population groups in rural regions and urban slum areas to mould a survival economy
with specific features7 because they cannot find sufficientoccupationand income neither by farming
nor if! the urban industrial sector. This peculiar manner of economic activity is called survival
economy. The households have to combine formal and informal occupation with subsistence
production to satisfy their basic needs. Their strategic action plans aim at applying the total labour
force available in their household in such a way that the highest possible income is realized. Due to
this, a substantial numberof households in slums and villageschange their composition within certain
periods. The household members engage in permanent or seasonal intercity, intracity, and circular
rural-urban-rural migration. As a consequence of these migration flows, distinctive economic rural-
urban networks are established which play a central role, both for the survival of slum households as
well as their relatives living in rural communities.
Based on these considerations Maennling developed the paradigm of the "Uberlebens-
okonomischesTerritorium"with emphasison the contextof peripheral urban settlements, the center of
I ., .
the regional growth pole and peripheral rural settlements. The economic transaction networks are
I
created between the regional growth pole and urban settlementsat the periphery as well as among the
peripheral urban settlements. Such transaction networks also exist connectingrural settlementsand the
related central town. The extension of the intrasettlement and rural regional connections for securing
the resources for survival and the sustained exchangeof goods, services and labour between rural and
peripheral urban settlements,even across considerabledistances, is pointed out as a distinctive feature
of the living conditions of poor families in peripheral locations.
The householdplays a central role in the actual exchangeof transactions through the established
networks. The households' room for actions to secure survival and to explore new production and
reproduction resources by combining reproductive work (subsistence production, homework) and
employment is largely determinedby the available labourpotential (Maennling, 1984).
7- See Bennholt-Thomsen (1981); Herrle (1983); Illich (1983); Jacobi/Niess (1980).
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The economic exchange networks are established within the reach of extended families and
regionally split-up households. They are directed towards exploring access to the resources of their
counterparts. This is done through the direct exchange of goods and money as well as indirectly on
informal markets which, according to Maennling, are not dominated by neoclassical market forces.
The stability arid intensity of the exchange relations depend mainly on the extent of communal
organization within the settlement, which is more distinctively developed in rural regions but influ-
ences also the spatial and communal organization of villagers who have recently migrated to the city.
Other factors affecting the exchange networks, like distance, diversification and shortage of exchange-
able goods, can be relativized by strong family ties. As a precondition for the stability of the exchange
networks the benefits of exchanged goods, services and labour must be perceived in the long run as
equal, whereby the exchange relations are judged based on economic as weUas socio-cultural criteria.
Through the exchange networks which are organized along family and communal ties the
households form economic action-rooms for the generation of their survival income. These action-
rooms can condense in the cities in the form of slums to economic survival areas in which intensive
exchange relations emerge between rural households of small holders or tenants and households in poor
urban settlements of the related regionalcenter (Maennling, 1984). The ability of people living in
slums and small holder communities (economic survival areas) to overcome, at least partially, the
settlement-specific shortages of resources is seen as an indigenous development of these areas.
Several economic survival areas (slums and villagesjconnected by exchange relations via the
regional center form an economic survival territory. The reach of the EST depends more or less on the
formal economic sectors in the region. The transport infrastructure and a certain number of workplaces
in factories, food markets, construction sites, ports, etc. available for slum residents as well as markets
for the microbusinesses - all these are important preconditions for the formation of migration streams
and the consequent establishment of household related exchange networks.
Maennling leaves the question unanswered whether the EST concept, originally designed for the
context of exchange networks between peripheral slums and rural communities channeled through a
regional center, can also be applied to inner-city slums and dispersed rural communities. He
recommends testing this for different countries and regions in individual case studies. This will be done
in Chapter Four for three of the five slum settlements researched in this study.
For this purpose the EST of slum residents in Bangkok will be structured and analyzed from the
urban perspective with the "circular flow" analysis, an instrument which is usually applied in the
calculation of the Gross National Product (GNP) for a country. The "circular flow" analysis depicts the
transactions between the different sectors of an economy, and measures the level of economic activity
which is indicated by the size of the GNP.
The economic structure of slums as parts of the EST is analyzed along the lines of the
categories of the "circular flow" of transactions in a national economy in order to grasp the economic
transactions between the slum and the world around it. Thus, all transactions of slum households as
producers and consumers within the survival area slum, as well as the exchange with other urban
sectors and the home villages of migrants living in the slum, can be recorded. The economic
interlocking of urban and rural survival areas, their relative autonomy, and the extent to which the
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slums are integrated into the urbanmacroeconomy can be analyzed with the "circular flow" categories,
In particular, with regard to the purpose of this study, to evaluate the contribution of informal
employment to the survival income of slum residents and potential development perspectives of slums
as economic survival areas, the "circular flow" analysis is most suitable for comparative city and
country studies.
The categories of circular flow of economic transactions applied in the calculation of the GNP
allow a systematic consideration of the very complex and heterogeneous economic survival activities
which previously could be recorded only to a limited extent with the informal sector concept.
The transaction categories applied in the GNP calculation have been developed for modem
industrialized market economies and can certainly not beapplied unchanged. Slum settlements are not
political economies, nor do the economic transactions in slums have all the same characteristics, like
the streams of goods and financial resources in an industrialized country with specialized subsectors.
In the following analysis of economic cycles in three of the five researched slums in Bangkok,
some transaction categories cannot be found at all while others exist only in a rudimentary form.
Essentially the following modifications are necessary:
- For the public sector: in general, there are no public sector institutions in slums and squatter
settlements. Compared to other sectors in the urban economy, microbusinesses and households in
slum and squatter settlements pay no or relatively low amounts of tax. Only 1.2% of the researched
microenterprises run by-slum residents pay a small business tax while none pay any income tax for
their workers. For the following calculation of the 'Gross Slum Product'(GSP) of the economic
survival area, tax on wages is considered only for those employees who could confirm with certainty
that their employers pay tax on their wages to the tax authorities. The minimum tax rate on wages of
7% which is valid fora yearly income up to Boot 30,000 is applied homogeneously to all tax-paying
employees.
- For the private business sector: the owner and head of the microbusiness, usually considers the
operational profit of his business as his freely disposable income and does not reinvest it. Since in
most of the microbusinesses investment capital is rather low, none or only very small amounts of
depreciation and investment to replace outworn equipment were found. Only 0.9% of the
micoentrepreneurs had reinvested into their business within the last three years.
Most of the raw materials and commodities are purchased from small retailers in the city, very
seldom from traders inside the slum. Some migrants bring agrarian commodities, like rice and herbs
from their home villages to the city. These raw materials for food stalls are valued by the prices of the
commodities sold on the markets in the slum neighbourhood.
Due to the fact that the microentrepreneurs consider profits (after taxes, if they pay tax) less
wages as their personal income, the microfirms' savings are always zero. Any amount saved by the
microentrepreneurs is considered as personal savings and recorded here under the category of savings
within his family's household.
- For the private household sector: unlike several other studies (Evers and Korff, 1982; Evers,
1981 & 1982) which consider the subsistence production as an important contribution to income
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generation in slum households, in the slums researched here only a minority produce goods for their
own daily consumption; i.e. food. For these households, a simple production account is established
which sets the self-produced output (valued by the local market price for similar goods) against a
calculated factor income as payment for the production factor's contribution. The subsistence
production found in the slums in Bangkok consists of food production, collection of half-rotten
vegetables from markets in the neighbourhood, collection of fuel wood, charcoal production, and
construction of shelter and drinking water wells by unpaid labour from household members and
friends''. In the cases of recently built houses we were informed about the total monetary expenditures
including materials and paid labour. For older houses the owner could not recall the total construction
costs, but told us an estimated actual resale price.
Besides being engaged in their own microbusiness and in subsistence production activities, the
slum residents earn wages in private business companies, the public sector or private households in the
city. A few households receive transfer incomes, like wages from relatives working in Saudi Arabia or
from household members who try to earn a living as beggars. Others send transfers to their home
villages to support relatives or to finance investments into their family's farm.
- For the 'slum economy' sector: the sector 'slum economy' of the economic survival area is not
congruent with the settlement area. Apart from the microenterprises located within the settlement,
those run by slum residents outside the slum area also belong to the private business sector 9. The
incomes of all self-employed and their paid workers are considered as being generated within the 'slum
economy' sector, regardless of the microfirms' location.
The wages of slum residents employed in business companies and private households outside
the slum and in the public sector; however, are considered as generated outside of the 'slum economy'
sector. These incomes from outside are part of the 'balance of payments', like the transfer incomes
from Saudi Arabia and from relatives living outside the slum, as well as agricultural raw materials
from the home villages. The related account is here called "outside world".
"Outside world"account
Exports of consumer goods Imports of production inputs
Transfersreceived Imports of investment goods
Income from employment Imports of consumer goods
Raw materials from home villages
Transferspaid
Direct taxes
Balance of pavments
The following analysis of the economic structure of three slum settlements cannot determine
the 'GNP' of the whole economic survival territory (EST), i.e. the slum and home villages of
migrants, but rather only' the Gross-Slum-Product (GSP) of the economic survival area slum and its
8- Evers (1981) and Evers and Korff (1982) define the construction of shelter, water wells and walkways as
urban subsistence production. As the newly constructed houses and water wells serve mainly for satisfying
basic needs of all households members they are not considered as investment into the microbusiness.
9- Nationals (concept of the GNP) calculation.
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dependence on external relations to, the city and the home villages of migrantsl''. The transactions
recorded in the "outside world" account are reflected in the following consolidated accounts of all
microbusinesses and all slum households for production, utilization of income and change of capital:
Slum production account
Depreciation Consumption
Remuneration for production factors Raw materials from home villages
Imports of production inputs Profits of microfmns
EXDOrts of consumer goods
Slum income utilization account
Transfers paid Remuneration for production factors
Consumption Transfers received
Savings Profits of microfirms
Direct taxes
Slum car ital account
Imports of investment goods Depreciation
. Balance of payments Savings
4. The economic cycle in the survival area slum
The circular flow of transactions or the "economic cycle" within the slum, its linkages to other
economic sectors in the city and to the home villages of migrants will be analyzed for the following
three slum areas in the metropolis of Bangkok:
The slum Trok Tai, which has existed for more than 100 years is located on a very small strip
of land, and its huts are squeezed in between a water canal and the walls of a shop-house complex. The
owner of this land is the Crown Property Bureau. Today, 49 families with 113 adults, 42 youngsters
and 21 children remain in Trok Tai. The average household size is 3.6 persons. Most of the families
earn their living as artisans and peddlers, as they have done for many generations. Only 18% of the 101
working residents are employed in the formal sector while 82% run their own informal microbusiness.
No subsistence production activities were observed during this survey.
The squatter settlement Rimbueng Makkasann is situated in a swamp area owned by the State
Railways of Thailand (SRT) close to the big railway repair-shop at Makkasann. The population of
Rimbueng Makkasann consists of 334 families with 837 adults, 180 youngsters and 324 children. The
average household has 4 members. 47% of the 657 gainfully employed residents work in the formal
and 49% in the informal sector. Some 10% are engaged in subsistence production.
The relatively young squatter settlement Chumchon Pattana in the suburb Bangna is located on
a privately owned plot close to an approach road leading to the superhighway. The first squatters settled
10- One could calculate the 'Gross Village Product' for all villages of migrants living in the slum and combine
this with the 'Gross Slum Product' in order to get the 'GNP' of the whole EST. This calculation would
consider exchange between the rural and urban survival areas not as external but rather internal
transactions. The effort to collect all relevant empirical data, however, could not be accomplished within
the framework of this study.
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here about eight years ago. The families in Chumchon Pattana, like the residents of the other two
settlements, don't pay rent for their plots. They do have, however, a permit signed by the landowner to
stay on provided they prohibit new families from settling downl l. The squatters have in return signed
a document promising to leave the area without any resistance in case the owner wants to sell or lease
the site. The 43 families, 110 adults, 26 youngsters and 39 children who used to live in 1986 in
Chumchon Pattana had at the average 4.1 household members. Out of the 92 persons who worked
rather regularly, 59% drew their income from formal and 41% from informal sources; 49% were, in
addition to their employment, engaged in some subsistence production.
4.1 Income generation within the settlements
The residents of the three researched slums generate income in the microbusiness sector within
the slum settlements mainly in manufacturing and services (see tables 2, 3 and 4). Only in Rimbueng
Makkasann does the trade sector hold the first rank, with 8 food shops and a news agent, whose young
vendors sell the newspapers at crossroads to motorists. Moreover, due to the favourable location on the
. edge of a swamp, 16 families are engaged in urban farming activities.
Table 2: Income generation in the microbusiness sector within the settlement Trok Tai
Number Number Number Average income
Sector of firms of of per month, in Baht
employers employees employers employees
Services
Laundry ·2 2 - 650 -
Electricity sales 1 1 - 400 -
Manufacturing
Paper garlands 22 24 - 2,031 -
Tovs 8 12 - 2,750 -
Table 3: Income generation in the microbusiness sector within the settlement Chumchon Pattana
Number Number Number Average income
Sector of firms of of per month, in Baht
employers employees employers employees
Services
Laundry 2 2 - 2,497 -
Landladv 1 1 - 400 -
Manufacturing
Candies 2 4 - 2,334 -
Pastry 2 2 - 1,198 -
Bicycle workshop 1 1 - ·5,000 -
Tailor 1 1 - 300 -
Urban farming ,
Pig breeding 1 1 - 4,092 -
11- The squatters have to organize the stopping of new arrivals themselves. Since 1987 they have had an
elected committee to coordinate their actions and negotiations with the landowner and government
officials. The only newcomers allowed to stay in the settlement are relatives of old-established residents.
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Table 4: Income generation in the microbusiness sector in Rim bueng Makkasann
Number Number Number Average income
Sector of firms of of per month, in Baht
employers employees employers employees
Trade
Food 8 8 - 2,958 -
Newspapers 1 4 2 7,121 2,400
Services
Hairdresser 2 3 - 4,054 -
Landlord/-lady 10 10 - 340 -
Laundry 9 9 - 2498 -
Manufacturing
Cook shops 6 6 - 1,564 -
Tailor 4 4 - 2,375 -
Shoemaker 1 1 - 3,000 -
Motorcycle workshop 1 1 1 3,958 600
Paoer bazs 8 16 - 400 -
Urban farming
Chicken breeding 6 6 - 1,200 -
Duck breeding 5 5 - 1,800 -
Pig breeding 3 3 - 4,000 -
Vegetable gardening 2 2 - 2,800 - -
-
4.2 Income generation from outside
The self-employed microentrepreneurs in Trok Tai and Chumchon Pattana generate income
outside the slum settlement, in the city, mainly by food processing. In Rim bueng Makkasann trade in
fruits, vegetables, flowers and newspapers ranks first before cook shops and transport services (see
table 5). The activities of these micro-entrepreneurs are, in some cases, spread over extraordinary long
distances as many of those who had been evicted already several times from other slum areas were able
to maintain their old sales markets and clientele. Most of the microentrepreneurs in Chumchon
Pattana, however, who had migrated to Bangkok within the last five years, have established their
business relations in a food market and close to a stop for intercity buses in the neighbourhood. The
microentrepreneurs of Trok Tai who had lived here for many generations could maintain and deepen
their business contacts in the immediate and wider vicinity of their settlement.
The majority of the working residents in two slums are employees; 58% of the working
residents (380 out of 657) in Rim bueng Makkasann and 67% in Chumchon Pattana (62 out of 92) are
employed outside the slum.settlement while three people in Rim bueng Makkasann work as
employees in microfirms within the settlement. In Trok Tai, however. only 33% of all working
residents are employed outside the settlement.
4.3 Total income generation - the net slum product
The residents of Rim bueng Makkasann, the biggest settlement among the three slum areas
"researched between September 1985 and November 1986, produced an aggregate annual income in 1986
of Baht 16,664,260 equal to Baht 12,427 per capita, which consists of the following components:
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Table 5: Incomegeneration in the microbusiness sectoroutsidethe settlement
Notes of table 5:
- Five households in 'Rim bueng Makkasann earn by begging in shopping centers and on pedestrian
bridges about Baht 1,500 per month. Two families in Chumchon Pattana who don't make enough income
by collecting waste materials for recycling, like cardboard, plastic and bottles, get one free meal per day
from alms left over by monks in a nearby temple. These transfers amount, on the average, to Baht 633
monthly per household.
- Once or twice per year, 26 households in Rim bueng Makkasann bring rice and dried spices back from
visits to their home villages. Thirty-five families here and four households in Chumchon Pattana have
left their school-aged children behind in the village with relatives because it is less expensive to
support them there than in Bangkok. The families of Trok Tai do not maintain any connections with
their villages of origin as they had migrated to Bangkok many generations ago.
- Two young men and two women from Rim bueng Makkasann -who earn, in Saudi Arabia, an income of
Baht 8,000 per month as construction workers and, as nurses in a hospital in Ryad,' Baht 5,000 per
month - transfer each between Baht 1,000 and 3,000 per month to their families.
Rim bueng Chumchon Pattana Makkasann
Number Average Number Average Number Average
Sector of firms income of firms income of firms income
Trade
Food 34 4,547 - -
Newspapers 21 1,430 - -
Flowers 17 1,600 - -
Candies 10 (16) 2,250 - 2 (6) . -1,650
Scrap dealers 5 3,417 - -
Cardboard, paper & plastic waste 8 400 - 4 (6) 260
Drugs 5 1,500 - -
Paper garlands & toys 4 1,500
Services
Auto-taxi 5 3,330 - -
Sahmlor(tuk-tuk) 12 2,958 - -
Tricycle-taxi 1 1,300 - -
Go-go girls 5 3,000 - -
Prostitutes 3 5,000 4 10,000 -
Manufacturing
Cook shops 38 2,878· - 4 (6) 2,782
Fish grill' shoo 9 (12) 4,900
-
-
Table 6: Incomegeneration Rim buengMakkasann in 1986 (in Baht)
Slum City Villal!es Total
Trade 683,376 3,519,804 - 4,203,108
Services 456,204 3,663,624 - 4,119,828
Manufacturing 394,104 4,387,560 -- 4,781,664
Construction --- 1,412,688 - 1,412,688
Public sector --- 1,452,564 -- 1,452,564
Urbanfanning 405,600 --- - 405,600
Subsistence oroduction 87,888 --- 10,848 98,736
Subtotal 2027,172 14436,240 10 848 16474260
+ Transfers
.
National 90,000
I
16,664,260
I International 1_...;I~OO=,..;;.;ooo;..;;..... ....I ---,- ---,- ---"
Net Slum Product (valued by market prices) = SlumIncome
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Microentrepreneurs contributed39% of the Baht 14,436,240 generatedoutside the settlement in ,
the city, while 61% was earned by employees. Within the settlement Baht 2,072,172 was produced
mainly by microbusinesses(96%), while the remaining4% was obtained by subsistence production.
The families in Trok Tai producedduring the same period an aggregatedannual income of Baht
3,253,260 or Baht 18,484 per capita. Microfirms contributed 59% of the Baht 2,251,680 generated
outside the settlement, while 41% was obtained by residents who are employed in factories and on
construction sites. The remaining Baht 1,121,580was produced by microbusinesses located within the
slum settlement.
Table 7: Income generationTrok Tai in 1986(in Baht)
Slum . City Villal!es Total
T~ --- 72,000 --- 72,000
Services 36,000 834,240 --- 870,240
Manufacturing 1,085,580 1,076,640 --- 2,162,220
Construction --- 148;800 --- 148,800
Subtotal 1,121,580 2,251680 --- 3,253,260
Net Slum Product (valuedby marketpnces) = Slum Income 3,253,260
In Chumchon Pattana the total slum income in 1986 amounted to Baht 2,203,416 , which
equals an annual per capita-income of Baht 12,591. Microentrepreneurs producedonly 18% of the
income of Baht 1,870,008 generated outside the squatter settlement, while 82% was contributed by
employees who work mainly in factories. The share of microbusinesses located within the settlement
amounted to Baht 318,216. Transfers in the form of free meals obtained from a Buddhist temple in the
neighbourhood contributedBaht 15,192.
Table 8: Income generationChumchonPattana in 1986 (in Baht)
Slum City Villages Total
T~ --- 139,680 --- 139,680
Services 64,728 465,744 --- 530,472
Manufacturing 204,384 1,017,072 --- 1,221,456
Construction - 80,592 --- 80,592
Public sector --- 166,920 --- 166,920
Urban farming 49,104 - --- 49,104
Subtotal 318,216 1,870,008 n.a 2,188,244
+ Transfers
- National 15,192
Net SlumProduct (valuedby marketpnces) = Slum Income 2,203,416
Themain part of the total annual slum income of all three slum areas, or between 69% and
86%, is produced outside the settlement, within,Bangkok. In Rim bueng Makkasann and Chumchon
Pattana, employees contribute the biggest shares of 61% and 82% respectively. In Trok Tai, however"
the microentrepreneurs whose families used to pass their profession on to their children for many
generations obtained 59% from activities outside and a further 34% from within the slum settlement.
These higher shares are explained by the fact that young migrants from up-country, who usually prefer
to work as employees in a factory, cannot settle in Trok Tai as there is no more space available.
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· 4.4 Income distribution
In both Rimbueng Makkasann and Chumchon Pattana, the income generated by employees -
Baht 8,881,764 and Baht 1,533,936 respectively - is higher than the income produced by the
microentrepreneurs - Baht 7,493,760 and Baht 654,288 respectively. This is also reflected in both
settlements by the relatively high contribution of incomes produced in the formal sector. In Trok Tai,
on the other hand, the microentrepreneurs' income is - parallel to the importance of informal
occupations - two and a half-times higher than the employees' income. By adding the depreciation of
equipment used in the microfirms to the net slum product valued by market prices, one arrives at the
gross slum product as the microfirms neither pay indirect taxnor receive any subsidies.
Table 9: Income distribution in Rim bueng Makkasann in 1986 (in Baht)
Entrepreneur Employee Transfers Subsistence Total
income ' income income nroduction income
Rim bueng Makkasann
Slum 1,874,484 64,800 --- 87,888 2,027,172
City 5,619,276 8,816,964 90,000
---
14,526,240
Villages --- --- 10,848 10,848
Abroad --- --- 100,000 --- 100,000
Slum Income 7,493,760 8,881,764 190,000 98,736 16,664,260
+ Depreciation 36,960
Gross Slum Product 16,701,220
Trok Tai
Slum 1,121,580 --- --- --- 1,121,580
City J,257,6oo 874,808 -
--- 2,131,680
Slum Income 2,379,180 874,080 - --- 3,253,260
+ Depreciation 160
-
Gross Slum Product 3253420
Chumchon Pauana
Slum 318,216 --- - --- 318,216
City 336,072 1,533,936 15,192 - 1,885,200
Slum Income 654,288 1,533,936 15,192 - 2,203,416
+ Depreciation 968
Gross Slum Product 2,204,384
4.5 Incomeutilization
In all three settlements expenditures for consumer goods share a very high proportion of the uti-
lization of income, with 85% in Rim bueng Makkasann, 88% in Trok Tai, and 69% in Chumchon
Pattana. In addition to these monetary expenditures, a few families produce food by subsistence produc-
tion, which amounted, in 1986, to Baht 98,736 equal to 0.6% of the total slum income.
The share of total expenditures for consumer goods purchased from microfirms within the
settlement was 12% in Rim bueng Makkasann, 1% in Trok Tai, and 8% in Chumchon Pattana. On
average, a household spent Baht 3,550 for consumer goods per month in Rim bueng Makkasann in
1986; Baht 4,898 in TrokTai , and only Baht 2,959 in Chumchon Pattana . The expenditures for
consumer goods of individual families ranged between Baht 470 and 11,000 per month.
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. Table 10:Income utilization in 1986 (in Baht)
Slum Citv Villaze Total
Rim bueng Makkasann
Consumption
- Monetary 1,682,747 12,544,015 --- 14,226,762
- Subsistence 87,888 - 10,848 98,736.
production
Direct taxes --- 428,244 --- 428,244
Transfers paid --- - 395,400 395,400
Savinzs 1515 118
Net Slum Product (valued by market prices) = Slum Income 16,664,260
Trok Tai
Consumption
- Monetary 31,280 2,848,700 --- 2,879,980.
- Subsistence --- --- --- -
production
Direct taxes --- 4,500 --- 4,500
Transfers paid --- --- --- -
Savings 368,780
Net Slum Product (valued by market prices) = Slum Income 3,253,260
. Chumchon Pattana
Consumption
- Monetary 117,070 1,409,642 - 1,526,712
- Subsistence --- --- - -
production
Direct taxes - 69,460 - 69,460
Transfers paid --- --- 35,800 35,800
Savings 571,444
Net Slum Product (valued bv market prices) = Slum Income 2,203,416
Unlike the residents in the two other settlements, the families in Chumchon Pattana saved the
comparatively high amount of Baht 571,444 in 1986, which equals 26% of the total slum income.
Most of the 43 families in this squatter settlementexpected to be evicted sooner or later. This expecta-
tion and a high portion of migrants from rural areas who tend to save as much as possible for invest-
ments into their residence in the home village led to this high savings rate. Like the households in the
other two settlements, the 29 families who stated that they pay regularly money into theirsaving ac-
counts at commercial banks did not, however, want to reveal the total amount of savings kept.
In all three settlements, theannual savingsare estimatedfor each individual householdfrom the
differenceof the total incomeand expenditures reported by the households. Unlike ChumchonPattana,
the annual savings estimated for Trok Tai of Baht 368,260 and for Rim bueng Makkasann of Baht
1,515,118are not entirely paid into bank accounts but include a considerable portion of expenditures
for gambling, underground lotteries and purchaseof gold ornaments which can be sold in times when
the household is short of cash. Also included are expenditures for drugs, like cannabis, opium and
heroin,which slum residentsconsumeregularly but did not report whenasked about their expenditures.
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Additional components of the slum income utilization are the direct taxes paid by some
microentrepreneurs and employees in the formal sector. In Rim bueng Makkasann, 325 employees paid
7% of the income as tax on wages, while 13 microentrepreneurs (12 taxi drivers and a newspaper
retailer) paid motor vehicle tax and business tax. In Trok Tai, however, only 18 employees paid tax on
wages while public sector employees, watchmen, drivers, factory workers and 2 microfirms in
Chumchon Pattana paid tax on wages, business tax and bribes to policemen and other government
agency representatives.
4.6 The economic cycle in the threeslumareas
The slum residents' income .generating activities are primarily linked to the demand of private
· households. The annual income of microentrepreneurs from sales of consumer goods to urban
· households· outside the slum areas amounted in Rim bueng Makkasann to Baht 26,531,505 and in
Trok Tai to Baht 5,565,220. In both slums these components contribute the highest share of the total
annual slum income. The microfirms' sales to other slum residents of Baht 1,682,747 in Rim bueng
· Makkasann and Baht 31,280 in T~k Tai are comparatively low.
The wage income from employees in private business companies outside the slums contributed
the second highest share of income in Rim bueng Makkasann and Trok Tai with Baht 7,094,400 and
.. Baht 874,080 respectively. The public sector employees in Rim bueng Makkasann earned an annual
· income of Baht 1,452,564 while employees in microfirms received Baht 64,800. In Chumchon
Pattana.. where many of the rural migrants who have rather recently come to the Greater Bangkok
· Metropolitan"Area are employed in factories along the Bangna-Trad highway, the wage incomes earned
in private business companies contributed the highest share of Baht 1,367,016, followed by the
rnicroentrepreneurs' income of Baht 654,288 and wages earned in the public sector of Baht 166,920.
The microentrepreneurspurchase raw materials, other production inputs and investment goods
mainly from private urban retail shops. The public sector supplies only between 0.3% and 0.7% of the
production inputs in the form of water and electricity to Rim bueng Makkasann and Trok Tai, The
squatter settlement Chumchon Pattana is not connected to any public utilities. The microfirms in Rim
bueng Makkasann and Chumchon Pattana in 1986 purchased investment goods in gross for Baht
60,000 and Baht 2,800 respectively. In Trok Tai, no investments were made in that year. The
depreciation of 10% annually is due to the low value or old age of the equipment - Baht 36,960 in Rim
bueng Makkasann, Baht 968 in Chumchon Pattana, and Baht 160 in Trok Tai.
Direct taxes, like business tax and motor vehicle tax, are paid by only a few microentrepreneurs
in Rim bueng Makkasan and ChumchoriPattana (Baht 4,050 and Baht 7,200 per year respective).
. ..
The slum households buy most consumer goods from small private retail shops. In 1986, the
consumer goods purchased outside of the slum settlements amounted to Baht 12,544,015 in Rim
bueng Makkasann, Baht 2,284,700 in Trok Tai and Baht 1;409,642 Chumchon Pattana, equivalent to
88%,99% and 92% of the total monetary expenditures for consumption per year.
The economic exchange relations with the home villages of migrants consist of one way
transactions, except for the transfer of raw materials to two microfirmsin Rim bueng Makkasann,
which amounted to Baht 9,120. The migrants in Rim bueng Makkasann and Chumchon Pattana have
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transferred Baht 395,400 and Baht 35,800 to their home villages, which represents 2.4% and 1.6% of
the total slum income generated in 1986.
The extent to which the researched slum areas depend on their environment, the "outside world",
is measured by contrasting the in- and outflow of consumer goods, services, production factors and
transfers which determine their balance of payments (for details see page 21). The settlement
Chumchon Pattana, with a negative balance of payments of Baht 13,247 per household, depends most
on the "outside world", followed by Trok Tai with Baht 7,259 per household and Rim bueng
Makkasann with Baht 4,467.
S.Territory and features of the economy of survival
The family household plays a central role in the economy of survival of slum residents in
Thailand. The household members combine various formal and informal income generation activities
and subsistence production in order to secure the income required for the survival of their family. Far
more than half of the slum households combine formal with informal employment to earn their living.
Regular subsistence production of food like vegetables, eggs, bananas, etc. and of charcoal was found
in only 10% of the households. More than 75%, however, had built their houses themselves, relying
on the help of family members and friends. The remaining households had engaged paid construction
workers.
Within the last fifteen years, during which the industrialisation of the Greater Bangkok
Metropolitan Area and some surrounding provinces has accelerated rapidly, formal employment has
obviously gained more importance for slum residents. Research studies of slums in Bangkok during
the seventies still found that the vast majority of the slum population was employed in informal
enterprises (Rabibhadana, 1977, Yamklingfung, 1973). But many of the younger residents interviewed
during this study whose parents earn their living as microentrepreneurs stated that they preferred to be
employed in big factories. Among the reasons mentioned were regular and fewer working hours, more
security, and making friends among eo-workers, Big factories in and around Bangkok, however, prefer
in general to employ women. These workers seldom earn more but often less than the legal minimum
wage and can be usually laid off without major problems.
Two thirds of the mostly informal rnicrofirms run by slum residents are headed by women, of
whom 44% are the main income earners in their families. The majority (55%) of incomes earned by
the microentrepreneurs are noticeably higher than the legal minimum wage, and the 20% who earn less
also work considerably fewer hours per week than their colleagues.
The supply of goods and services is geared towards basic needs. Almost 74% of the microfirms
sell goods which are produced with raw' materials from the primary sector and labour-intensive '
technology. The age of the microentrepreneurs and the fact that almost all own the microfirm they head
speaks for the sustainability of the microfirms. The existing entrepreneurial skills and potential for
expansion, however, are in many cases constrained by government regulations, harassment, scooped
out sales markets, lack of access to loans from the formal banking sector and social obligations
towards their extended families which often cause a considerable outflow of working capital..
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Table 11: Share of different slum income sources (in percent)
Rim bueng Trok Chumchon
Makkasann Tai Pattana
Micoentrepreneurs 45 % 73 % 30 %
Wages: Private business fInns 44% 27 % 62%
Wages: Public sector 9% - 8%
Wages: Microfinns 0.4 % - -
Subsistence production 0.6% - -
Transfers from abroad 1% - -
'.
, Note: Among the working slum residents, 5% have more than one occupation to earn
their income.
The economic survival territory of slum residents has its centre in urban areas outside the slum
settlements. The economic cycles of the three slum areas researched here in detail clearly show that
metropolitan slum settlements are economically highly integrated into the urban economic system and
sustain only singular and limited exchange relations with the home villages of rural migrants.
In all three slum settlements, the rnicrofirms contribute substantial parts of the total annual
slum income. But the incomes they generate are for most families not sufficient to guarantee a basic
subsistence, and have therefore to be supplemented by employment of household members in formal
private business firms and the public sector. The share of total slum income generated through
continuous subsistence production is, at 0.6%, comparatively low. Without subsistence production,
however, several families could not secure a sufficient survival income.
The microfirms buy raw materials and investment goods almost exclusively from small retailers
in the city. The slum households purchase food and other consumer goods mainly from markets and
small retail shops outside their settlements. Only up to 35% of the expenditures for consumption are
spent at microfirrns which supply their goods within the slum areas. The microfinns run by slum
residents find their main markets and customers outside of the slum settlements and sell barely 30% of
their goods and services to their neighbours within the slums.
Therefore, contrary to some opinions, slum and squatter settlements are by no means autono-
mous islands in the urban system which are interwoven with rural settlements through a network of
economic reciprocities (Maennling, 1984) and endowed with an independent development potential
(Baldeaux, 1983). Slum and squatter settlements, on the contrary, depend to a high extent upon their
immediate urban neighbourhood for the sale of goods and services produced by microentrepreneurs,
purchase of production inputs and investment goods as well as food and other consumer goods.
Although more than half of the microentrepreneurs and the majority of adult slum residents
have migrated to Bangkok from rural areas, the economic exchange relations between their home
villages and their urban slum residence are hardly pronounced. With increasing age of the settlement
and a growing number of families that have lived in the slums for many generations, the
socioeconomic linkages to the originvillage of migrants lose their intensity, like, for example, in the
slum Trok Tai, which has existed for more than 100 years and is located in the old centre of Bangkok.
Only in cases where several households in older slum areas let out rooms to seasonal or newrural
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migrants can some linkages between older slum areas and rural villages emerge as, for example, in .:
Rim bueng Makkasann. Indeed, slum residents tend, both as microentrepreneurs and as consumers, to
engage in economic transactions with small family enterprises and market retailers for which the
features of informality mentioned in the beginning hold true, which are self-employment, no
registration and a high level of risk and insecurity.
Maennling's presumption, however - that economic transactions between households in rural
areas and urban slum and squatter settlements established through migration, besides being mediated
via the direct exchange of goods and money, would be mainly channeled through informal markets
which are ruled by other than market forces (Maennling, 1984) - cannot be verified for the slum areas
researched here. The existing market mechanism, of course, cannot beequated with the market systems
of Western ~ndustrialized economies which are controlled by fiscal and monetary policies. It is not an
economic system which is characterized by a differentiated subsystem (Luhmann, 1970) equipped with
its own decisive logic. The economic decisions are rather embedded in sociocultural conditions which
are determined by Buddhist philosophy and the system of social values, and dominated by instrumental
pressure groups, like patron-client networks, and the related hierarchy of authority (Igel, 1988). The
social obligations towards the family and reciprocal relationships with neighbours and friends likewise
influence the economic decisions.
The socioeconomic. behaviour of the actors in the economy of survival is determined by the
fundamental principle of reducing insecurity regarding the supply of basic goods caused by fluctuating
incomes12. However, despite the various strategies of risk minimization, like the combination of
different income sources and tying of reciprocal exchange networks beyond the extended family, the
microentrepreneurs respond positively to market signals, like growing demand, rising sales prices, etc.
That there is potential for innovations in the economy of survival has been proved by hundreds
of thousands who changed their profession from tenant or small holder to microentrepreneur or wage
worker. Yet, most microentrepreneurs' potential for innovation is restricted to imitating successfully
tested production techniques and sales strategies of their neighbours and friends. The market
mechanism, which functions in principle, is curbed considerably in many areas by dominating cartels,
as on the informal credit market, and Mafia-like limits of access to resources and sales markets as well
as patronage and nepotism.
12- The lack of planning, a high appreciation of quick, visible profits and the widespread tendency to engage
in illegal lotteries and gambling, which involves comparatively high amounts of money, was found in
almost all slumhouseholds and is, according to the microentrepreneurs, motivated by the daily insecure
supply of basic goods and a latent or acute threat of eviction from their settlements and work places.
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Micro and Small Enterprises and Institutional
Framework: a Comparative Study of
Thailand, Ecuador and Tunisia
Henri-Bernard Solignac Lecomte and Naruemol Bunjongjit
Introduction
In most developing economies; modem sectorenterprises have failed to provide rapidly growing
active populations with sufficient levels of employment. The impact of structural adjustment
programmes has increased this shift: both cuts in public expenditureand the economic recession have
. .
led existing parastatal and private firms in the modem sector to reducing their staffs. Therefore, the
development of small private activities -- the so-called "informal sector" -- appears as the only
alternative to job stagnationor reductionin the modem sector.Finding waysof promotingjob creation
in the informalsector has thus becomea major issue in development economics.
Aside from "traditional" economic analyses of this question, the institutional approach has
drawn a growing interest in the 1980's (See de Soto, 1986):. One of its main features is the
assumption that inadequate laws and regulations impede the growth of informal activities; if legal
obligations, such as the fiscal burdenor minimum wage laws,are too expensiveand/or too difficult for
small entrepreneurs to comply with, they may either endanger the profitability of small businesses or
oblige them to operate outside the legal parameters,denying them access to vital inputs such as credit
from banks, or opportunities such as public contracts. Consequently, reforming institutional
frameworks might be a low-cost way of promoting the growth of these informal activities through a
better integrationwith the modem "formal" sector.
The aim of this paper is briefly to review some of the fast results of the OECD Development·
Centre's project, "Relationsbetween the InformalSector and Public Authorities, and Political Power".
This project aims at assessing the impact of institutional regulationson the development of micro and
small enterprises in developing countries. In that perspective, surveys have been carried out in seven
countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Jamaica, Niger, Swaziland,Thailand and Tunisia. This paper proposes a
comparative analysis of three of these case studies: Ecuador, Thailand and Tunisia, with a particular
focus on Thailand. These countries have similar levels of per capita income but they differ largely in
terms of geographical situation, institutional settings and cultural background. Their economic
situations also differ, although the three countries now have open market economy regimes. Still, the
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growth rate of the Ecuadorian economy since 1988 has been picking up after almost a decade of
stagnation, while Thailand's GDP has grown rapidly -- doubling In ten years -- and Tunisia is
recovering after a period of structural adjustment.
We will study the degree of compliance of entrepreneurs with various aspects of the different
legal and regulatory frameworks: registration, taxation, labour. regulations and health and security
standards: for each of those aspects, we will also study the reasons .given by proprietors for evading
their obligations. Finally, we will try to draw preliminary conclusions from this comparative review
and to assess the relative impact of institutional constraints compared with macro-economic constraints
on micro and small enterprises. The samples used for the surveys are presented in the annex.
1. Registration
In each of the three countries, firms have to be registered in order to establish themselves as
businesses. In Ecuador, getting a RUC (Taxpayers Registry) is the first step to qualifying for the
. promotion laws for craft activities]: entrepreneurs who register as craftsmen benefit from several
economic advantages, compared with "common" small enterprises (cf. infra). Therefore, it is not
surprising that the degree of registration should be particularly high in Ecuador: 69 percent of the
sample is registered in this country, while the proportion is 20 percent in Thailand and only 3 percent
in Tunisia. In the latter two countries, registration is not actually linked with specific advantages; the
great majority of those who do not comply with the registration obligation say that it does not concern
them or that they do not know about it. In addition, the frequency of registration varies with the size of
the establishment: larger enterprises tend to be registered more often than the smaller ones. Still it
should be noticed that 50 percent of the own-account entrepreneurs in Ecuador are registered, which
seems very high compared to the registration levels observed in the two other countries, where the lack
of information from civil services towards entrepreneurs --and especially the smaller ones -- might
explain this result.
2. Taxation
. 2.1 Tax Legislation
Tax legislation appears to vary greatly from one country to another. In Ecuador, three main
taxes apply to all enterprises but important exceptions are provided to persons, crafts and firms that
earn less than a certain level of income and/or are smaller.
The Thai system is simpler, with one main tax (business tax) accounting for 90 percent of the
total fiscal burden (at the time of the survey); moreover, a recent reform has replaced this tax with a
Value Added Tax, from which smaller enterprises will be exempted. Of the entrepreneurs, 60% pay the
business tax, but these firms represent only 37% of the self employed. The main reason stated for not
1- In Ecuador, the specific regime of firms registered as crafts provides them with a highly protected status
and with advantages which allow them to compete with larger firms of the modem sector.
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complying with the fiscal obligation is that they are not concerned by it or they are not aware of its
provisions. On the part of entrepreneurs, there is no fear of the consequences of not complying with
the fiscal obligation. Only a few mentioned some problems such as the need to change location often
or the risk of paying a fine. Moreover, not many Thai entrepreneurs complain about fiscal obligations
in general (16 percent of the sample): they do not fear the fiscal administration, and it is sometimes
possible to negotiate with civil officers in case of late tax payments.
The Tunisian legislation is slightly more complex and provides fewer exemptions for small
establishments than the Ecuadorian and Thai systems. In addition, non-payment of taxes in Tunisia can
lead to sanctions including the obligation to cease all activity. Nevertheless, the attitude of civil
officers toward the recovering of tax duties appears to be rather lax: in doing so, they aim at reducing
the actual fiscal burden imposed on micro-enterprises, which sometimes appears to be too heavy for
small producers. .
2.2 Compliance with Fiscal Obligations
Payment of taxes is uniformly the type of regulation that small entrepreneurs comply the most
with. Table 3 displays the degrees of compliance in the three countries for the main tax, i.e., the most
expensive as well as the one for which exemption cases are the most seldom.
Table 1: Compliance with Main Taxes, by Size and Activity*
Ecuador Thailand Tunisia
(patente) (business tax) (patente)
1 28 37.4 40
2-5 77 70.8 85
6-10 89 92
+ 10 90 72.8 88
Total 75 60.4 85
Source: Results of the surveys, 1991.
* Percentage of the sub-samples of entrepreneurs liable to pay these taxes.
In all cases, a majority of entrepreneurs say they pay their taxes: 75.5 percent in Ecuador, 60.4
percent in Thailand and 85 percent in Tunisia. In addition, tax payment follows the size of the firm:
less than half of the self-employed actually comply with fiscal obligations (28 percent in Ecuador,
37.4 percent in Thailand and 40 percent in Tunisia). Moreover, as the size of the enterprise considered
grows, the degree of compliance with fiscal obligations gets higher.
2.3 Reasonsfor not Complying with Fiscal Obligations
Entrepreneurs who didn't pay their taxes were asked why they evaded this obligation (see table
2). Surprisingly, the main reasons given were neither the cost of taxes (except in Tunisia: 18 percent
gave this reason) nor the complexity of administrative procedures, which was not even mentioned in
the Thai and Tunisian entrepreneurs' answers. In these two countries, firm owners say that they were
unaware of those taxes or that they are not concerned by them. It is worth rioting that Thai firms
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working as subcontractors can be exempted of the business tax, if it is paid by the main contractor (it
depends on thekind of contract); enterprises earning less than4.000bathper month are also exempted.
There are fewer exemptions in Tunisia, and ignorance of tax regulations seems to be a more wide-
spread reason for "evasion" than in Thailand andEcuador.
Anotherreason frequently given is the absence of control or sanctions from civil officersin case
of non-payment (42 percent in Ecuador, 35 percent in Thailand and 36 percent in Tunisia). If we
assume that all the entrepreneurs who haveevaded taxes for that reason,or becauseof the cost ("too
costly") or the complexity of procedures, are true "swindlers", then the "swindle" rate, for each country
sample, is 13percent in Ecuador, 18percent in Thailand and 8 percentin Tunisia-. These rates appear
to be relatively low, especially considering the low level of income of manyentrepreneurs. Since tax
regulations are the most pressing set of institutional rules, we can conclude that refusal of all
constraints and preference for illegality are nota dominant feature in the circleof MSEs.
Table2: Reasons for not Complying with FiscalRegulations (%)*
Ecuador Thailand Tunisia**
(natente) (business tax) (natente)
Unaware of the tax 8 25 36
Non-applicable tax - 25 -
No controls or sanctions 42 35 36
Tooexpensive 8 10 18
Procedures too long/complicated 8 0 0
Otherreasons 33 5 10
Source: Resultsof the surveys, 1991.
* Percentage of the number of enterprises not complying with tax regulations (Patente in Ecuador and
Tunisia, Business Tax in Thailand).
** Not including the tapestry sector.
. As far as the fiscal obligation is concerned, small entrepreneurs do not live with fear of the
fiscal administration. Sometimes, negotiation with officers for a postponement can occur. Although
there are manycomplaints about taxation in general, this matter is not a main constraintfor the small
, entrepreneurs. In Thailand, where this measurement is possible from the survey, it appears that the tax
pressure among small enterprises is not high on average (although not fairly distributed). Thus, the
fiscal obligation is not a crucial obstacle to the growth of small enterprises. This situationshould not
change with the introduction of the VAT system, sincemost smallenterprises are under the minimum
taxable level-', and it willactually benefit small producers.
2- The figures for Ecuador and Tunisia might be slightly under-estimated, due to the selection method used to
build up the samples : very small establishments might be under-represented in those two countries,
including those operating "underground".
3- According to the new tax law, any enterprise which brings an annual income of less than 600,000 baht is
not liable to pay VAT. .
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3. Labour Regulations
3.1 Legal Frameworks
As for taxation, the Ecuadorianand Thai legal frameworks provide small establishments with
more advantages and exemptions in terms of labour regulations than the Tunisian system does", For
instance, in Ecuador, craftsmen have to pay a minimum wage to their wage workers that is 25 percent
higher than other micro-enterprises, but at the same time, the various exemptions from which they
benefit (concerning compensatory wage bonuses, two additional wages every year, etc.) reduce the
salaries that they pay by 43 percent, when compared with other enterprises not registered as craft
shops. In Thailand, at the time of the survey, firms employing fewer than 20 people were exempted
from contribution to the Workmen's Compensation Fund at the Department of Labour. In Tunisia,
labour regulations are somewhat stricter and there are no provisions in favour of small establishments
for exemptions concerning minimum "{ageor social security.
3.2 Compliance with Labour Regulations
While considering compliance with labour regulations, it must be remembered that minimum
wage and other obligations designed to provide employees with protection do not concern the owners
themselves, the self-employed, apprentices, non-regular workers and family helpers. It should also be
kept in mind that only part of the labour force employed in the firms of our samples actually has a
wage-earner status.
Generally speaking, the degrees of compliance with labour regulations in Ecuador and Tunisia
are not as high as with tax regulations (table 3). This is clear in the case of social security
contributions, where the global rates of full compliance in those two countries are respectively 26.7
percent and 15 percent''. Similarly, only 41.5 percent of the firms in the Ecuadorian sample comply
with the regulations concerning maximum working hours. On the contrary, minimum wage laws are
mostly followed in the three countries. In Ecuador, this legislation is largely complied with due to the
low level of the minimum wage imposed on small entrepreneurs registered as craftsmen; this explains
the high proportion of wage workers in the total labour force (cf. supra). In the case of Tunisia, where
the level of the minimum wage is the same for large and small enterprises, entrepreneurs actually
comply with this regulation, but they tend to reduce the salaries' burden by employing a greater
proportion of non-wage workers (37 percent of the total labour force) such as apprentices and family
helpers: moreover, "after-hours" work mostly remains unpaid. The lowest degree of compliance with
minimum wage laws is observed in Thailand, but it still represents a significant proportion of the
sample (63.1 percent).
4- Data concerning compliance with labour regulations differ from one country to another. Thus, a few
preliminary remarks are necessary before commenting the figures: for Thailand and Ecuador, we consider
the sub-samples of firms with at least one wage worker or apprentice; for Tunisia, the figures for this type
of sub-sample were not available and we refer to the whole sample of firms surveyed, not including the
sector of tapestry, in which labour regulations are totally ignored.
5- Social security contributions are fully paid by 15 per cent of the Tunisian entrepreneurs, but 61 per cent
say that they actually pay them "partly", i.e. not for all their wage workers, but only for some of them.
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Table 3: Compliance with LabourRegulations, by Size*
Ecuador Thailand Tunisia
2-5 ~1O Total 1-5 +5 Total 2-4 5-10 + 10 Total
Social security 24 54 26.7 70 81.7 73.3 16 7 13 15
Minimum wage 91 91 91 61.8 65.9 63.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. 90**
Maximum working hours. 39 69 41.5 60.1 65.9 62 54 70 87 60
Source: Results of the surveys, 1991; n.a.: not available.
* Percentageof enterprises employing at leastone wageearner.** Estimated.
Note: Thai firms with less than 20 employees were not liable to social security contribution at the
time of the survey; entrepreneurs were asked if they "agreed" with the regulations concerning social
security. Thus, one should be very careful in comparing those figures with actual rates of compliance
in Ecuadorand Tunisia.There is heavysuspicion that thosepercentages do not actuallyreflect the rates
of compliance that would occur if entrepreneurs were actually liable to pay those contributions. For
Tunisia, the figures represent the percentage of entrepreneurs which comply strictly with labour
regulations; thus, the other entrepreneurs of the sample either comply only partly with those
regulations,or do not complyat all.
The link between size and compliance with regulations is once again obvious: the larger the
firms, the more frequently they comply with labour regulations, except for Tunisia, where smaller
firms pay their social securitycontributions morefrequently than the larger ones. This paradox can be
explained by the fact that, since the burden of contributions falls heavily on the global payroll of
Tunisian enterprises'' and is a function of the numberof wage workers, those who hire more than one
.or two wage workers generally do not declare all of them. 54 percent of firms employing between 5
and 10 people say they pay contributionsonly for some of their wage workers, while this proportion
is zero for firms employing 1 to 5 persons (they either pay contributions for all of their declared
employeesor none of them).
3.3 Reasons for not Complying with Labour Regulations
Among the reasons given by entrepreneurs not complying with minimum wage and social
security regulations, it is interesting to compare two kindsof answers: on the one hand, some consider
compliance with regulations as "too expensive"; on the other hand, some others say they are "not :
concerned", they "do not know" them, or "procedures are too complex" and "there is a lack of
information" (see table 4). In the first case, evasion of obligations is truly a matter of purpose, and
firm owners intend to bypass an obstacleendangering the profitabilityof their business. In the second
case, motivesare not so clearand seem to relate more to a lack of information from governments.
In Tunisia, if we consider the cases of minimum wage and social security laws, the most
frequent answer of firm owners on this matter concerns the cost of compliance ("too costly"). In this
country, labour laws are more restrictive than in Ecuadorand Thailand, especiallydue to the absenceof
specific exemptions targeted toward small establishments, and entrepreneurs evade these regulations
6- In Tunisia, social security contributions represent the equivalent of a 33 per cent rise in the monthly
payroll, which is a very heavy burden for small firms.
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because they cannot economically afford to comply fully with them. Nevertheless, the relatively "lax"
attitude of the government is also reflected by the entrepreneurs' answers: the second most frequent
answer is that there are "no controls" from civil officers. Thus, labour regulations may be restrictive,
but poor enforcement of those regulations is apparently a major cause of non-compliance.
Table 4: Reasons for not Complying with Labour Regulations*
Minimum wage Social security Maximum working hours
Ec. Thai. Tunis. Ec. Thai. Tunis. Ec. Thai. Tunis.
Unaware / not concern d 47 44 2 40 23.8 2 n.a 13.7 33
Procedures too complex / - 6 - 7 2:4 1 n.a. 1l.8 -
lack of information
Too ·costly 21 3 47 4 2:4 45.5 n.a. 33.3 -
No controls - 9 20 4 7.1 29 n.a. 2 56
New activity /
new employee 5 - - 21 ' - - n.a. - -
Employee refuses 2 - - 12 - - n.a. - -
Other reasons 26 38 31 11 64.3 22.5 n.a. 39.2 11
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 n.a. 100 100
Source: Results of the surveys, 1991; n.a.: not available,
*Percentage of the answers given by entrepreneurs evading labour laws totally or partly; except for
Ecuador: percentage of reasons given for each employee not affiliated.
The Ecuadorian and Thai cases show different types of constraints and different attitudes from
entrepreneurs: the main reasons for not complying with minimum wage and social security laws are
ignorance of legal obligations, assumed non-liability and, to a lesser extent, lack of information and
complexity of procedures. One feature of the Ecuadorian case is of some interest: a certain number of
entrepreneurs (12% ~f the sample) say they do not pay social security contributions because their wage
workers refuse to contribute; since the minimum wage is very low, they prefer to get the total amount
of their gross salary rather than "lose" a part of it through social contributions.
Thai entrepreneurs, unlike their Tunisian counterparts, do not genetally consider labour laws as
an obstacle to the growth of their activity, even if the type of organization of Thai firms makes it
difficult to comply fully with regulations. It must be noticed that the survey took place during a period
when scarcity of labour, and especially skilled labour, was particularly acute: institutional constraints,
which are less burdensome than in other countries like Tunisia, were therefore better accepted.
Moreover, the forthcoming measures designed to strengthen workers' protection are following a global
growth trend in the Thai economy (and especially in manufacturing activities). Thus, several factors
can explain the greater compliance of Thai entrepreneurs with labour regulations compared with
Ecuadorians and Tunisians: the needfor skilled labour, a less restrictive regulatory framework and
growth rates that allow them to bear the cost of complying with laws. Thai entrepreneurs, however,
complain about the provision of the minimum wage law. The main reason given by entrepreneurs for
not complying with the minimum wage is that it is "too costly". Many entrepreneurs express that the
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minimum wage laws should not be applied to small enterprises. If they were to comply with the
standard wage, entrepreneurs say that they would be unable to "survive". But in practice they do not
suffer restrictions imposedby the authorities. It is frequently said that there is" no inspection" and this
is a reason for not complying with the minimum wage regulation. Poor enforcement may be one of
the crucial factors detennining ignorance of legalobligations.
As for the provision on maximum working hours, the attitude of the entrepreneurs varies
according to the activity concerned. In the metal sector, almost all entrepreneurs comply with this
provision. "After hours" work is mostly paid to employees by firm owners in this sector. This is due
to the situation of the labour market where the degree of labour mobility is considerably high. Also
the shortage of skilled labour is obvious. To this extent, most entrepreneurs want to keep employees
working for their firmsas long as possible. The link between the labour situation and compliance with
the provision is obvious: the higher degree of labour shortage, the more frequently entrepreneurs
comply with the maximum workinghour obligation.
The situation is somewhatdifferent in cases of the food preparation activities and the garment
sector.Most firms withhired workers, in the garmentsector, workwith subcontracts. Their work order
is restrictedby deadlines. Hence, employees are paid as piece workers,so payment is not according to
the duration of work. Most of the firm owners believe that they are not concerned with the provision
of maximum working hours.Real workerincomes calculated from the survey show that piece workers
generally receivean incomehigher than the legal minimum wage.
. The Thai case clearly shows that the attitudeof theentrepreneurs toward labour regulations is
dependent on the state of the labour market and even of labour sub-markets, and that institutional
factors (apart from the minimum wage)are not a majorproblemfor them.
4. Health and Safety Standards
4.1 Legal Obligations
Data on this question is scarce for Ecuador. Nevertheless, hygienicconditions are specifically
regulated in food preparation activities: 69 percentof the entrepreneurs in this sector say that they are
submitted to strict regulations of that kind. In Tunisia and Thailand as well, there are hygienic
regulations for foodpreparation thatare fairly enforced and observed.
InTunisia, safety legal obligations are also very strict: the matchingof legal norms is required
for electric installation, arrangement of equipment, soundproofmg of premises,etc. Under the law, this
applies to all firms (whatever the size),but as a matterof fact onlya few basic normsare required from
MSEs, and controls are not frequent. The only exception is food preparation, where legal obligations
are stricterand their application betterenforced: restaurants must have tiled walls, a refrigerator,glass
cases for foodand separate premises forcooking and dishwashing.
In Thailand, the FactoriesAct imposesenterprises withat least 2 horse power machines (it can
be found only among the largest enterprises of the sample, in the metal sector only) a whole set of
health and security standards that 'arenecessary for obtaining the operation license: emergency exits,
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alarm signals, fire fighting equipment,etc. In case of seriouspublic nuisance, the firm might be closed
by public authorities. This is due to the fact that most premises, particularly in the metal sector, have
not been located in the proper business locationspecified in the regulation; As a result, restrictions on
location and environmental conditionsare apparentlya major constraintamong entrepreneurs in large
enterprises (especially metal firms). This, in turn, becomes a basis for frequent harassment and
extortion of briberyby officials.Labour laws also require the availabilityfor workersof dean drinking
water, sanitary and medicalfacilities.Controlsare not very frequentbut according to 70 percent of the
entrepreneurs,they occur at leastonce a year in MSEs.
4.2 Compliance with Regulations and Reasons for notComplying
, .
In Ecuador, the only information available is that half of the firms of the sample follow health
regulations in general.
In Tunisia, 52 percent of the sample comply fully with hygienic and safety norms and 37
percent comply only partly with them. Once again, the degree of compliance, when adding full
compliance and partial compliance cases, varies with the activity considered: it reaches 70 percent of
the sample in repair services and two thirds of the sample in garment. In food preparation, it is
impossible to avoid controls, which occur frequently, or to evade norms completely. The rate of full
and partial compliancereaches 92 percent; the rate of partial compliance alone is 50 percent, Le. halfof
the entrepreneurs comply only partly with those regulations, either because of a lack of information
(57 percent of them) or becauseof theircost (43 percent).
In Thailand, the attitude of entrepreneurs varies according to the activity considered. In the gar-
ment sector, only 16 percent disagree with health and safety regulations, whereas a majority ofen-
trepreneurs engaged in food preparation complain (73.8 percent of the sub-sample), saying that com-
plying with health standards would be too costly and that they cannot afford it7. Nevertheless, regula-
tions are not strictly enforced by authorities,especially in Bangkok where very few controls occur. In
the metal industry, most of the firm owners believe that safety standardsare a necessity: they manage
to pay the cost, although they complain that it is too high. However, restrictionson location andenvi-
ronmentalconditionsappear to be a majorconstraint: controlsare frequent. especiallyamong larger en-
terprises,and entrepreneurssometimeshave to pay a bribe to officials to get the operation license.
5. Labour force
The average total labour force (ownersincluded) equaled3.9 in Ecuador,3.6 in Thailandand 3.7
in Tunisia. Wage workers account for less than 50 percent of the labour force both in Thailand and
Tunisia (respectively43.3 percent and 47 percent). In Thailand, more than half of the firms surveyed
have no wage workers: some are own-accountfirms and the others only employ family workers and/or
apprentices. On the contrary, 69 percent of the total labour force in Ecuador are wage earners; this
, fmding may be partly explainedby the bias mentioned above(whichleads to an under-representationof
the self-employed).
7- Still some of, the firm owners comply with the hygienic norms thinking that getting the certificate will
bring them more clients. . .
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The proportion of apprentices reaches a peak of 30·percent in repair services (Ecuador and
Tunisia) and in metal industries (Thailand). As far as the garment sector is concerned, this proportion
is higher in Tunisia (28.1 percent) than in Ecuadorand Thailand(7 percentand 16.5 percent).Generally
speaking, apprenticeship is more important in Tunisia (25 percent of the total labour force covered)
than in Thailand(18.5 percent)or Ecuador(14 percent).
Table 5: AverageComposition of Manpower, by Activity":
Ecuador Thailand Tunisia
~armen Food RepairiI'otal Garmen FoodlMetal Total Garment Food Repair Total
services services
Owners 3 3 8 5 31.1 57.1 21.4 32.8 17.3 23.3 23.4 21
Wageworkers 78 ·69 60 69 49 24.6 47.3 43.3 47.4 50 42.5 47
Apprentices 7 6 30 14 16.5 0.5 29.8 18.4 28.1 16.9 30.4 25
Family helper 11 21 1 12 3.4 17.8 1.4 5.6 3.9 10 2.4 5.4
Others** - - - - - - - - 3.3 - 1.3 1.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Results of the surveys, 1991.
* Percentageof the labourforce.**Piece-workers.
Note: Figures for Ecuador unfortunately did not take the self-employed into account; therefore, the
percentage of ftnn-owners is under-estimated and the percentage of other categories, and especially
wage workers, is slightly over-estimated. This should be kept in mind when comparing these figures
with others in Thailandand Tunisia.
5.1 Profile of the Entrepreneurs
The proportion of female entrepreneurs varies greatly with the activity: in the three countries,
they are very weakly represented in metal industries and in repair services (less than 10 percent of the
samples).On the contrary, 100percentof the entrepreneurs in the Tunisian tapestry sector are women.
Nevertheless, the picture is more strongly contrasted between countries in the other activities. For
instance, two thirds of the entrepreneurs engaged in the garment sector in Thailand are women, while
this proportion falls to 22 percentin Ecuador;similarly,in foodpreparation,three firms out of four are
owned by women in Thailand, and one out of four in Ecuador. Apparently, this partly reflects the
traditionaljob divisions betweenmen and women,whichare related to each country's specific cultural
background.
In terms of level of education, figures were not available for Tunisian entrepreneurs, so the .
following remarks are based on the Thai and Ecuadorian cases. Owners of larger firms tend to have a
higher level of education than those of micro-enterprises; the gap is particularly noticeable between
own-account workers and entrepreneurs who hire employees, although this appears less clearly in the
garment sectors in ThaIlandand Ecuador. In firms with at least one employee, a correlation between
the level of education of the owner and the size of his business does appear, but it is not as sharp as
could be expected; the reason for this might be the following: apparently, older entrepreneurs, who
have been in the business for a longer time than their youngercounterparts,are more numerous in the
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larger enterprise sub-samples,and they usuallyhave a lower level of educationbecauseschooling rates
were lower for their generation.
Conclusion
Using three country case studies, we have briefly studied the degree of compliance of MSEs
.with a few aspects of the institutional frameworks they operate in --registration, taxes, labour
regulations and safety and health regulations. We also reviewed the reasons why some MSEs do not
comply fully or partly with those legal and regulatorysettings. In doing so, we left unaddressed other
aspects of institutionalenvironments that are essential to a morecomplete approach of that issue, such
as regulations concerning financial credit, relations with clients and suppliers, subcontracting, etc (see
Morrisson, Solignac Lecomte, Oudin, 1994).
First, the degree of compliance with regulations is determined not only by the more or less
constraining character of those regulations, but also by the "degree of enforcement" imposed by
authorities. For instance, poor controls and/or sanctions in case of non-compliance with fiscal
obligations in Ecuador, Thailandand Tunisiaare the mainreasons for not paying taxes.
It is also noticeable that compliance with regulations is more frequent than could be expected
from so-called "informal" enterprises. For instance, 60.4 percent of the entrepreneurs interviewed in
Thailand.pay their main taxes, and that proportion reaches 75 percent in Ecuador and 85 percent in
Tunisia. In that respect, we have already mentionedthe fact that MSEs cannot be globally considered
as operatingbeyondregulations.
Moreover, administrativeobligations and procedures are not the main obstacles to investment
and growth for MSEs, as table 6 shows.
Table 6: Main Obstaclesto Investmentand Growth*
Thailand Tunisia
None - 28
Lackof demand 5.1 -
Lack of funds 67 74
Administrative obstacles 16.4 12
Raw materials/ equipment 1.1 -
Bad locationor premises 17.9 -
Lack of labour or skilled labour 34.3 -
-
Others 7.7 -
Total 149.5 114
Source: Results of the survey, 1991.
*Percentageof the samples;multipleanswers.
According to a large majorityof entrepreneurs in the Thai and Tunisian samples, lack of funds
is by far the main problem MSEs face: it is cited as such by 67 percent and 74 percent of the
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entrepreneurs interviewed in the two countries respectively. In contrast, administrative obstacles are
cited by only 16.4 percent of the Thai entrepreneurs and 12 percent of the Tunisian entrepreneurs. In
Thailand, lack of labour is also more frequently cited as a drawback than regulations. Therefore, in
these two cases, institutional constraints can be considered as secondary obstacles compared to the
supply of inputs such as credit and, in Thailand, labour. Nevertheless, it should also be kept in mind
that access to inputs such as credit is also linked to the degree of integration of MSEs in the legal and
regulatory framework. For instance, firms that do not pay their taxes may have difficulty in gaining
access to credit if payment of taxes is one of the conditions required by commercial banks for granting
a loan. This means that institutional issues have both a direct and indirect impact on the environment
in which MSEs operate. Further data on this matter should allow us to draw a more precise picture of
those issues.
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Annex: Methodology of the surveys
In each country, a quantitative survey was conducted among 300enterprises (500 in Thailand):
altogether, more than a thousand units were covered.Then, 30entrepreneurswere selected among each
country sample to answer a qualitative questionnairein order to get more detailed information on their
behaviour and motives.
An enterprise defines any economic activity run by an individual in order to yield an income,
whether it requires hiring labour or not. In developing countries, micro-enterprises often employ
apprentices or family helpers, who are not wage earners; we have therefore listed those enterprises by
number of workers, which is not necessarily related to the number of wage earners (many small firms
that have two to five workers8 have no wageearners).
Since there is no operational definition of informality -- which can not be based on total
illegality, since the bulk of firms pay at least one tax, the criterion used in this study is size: all the
firms surveyed are enterprises that have10 workers or fewer; thus, we call them micro and small
enterprises (MSEs) rather than informal enterprises. About 10percent of the samples consisted also in
firms that had 11 to 20 workers; they were used as test groups to be compared with the MSEs
samples.
Table 7: Number of EnterprisesSurveyed,by Size and by Activity.
Ecuador Thailand Tunisia
Micro and small entemrises
1 30 163 9
2-5 198 226 205
6-10 39 91 61
+10 31 23 14
Test grouP
Garment 100 183 80
Food preparation 103 188 92
Repair services 95 - 87
Metal - 132 -
Carpets .. - - 30
Total 298 503 289
Source: Results of the surveys.
1.. Scope
1.1. Sampling Method and Selection of Activities
The different activities selected for the samples are about the same in the three countries: they
are among the most widely spread in developing countries and those where small scale enterprises are
the most numerous. In Ecuador, these activities were garment, food preparation and repair services; in
8- The term "worker" has here a comprehensive significance : it includes proprietors and employees.
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Thailand, garment, food preparation and metal industries; and in Tunisia, garment, food preparation,
repair services and carpet making. Whereas in Tunisia lists of enterprises were available from an
official statistical institute, the research teams in Thailandand Ecuador had to build their own..
In Thailand, a preliminary census was made in Bangkok with 72 blocks selected, in which all
small establishmentsof the selected activities were counted: 1500 micro-enterprises were found, from
which the final sample for Bangkok was built. No such preliminary census was made in other towns,
where selected blocks were surveyed one by one, small activities were spotted and samples
progressively built up by activity. These methods make sure that all types of enterprises are
representedin the sample,even the very smalland/or unregistered ones.
In Ecuador, a list of firms was established progressively through a direct search of firms meet-
ing the requirements of size and activity, Le. there was no preliminary exhaustive census by block as
in Bangkok, and very small activities, especially own-account entrepreneurs, might be under-repre-
sented. A bias might then appear in the sample, wherelarger enterprisesmightbe over-represented.
In Tunisia, this bias is even more acute: firms were selected from an official file9 and the final
sample was built through a random selection procedure from this list of firms. Very small firms and
own-account workers must have been under-represented in this sample; this was confirmed by the
Tunisian research teamlO.
2. Location
The objective of the study was to focus on urban activities; thus, the survey covered the capital
cities and main cities of each country: Quito, Ambadoand Cuenca in Ecuador; Bangkok and the main
cities of another ten provinces in Thailand; Tunis, Sfax and Kairouan in Tunisia. Fifty percent of the
enterprises included in the samplesare locatedin the capitalcities (58 percent for Tunisia).
3. Size
In the three countries, more than half of the firms belong to the 2- to 5-personll class (see
table 1). The highest proportion of self-employed entrepreneurs was found in Thailand; it was
especially high in food preparation (more than one half of the units covered)and in garment (about one
quarter of the units). In Ecuadorand Tunisia. the under-representation of the self-employed(10 percent
of the sample in Ecuador, 3 percent in Tunisia) reflects a bias toward larger enterprises; the reason for
this may be related to the poor visibility of own-account firms: the methods used in Ecuador (direct
door-to-door search) and in Tunisia (selection from an official file) were not based on an in-depth
census as in Thailand and probably overlooked this type of firm, which have no workers and may be
located in the entrepreneurs' homes.
9- The name of this file is FENA (Fichier des Etablissements Non-Agricoles),
10- They pointed out that updating of this official file was more systematic for larger enterprises than for the
smaller ones.
11 - Including firm owners and workers.
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Promoting Informal Sector Entrepreneurs :
A Comparative Analysis of Asian and African Countries
He Yong
Introductlon
The informal sector plays an important role in developing countries. According to International
Labor Office ILO estimates for 17 African countries, the informal sector's production represents on
average 20% of GDP and 59% of urban labor work within the informal sector. (the World Bank 1989
chapter 6)
. Anderson (1982) distinguished three phases of industrial development: 1). a phase in which
household manufacturing is predominant. 2). a phase in which small workshops and factories increase
at a comparatively rapid rate. 3). a phase in which large-scale production becomes predominant. We·
define the problem of entrepreneur promotion within the informal sector as that of the formalization of
informal enterprises, or, the passage from the first to the second phases as described by Anderson. In
other words, we shall analyze how an entrepreneur of informal sector can accumulate enough capital in
order for him to increase the size of his enterprise and to become a formal sector entrepreneur.
This process of transformation is sometimes presented as unavoidable. As Judet (1989) wrote:
"the unstructured sector is usually a component of the organic process of industrialization. It should be
considered as a cradle of entrepreneurs and of enterprises, and its existence is unavoidable and merits to
be promoted." To criticize the judgment that the informal sector only signifies a prolonged survival in
crises and can never found a development dynamics, he wrote: "we have forgotten to inquire the way by
which industries as a whole have been formed with the passing decades, going from simple to
complex, from unstructured to structured."
This judgment is doubtless correct. However it seems that it only fits well with the experiences
of Asian countries. As Anderson (1982) has shown, the countries of South-East Asia have rapidly
realized their transformation from the first to the second phase. Poapongsakorn ("The Informal Sector
in Thailand," in Chickering & Salahdinel99l) has shown that Thailand has implemented good
policies and has had strong growth, which has resulted in a steady decline in the informal sector.
On the contrary, this transformation appears to bevery difficult in the case of African countries.
According to the ILO (1989), while the proportion of the informal sector in total urban employment of
African countries was on average 60% in 1970s, it remained at the same level in 1988 (58%). The
World Bank (1989) recognized that, apart from the informal sector and large firms, African countries
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lack small and middle-size firms, This problem of the "missing middle" is considered to be the major
obstacle to African industrialization1. Rather than accumulate their capital, the most serious problem
for informal enterprises is how to survive. According to a survey of a large number of informal
enterprises in four African cities (Bamako, Lome, Nouakchott and Yaounde), there are 13,3% of
employers and 83,7% of employees whose weekly wages are lower than the guaranteed minimum wage
of their countries (MaIdonado 1987 p.l33).
To explain the difficulty of such a transformation from informal to formal enterprises, the
supply side conditions are often emphasized. To Aftab and Rahim (1989), "barriers" to the growth of
informal enterprises lie in their artisan base which is initially determined by the educational
background, knowledge, skills and the economic resources of the owner-manager. Consequently, the
governments are often urged to improve their supply conditions: financial and technical assistance,
formation, technology, infrastructure, input supply, etc. (page and Steel, 1986)
While policies favoring of the informal sector as practised in India, have led to failure in the
Southeast Asian countries where informal enterprises are dynamic, the governments have not.
deliberately helped them in this way.
These observations lead us to agree with Schmitz (1982, p.445): "the issue is not whether
small enterprises have growth and employment potential but under what conditions."
The analyses of three markets: the labor market, the product market and the financial market
will show that l). the difference between the performances of informal enterprises in Asian and African
countries lies in their different rural conditions; 2). this difference links less with the supply side
conditions, but more with the demand side conditions of informal enterprises. From this point of view,
state intervention should stress the improvement of the economic environment and the demand side
conditions facing informal enterprises.
1. Analytical Framework
In this section, we will analyze how the performance of informal enterprises is conditioned by
the IaOOr market, the product market and the financial market.
1.1 Labor Market
Here we borrow a diagram from Hemmer and Mannel (1989) with some modifications, which
helps us to understand the interactions among the informal sector, the formal sector and the agricultural
sector in the labor market.
(See Figure 1 in annex).
In figure I, the horizontal axis represents the quantity of Iabor, the vertical axis the production
level of the agricultural sector (Xl), the formal sector (X2) and the informal sector (X3). We suppose
that the totallabor input is measured by OG. We also suppose that the production of each sector is
1- In the case of Kenya, cf. Livingstone (1991).
176
only a function of labor input, so, for example, the production function of the agricultural sector is
noted by Xl(L). In the zone (I), starting from the point C, the slope of the XI(L) is equal to zero,
which illustrates the existence of an excess rurallabor input measured by EG. The average product (and
the average income) of rural workers is measured by the slope of the line OH.
In the zone (11), X2(L) is the production function of the formal sector. The slope of the line W2
represents the wage in the formal sector, which is often over-determined by public regulations related
to the market-clearing wage. The tangent Point between X2(L) and W2, T, determines the quantity of
labor absorbed by the formal sector, which is measured by OS.
In the zone (Ill), X3(L) is the production function of the informal sector. The labor absorption
of the informal sector is determined in the following way. Based on Todaro's model 1967, the
immigration decision of a rural laborer is a function of the laborer's estimate of the wage he will
receive after his migrating. This estimation (We) is calculated according to the formula
We = p2xW2 + (l-p2)xW3, where P2 is the probability of being employed by the formal
sector.
This allows us to obtain We. Then, by drawing in the zone (I) OJ as a symmetric line to We,
we can obtain the quantity of rural-urban labor migration as measured by GF. With OR=GF, we have
the quantity of the labor absorption of the informal sector, which is measured by OR-OS=SR. The
informal sector's wage is measured by the line indicated by slope=W3.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis: 1). the economic situation in the rural areas
is of crucial importance for the performance of the informal sector. Both a productivity improvement
or a decrease of demographic pressure in rural areas will reduce the labor quantity that should be
absorbed by the informal sector. This will, in turn, increase the informal sector's productivity and
average income level. 2). the wage level of the formal sector influences its ability of absorbing labor
quantity, which in turn affects the pressure of employment born by the informal sector. Furthermore,
it modifies rural-urban migration through its impacts on the income expectation of rural workers for
immigration-.:
1.2 Product Market
We have shown how in the labor market the division of labor is realized among the agricultural
sector, the informal sector and the formal sector. Now, we will analyze how product market shares are
determined between the formal and informal sectors.
(See Figure 2 in annex).
In figure 2, we will begin by distinguishing the specific demand (Os) and the nonspecific
demand (On). Following the definition of Hemmer and Mannel (1989 p.1546), "specific demand is
defined as the exclusive demand for goods of one particular sector.... Correspondingly, nonspecific
demand refers to formal as well as informal products and directs itself to the sector with the lower
2- The regulation of wage level in formal sector results in an increase in labor and a decrease in wages in
informal sector. These effects have been analyzed in Rauch's model (1991). .
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price." The specific demand for the formal sector (Dsf) is addressed to products whose production
requires a level of technology and of investment beyond the reach of the informal sector (for example,
most electronic goods). The specific demand for the informal sector (Dsi) is characterized by its
flexibility and its small quantity (the demand for many non-durable products corresponds to this
criteria.)
In figure 2-A and 2-B, we illustrate respectively the product markets for the formal and informal
sectors. Sf and Si are the supply curves of the formal and the informal sectors, which are based on their
marginal production costs. We suppose that the tangent of Si is superior to that of Sf.
The intersections between Si and Dsi, and between Sf and Dsf determine the optimal specific
productions of the formal sector (Qf2) and of the informal sector (Qi2) and their respective prices (Pf2
and Pi2). We observe that if the informal sector's production cost is given, to increase its benefice, that
is; to enlarge the triangle OEPi2, the specific demand for its products should increase; that is, Dsi
should displace towards the north-east.
In figure 2-C, S being the total marginal cost (S=Sf+Si), its intersection with the nonspecific
demand (Dn) gives the optimal nonspecific production (QI) and its optimal price (PI). The formal
sector and the informal sector respectively produce Qf1 and QiI, which can be observed in 2-A and 2-B,
with QI=Qf1+Qil.
From this analysis regarding nonspecific product market, we conclude that the cost function of
the informal sector is unchanged, and therefore the only way for it to increase its benefice (which is
measured by ONPI in 2-B) is the increase of the nonspecific demand, that is, the Dn displaces towards
the north-east.
1.3 FinancialMarket
In developing countries, the informal financial market constitutes an important source of .
financing for the informal sector. Related to the formal financial market, its financing ability is more
limited. These two markets can be substitutable or complementary. We can formalize their
relationships in the following way:
(See Figure 3 in annex).
In figure 3, D is the demand curve for credit. For the formal financial organizations, credit
extended to the formal sector is less risky and therefore cheaper than that extended to the informal
sector. This is reflected by the curve Cff (the cost of financing the formal sector by the formal financial
organizations), whose tangent is inferior to that of the curve Cfi (the cost of financing the informal
sector by the formal financial organizations). Consequently, the quantity of loans provided to the
informal sector (Qfi) is much lower than that to the formal sector (Qff). In the same way, the interest
rate set by formal financial institutions for the informal sector (Pfi) is much higher than that for the
formal sector(Pff).
We introduce then the curve Cii, the costs of financing the informal sector by the informal
financial organizations. We suppose that the tangent of Cii is inferior to that of Cfi. This means that
. the costs of financing the informal sector by the informal financial organizations are lower than those
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by the formal financial organizations-. We also suppose that the financing ability of the informal
financial organizations is more limited, so starting from Qii, Cii transforms itself into a vertical line.
In this figure, first, we observe that there is some substitutability between the two financial
markets. Theoretically, the interest rate of the informal financial market can vary between Pii and Pii,
but it cannot be too speculative in that it cannot surpass Pfi, the interest rate of the formal financial
market. Otherwise, the infonnalenterprises will turn to the formal financial market. Therefore there
exists some degree of competition between the two financial markets, which prevents to some extent
the interest rate to be too speculative in the informal fmancial market. Second, we can conclude that if
. the infonnai financial market improves its performance, that is, if the tangent of its cost curve reduces
and/or if it increases its financing ability, it can increase its quantity of loans with a lower interest rate.
This is shown by the curve C'ii, which leads to Q'ii, with Q'ii>Qii.
2. Applications to Asian and African Countries
2.1 Rural Conditions
In our analysis of the tabor market, we have shown how the performance of informal enterprises
is conditioned by rural development, more specifically, by agricultural growth and population growth.
The difference between the Asian and African countries in these growth patterns is fundamental. At
first, we shall consider some Asian countries.
Table 1: Growth Rate of Agricultural Production (%)
..
1960-69 1970-79
Taiwan 4.6 4.5
1961-70 1971-85
Korea 3.5 3
1971-81 1980-84
Indonesia 3.7 4.6
Malaysia 4.7 3.4
Philippines' 4.9 2.1
Thailand 6 3.4
Sources: Taiwan Statistic Data Book (1990); Korea Statistic Yearbook (1971); Korea Statistic Data
Book (1990); Barghouti, Tim~er and Siegel (1990 p.l5). .
On the contrary, in African countries, rural development remains a serious problem. In Africa,
the population growth rate is more than 3%, much higher than that of most of developing countries.
3- Because 1. informal enterprises being small-sized, there can be no an effect of the economy of scale for
the formal financial organizations; 2. the informal financial organizations being near to their debtors,'
their costs of information are relatively low; 3. in general the informal financial organizations benefit
from a trust link with their debtors, so the risk of their credits is lower. For more complete analysis, cf.
Ghate (1992).
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(Cf. the World Bank 1989 introduction). In Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural growth for the period
1973-84 in real terms was only 0,7% per year,or -1,9% per year, per inhabitant. (Serageldin 1989
-p.12)'
Furthermore, Asian rural development is characterized by the expansion of non-farm activity,
which may reduce immigration into towns. In Thailand, in 1960, the share of agriculture in total GDP
was estimated at about 39,8%. This share was reduced to 17,5% in 1985. However, the reduction of
rural population's share in total population was not as same speed falling from 82,4% to 68,4% in the
same period (Krongkaew 1'988 pp.73-75). Its explanation seems to be the rapid development of non-
farm activity in the rural regions. In Thailand, by 1984, 34,7% of total income of farm households
was derived from non-farm activities. In Korea, in 1979, non-farm employment accounted for nearly
.65% of total employment in rural areas. In Malaysia in 1978, rural non-farm activity provided about
32% of primary employment in rural areas. In the Philippines, rural non-farm activity accounted for
about 55% of total income for rural households in 1971 (Cf. Mukhopadhyay and Lim (1985) p.7,
p.386).
Nevertheless this is not the case for the African countries. For example, according to
Livingstone (1991),Kenya's informal sector is heavily concentrated in towns. For the period 1978-85,
Kenya's elasticity of informal sector employment with respect to GDP was 2,87, while it was only
0,49 for private formal sector World Bank (1987). To Livingstone (1991), in Kenya, informal sector
employment has grown at 11,1% per year over the period 1985-88, while this growth rate was only
2,7% in private formal sector. In manufacture, these rates are respectively 15% and 2,3%.
These observations support the judgment of Chaponniere and Judet (1992): "the good heaJth of
agriculture is perhaps one of the most important factors of Asian industrial success in the past, while
the difficulties in African agriculture constitute a further handicap for their industries."
2.2 Market Size and Exportation
In our analysis of the product market, we have shown how the growth of the informal
enterprises is conditioned by the specific and nonspecific demands for the informal sector's products.
This demand condition is also markedly different between Asian and African countries.
Clapham (1985 p.2l) affirmed that the size of consumer goods markets in developing countries
is limited by low average incomes, inadequate transport possibilities and by the specificity of demand.
Consequently there exist many small submarkets which are limited in volume and are frequently found
at the local level.
This description seems more relevant to the informal sector in African countries. Based on some
observations in Transkei in South Africa, Nattrass (1987) concluded that it is absurd to think that
street traders could become the "giants of tomorrow's economy". The failure to succeed is the result of
structural limitations, that is, the size and the nature of the lower-income market. According to
Livingstone (1991), in African countries, the dichotomy between the formal and informal sectors arises
out of a corresponding income dichotomy between the mass of consumers making use of informal
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sector goods and services and a wealthy class largely patronizing the formal sector. However in many
Asian countries there is more of a spectrum than a dichotomy'.
What the African countries should learn from Asian countries is how their informal enterprises
have utilized their comparative advantages to conquer the domestic markets and export markets. As
Berry and Mazumdar (1991) affirmed, small-sized firms play a significant role in exportation because
their products are labor-intensive and they have the capacity to respond quickly to changing market
conditions. A "representative" survey undertaken in the early 1970s indicates that in Singapore, the
share of output exported was 19,3% for firms with fewer than 10 workers. Chou (1988) has shown
that the market structure in Taiwan is characterized.by the fact that in the domestic market, there were
relatively large-scale manufacturers with numerous small-scale distributors; in the export market, there
were relatively small-scale firms with an enormous number of small-scale trading companies.
According to Regnier & Kirchbach (1992), the share of the exportation in total production of the small
and middle enterprises account for 65% in Taiwan, 35% in Korea and 17% (direct .exportatio~ only) for
Hong Kong.
Following such examples is necessary for the formalization of informal enterprises in African
countries. Based on a survey undertaken in six African countries, Marsden (1990) has concluded that
informal enterprises in Africa can be transformed into modem enterprises. But nearly all African
enterprises he has taken as examples are exportation-oriented.
Another point is that the complementary between small and large-sized firms is one important
reason for the success of small enterprises in Taiwan and in Korea. (Cf. Ho 1980, pp.17-19) The
informal enterprises appear to be efficient only in those industrial sectors where they don't face
competition from modern large-size firms (Cf. Bruch & Hiemenz 1984 pp.44-52). Often the small
enterprises are exploited by the large ones in developing countries (Cf. Schmitz 1982 pp.433-7).
However as Amsden (1991) has argued, in Taiwan, the large firms constitute an important support for
small firms in the domain of credit and of technology transfers.
2.3 Financial Conditions
Inour analysis of the financial market, we have shown that the growth of informal enterprises
is conditioned on the expansion of the informal financial market because the formal financial
organizations, based on credit cost evaluation, prefer the formal enterprises.
In most Asian countries where small-size firms are very dynamic, large-size firms are always
enjoy better access to credit and raw materials (Cf. Berry and Mazumdar 1991). InTaiwan, small-size
firms have been discriminated against under the financial system. Three-quarters or more of what
financial institutions lend must be secured by collateral. This discrimination appears to be related to
risk and transaction cost minimization (Cf. Amsden 1991).
4- The difference between rural population densities in African and Asian countries also plays a significant
role. In the Island of Java, an informal entrepreneur can reach a market of 1,2 million consumers within a
20 Km radius, whereas in many African countries, he would have to travel more than 100 km to meet the
same population.
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In the case of the informal sector, most of financial needs of firms are met by the informal
financial markets. (For an estimate of the size of the informal financial markets in 10 Asian countries,
cf. Ghate 1992) Several scholars (Mcleod 1984, Yotopoulos and Floro 1991), using Indonesia and the
Philippines as examples, have even concluded that in Asia, the informal financial system runs so well
that the financial constraints of the informal sector no longer represent a serious problem to its
development.
However, if we consider the African countries, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda,
we can observe the same tendency (Cf. Page 1979 p.21). The uses of the systems of tontine and other
forms of share associations in saving and in credit are very extensive'[. In Kenya, the resources coming
from personal savings and from families finance 92% of small-size enterprise investments. In Zaire,
this proportion reaches 99% (The World Bank 1989 chapter 6).
Therefore it is not the intensive use of informal financial markets, but the absolute size of their
informal financial markets which makes the difference between Asian and African countries. The
informal financial market size is tightly linked with the level of domestic savings. The latter is, in
turn, conditioned by the general economic performance of the country. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the
gross domestic saving represents 19,6% of GDP during 1975-80, it was 13,9% during 1981-85 and
11,8% during 1986-87 (the World Bank 1989 chapter 8), while this rate was on average 17,2% during
1961-70 and 23,7% during 1971-80 for the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. It was
17,2% during 1961-70 and 26% during 1971-80 for Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong.
(Kim 1982 p.15) If one takes into account the absolute levels of GDP, the difference in the credit
abilities of the informal financial markets between Asian and African countries should be more
significant.
3. Implications for Government Policies
Governments of developing countries are often asked to encourage the growth of informal
enterprises. While this is a positive approach, the question is how to help them? The experiences of
Asian countries are instructive.
Ho (1980 p.88) has argued that during the stage of industrialization, neither the governments of
Korea nor Taiwan actively promoted the development of small firms. Rather small firms were left
largely to fend for themselves. However, government policies did help determine the economic
environment in which small firms operated.
On the contrary, in India, the economic policy of the government has favored small-size firms,
not because they are more efficient, but because they are small. The results are naturally disappointing.
The best example is the government's use of fiscal measures to encourage the development of
handloom weavers and to slow the development of powerlooms. In spite of this policy, three-quarters
of the growth in cotton production came from those firms using powerlooms (Cr. Little, Mazumdar &
Page 1985, Kashyap 1988).
5- For several studies about this subject, cf. Henault and M'Rabet (1990 Part 2).
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The lack of human capital in infonnalenterprises is often an argument in favor of government
intervention. However, certain estimates show that this is not a very serious obstacle to the growth of
informal enterprises. According to Vijverberg's calculation (1991) about the informal sector in Cote
d'Ivoire, there isonly weak evidence of returns to human capital. Even those for education are
statistically insignificant. An empirical study undertaken by Nee and Young (1991) of some Chinese
villages showed that the level of village education has no significant effect on the development of
peasant entrepreneurship across villages.
In most Sub-Saharan African countries, government interventions seem inadequate. For
example, the exchange rate may be over-evaluated, leading to a loss of export market shares. (The
World Bank & UNDP 1989). According to Balassa (1990) in these countries, a 1% change in the
exchange rate is negatively associated with a 0,8-1 % change in the ratio of exports to output.
Another example is price discrimination against agriculture. According to Cleaver (1985),
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with a high degree of price discrimination against agriculture had an
average agriculture growth rate of 0,8% in the 1970-81 period. In contrast, corresponding growth rates
were 1,8% to 2,9%in countries with medium and low price discrimination against agriculture.
Excessive bureaucratic interventions can also have a negative effect on the growth of informal
enterprises. De Soto (1989) argued that the excessive regulation imposed by the enormous bureaucratic
state was effectively excluding Peru's informal workers from full participation in the country's
economic life. According to Nee and Young (1991), in Chinese villages, the most important negative
determinant to the development of the peasant household fmns is bureaucratic mobilization. Based ona
survey in Tanzania, Levy (1991) concluded that small firms bear punitive formal tax and licensing
requirements. Furthermore, these requirements provide opportunities to bureaucrats to extract side
payments.
Given these arguments, we can agree with Little (1988), who states: a policy of supply-side
interventions in favor of small-scale enterprises will not promote an efficient labor-intensive
development. The elements of a sound policy include the following: 1). Trade and protectionism
policies should be changed to make exporting as profitable as domestic sales. 2). Interest rates,
including those to small enterprises, should not be subsidized. 3). High wages in the formal sector
encouraged either directly or indirectly by governments should be abandoned or at least modified. 4).
Any supply-side industrial promotion measures should disregard and, so far as possible, be neutral
between firm or establishment sizes.
This does not mean that the government has nothing to do in the informal entrepreneurship
promotion. As Chickring and Salahdine (1991) have suggested, governments should eliminate
institutions and policies that discriminate against the informal sector, such as difficult procedures to
register or operate a business, to establish title to land, or to obtain a permit to build; burdensome
regulations on economic activity; and policies that indirectly discriminate against the informal sector
such as promotion of large enterprises, strict interest rate regulations, and trade restrictions.
The policy reform seems to be the most important for most African countries. According to the
World Bank and UNDP (1989 chapter 6), among the Sub-Saharan African countries, those that have
actively taken part in reforms, including those that address the exchange rate, agricultural products
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prices, public expenditure and public enterprises experience an economic performance much better than
those that have not been active in these reforms. (See table 2.)
Table 2
Indicator Period Countries with a program Countries without program
and active in reforms or weak effort in reforms
Agricultural production 1980-84 1.1% 1.3%
1985-87 2.6% 1.5%
Growth in volume of exportation 1980-84. -1.3% -3.1%
1985-87 4.2% 0.2%
Conclusion
We have used several simple analytical tools to show that (1) in the labor market, the-
formalization of the informal sector depends on the average income and the quantity of rurallabor and
on the wage level regulated in the formal sector; (2) in the product market, it depends on the market
size; (3) in the fmancial market, it is linked with the fmancial ability of the informal financial sector,
which is also determined by the size of the product market. We have shown that in these three points,
the conditions for the informal sector entrepreneurs are fundamentally different between Asian and
African countries.
The implications of our analysis for government policies in developing countries is that
government efforts should bedirected at developing agriculture, reforming wage policies vis-a-vis the
formal sector, reforming fiscal and exchange rate policies to promote exportation, and reducing
administrative burdens on informal entrepreneurs. In short, improving economic environment and
demand side conditions may be a more.efficient way to promote informal sector entrepreneurs.
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IV. ENTREPRENEURS IN MODERN INDUSTRIES

Presentation
The dynamics of entrepreneurs in modern industry is painting a bright picture in the Asian
region, particularly for the manufacturing sector. Whereas global reports emphasize the new
development and diversification of manufacturing activities in Southeast Asia with the quick response
of NIC's industries to changing market opportunities and the changing patterns of competitiveness, the
economic press highlights the success stories of small traders turned tycoons, of entrepreneurs fighting
their way from a small workshop to the establishment of a large manufacturing corporation over a
span of two decades. Previously, most comments and academic literature tended to focus on either
small traders or large firm and multinational corporations. However, the contemporary picture leadsto
a reassessment of local entrepreneurial dynamism and the sprouting of the academic debate.
The process of sustained and rapid industrialisation lead us to address the issue of the role of
entrepreneurs in sectoral development, their performances, and the relationship with institutions that
shape or direct industrial policy. What are the specific characteristics of Asian entrepreneur's current
attitudes? how do their strategies contribute to the construction of modern industries? How do they .
cope with a context of rapidly changing national competitive advantages in the world economy and
regional arena?
The present chapter is an attempt to reflect upon these issues, going beyond some conventional
wisdom about the dynamics of entrepreneurship in Asia, and to cast new light upon three major
themes: the role of private initiative in modern industries, the strategies to maintain competitiveness,
the business networks and lobbying powers of modern entrepreneurs, and particularly the relationship
between entrepreneurs and the State.
1. Private Initiative in Modern Industries
In Southeast Asia the pattern of industrial development was based on a large number of small
and medium size private ventures, and a relatively small proportion of larger, or even state owned
companies: This characteristic accounts for the widespread intervention of entrepreneurs, many of
whom have turned their project to success thanks to two elements that differentiate this region
relatively to, say Latin America or West Africa:
1) a favourable economic context - over a span of thirty years for most countries in the region -
with several strong cycles of growth and prosperity, and
2) a capacity to shift from one activity to another, or to expand a small, narrowly specialized
venture, often based on trading activities geared to the local needs, into a larger, more diversified
enterprise targeted to world markets.
Thus in the Asian context, the increasing opportunities to make profit, implied for the
entrepreneurs a particular ability to manage changes and the evolution of their activity: over-production
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crises have been common (in textile, as well as chemicals) and East Asian Nics are currently
restructuring their own "sunset industries" since the mid-80s. D.H Kim, referring to the case of Korea,
mentions the economic challengebut also the structural tensions resulting from these adjustment.
This holds true particularly in the case of the textile sector, which was one of the founding
stones of industry in most East Asians Nits, and is now a major component of the manufacturing
sector in SoutheastAsia (paperpresented by J-C Simon). Considering its development in Thailand, we
see that entrepreneurs concentrated first on the development of upstream and local marketactivitiesand
gradually shifted their efforts to exports. Since the late 70's the recent boom in garment production has
enabled the generation of several thousand smalland medium ventures.
The emergence of a modern industry is therefore gradual: there are steps and leaps but
maturation is the key to national integration of activities. The presentation of the development of the
automobile sector by M. Lautier highlights both the many interactions that preside over the
generations of the chain of activities and the various approachesadopted throughout Asia to promote
this sector.
When it comes to the so-called "High-Tech" activities, we have to admit that their
characteristics put them out of the reachof most entrepreneurs and many developingcountries. Several
key parameters have to interact for their success;D. Danaraj stresses in his paper the prerequisites for
the development of High-Tech activities: long term project, substantial financial commitment,
mastering a specificaridevolutivemanufacturing process.
2. Entrepreneurs' Strategies and Competitiveriess
To reach the stage of "modem industry", emerging entrepreneurs have to struggle through the
ups and downs of the global economy, learningboth the tricks of tradeand the state of the art in terms
of equipment and management. In a region such as Asia where globalization has transformed the
horizon of entrepreneurs, this issue of maturation of industryand the ability to maintain a competitive
advantage on worldmarkets is indeeda crucialone.
The three sectoral papers quoted above show that entrepreneurs' strategies differ according to
specific sector dynamicsbut tend to face similarconstraints of periodicaladjustment and restructuring.
At the first stages of companydevelopment,entrepreneurs, especially those whose company emerges
from a family based business tend to give more attention quantitative expansion, Le. machinery and
physical components of the firm, increased sales, rather than human capital selection and training, or
quality improvement in production.
The current rapid growth of companies seems to minimize the need for careful and optimal
management of resources. But this is not going to last: tensions on the labour market are already
frequent in SoutheastAsia (particularly for qualifiedworkers and executives), and increasedcompetition
is placing new constraintson firms both to access local natural resourceand keep a profitable share of
markets. Adapting to the new times requires structural changes in enterprises (e.g. reshaping
conglomerates, incorporating or listing family business) and also bringing a vision, a project into
emerging companies: this is part of the maturation process that is taking place at the present stage of
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development in Asia. Needless to say, not all entrepreneurs will make it throughoutall required steps.
As a matter of fact we know very little about unsuccessful entrepreneurs, and more research work
wouldbe welcometo follow up evolution of companies.
Therefore the present competitive edge of Southeast Asianentrepreneurs seems to be based on
two elements:
- the capacity for rational arbitration and adequate selectionof strategies to maximize profits
which result in take-off of both internationally competitive industries and nationally protected
activities.
- the acceptance of risk and the flexibility to reorientate activities threatened by loss of
competitiveness: this has resulted in shift of labour intensive activities from East Asia to Southeast
Asia, and a general drive of many companies towards high tech activities (higher range of consumer
goods, telecommunication, engineering....) which present new challenges for entrepreneurship and
industrial management, as Danaraj rightlypointsout.
3.: Entrepreneurs, Business Networks and Cooperation
The papers emphasizes the roleof industrial linkages that determine the structuring of sectors
and the personal network of entrepreneurs (relationship of cooperation, lobbying power, that help to
by-pass or decrease entrybarriers in industry).
Informal networks have given way to more formal business association, as Chaponniere
convincingly shows in the case of East Asian Nics. Whereas informal networks and cooperative
strategies where primarily based on groupcohesion, the new networkcan be more open, and forward
looking: business association contribute to the technical data and market knowledge diffusion among
of their members; and play the role of effective lobbies to secure State protection, or even for global
tradenegotiation
In many respects research on modern industry shows a complementarity with small scale and
informal sector: it is indeed striking to realize the role played by sub-contracting for the promotion of
the garment sector in southeast Asia (a good comparison can be based on the textile industry, see V.
Charoenloet, in the previous part, and J-C Simon). Both sectors (formal/modern and informal) have
similar strategiesand practices,for eXamPle evadingtaxes,or limitedregistration, beyond the common
tappingof temporary migrantlabourresources from thecountryside.
Therefore the institutional context of industrial growth in which companies operate deserves
attention too, especially their relationship with regard to rules and regulations governing economic
activity.
State intervention was markedly different throughout the development process in East-Asian
Nic's compared to Southeast-Asian experiences. Both J.R. Chaponniere and D.H Kim present the
specificity of East Asian cases, and the features that are unlikely to be reproduced in other countries
(exemplified by M. Lautier ir, his paper on the promotion of the car industry in the region). In
addition, the request for supportby entrepreneurs is frequently a request for assistanceand protection,
more thanan acceptation of the "picking the winner" principleby entrepreneurs.
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Conclusion
It would be over-ambitious to reach fmal conclusions about the characteristics of entrepreneurs
in modem manufacturing companies of contemporary Asia. But in a more limited way we could
summarize elementsfrom the debatethat followed the presentations, in order to highlightsome salient
features;
Part ofthe debate is centered on the issueof long termperformances of entrepreneurs: it is well
recognized that the emergenceof modem industries has been widespread throughout Southeast Asia
over the past decades, and even more in the recent years, but the long term prospects are to be
discussed. A first point was made about the necessary balance between export-led activities and
. local/regional marketgrowthas the key to the successof many industries.
Another element to be monitored in the future should be the pattern of employment and
stabilityof manpower. One participant mentioned that the numberof strikes is not a valid criterion as
many conflicts do not end up in strikes but rather affect productivityand quality of production. Dr.
Samart Chiasakul, the moderatorof the panel, emphasized the ambivalenceof Asian entrepreneurs:
They have a genius for flexibility, quick response to changes, but that could also weaken the
industrialisation process, as manyindustries show "footloose" characteristics (e.g. many entrepreneurs
from KoreaandTaiwan haverelocatedtoThailand).
The discussion about the role of the State stressed the changing relationship between
Governments and the private sector: as mentioned above about Korea, the entrepreneurs tend to adopt
new attitudes towards the institutions and the State. this is particularly true-in Thailand where recent
political events have been analyzedas a conflict of generation between traditional politicians and the
new economic elite.
Finally, many questions can be raised about entrepreneurship and new regional strategies of
modem companies. One aspect is the new perception of regionalpotential by entrepreneurs - whether
we refer to the new "zoneof trade" of continental Southeast Asia Of to the "Triangleof growth" further
South. There are very few modern companies in Southeast Asia that have a truly regional or
international dimension - it is expected that the next years will see the emergence of regional
conglomerates, that will contribute to the restructuring of manufacturing activities (such as
automobile, petrochemical, consumer products...). A final aspect is the strengthening of linkages
between entrepreneurs throughout the region despite the different businesspractices, regulations and
habits - one case of such transnational businessculture is found among the business communities of
Chineseorigin,and will be adressedin the nextpart.
194
Entrepreneurs, State and Networks
Jean-Raphael Chaponniere
After a lost decade in Africa as well as in Latin America, the Asian Newly Industrialized
Countries (NICs) have become the new references in the field of development economics. However, the
lessons drawn from these experiences do not enjoy unanimous acclaim, especially as regards the
respective role played by entrepreneurs and the State in the industrialization process. Early analysesl.
emphasized the neutrality of the trade regime put into practice after the economic reforms implemented
in the early 1960s in Korea and Taiwan; these reforms are said to have promoted neither export
activities nor import substitutions- and to have given a free rein to entrepreneurs who.faced with
limited domestic markets, switched to the export of labor intensive products. In doing so, these
countries have avoided repeating the errors of other countries' who had hastily embarked upon the
"second import substitution stage". Korea is an almost classical example of an economy which creates
its own advantages of comparison, while reaping the benefits of economic theory." (Westphal 1982).
By creating a favorable macro-economic atmosphere, there seemingly emerged several dynamic
entrepreneurs, which enabled the NlC's industries to leap forward,
Little by little this "neo-liberal" interpretation has given way to what might be termedmore
heterodox explanations which commonly stress the importance of enlightened State intervention.
Thus, after the "developmentalist" approach of the 1960s and the "dependentist" outlook of the 1970s,
the experience of the NlCs became a new formula for tackling under-development (Haggard, 1990).
From this experience was born a new paradigm carrying different names: Johnson (1986) described a
"Capitalist Developmental State"; others spoke of a State model (Clark, 1989; Colclough, 1991);
Wade (1990) argued that the State governed the market; and more recently, certain writers evoked the
specific features of the "East Asia Developmental State".
That one experience may give rise to such a variety of conclusions is an indication of the
complexity of this phenomenon, which will undoubtedly continue to be a topic of research. His no
longer denied that the State has played an important role in industrializing the NICs. Though some
authors would claim that these countries would.have progressed even more rapidly without the State's
intervention, it is generally agreed that their intervention was of a positive nature since, for the most
part, it was in harmony with the market (park, 1990).
1- Writings by Little (1970), Belassa (1971, 1975) and the presentation of the NICs' success in reference
manuals, e.g; the "hand book of Development economics" (1991). '
2- The elimination of the arbitrary nature of the administration (moving from a "negative" list which
specified the only athorized importations to a "positive" list which indicated. the products barred from '
importation; as well as 'the abrogation of quotas and import monopolies).
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However, this consensus has, in turn, raised new questions. What could account for the great
success of the NIC State interventions while, in so many other developing countries, similar
interventions have led to failures? Which mechanisms have enabled the state to intervene without
'cramping' their entrepreneurs' dynamism? The answer to these questions lies partially in the existence
of various networks linking the State and the entrepreneurs. As it will be described in this paper, one
should distinguish between the nature of these networks. While many authors have stressed the
informal network (i.e., "Korea Inc."), this paper wiUemphasize the role of the more formal networks
(i.e. the industrial associations). However, before going into those details, a quick description of the
State's role in the NICs will be given.
1. The State and the Promotion of Entrepreneurship
The NICs industrialization has relied on private initiatives. Success stories of self- made men
abound in Korea, Taiwan and Hong' Kong. Several of these founders are still at the head of the
businesses they created. These large enterprises - some of them'figure in the top 500 enterprises in the
world 3- form the tip of an iceberg made of tens of thousands of companies. The dynamism of these
entrepreneurs is comparable to that of the "captains of industry" of Europe's nineteenth century. All
the same, it is also undeniable that their success can also be attributed to the supportive role played by
the State. .
. The State in the NICs has peen, as in Japan, a development "expert". It has been active at each
phase of the life of a firm. It sometimes created them, and later on it protected them, then went on to
help them to reinforce their technological capacities, and recently it has accompanied them in their
delocalization moves.
The State has picked the winners. This practice is similar to industrial targeting policy. It only
targeted certain sectors but, at times, also chose the entrepreneurs responsible for carrying out the
industrial projects it wished to be realized. In Korea, the setting up of big groups was one of General
Park Chung Hee's ambitions; his wish was to promote the growth of a national capitalism and to
"enable millionaires to build large factories" (quoted in Amsden, 1988). An alleged meeting between
the President and several heads of large firms at the "Blue House" was the origin of a tacit agreement
between the State and businessmen (Jung-en Woo, 1991). Following this meeting which, according to
some, signaled the birth of Korea Inc., thirteen business heads went abroad in a bid to mobilize capital,
and on their return they proposed a series of measures which included the construction of the Ulsan
industrial site. These measures were immediately put into effect by the State (Koo Suk-mo, 1989).
These entrepreneurs created the Federation of Korean Industries and brought together the largest of the
Korean groups. In Taiwan, where State enterprises had dominated the scene during the fifties, the State
also had a very decisive role in promoting private enterprise. One such case is that of the textile
industry, which, up to 1983, had been the country's major export activity. The State began by
3- Among the most well known examples in Korea are Cho, the chairman-founder of the Hanjin industrial
group; Chung, chairman of Hyundai; and Kim Woo Chong, founder of Daewoo. In Taiwan famous examples
are Lin of Tatung and Wang of Formosa Plastic.
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entrusting some chosen enterprises with the task of transforming the raw material that it sold them and
that it bought back from them after being processed. This strategy was quite similar to the "putting
out" practiced by English 19th century merchants (Li, 1959). In this way, many Taiwanese spinning
and weaving companies were spared the difficulties of buying raw materials, ensuring working capital,
or dealing with marketing problems. These enterprises were later able to boast independent
management, and it was only much later that they were made to face international competition. In
Korea, the same practice, used to promote these large groups, was adopted during the 1980s in an effort
to boost the 5MBs. In order to reinforce the industrial fabric, the State proceeded to select 3,000 out of
the 30,000 existing ftrms (using management criteria), which were then put forward as potential
candidates for transfer of technology operations in collaboration with foreign firms that were able to
choose their partners within this subset.
Targeting was not only aimed at domestic entrepreneurs, as is clearly the case in Singapore.
This City-State is the only Asian NIC country in which foreign firms play such a decisive role (they
account for 80 percent of Singapore's manufacturing production). Multinationals did not settle there
spontaneously. The promotion policy of the late 1960s implemented by the "project division" of the
Economic Development Board was very instrumental. As from 1968, the EDB, through its external
antennae, made direct negotiations with the largest multinational enterprises in order to convince them
to settle in Singapore. Requests for the status of "pioneer industries" were analyzed according to the
impact such new production would have on industry overall and to the type of industrial integration
they offered. In more recent years, Singaporian technocrats have been aiming directly at "start-ups"
. which are less knowledgeable about Singapore. Sometimes they play the role of venture capital in
order to incite these new-comers to set up in the city sate (today both of Korea and Taiwan import as
much as Africa; Korea and Taiwan together import as much as Latin America) (Chaponniere, 1990).
The evils of protection are often put forward. It offers an opportunity for rent seeking
entrepreneurs and encourages non-competitive businesses. The examples of Korea and Taiwan have
often been quoted as examples of countries which have fought against this policy. After several years
of protectionism, these countries have placed their enterprises in a situation of free exchange. However,
it must be remembered that this opening-up only involved exporters and that it has existed along-side
an extremely demanding kind of protectionism, which could have rivaled the kind practiced in Latin
American ·countries. As these countries began acquiring strategic commercial importance, their
protectionist practices came out into the open (Bagwhati, 1990) and gave rise to pressure on the part of
their trading partners, who demanded that they dismantle their tariffand non-tariff barriers. In analyzing
the Korean protectionism set-up, Luedde Neurath (1986) pin-pointed numerous administrative
measures'[ the effects of which had not been taken into consideration by previous studies. Analyses
carried out on Taiwan's case (Gold, 1986; Wade, 1990) came to similar conclusions: not only was the
effective rate of protection not homogenous, but the distribution of the rates measured at a more
sensitive level of the nomenclature left nothing to chance, showing up the existence of a targeted
industrial policy whose aim was to promote certain well-defined sectors. Besides these protectionist
4- For example, the down payments required for importation as well as the role played by industrial
associations in import management (see infra). .
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measures, it would appear that the State did not hesitate to take such steps as manipulating prices in
order to favor investment in sectors thought to be of top priority (the practice of using different interest
rates and of linking exportation success to the possibility of importing).
The only original thing about these protectionist practices lay in the fact that by protecting
.their market, the States did not necessarily favor rent seeking enterprises, as is widely the case in many
countries. The firms which were to benefit from these measures were forced to respect a "performance
clause" by proving their competitiveness on the international market. In Korea, enterprises benefiting
from protection measures at an internal level also had to prove their worth as exporterst. The State
was ina position to enforce these performance clauses since it was able to exercise a very efficient
control over such firms via credit facilities; the nationalization of the banking system gave the State
the right to have its say in allocating credits, thus, providing Taiwan and Korea with one of its
principal instruments of industrial policy up to 1983. Banks were privatized in 1983. However, this
privatization did not seem to have influenced the role of the banks until the last few years, a role which
continues, in many ways, to resemble that of State relay. Among the other more "classical"
instruments which have been used were: the production license system, price control, and a close
surveillance of the exit of capital from the country. These instruments helped the State to mobilize
external financing in favor of big firms, but turned out to be detrimental to small and medium
businesses. One might observe that the NICs remained faithful to List's initial teaching, namely that
the protection of budding industries ought to be looked upon as a preparation for international
competition (Judet and Chaponniere, 1992).
The State has also been very active at each technological step taken by these industries.
Contrary to what has sometimes been said, neither Korea nor Taiwan had waited until their
comparative advantages had worn out to launch the second phase of import substitution. It is
interesting to remember that such investments were severely condemned by the World Bank at the
time. The State became the promoter of projects in the domain of iron and steel and by doing this, it
clearly anticipated the demand. These projects have been realized by State owned enterprises. China
Steel and Pohang Steel Co. have been ranked among the most successful iron and steel companies in
the world. In Korea's case, what is striking is the variety of laws aiming at industrial modernization;
for example, laws promulgated in the early 1970s for the promotion of engineering or laws which gave
top priority to the electronics industry and which catered for the production of semi-conductors (and not
only for their assembly) as early as the mid- 1970s (Glabi, 1991). At around the same time as Taiwan,
the Korean state made similar efforts to convince private entrepreneurs of the strategic importance of
the electronics sector; anticipating its evolution they, too, undertook investments ranging from the
building up of an industrial and scientific site in Hschinchu in 19786 to the setting up of research
centers or of state enterprises in that field (as in the case of telecommunications in Korea). From the
5- Thus, in an effort to reward a given exporter of its first automobiles exports, which had been sold in a
counter trade agreement involving bananas, the State offered the possibility to commercialize those·
bananas, which were being sold at US$2 each unit at the beginning of the 1980s. This substantial profit
was possible because of the protected nature of the market.
6- Where in 1993, over 140 high-technology enterprises are operating.
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mid·1980s, both the Taiwanese and Singaporian States embarked upon heavy investments in an effort
to help firms take new steps in technology7. '
For the past few years, the NICs have been faced with the problem of the aging' of their
traditional industries. The rise in salaries and the higher values of their currencies have eroded the
competitiveness of their labor intensive industries such as clothing, and shoe and toy manufacture, so
much so, that local entrepreneurs have been forced to delocalize their fabrications to South East Asia
and China. It is noteworthy that, in this movement, the State in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore has
been playing an active role by softening its policies ori the exit of capital as well as accompanying
these enterprises and by directly participating in the construction of industrial zones in certain countries
where these firms are to be implanted (In China; in the rest of South East Asia; in Central America
and also in Ireland).
From this rapid summary, it is clear that the State was not prepared to simplyotitIine "the rules
of the game" which allowed entrepreneurs to emerge, but was also present at each stage of the lives of
these firms.
2. The Networks
It may be wondered how the State in the NICs managed to intervene in a judicious manner in
the industrial development of their countries (Le. in harmony with markets), whereas in most of the
other developing countries its involvement has led to dismal failures or the building up of "white
elephants". How waste state able to be so clairvoyant in its choices?
In order to throw light on this paradox, it must be admitted that the boundary between State and
the business world is not clear cut. Attention has been focused on the workings of informal networks
very close to a caste-like' system (e.g. networks formed between the graduates from the' same
institution). However, the existence of these networks revealed by political economy scientists only
partly explain the relationship between the State and the private sector. In addition to these networks,
there exist more formal networks (e.g. industrial associations) which play a role just as important as
the informal networks and whose power is gradually increased throughout the development process.
Whereas the former involved, almost exclusively, big groups of companies; the latter mobilized a
greater number of enterprises.
However before going into detail about these networks, mention must be made of the
uniqueness of the State in the NICs. A rather "cynical" outlook is often taken when viewing the
State's capacities for intervention in developing countries: these interventions in the economy are '
judged at best as ill adapted, and in most cases they are considered to stand in contradiction to the
"smooth" running of the market and to represent a source of corruption. However, paradoxically, the
successes as well as the failures in the adjustment processes in developing countries and in socialist
economies have shown .that the success of a liberalization process calls for a strong state. While on
7- In Taiwan and Singapore, the, State collaborated with foreign companies in order to set up silicium
foundries; a highly capital intensive industry up-stream to the micro-electronic sector.
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this point, it might be timely to recall the contrast between the reforms in China and those in Russia:
the latter's difficulties were partly due to the weakness of the State. In Korea and Taiwan, due to their
long administrative tradition, the Japanese colonial heritage, and the way in which civil servants are
recruited "meritocracy", as described by Vogel (1992), the administration enjoys a privileged status
which enables it to have more autonomy than in most other third world countries administrations. For
this reason, these States deserve to be called "strong states" (in the sense described by Myrdal (1969):
Le. States which are capable of mobilizing the ways and means of enforcing their decisions.
One early account for the success of interventionism in the NICs lay the accent on the close
understanding existing between the State and the business world. Thus, in a capitalist development
State, "The principal strength lies in the collaboration between bureaucracy and businesses. Civil
servants do not attempt to obtain absolute control over firms, but rather seek to guide the economy by
using them as antennae: they learn about the markets by closely observing business experiences". In
their view, the freedom of the market is not an aim in itself, but one of the many instruments used in
attaining predetermined objectives; Objectiveswhich are second only to that of industrial growth". This
understanding can be illustrated by the modalities of the workings of informal networks which justify
the names of "Korea Inc.", "Taiwan Inc.", and "Singapore Inc.". This concept, which has sometimes
been usedto criticize the mysterious, even negative character of their decision-making (Wilkinson,
1992), in reality is a symbol of the closeness of the ties between the State and the big groups. Such is
the case of the "alma-mater"networks: these could range from retired top civil servants to past-students
of prestige universities, as well as networks formed along the political party line (as in the case of
Taiwan in particular where several of the enterprises promoted by the State during the 1950s had been
founded by businessmen from continental China or who were close to the KMT party). Inspired by the
Japanese custom of "descending from heaven", some Korean retired top civil servants continue their
careers in a jaebud where, as vice-presidents, they make use of their past relationships (Steers, 1989).
Another factor favoring the creation of networks is the fact that these top civil servants and directors of
important firms have had the same academic background, often from secondary school level and
continuing on to university'[. Thus, the existence of these kinds of networks, which function in a caste
or clannish manner, gives a preliminary account for the deep understanding between the State and huge
groups. Such networks, with their informal manner of functioning contribute to blur the boundary
which is supposed to exist between the administration and the business world. Such networks are not
specific to Asia but exist in all western countries. This system can be found in France, under the name
of "grands corps", or in Britain, where one speaks of the "establishrnent'P,
8- Kyunggi High School in Seoul, Kyunbok in Taegu, and in Pusan until the secondary school reform, as well
as several big universities. One chairman out of three (from the 490 biggest firms on the stock market)
holds a degree from the SNU, the most prestigious State university where most top civil servants are
trained. The chairpersons of the big jaebuls, or large business conglomerates, follow different training
orientations: a great many of them have been Japanese or U.S trained (which is logical because of their
age), and only two of them are graduates of the SNU and five have no university training at all.
9 - An article from the review, "The Economist" (December 1992) gave one an idea of the permanent nature of
this structure in the U.K.
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Apart from these informal networks, which almost exclusively concern relations between the
State and big businesses, there are also networks of a much more formal nature. These were set up
through meeting, "forums", and associations, and have been reinforced over the years and now form
"institutional" networks, thus providing the State and the ever-increasing number of entrepreneurs with
multiple occasions for contact and dialogue.
In Korea's case, the decision to set up a weekly exporters' meeting has been considered as a
significant institutional innovation (Shinohara, 1983). It is at such meetings, presided over by the
President of the Republic, that dialogue has occurred between the executive powers and business
people. These meetings have been instrumental in settling a number of matters concerning
administrative functioning and have helped to create a massive mobilization of the participants in
export objectives. During the 1980s, these weekly meetings, not only dealt with exportation.but also
involved matters concerning technology, an indication of the evolution of their industrialization
strategy. In Korea, the Joint Export Development Committee, established in 1965, bringing together
administrative and industrial representatives, has had the task of managing the system for encouraging
export: they participated in defining the industrial objectives on a sectorial level and in return, were
. given the power to allot export quotas to their members (Yung Whee Rhee, 1984). Such encounters
are important for a better circulation of information. An opportunity for explaining policies is offered
and any measures taken can beproperly coordinated. Such a level of organization of relations between
the State and the business world is not specific to Korea and Taiwan. In Singapore, where foreign
companies ensure the essential part of industrial production, the Singapore International Association
maintains close relations with the government while local firms get together in different chambers of
commerce with definite ethnic leanings. In Hong-Kong, the private sector is organized into more than
200 associations which bring together 7,000 firms: the Hong-Kong General Chamber of Commerce,
in itself, makes up a small government.
The smooth functioning of such meetings requires that businesses be represented by
associations which have an adequate structure in order to be able to pass on their expectations from one
to another; which leads us to emphasize the way in which industrial associations function. The role
played by intermediate structures has been neglected by economists who prefer to focus either on firms
or on the State; but this role seems to be an important one. The mentioned associations have become
privileged channels between the State and businesses.
As early as the beginning of the 1960s, the Korean government had demanded that all
"incorporated" enterprises belong to an industrial association and these associations were created at
level 4 of the classification of acnviuesl": in the case of the textile industry, the creation of different
associations (spinning, weaving, synthetic fibers, etc.) followed the progressive construction of that
branch. Other organizations were later set up at a more cohesive level. Thus, the KOFOTI, set up in
1967, brought together the different specialized industrial associations who were to become the textile
division's negotiator with the Ministry of Industry. In Taiwan, as from the 1950s, the government
10- In the case of the automobile industry, the State was in favour of dividing the federation into two separate
sub-units during the early 1980s; the Kama which consisted of constructors and the Kaica which brought
together equipment manufacturers. These federations sometimes have diverging problems and interests.
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encouraged firms to get together into industrial associations in order to regulate production and
promote exportation (Alam, 1989). Any sector consisting of more than five firms were to be
registered. However, most of these associations carried very little weight, except the noteworthy
Taiwan Textile Federation, which brought together 18 associations.
Even though the Korean or Taiwanese industrial associations have been less influential than
their Japanese counter parts, it is clear that their recommendations are often adopted by the
administration. Koo Suk Mo (1989) has pointed out that in 1974 three quarters of the
recommendations made by the KOTRA have been retained not implemented into public policies.
-'-
In Korea, as in Taiwan, industrial associations served as filters for importation during the
1970s. Depending on the availability of currency allotted by the administration, certain import
objectives were fixed by these industrial associations after consulting their members and later
distributed the importation quotas among themselves. Through this system which remained in place up
to the end of the 1970s, these industrial associations were able to deal with the "non-tariff barriers" to
importation, These barriers, being totalIy informal, were totalIy ignored. In this way, the KOSAMI
(Korean Society for the Advancementof Machine Industry), an industrial association bringing together
entrepreneurs in the machine and engineering sector, had the power to approve or reject licenses to
import equipment for industry. In the course of foreign investments, and during negotiations dealing
with the imposing of informal performance clauses, it was clear that the administration became a
virtual representative of these professional associations (Chaponniere, 1991).
Industrial associations also served as important go-betweens when these countries had launched
their modernization plan. In the textile industry in Taiwan (Wade, 1990), it was the Textile Industry
Association which drew attention to the fact that, in that sector, there was lIttle or no activity (a
similar fate had befallen the dyeing branch) and in return the Industrial Development Bureau sought to
find an entrepreneur who would accept to invest in that sector in order to fill the void. In the case of
the petro-chemical industry, the associations organize quarterly meetings between the up-stream and .
down-stream businessmen of that sector. Another object of State - association relations has been
quality control (for which a program between State and industrial associations has been created). In
Korea, the law for the modernization of the textile industry, promulgated at the end of the 1970s, put
KOFOTI (an industrial association bringing togetherJS associations) in charge of that program in
addition to giving them the power to control production capacities (Moskowitz, 1984). Elsewhere, the
KOSAMI, having been set up to represent the Korean equipment industry, was given the
responsibility (by the State) to manage the fund for the promotion of the machine industry and to offer
guarantees in order to promote the purchase of Korean equipment by local businessmen. The sudden
emergence of the NICs in the high tech industries is partly due to the experience amassed by the
research institutes created by these governments and which used to function in a symbiotic manner
with industry. They worked together towards the diffusion of technology and helped industries
upgrading their technology as in the case of the Electronic Research Scientific organization, (ERSO) in
Taiwan.
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The associations, created partly through the State's initiative, have created sophisticated
information systems which offer their membersdetailed knowledgeof their sectors11 and which have
enabled the State to better "adjust" its industrial policy. At the same time, a pooling of these bits of
informationhas reinforced their capacities to carry out studies, and consequently to make proposals, a
situation which provides them with a means of negotiation with the State. In order for constructive
dialogue to take place between the State and business people, their representatives must be in a
position, not only to criticize the impact of a given reform, but also topropose constructive solutions.
The reinforcement of these professional associations is, no doubt, a process which cannot be
disassociated from the democratization of economic life.
The existence of these networkshave been a motivating force in establishing dialogue between
the State and entrepreneurs. They have the.added meritof not being limited to big groupsof companies
but seem, a posterior, to be one of the explanations for these companies' successes. These countries
have built up a "rhenan" style capitalism (Albert, 1991),a category which comprises Germany where
industrial associations count numerous members and play an important role, but also with Japan
where, according to one observer's hypothesis, "the Ministry of Industry and Commerce's concrete
mode of intervention consists in encouraging the creation of associations which together would form
an intermediate body, within which, at one and the same time, and in a not dissociable manner, all
industrial strategies wiu be set up"12.
The lessons to be learned from the NIC model are not to be limited to a few macro-economic
recipes which were put into practice, but should extend to the modalities of cooperation between the
State and businessmen. These relations have upset traditional ideas and can be linked to Perroux'
notion of a mixed "oligopoly": "this mixed entity. (private and public), this composite ensemble is
quite a monstrous thing when stood up against the sublime nature of the market economy logic of the
usual models of international exchange " (Perroux, 1982). The functioning of this ensemble requires
the existence of multiple bridges, the increase in consultation organs and the reinforcement of
industrial associations. The State in the NICs has favored the emergence of intermediate negotiators.
This lesson is important for the countries which have'embarked upon the NIC's trail13.
11- Example: the textile associations, also the KOSAMI, the KAMA (automobile), or the EIAK (Electronics
Industry Association of Korea) which, apart from their commercial functions, have at their disposition
different means of documentation and important research, and publish statistical bulletins (weekly in the
case of EIAK) which offer extremely detailed data concerning their sector.
12- A hypothesis which confirms sectorial studies; hence, Friedman (1989): The misundestood miracle
Camel! University Press dealing with the strategic machine tool industry in Japan.
13- As in the case of Thailand where, since the beginning of the 1980s (Anek Lao thamatas 1992), the
NESDB has created the Joint Public Private Development Committee which has served as a very important
junction.
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The Role of Industrial Policy in the Formation
of the Firms Strategies in the Process
of Korean Industrialization
Do Hoon Kim
Introduction
Korea is experiencing a hard time these days. While her industries suffer from decline in
international competitiveness and her position in the international markets is threatenedby new rivals
such as the ASEANcountries and China, the Korean government and business sectors are proposing
differentstrategy to developKoreanindustries. This is quite revolutionary reflecting upon past Korean
industrial developmenthistory. In the past, their interests coincided witheach other and the two parties
remained in perfect harmony in the process of industrialization. However recently, when the
government proposes a particular plan, private business suspects an ulterior motive; when private
business plans to invest in certain areas, the government refuses to approve it. Why do these
differences in stands occur? What changes in the economic environment are causing these
disharmonies? What are the future strategies of Koreanfirms? What will and must be the direction for
the Korean industrial policy in the future?
1. Evolution of Relations between the Korean Government and the
Business Sectors in the Process of Industrialization
In the 1960sand 70s, the government and privatebusiness sectors were the two wheels heading
in the same direction for rapid industrialization. The government led the business sector to invest in
desirable industries, and doing so utilized different policy tools at different times. During the 1960s,·
the Korean governmentfaithfully adopted marketpredictions. It promptedexport industries whichen-
joyed a comparativeadvantagein factor supplies, Le. light industries or labor intensive industriessuch
as textile, footwear, clothing etc. In other words, the government tried to intensify the market condi-
tions by subsidizing the industrieswith comparative advantages. During the 19708, it tried to advance
marketpredictionswith industrial targeting policies. The government promptedthe so-called "heavy&
chemical industries" (or HCI), whichhad not yet acquired a comparative advantagebut wouldgain one
in the near future according to the government's rosy vision. The business sector followed these gov-
ernmentdirectives withsincerityand contributed in the industrialization processof the nation.
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During thesetwo decades, theKorean government ignored the impacts of these types of policies
"to upgrade the industrial structure" upon the market structure of the industries concerned. On the.
contrary, the so-called "picking the winner" policies fostered monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions
in many domestic industries. Meanwhile, some entrepreneurs diversified their business-lines to form
"Chaebols": large private companies that control many sectors of manufacturing activities and basic
industriesin Korea,by takingadvantage of thesepolicies. The diversification strategy(eitherin related
industries or in completely new ones) was and still is the main growth path of "Chaebols" because
diversification by increasing theireconomic powergivesthem the monopolistic power to access scarce
resources such as bank credit, land and human capital etc. In sum, Korean business, following the
industrial policies of the government who controlled all information on the international markets and
dynamic evolution of comparative advantage at that time (or at least claimed to do so), chose the
"diversification" route to obtaineconomic power.
However, during the 1980s,this closerelationbetween the government and Chaebols began to
face two serious problems. The first problem was "excess investment" in some heavy & chemical
industriesand the second one was the issue of restructuring "sunset industries". Chaebols were very
reluctant to follow the "rationalization directives", since they opposed the Chaebols' unsuitable urge
for diversification. Moreover, Chaebols concerned were afraid that following these directives would
only provide an advantage to a rival chaebol. Nevertheless, the government succeeded in arbitrating
complicated interests amongst the Chaebols, using persuasion or the threat of cutting off bank credit.
This rationalization would not have been possible without the general business success of Korean
industries at the time.
Table 1 : History of Relations between Government and Business
Concerning Industrial Policies
Period Finns' strategy Government policy Maior industries
60s-mid70s Takeadvantage of Export-promotion Textile,footwear
cheap labor clothing, electronics
Search for economies of scale Pick-the-winner
\ ,
Export
mid70s-70s Diversify Incentives on HCI Steel, automobile
(Heavy andChemical Industries) shipbuilding chemical
Export
80s Diversify AdjustHCI Machinery, hi-techparts
and intermediate product:
More attention to Rationalize "sunsetindustries"
domestic demand
90s Reclaim deregulation Specialize Hi-tech,R & D software
Independent from zcvemmen Reduce chaebols' economic power
Unfortunatelyduring the 1990s, Korean industries are suffering severely from the recession in
the majoradvanced economies and the threatfrom newrivals. Chaebols, whichnowpossess their own
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think-tanks, are starting to blame the government for mismanaging macro-economic policies and for
not having a proper vision for the future. They are developing their own plan to pick the industries,
the partners and the locations (even overseas) for their future business. The government, aware of the
chaebols' new attitude, still wants to maintain a strong influence on the Korean industrial structure for
three main reasons. First, the Korean government wants the Chaebols to participate in its plan to
develop hi-tech industries such as semi-conductors, super-computers, HDTVs (High Density
Televisions), and bio-industries. Second, public opinion urges the government to reduce the
monopolistic power of Chaebols or at least restrain from giving them too much favors. Third, the
Korean government is too accustomed to the role of leading business to give up strong influence,
which it enjoyed through the industrial policies.
2. Domestic and External Environment in the 1990s
2.1 Domestic Economic Environment Changes
First, the increase in domestic wages is surpassing that of tabor productivity while the famous
conscientiousness of Korean workers is generally regarded as diminishing. Korean wages in the
manufacturing sector are now higher than their Taiwanese and Singaporeans counterparts even though
the Korean personal income level still lays far behind that of the two rival countries.
Second, rising incomes are inducing people to pay more attention to issues such as the'
environment, housing, health, and equity at the expense of economic growth. These changing attitudes
are expected to shift priorities from investment to consumption.
Third, the decentralization of administration is making an increase in social welfare and balanced
regional development a necessity. There is increasing public pressure to reject policies that may lead to
cronyism or favoritism.
Table 2: Wage Rate Comparison (1990)
(A) AverageWage Rate in the (B) per capita (A/B)*12
Manufacturing Sector (uS $) (US $)
Korean 834.7 5,569 1.8
Taiwan 824.7 7,735 1.28
Singapore 727.7 10,703 0.82
Jaoan 2,431.2 23,224 1.26
Source: Kim Hee Joo &Klm Do Hoon, Domestic and International Environment and Proposal for the
Improvement of Balance of Payments; KIET, Nov. 1991 . .
2.2 External Economic Environment Changes
First, industrial competition in international and domestic markets are expected to become more
severe as the signing of the Uruguay Round negotiations will open wide the domestic markets of all
countries, and as the former socialist countries participate more actively in the world economy.
Therefore, Korean firms must concentrate their business resources in a few business lines that promise
a bright future.
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Second, regional integration such as the formation of the European Community and the signing
of the North American Free Trade Agreement will significantly reduce the market access of non-
member country such as Korea. Korean industries will have to make inroads into these markets as
early as possible.
Third, environmental restrictions may be used as a new type of trade barrier by the advanced
economies, and environmental technologies may prove a bottleneck for the future competitiveness of
Korean industries.
Fourth, national competitiveness is expected to depend increasingly on the technology
competence and development level of nations. Therefore, industrial countries will compete more
intensively in the R & D field and avoid the transfer of technology to countries which may become
future rivals, for example, the Asia NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economics).
Fifth, the so-called "next-NIEs", including ASEAN countries and China, will catch up to the
NIEs by quickly developing their industries, through their competitive advantage of low wages and the
technological and financial assistance of industrial countries. The share of these next-NlEs in some
major world markets are beginning to surpass that of NIEs already.
Table 3: Trend of Export Share in the US Market (%)
NIEs Next-NIEs
Korea Taiwan Hong Kona China Thailand Malaysia
1987 4.2 6.1 2.4 1.6 0.5 0.7
1991 3.5 4.7 1.9 3.9 1.3 1.3
Source: GATT Report 1992.
3. Current Status of Korean Industry
Korea now possesses a sophisticated industrial structure, characterized by a fair amount forward
and backward linkages. The share of heavy industries in the value-added of the total manufacturing
sector rose to 69.5% in 1991 from 44.8% in 1970. The production levels and exports of major
industries have increased to within the top ten in the world, with the exception of some high-tech
industries.
On the other hand, Korean industry does face some difficulties in developing high quality and
high value-added products, because it has low level of industries technology relative to the advanced
economies and depends heavily on imported intermediate products. Moreover, most Korean industries
are still specialized in processing and assembling based on cheap labor. These industries are mostly
dominated by large companies, members of Chaebols. As a result, Korean industry is rapidly losing
international competitiveness due to the lack of strong small and medium industries which could
specialize in parts and intermediate products.
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Table 4: Major Industries' Production Position in the World*
1986 1990 2001
Electronics: an, $ 12.1 (6) 29.7 (6) 126.8 (4)
Automobile: 1,000 unit 602 (12) 1,332 (10) 3,789 (5)
Shipbuilding: 10,000 crt 364 (2) 346 (2) 540 (2)
Machinery: su, $ 4.2 (14) 13.9 37.7 (6)
Steel: Mu.. M{f 15 (10) 23 (7) 35 (6)
Petrochemical: MIL M{f 1,944 (17) 4,821 (6) 10,336 (7)
Textiles: 1,000 M{f 825.4 (6) 1,286 (6) 1,650 (6)
Footwear: xm, PAIR 467 (2) 512 (2) 690 (2)
Source: Kim Do Hoon, Industnal Policy Direction In the 21st Century, The Korea Economic Weekly,
July 20 1992.
* ( .) represents Korean industry's value of production and rank in the world market.
4. Major Changes of Korean Firms' Strategies in the 1990s - with
Relation to Industrial Policy of Government
First, Korean firms (especially member firms of Chaebols) are attempting to obtain some
independence from government policies so as to make their 'own decisions on investment project
choices. This change is largely due to their increasing ability and advantage in gathering valuable
business information in a rapid manner. Most Chaebols, with their own international network
connecting the foreign branches of its trading arm and with their own think-tanks (both R &. D
activities and in economic research activities), have developed their own decision-making systems.
Second, in contrast to past practices, Korean firms are very reluctant to yield to government
intervention and arguing for deregulation to a significant degree. In the past. the Korean government
issued many regulations and directives either to promote or to restrain certain industries and certain
business activities.
Third, Korean firms which who continually searched for exploitation of economies of scale, had
been mostly export-oriented. due to insufficient domestic demand during the past three decades.
However, as national income increased rapidly and domestic markets grew large Korean firms started to
pay more attention to domestic markets while the government still wants to promote exports.
Fourth, leading industrialists of the Chaebols are very nervous these days about the
government's anti-trust and competitive policies, called as "new industrial policy". They are afraid that
the government has a desire to dissolve Chaebols or at least to reduce their monopolistic economic
power drastically. These large business groups have made their position clear on the issue: A
unanimous "No!".
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5. Basic Directions of Industrial Policies in the 1990s
Basically, there seems to be a consensus that future industrial policies should be pursued only
for the sake of fostering the vitality of the entrepreneurs, the small and medium industries in the
private sector. To this end, government will drastically reduce industrial regulations and provide strict
and reasonable. rules of the game to the private sector, thereby improving market competition
conditions. To promote market competition, government will abolish many industrial entry barriers
and permit procedures which claim to regulate industrial activities and prohibit unfairness which results
'from economic power.
On the other hand, government will play an important part in improving such industrial
circumstances as the labor supply, capital market, and location supply. To avoid the negative effects of
over- or under-investment as weUas unfair activities in the market, government will propose a vision
of the future and induce industrial activities to move in the most desirable direction. In the case of
industrial policies, it is believed that Korean government will concentrate it's efforts on the three
points that follows.
1. Improvement of the technological level: The government should play a important role in the
process of developing certain strategic technologies, and should give more incentives to companies
actively engaged in R & D activities. In cases where it is difficult to develop high technology by
domestic firms on their own, strategic alliances with firms of advanced countries should be favored.
2. Improvement of sectors aiding manufacturing: Government should actively engage itself in
upgrading sectors which aid the manufacturing sector, such as education, finance, land supply and
logistics.
3. Globalization of industry: Overseas investment by Korean industry should be favored in order
to take advantage of foreign resources, including natural, financial and human resources. The
government should persuade industries to involve themselves in major regional integration such as EC
92andNAFfA.
Concerning "Chaebol Policy", Korean government is trying to encourage the large
conglomerates to specialize their industrial activities in a few selected sectors in order to achieve
economies of scale in R & D and production. In this sense, it is argued that the "selective main firm
system" introduced to stimulate their specialization should be replaced by the "selective main sector
system". In this case, som~ financial incentives at the domestic or international market level will be
given to "specialized firms", while mutual guarantee payments between subsidiaries should be
drastically reduced to "non-specialized firms", The government should also recommend that large
companies employ specialized managers and prohibit the unregulated use of company resources for the
personal benefit of the owner. It is also argued that the family ownership of Chaebols should be
decentralized and opened to the public
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Table 5: Ownership Structure of 30 Big Chaebols (%)
1987 1990 1991
Chairman or family (A) 15.8 13.7 13.9
Cross investment (B) 40.4 31.7 33.0
A+B 56.2 45.4 46.9
Source: Yang Wonkeun, On the Efficiency of Chaebols, KIET, 1992
Mr. Kim Young Sam, president-elected, seems to have the intention to promote small and
medium size industries. It is proposed that a special committee to encourage the SMIs will be operated
inside of the President's Office.
The major economic policies that will come for discussion should facilitate the conditions of
operation of small companies in the present economic context. They should include stabilization
measures for wage and interest rates. Additional efforts will have to bemade by government agencies
to ease decisively restrictive regulations. It is also vital that specific measures bring additional support
to emerging entrepreneurs in small and medium industries. Finally, for an established NIB as Korea,
more than ever R&D has to be placed at the core of new industrial policies. It is very likely that
intense political debates will preside over the future choices of industrial policies: large groups will
resist the restriction of their privileges and monopolies, whereas SMI will demand additional protection
rather than incentives for change and adapting to the new world order.
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The Growth of the Automobile Industry in Asia:
the State's Role in Promoting Domestic Entrepreneurs
Marc Lautier
The automobile industry has always been considered as a highly industrializing sector for a
country to develop. Its expansion, inevitably, goes together with powerful industrial and technical
linkage effects, especially in such sectors as production goods, basic products, parts and components'.
These linkages enable i~ to act as an engine to promote high value added activities.
However, many specialists consider.that the industry's oligopolistic structure and the formidable
entry barriers, in reality, prevent the emergence of new firms, especially those originating from third.
world countries-, . ..
Table 1: The Growth of Automobile Production in Asia
1960 1970 1980 1990
Japan 482 (2.9) 5,289 (18.0) 11,043 (28.7) 13,487 (27.9).
South Korea 3 (ns) 29 (0.1) 123 (0.3) 1,322 (2.7)
Taiwan od 20(ns) 132 (003) 339 (0.7)
Thailand 0 5 (ns) 43 (0,1) 305(0.6)
Malaysia 0 31 (ns) 105 (0.3) 192 (0.4)
Total Asia 555 (3.4) 5,488 (18.7) 11,502 (30.0) 15,683 (325)
Thousands of umts (percentage of world production)
Sources: CCFA, MVMA
Asian breakthroughs (in the automobile industry or otherwise) have, thus, upset these
certainties and are sometimes explained by an absence of autonomy on the part of these new entrants
and their workshop function linked to the multinationals' delocalisation strategies. After Japan, which
was dependent on American capital after the war, Korea and Malaysia are today considered as the
"Japans of Japan"3. These "normalizing" analyses present, at the very least, a, rigid vision of the world
1- In France, for example, the automobile manufacturing sector employs 210,000 workers while related .
industrial employment rises toa figure of 607,000, which corresponds to. 16% of manufacturing
employment as a whole.
2- Thus, Prud'homme (1984) placed the accent on economies of scale and Jenkins (1977) lay the emphasis on
the de-nationalization process for developing industries. For a more detailed view of these tendencies, see
Doner, 1991, p.9 and the following.
3- In a study carried out on the Japanese automobile industry, the other Asian countries (car manufacturing
ones) were presented under this heading (Mory, 1985). See Deyo, 1987, in which these theories of
dependence are presented, and Harris, 1986, who revised these theories.
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industry and its evolutionary processes. Mr. Humbert's approach, which refuses the
autonomy/dependence outlook, seems to be more in-keeping with the realities of industrialization:
"The aim of industrialization should be to ensure an active participation on the part of national
enterprises in the world-wide industrial system (...). A successful entry into the world-wide industrial
system would mean avoiding both sordid independence and pitiful dependence" (Humbert, 1988).
In others words, it means initiating and managing an open-oriented dynamic, which favours
impulse and learning processes, as well as minimising the "effects asymetriques" and the."emprises de
structures" (perroux, 1975),
This text examines the modalities through which the East Asian States4 have accompanied their
national entrepreneurs along the narrow path of "automobile industrialization". This will be illustrated
by the Japanese experience (1920-1970) and, more recently, South Korea's, Malaysia's, Thailand's, and
Taiwan's,
1. From Passive Protection to Active Dependency
In the absence of targets and specific promotion measures" the first steps of the automobile
industry occur in a rather spontaneous manner. During the very early stages, it only benefits from a
. general trade protectionism context. This first phaseS, thus, corresponds to passive protection, and its
purpose is to limit or forbid the importation of completely built vehicles to the benefit of the local
assembly of foreign brands (CKD assernblingj''. Numerous attempts are made at increasing the
localization rates (import substitution) and at developing intre and intre-branch linkages, but such
efforts are not always coherent.
However, they have the merit of providing private entrepreneurs and the related industrial sectors
with a 'debut' in practical knowledge and experience. The first "Korean" car was manufactured by
Shibal in 1955. Seven years later, Saenara was created and became Daewoo Motors in 1972. Then
came Kia, a former cycle manufacturer, Hyundai and Asia", In 1953, the Taiwanese Yu-Loong had
already gone into car assembly and managed to hold a quasi-monopoly in this activity over a IS-year
period. In the early 1930s,an initial concentration movement gave birth, in Japan, to Nissan, which
rapidly became the leading mass manufacturer in the Pacific area''.
Automobile activity began to be firmly implanted within the national industry via its purchases
of manufacturing equipment, tools, parts, and components. The localization rate had reached the 70%
mark in Korea by 1974 and the 40% mark in Malaysia by the early 1980s. Toyota, before the war, had
4- In order to limit any digression in this text, only the most ambitious strategies issuing from this zone will
be studied: Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
5- 1930s and 1940s in Japan, 1950s and 1960s in Korea and Taiwan, up to the early 1980s in Malaysia and .
6- CKD : Completly Knocked Down
7- CKD assembly of Toyota Corona by Shinjin (ex Saenara and future Daewoo Motors) in 1962, of Ford
Cortina by Hyundai in 1968 and of Fiat 124 by Asia in 1970.
8- By 1941, Nissan's annual vehicule production reached 20,000 units.
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designed its first flexible manufacturing equipment and placed orders with Komatsu. Hitachi Seiki and
Toshiba rapidly began furnishing.Nissan with transfer machines. Later, the density of the Japanese
small and medium sized industry made it easy to localize the production of components for foreign cars
locally assembled under licence''.
InThailand, the automobile parts industry went from strength to strength: Yuasa Battery, Sa-
Nga Damrong (windows), Siam Group, etc. (Nawadhinstikh, 1983) and by 1980, the localization rate
was estimated at 35%. With the exception of Japan (in the 1960s), whose "automobile industry is
young only in terms of exports" (Cusumano, 1985, p.6.), the results in terms of quality as well as
quantity were quite modest.
Large technology transfers are needed in order to catch-up with the industrial "state of the art"..
One essential part of this mechanism is the opening up of the sector to the MNF, which is used as a
lever for upgrading the national industry's competitiveness. Whenever the system of dependence is put
into practice, there is strict management and control, very often taking on a "predatory" aspect.
In 1925, Japan accepted a Ford assembly factory and later a General Motors production unit
(1927), but forced them, by means of high customs duties on parts imports, to increase-their orders
from national producers. At the beginning of the ~950s, in order to rapidly reorient a war-oriented
industry, the MITI encouraged Japanese firms to negotiate licensing agreements with foreign
manufacturers. Four of the six projects presented were acceptedl''.
Twenty years later, under a Korean programme called "citizen car" (1974), Kiaembarked upon
the production under licence of a Mazda vehicle, Saehan upon a similar cooperation deal with Isuzu,
while Hyundai, even at that stage, was half-way through opening "the technological package". Hyundai
manufactured a "national" car built frOI1J an Italian design (Ital) and mainly Japanese components
(Mitsubishi) with English engineers (ex British-Leyland).
Malaysia, in 1983, allowed Mitsubishi to take a predominant position in this sector in order to
create a "national car manufacturer". Whereas the technical performance and the competitiveness of the.
industry are still quite unsatisfactory, cooperation with foreign firms has made leaps and bounds. The
heavy losses between 1986 and 1988 forced Hicom to hand over its management of Proton to
Mitsubishi (Machado, 1990). In an effort to rationalize the sector, the Taiwanese government invited
Toyota in 1982 to invest in a joint-venture, namely the "Big Auto Plant", which should become the
national automobile leader. The lack of quality of Korean vehiclesl ! turned out to be the cause of the
.strengthening of ties, especially financial ties, between Hyundai/Mitsubishi and Kia/Mazda.
Whenever the catching-up objective is achieved, or whenever the foreign presence slows down,
instead of reinforcing, national industries, seperation is often the final result.
9- An agreement between Austin and Nissan (December 1952) envisaged a progressive local manufacturing
process, which would attain the 100% mark under a 3 year period; an objective achieved 6 months before
schedule.
10- Isuzu/Hillman, Nissan/Austin, Hino/Renault, Mitsubihi/Jeep,
11- The first Hyundai "Pony" failed the American pollution and security tests.
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-Aftermaking a huge contribution towards the blossoming of the Japanese parts and automobile
industry, GM and Ford were forced out of the country at the end of the 1930s. After the war, though,
the eviction of foreign firms was more gradual. It. however, proved to bean equally efficient move 12.
Similarly, in Korea, GM had to withdraw from its joint-venture owing to its partner's strong desire for
independence (Daewoo had created a second automobile subsidiary, independent from the joint-
venture)13. Michelin also has recently abandoned its joint-venture with Hankook. In Malaysia, locally
assembled foreign brands are being threatened by the new localization rates, which will jump from a
30% to a 60% minimum between now and 1996, and the creation of a second national car-makerl''.
2. The State's Three Roles: Initiator, Strategist and Regulator of the
Industry's Development
The State accompanies the development of the industry by adapting its forms and scope of
intervention and by progressively giving way to the initiative of the private sector.
2.1 An Impulse-Giving Role
After the war, the MITI proceeded to reorient the Japanese automobile industry towards
consumer demands. The importation of manufacturing equipment and techniques (technical licensing
agreements) was favoured in order to catch up with western car-makers who, at the time, occupied two-
thirds of the domestic market (Odaka, 1983, p. 353)~
Acting under the 1974 automobile plan, the Korean government selected three firms - Hyundai,
Kia, and Saehan/Daewoo - which were to benefit from all the support necessary for the production of a
"national car"15, In Malaysia, the State made direct commitments towards the automobile business via
the state company, Hicom 16. The Proton project became one of the main components of Prime
Minister Mahatir's policy, on an industrial level, to develop capital-intensive industries, and on a
social level, to restore the balance ofeconomic power to the advantage of the bumiputras. In Taiwan
and Thailand, impulse followed impulse, to such an extent that they were becoming inconsistent.
2.2 The Strategist Role.
The State tries to control the growth path of the industry, with a varying degree of precision
according to the country involved. The strategic orientations of firms are overly determined by the
directives of industrial policy . For example, the second Taiwanese plan (1958-1961) indicated that: "the
government should positively undertake to guide and help private investments so that they do not flow
into enterprises which have a surplus productivity and a stagnant market" (see Wade, 1990, p.8l).
12~ Production under license represented 42% of the Japanese production in 1954 and 0.4% in 1964.
. 13-Whic~ produced a new vehicle, under Suzuki licencing.
14- In partnership with Daihatsu (cf: Far Eastern Economic Rewiew, 13/2/92).
15- Which should have a localization rate above 95% and a cylindervolume under 1500cc(Kim & Lee, 1980).
16- In a joint-venture in which Mitsubishi held 30% in 1985 and only 17.4% now.
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In particular, suchailobjectivewaschosen and announced via theJapanese 1956State-Plan, the
Korean one in 1974,and the Malaysian "NewEconomic Policy" launchedby Prime MinisterMahatir.
The Stateallocatedvast sums towards the realization of theseplans.
In Japan, the automobile policyis definedby'the MITI but put into practice more globally (by
the 3 Ministries - Construction, Transport and Finance)!". Carmakers benefit from loans at special
rates,'from subsidies, from specialdepreciation rights, and from exemptions or reductions in customs
dutieson the importation of manufacturing equipment and inputs.
Throughout the 1970s, new Asian entrepreneurs were able to benefit from a wide range of
similar aids which were sometimes added upon. Korea stands out for its use of very efficient
adjustment tactics for prices and interest rates (See Jones and Sakong, Chap. 4, and Amsden, 1989,
Chap. 6). In Malaysia, the "domestic carmaker" was able to benefit from an exemptionfrom customs
duties on imported parts,as well as from fiscalprivileges.
More fundamentally, the State takes on the burden of a large part of private entrepreneurs'
investment risks during the first stages of manufacturing, and this by means of public or bank
financing. The debt/equity ratios standsat around five. This debt level could only be attained through
State financing or guaranteeslb; The autonomy of these entrepreneurs, private though often state-
financed, is limited by the 'so-called "socialization" of investmentrisks. In Korea and Taiwan, "the
channeling of high savings through government-controlled banking system has been a key instrument
of industrial coordination" (Wade, 1990, p.165).
2.3 The Regulating Role
The management of the industry's growth is almost systematic. This takes place by means of
alternating rationalization measures (in order to allow firms to attain a critical size) and liberalization
measures (in order to develop competition). However, this type of regulation only meets with partial
success becauseof thedetermination of theprivateactors.
Vigorous rationalization measures for the sectorwereoutlinedby the Koreangovernment after
the 1980 crisis. However, after undergoin~ pressure from certain firms, notably GM and Hyundai, a
wide merger project was canceled. Instead, each of the four carmakers was to have specialized in a
particularsegment, with personal cars beingearmarked for Hyundai (theseexcludedprestige vehicles).
Added to that.there was a ban on all newentrys into the industry until 1989.
Malaysian assemblers were firmly requested to limit their business aggressiveness as soon as
the project of "national interest", Proton,came to life. In Japan, successive concentration plans made
by the MITI ran into difficulties, beingfaced with the strong firms' desires for independence and with
the diversification strategies of the keiretsu. The "people's car" project (1955), which was aimed at
concentrating efforts on a standard model; thus maximizingeconomiesof scale, turned out to be a
17- In the 1960s and 1970s. road construction represented more than 40% of public works spending
(Komiya, 1988, p.311).
18- The debt/equity ratios were 4.3 for Nissan in 1965,7.8 for Honda in 1967,4.5 for Proton in 1986 and
5.0 for Hyundai Motor in 1987. .
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failure. Later, in the 1960s, the desire to rationalize the sector around the two most important firms
created very little impact. Nissan took over Prince in 1966 then partially bought Fuji Heavy in 1968,
while the Toyota group incorporated Daihatsu (1966) and Hino (1968). Despite steps taken by the
MITI19, other manufacturers were able to keep their independence, but, being threatened with
absorption, they redoubled their efforts. A similar sequence took place in Taiwan between 1982 and
1984 when the government failed to create a "great" automobile firm ("Big Auto Plant"), but, instead,
had the effect of spurring on the existing entrepreneurs of that sector.
The management of domestic competition forms the other basis for sectorial regulation.
Malaysia is the most recent example: they are now developing a second national carmaker, whereas
Proton has only barely attained the age of majority. This process was one which had been previously
adopted by Korea, with liberalization measures ("de-specialization") as from 1985. Hyundai's successes;
notably in exportation, coupled with pressure from the industrial heads, led the government to
authorize the widening of Kia and Daewoo's activities to the whole industry. This new competitive
environment contributed towards accelerating the development of the Korean automobile industry,
which began increasing its models and technical improvements as from 1987. In Japan, the State is
much less capable of choosing the actors, who often rely on group structures (Mitsubishi, Mazda,
etc.). In Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, in Thailand, the State was unable to create a clear, coherent and
durable automobile industrialization strategy. The diverging pressures of the different national and
international lobbies had led to permanent hesitation between a nippo-korean model, based on the
support given to a few important firms, as well as on the desire to build up specialization in
automobile equipment-i', Thus, in Taiwan, customs duties followed a rather fluctuating trend, and the
same applied to localization and exportation rate constraints. After the attempts at creating a huge unit
in 198221, followed by a "national car" project (the "Feeling" with Nissan), the direction to be
followed then seemed to be more clear-cut after the 1985 "compromise" through which sales (including
imports) were liberalized (Imports represented 40% of the Taiwanese market in 1990), and by which
Taiwan was to become an automobile parts exporter.
In Thailand. the "bureaucratic fragmentation" (Doner, 1988) of the government (six Prime
Ministers between 1972 and 1977) was a factor which limited the country's ability to regulate this
sector and hold strong against the converging interests of multinationals and their local licensees,
supported by huge Thai industrial groups (Siam Cement, Sukosol, Sittipol, etc.). Even though "the
Thai automobile policy has always insisted on the need to rationalize the market," (Doner, 1991, p.46)
it has never been able to limit the number of firms or to enforce its localization measures. This
situation explains the recent decision (1991) to intensify competition by drastically reducing
importation taxes (In July, 1991, these fell from 180% to 60% for personnal cars and from 120% to
60% for pick-ups).
19- The MITI itself negotiated the Prince/Nissan merger and the latter was rewarded with a loan of 11 million
USD (Johnson, 1982, p.268).
20- See Doner, 1988 and Wang, 1989. on the hesitations and wavering in the Thai and Taiwanese automobile
policies respectively.
21- The "Big Auto Plant" was to have produced 200,000 cars per annum, mainly for exportation.
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3. The Protection and Promotion of Internal Cohesion
Since there is an oligopoly on the world scale, there is a necessity to protect budding
industries." No country, whether England or even less the USA., has ever embarked upon economic
development without setting up strong customs barriers, in an effort to protect its young industries"
(Bairoch, 1992, p.521). Very often in the Asian countries, this protection is of an "aggressive" nature:
preparation over a limited period for international competition. Its coherence lies in the fact that
simultaneously there is a will to promote internal competitiveness.
Once again, the Japanese example serves as model and has since been widely adopted. National
carmakers in that country are protected from importations by numerous taxes aimed particularly at the
most competitive kind of cars, namely small types. A bilateral agreement with Italy, world specialists
in small-car manufacturing, was even concluded. Official protection came to an end in 1964, an event
which coincided with Japan's OCDE entry. However, many constraints continued to bar importations
of any great significance. Moreover, a very elaborate form of regulation22 persisted and served as a
protector from foreign investments until the implementation of liberalization measures in 1971.
In Korea, despite the apparently low customs duties (17%), Korean carmakers suffered very little
from foreign competitiveness. The reason beinga cascade-like system of taxes, which doubled the price
of imported cars. However, the main import barriers stemmed from non-tariff measures, very often
quite original, such as fiscal checks. Foreign investment and technology importations were being
filtered by the Economic Planning Board, through which all projects were bound to pass.
Jap~and Korea were able to maintain a firm block against foreign entry into their market until
external pressure and internal competitiveness reached a certain level. Taiwan, on the other hand,
continued to follow its erratic policy, which had a de stabilizing effect on its national entrepreneurs.
Customs duties on cars jumped from 50% in 1965 to 75% in 1971, only to fall to 65% in 1985 and
progressively decrease before reaching the 30% mark in 1992. A similar pattern befell the importation
of parts for local assembly.
The competitiveness of parts and components firms became a determining factor for the
carmakers' own competitiveness, thus giving rise to vigorous policies promoting upstream industries.
As early as the 1930s, Japan had forced General Motors and Ford to increase their purchases
from local businesses. In 1956, the "Machine Industry Law" pinpointed the automobile parts industry
as ~eing one of the 17 sectors to be promoted. The industry was then rationalized and given
technological and financial support. Japanese parts manufacturers were able to benefit from more than
40% of the Japan Development Bank loans ear-marked for the machine industry23. At the same time,
the currency allocations for car manufacturers were reduced in order to force them to buy Japanese.
At present, Taiwan has, at its disposal, a competitive base of about 2,000 companies exporting
1 USD in automobile parts per annum. These partmakers allow local assemblers to reach a reasonable
22- Johnson (1982) gave a detailed description of the selectivity and efficiency of these measures (for the
automobile industry, see specifically p. 278 and the following). .
23- 32% between 1961 and 1965; 54% between 1966 and 1974 (Korniya, 1988, p. 615).
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localization rate24. This kind of competitiveness results from the only coherence of Taiwan's
automobile policy: the manner in which localization is boosted. In practice,each assembler must buy
a determined numberof locally madecomponents which appearon a list established by the Ministryof
Economic Affairs (MOEA). This list increases regularly, and so does the numberof components to be
localized. This regulation systemincitesassemblers to makeuseof the internal competitive advantages
of the industry, by givingtheirordersto the top-notch producers.
The opposite pattern can be observed in Korea. Following the 1970 industrial concentration
process, small and medium businesses were weakenedThere was a slowing-down effect on the-
qualitativeevolution of the automobile industry since, in this case, carmakers were made to rely on
uncompetitive automobile parts producers. On the one hand, there was a high localization rate,
existing for some time (90%), and on the other hand, a great deal of parts importation which, even in
1988, attained 1,300 USD per vehicle (Lautier, 1991). In order to give a boost to 5MBs (Small and
Medium Business) and to favour a more balanced industrial structure, numerous measures were
implemented as from the middleof the 1980s25.
In Thailand; in the face of resistance from assembling companies against the localization
constraints, the government.decided to aim at the heart of this industry. An engine project was set up
in 1985 and implemented as from 1987. Its objective was to attain a localization rate of 80%. In
anticipation of these problems, the Malaysian automobile plan envisaged, almost immediately, the
creation of a component factory, so as to quickly increase the localization rate. The absence of this
secondcompany was compensated for by the dynamism of local entrepreneurs; which enabledProton
to reach a 69% localization rate, as compared to 18%at its inception.
Thus, though practicing protectionism, thesecountries were able to avoid monopoly behaviors
and rents in this industry.
4. A Triple Stance' on the Dynamics of Private Capitalism
4.1 Dealings with Private Entrepreneurs
C. Johnson emphasizes that the East Asian developing States, depend to a large extent on
public/private cooperation, which takes place between the "State managers" and the "private
managers"26. The general tendency is to create close ties between State and private industrialists, but
the modalities and, especially, the weight carriedby each "partner" differ from country to country in
EasternAsia.
In Japan, the older and more powerful business groups were able to achieve great autonomy.
Mitsubishi's strong desire to continue its expansion in the automobile industry has upset the MITI's
24- 60% for Sanfu Motors, licensee of Renault (pEE Taipei's April 1992 Study).
25- The setting up of a sizeable agency for the promotion of 5MBs (SMIPC), bank loans reserved for 5MBs,
Fair Trade Law, Subcontracting Act, etc. See Park, 1989, the reference in this topic. -
26- See his comparison between "Capitalism Developing States: Japan, Korea, and Taiwan" in Deyo, 1987.
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rationalization plan and its foreign capital opening schedule. In order to escape from the MITI's plan to
concentrate the sector around the two biggest carmakers, Mitsubishi began accelerating negotiations
with Chrysler. A new subsidiary was created with the American company in 1969 and a financial
agreementwas signed.
In an effort not to lose face, the MITI was forced to launch its opening programme in advance
and announce the liberalization .of foreign investment in October 1971 (Johnson, 1982, p.287 and
foIlowing). During that same month, with Mitsubishi;s agreement becomingeffective, Chrysler began
to seIl the former's cars in the USA. Isuzu quickly took advantage of the situation and preserved its
independence by concluding a similaragreement withGeneralMotors (1971).
In Malaysia and Taiwan, the opposite tendency has been observed. The State began taking the
place of private capitalists (for differentreasons) through"greatautomobilecompany"projects. Indeed,
the ethnic factor in Malaysia would have prevented the driving force behind such a strategic project
from being a private concern, for this concern would have been headed by businessmen of Chinese
origin.For the same reason, the entrepreneurs' alreadyinvolved in that sector were headedoff.
In Taiwan, the public enterprises traditionaIly were the ones to become the main tools of the
sectorial "big pushes". These public investments induced,downstream, private entrepreneurs' business
developments. The choice of China Steel as the local operator of the great 1982 automobile project
foIlowed this philosophy. Having been deprived of participation, the Taiwanese automobile firms
reacted quite aggressively to this with an exportation plan and the creation of a common design ce~tre.
It was this dynamism which enabled the industry to maintain its growth path after the failure of the
China Steel{foyota project (1984). In Thailand, Siam Nawaloha Foundry, along with Siam Cement,
were the main beneficiaries of the only automobile targeted project, the "engine plan" (1985/87)
\
(Doner, 1988).
The Korean scheme appears to be the most balanced, but also the most directive one. The State
is not a producer, but its industrialpolicyhas served as a directand strongreinforcingagent for selected
entrepreneurs. At the same time, the competitivespirit was developedamongst them.
4.2 Reliance on Foreign Multinationals
The building of a competitive, industry implies catching-up with the norms set by the world
oligopoly (Humbert, 1988). The transfer of technology is, thus, an inevitable stage in this adopted
course. There is a power relationship involved, which relies on the traditional rivalry within the
oligopoly.
South Korea has been particularly successful in turning this unbalanced relationship to its
.advantage. By blocking any direct access to the domestic market, the State has been able to reinforce
the bargaining power of Korean companies. Moreover, since all foreign investment and technology
transfers must be systematically submitted for government approval, the latter acts as the direct
negotiator in all projects involving any foreign firm. Thus, any multinational wishing to operate in
Korea must commit itself to cooperationand incorporate the aims of the Korean industrial policies in
its own strategies. The Korean carmakers w~re also able to make use of the US export restrictions on
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Japanese firms by obtaining from the latter more advanced products, as well as their aid for
exportation27.
Malaysia, with fewer "arms" at its disposal and, therefore, more sensitivity to these "emprises
de structure," has placed its automobile policy within the same perspective.
Its commitment to Proton has enabled Mitsubishi to bypass Toyota and Mazda in Malaysia and
to incorporate this unit into itspan-ASEAN strategy. The Japanese group has been able to take
advantage of the difficulties of the project in 1987/1988 (heavy financial losses and failure in the
attempt to export to the USA) to strengthen its hold. However, the present strong/weak relationship is
having a detrimental effect on its fortunes. Indeed, Mitsubishi eventually had to go back on its
position concerning the localization rate and accept certain ambitious exportation aims. The imminent
.arrival of a second national carmaker should once again reduce its influence in Malaysia.
On the other hand, the repeated changes (i.e., hesitation) in the Taiwanese automobile policies
have not served to increase the nation's degree of liberty. Toyota's free movements are an example of
this inability.
This Japanese company entered the local industry in 1967 via a licensing agreement with Liu-
Ho. As early as 1974, it withdrew to set up in China. Later, Toyota became a partner of China Steel
in the 1982 "Big Auto Plant" project. However, it refused to undergo the localization and exportation
I
constraints and once again pulled out in 1984, which led to the cancellation of the project. This fiasco
incited the' government to limit the obligations imposed on foreign companies operating in Taiwan.
The attraction of a dynamic market is now moving Toyota to reinvest in massive operations in
Taiwan. The production capacity of its partner -Kuozui- should attain 200,000 units and, thus, enable
it to occupy second place in the sector (China Post, 19/09/92).
These different experiments, all bearing similar objectives - the development of national car
manufacturing companies - are reminder that it is preferable to relate with the weaker members of the
oligopoly. The successes of Mazda's and Mitsubishi's partners, Kia and Hyundai/Proton respectively,
contrast with the difficulties encountered with General Motors (divorce from Daewoo and failure of
Taiwan's truck project) and Toyota (failure with the "Big Auto Plant").
4.3 An Instrumental Use of the Market
"The market would tend to disappear if there are interventions acting both on price and quantity"
(perroux, 1981). In Asia, the opposite tendency is the case: the attenuation of control creates the
market. "The State, via its intervention, contributes to boost the market and is opposed to monopolies
creation" (Judet, 1989). The second phase of the catching-up consists of introducing competitive
dynamics so as to give a new impulse to the industry, and this, is achieved by progressively
suppressing pre competitive policies.
27- An agreement, voluntarily limiting automobile exportations was concluded in March 1981 between the
U.S.A. and Japan. Mitsubishi and Mazda, losers in this quota system used their Korean partners in order to
increase their automobile value added exportations (indirectly and without quotas) to the USA. See Rennart,
1992, chap. 5 Section 1.
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The market, domestic or, more often, international, is used as means of evaluating (and
estimating) strategic choices.This dynamicand pragmaticmeso/micro articulation,between the whole
. industry efficiency and the constraint of thefirms' own competitiveness, may account for mostof the
strategic movements imposedon the industry.
The market becomesdeformed and is replaced wheneverthe fragile nature of the industry calls
for defensivemeasures. The obsolescence of domestic automobile productscaused theMIll to promote
manufacturing under foreign licensing after the war. Later, in the 1960s, the MITI sought to
concentrate the industry in order to increase the economiesof scale of Japanese carmakers. A similar
problemcaused the Korean government, in 1981, to reducecompetition betweenthe mainproducers by
getting them to specialize.
Concerning the market, competition becomes more intense as soon as competitiveness seems
to be sufficient to carry out more aggressive strategies. The successful exportations of Hyundai cars
was a facilitating factor towards a total opening-up of the sector to Kia and Daewoo. A little later,
Samsung, the leading Korean business group was, at last, allowed to branch out into the automobile
sector.
As soon as Proton was able to makea break-through in exportation, the Malaysian government
created a second national car manufacturer and reduced the customs advantages from which that joint
venturehad previously benefited.
The dynamism of automobileparts industriesand the rents earned by local assemblers recently
led Thailand to suddenlyopen its market to importations.
The State accompanies and orients firms on foreign markets. In Japan and Taiwan, companies
were "prepared" for exportation by the toughening of national pollution,securityand quality standards.
Japanesecarmakers were, thus, made to recall 2.5 million vehicles in 1969in order to correct defaults.
The State also intervenedin an effort to "unblock" foreign markets. Korea, by brandishing an attractive
TGV contract, was able to obtain from France the opening (withoutquotas) of its automobile market.
Malaysia made use of similar pressures in an effort to developProton sales in the UK.
Car manufacturers were firmly encouraged to seize theseexternalopportunities. Thus, in Korea,
vehicle exportations gave the right to obtain attractive loans and to import foreign vehicles, allowing
highly remunerative margins on the domestic market.
The constraint of market-finding wasrelaxedby pragmatic adjustments betweenthe internaland
external markets. Faced with a morose Malaysian demand, one which was to have been its main
market, Proton embarked upon an exportation campaign. It failed in the USA but later broke through
in the UK (11,000 sales in 1990). The misfortunes of Korean companies in North America as from
1989 (a cut-back by half in its exportations) were highly compensated for by a boom in the domestic
market, caused by a rapid hike in Korean wages. Meanwhile, Japan continued to enjoy a high growth
rate during the 1970s,owing to the development of their exportation.
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Conclusion
From dependence to autonomy, it's a non-linear development fath. When the State protects and
guides the development of the automobile industry, as in Japan, Korea, and Malaysia, It is a "hard
State," borrowing a term used by G. Myrdal. Its cohesion, stability and autonomy enable it to
efficiently coordinate theactivity of private entrepreneurs and to define long term targets. By financing
entry costs, the government paves the way for local firms to embark upon automobile activities.
Whether the companies involved beState-owned or private, it is of no consequence since the industry
is considered as a "public good". The aim of entering the oligopoly is shared by the State and private
managers.
In the absence of a coherent enough strategy (the outlining of a goal and the allocations of
means), the localization policy for industry has only results the dynamism of the entrepreneurs could
construct a specialization pole (already existing in Taiwan, under way in Thailand),. but without
enough commitment from the State, the national control of the complete sector would appear to be out
of reach. In such a case, it is only a specialization "par defaut", limited from the start by the very
strong entry barriers to the automobile manufacturing industry. Contrary to Doner's hypothesis, the
automobile multinationals' new competitors are not their former suppliers. A determined industrial
policy seems to be necessary in order to build up and ensure the development of national carmakers.
Whereas the choices of industrial policy may bedecisive for firms, the courses to be taken are
neither pre-established nor linear in nature. They often result from compromises involving government
factions and industrial lobbies. In Japan, the MITt's desire to protect and boost national industry
entered into conflict, between 1949 and 1951, with the liberal positions held by the Bank of Japan.
The MITI's position finally won with the help of the automobile firms. The debate within the
, Taiwanese government concerning the segment of the industry to beaimed at -- i.e., whether to have a
mass car manufacturer oriented towards exportation or a competitive automobile parts industry oriented
towards specialization -- only came to an end in 1984, when a change of political power occurred.
These new politicians set aside the first strategy, a direction which was the best course for industrial
interests. In Malaysia, the difficulties encountered by Proton (1986-1988) served as a weapon for
Mahatir's political adversaries, thus favouring closer ties with entrepreneurs of Chinese origin. In
Thailand, the scope of the investments made by Siam Nawaloha Foundry led the government to give a
second start to the engine plan.
Several new automobile producers have made their appearance in Southern Europe (e.g.,
Portugal and Spain) and in Latin America (e.g., Brazil 'and Mexico), but these production zones remain
exclusively internalized to the activities of the automobile multinationals. The only real new
competition comes from Asia. Following the Japanese example, companies such as Hyundai, Daewoo,
Kia, Ssangyong, and Proton are now making a forceful entry into the oligopoly. The remaining
dependence ties with the latter are only one of the levers of a coherent catching-up strategy aimed at
creating autonomous companies. These ties, all the same, impose some "emprises de structure," which
are progressively reduced through the conjugated efforts of the State and entrepreneurs. This is a path
which is not linear and which is riddled with failures and crises, but which turns out to be coherent in
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the long run. Industrialization is a non linear process. One can judge the performances of these new
entrants and the industrial policies which have propeUed them only within a historical framework.
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Entrepreneurship, Markets and Industrializing Effects:
the Case of Textile Industry
Jean-Christophe Simon
Economic analysis generally identifies three strands.which define and condition the attitude of
entrepreneurs: the search for opportunities to make profit, the capacity for rational arbitration to
maximise profit, and the acceptance of risk.
It has been the tendency over the past years to consider the attitudes of entrepreneurs with
specific reference to the institutional context in which they operate especially their relationship with
regard to rules and regulations governing economic activity, and State intervention. Thus certain liberal
economists emphasize the idea of the State as an additional.risk factor - which leads to an apology for
true competition and liberalisation - although, as we will see, States .and markets present complex
interactions, that contribute to the success of enterprises, or to the ~rocess of rapid industrialisation,
In this paper, we would like to go beyond an approach which views agents as individuals and
consider modem industrial entrepreneurs both as a type of economic actor responsible for profitable,
productive activities, .and as members of a social group ,whos networks and attitudes are socially
determined:
- The first aspect pertains to their role in the process of economic development, the circulation and
accumulation of capital and also in the context of our study, to the general process of industrialisation.
- The second aspect takes into account multiple and diverse characteristics inherent in value systems, as
well as favourable networks, industrial Clans which naturally tend to seek political power (in order to
influence economic institutions and regulations).
The intervention of entrepreneurs in the construction of the industrial sector of a developing
economy has specific, characteristic features: those related to the sector and those related to national
economy, for example. The attitude of entrepreneurs is therefore also indicative of the characteristics of
the industrialisation process as a whole.
In this context, our reference to the textile sector is justified for two reasons:
On the one hand, it is a fundamental sector which emerges right from the beginning of most
industrialisation processes - taking Europe of the XVI to XIX centuries as a first case. In developing
countries, this sector has initiated or given rise posteriorly to most industrialisation strategies - in
Latin America as in Africa and Asia. In South-East Asia, the modem textile industry with its forty-
year-old history, is both dynamic and instructive, especially in Thailand. This historical depth enables.
us to trace the stages of the development process and highlight the lasting experiences related to the
intervention of entrepreneurs.
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On the other hand, it is a sector which lays bare certain bases of the dynamics in newly
industrialised economies in Asia. It combines oligopoly forms of organisation (which are politically
influential) and dispersed forms which constantly give rise to the emergence of new entrepreneurs. This
diversity of structure, the types of markets and actors, are often underestimated: textile is said to be a
"Iow-tech" industry. This might be true to a certain extent with regard to equipment and process, but
highly debatable when it comes to entrepreneurial attitudes - in fact it is a skill-intensive industry from
the latter point of view.
Last but not least, it is a sector which coincides with World Economy in Braudel's (1985) sense
of the term. The textile sector is indeed one of the vectors of the internationalisation of industrial
capital. Furthermore, the techniques it employs and its markets are globally structured and globally
determined: the products are quasi-commodities compared to the basic raw materials, the techniques can
be found from Sao Paulo to Seoul, the patterns travel by fax from Paris, Milan or Munich to Bangkok.
In this paper our presentation focuses on the relationship between entrepreneurs' attitudes and
textile sector development in the context of a rapid industrialisation process. We will draw data from
both the macro-economic level and firm level analysis. This was collected in particular through
interviews with managers/entrepreneurs in order to get a good picture of the context for initiation and
developmenet of activities and the competitive strategies (porter, 1980). We will refer mostly to the
context of Thailand, but also to the experience of other Asian countries with similar industrialisation
patterns in South East and East Asia.
1. Entrepreneurship and Sectoral Development
. 1.1 Structuring of the Textile Industry in Thailand
The diversity of entrepreneurs in the textile industry derives from both its construction pattern
and its specific structure: Textile as an activity was for a long time limited to small workshops and
traditional domestic cottage production. In the early fifties there was hardly a textile industry as such
(except for government-owned mills and a couple of private ventures), and imports of material from
. neighbouring .countries were substantial. It can be said that in the 60's, the perception of a growing
market, and the national development policy, encouraged both local and foreign entrepreneurs to initiate
ventures in Thailand ..
Since that period, the expansion of the textile industry has been strong, with cyclical boom and
recession periods. Interestingly, this sector has, throughout the past decades of development, maintained
a dual pattern of formal and informal enterprises: The revival of traditional handicraft, and the strong
growth of the "shop-house" garment producers are noticeable features, as they are well connected to the
modern sector (either through sub-contracting or trading arrangements; see Voravidh Charoenlert,
1992). In the modem sector itself, another dual pattern can be identified, with a minority of companies
operating as standard incorporated ventures, and others still keeping a fairly family-owned and managed,
semi-registered form of operation.
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1.1.1 The Foundation ofIndustry
The first entrepreneurs were indeed locals; they established the core of the textile industry:
spinning, weaving operations, with technical assistance and financial participation of members of the
Chinese communities in Southeast-Asia . They also benefited from the first set of government
promotionrules for industrialactivities (Chirayu Isarangkun, 1969).
This phase of import substitution lasted until the beginning of the seventies, and the following
policy of export promotion was poorly timed (with the volatile regional situation, and the willingness
of most companies to recoup their investment by selling on the local market) Actually exports took off
only after 1975 and exporters made full use of the export credit scheme generously granted by the
Government - and by the beginningof the seventies there was an excess supply on the local market, as
several major Japanese ventures had contributed to doubling the capacity in spinning, weaving and
dyeing. In 1973, garments emerged as one of the ten exports of Thailand, but still together with other
textileproducts they were a mere 3% of totalexports.
The upstream companies were rapidly established as oligopolistic structures with considerable
bargaining power with government officials. In that respect, by 1971, the group of spinning and
weaving mill entrepreneurs had successfullyaffmned itself as a major industrial lobby, although with
about 15 % of manufacturing value added in the 60's, textile and garments were not heavy-weight
players with the ministry ofIndustry.
This position, coupled with an official policy of import substitution, tended to increase the
protectionof the domestic markets and to raise the entry barriers in industry - promotion of Investment
for production geared towardsthe local market wassuspended in order to avoid further excess capacity,
and regulationswereadopted to forbid the expansion of capacityof existing companies.
1.1.2The Expansion and Diversification Phase
Prosperity came back in the late seventies as export of both woven product and garments took
off after 1975. Because of mimetic strategies and poor coordination by public institutions, periodical
overproduction crisesappearedsuch as in 1978and 1983.
Nevertheless, the textile industry was well established by the end of the 70's: it amounted to 18
% of manufacturing value added (a similar share of manufacturing employment), equally divided
between upstream and downstream activities (garment). Thisdiversification resulted in a comprehensive
industrial structure, that was large, nationally controlled (if not operated) and thriving; Out of a total
amount of about 33 Billion Baths total investment (accounted for by Thai Textiie Manufacturers
Association) only about one third wasapprovedand promotedby the Boardof Investment (13 Bn Baths
in 1978). This promoted investment was mostly related to upstream plants with 63 firms in spinning,
knitting and weaving, and only 15 in the garmentsector.
It is very striking indeed to compare the small number of promoted companies to the estimated
total number of enterprises in the textile industry: more than five hundred upstream, and over one
thousand in the garment.sector by 1979-90. This clearly demonstrates the fact that industrialpromotion
by the government was not responsible for the rapid take off. Rather, similarly to other areas of
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industrial policy, the government set a reasonable target for expansion, and went alongside the
entrepreneurs' and industrialists own strategies.
1.1.3TheBoom of Entrepreneurship in the Garment Industry
It is the major feature ofthe 1980's, and naturally the results were more clearly seen on the
export structures: by 1984 textile exports reached 10 % of total exports, and they now amount to about
18 %.
The expansion of the garment sector resulted in the doubling of the number of companies, and
certainly was a decisive pull-factor to encourage in turn the expansion of weaving and dyeing activities.
In 1990 the economic structure of the textile industry was based on about one hundred enterprises at the
up-stream level, more than 1,100 engaged in knitting and weaving, and about 1,800 in the garment
sector. A noticeable contribution to this trend was made by industrialists form East Asia, and Europe
transferring part of their production base to Thailand.
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992
Manufvalue added 18500 24900 40800 63900 81500 156000 199000
. Textile share/ m.v.a % 16.1 18.2 23 24 24 20.8 20.9
l.Upstrearn/m.v.a % 10.6 9 13.2 ·14.7 14.1 10.5 11.1
Production index 21 24 57 100 121 218 234
2. Garment share! m.v.a % 5.5 9.2 9.7 9.2 10.1 10.4 10
Production index 17 39 67 100 140 298 339
Source. National Accounts NESDB. M.V.A Mn Baths base 72
1.2The Entrepreneurs, theirLinkages, theirNetworks
Behind the macro-economic data and intertwined with the historical transformation of the textile
industry, we can identify a pattern of entrepreneurship with particular attitudes and dynamism:
- Linkages between companies, are not limited to up-stream and down-stream input-output flows
as one would conclude from the superficial analysis of industrial structure. They also extend
horizontally, to cover cooperation between enterprises. These cooperation can have several practical
purposes: from sourcing raw material to acquisition of second-hand equipment, or arranging sub-
contracting to fulfill an unexpected order on time. Most of the time they are informal, i.e. not covered
by any contractual arrangement that is known to outsiders (Redding, in Hamilton, .1991).
- Strategies the entrepreneurs have to cover plant/workshop, company management and market
appraisal, but they also include the management of a personal relationship network: this is an essential
component to provide information, contribute to investment or capital increase , new business
opportunity, but also lobbying capacity or corruption/bargaining power with State officials or
influential politicians. We will see below how these linkages and networks play a key role at two
levels of the firms' activities.
1.2.1 At production level
Many small companies in the garment sector rely on the founder's own savings, and generally
family saving's too, to start up and prosper. We came across cases in both trading and manufacturing.
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Obviously in the thriving garment business, investments are relatively low, so returns can be quick -
in that case, manufacturing requires probably no more capital than land and property development, or
even orchard-growing.
However, capital accumulation in the textile industry was greatly facilitated by the transfers of
foreign investment and the willingness of local entrepreneurs to establish joint-ventures. This was
certainly more relevant in the capital -intensive upstream activities (weaving, spinning), and had some
bearing on the mastery of technology too (as for dyeing). Very seldom, the Thai partner will be a
"silent-partner" who does not have the ability to manage the modem plant.
Our survey showed that local entrepreneurs in garment production are keen on keeping their
. financial autonomy, and even to restrict their expansion rather than engage an uncertain joint-venture
with a foreign partner. In most cases, some small companies get technical assistance, credit facilities
from Japanese or Taiwanese companies keen to secure and control a local supplier (for example in
garment or dyeing sectors).
The sub-contracting and licensing relationship has been extensively debated from many points of
view: the dependence and passive attitude expected from the company, the lack of incentive for
upgrading production.... To add fuel to the debate we would like however to cite elements in favour of
sub-contracting and licensing that seem to have played a positive role for companies in Thailand; for
example, sub-contracting has enabled some firms to improve their standards by working with partners
enjoying a quota of exports from the Ministry of Commerce (Le. to market in Multi Fiber Agreement
countries with import restrictions). Some companies will act as godfather and encourage smaller ones
to supply them with improved production. These forms of "solidarity" or collaboration - which give a
company easy access to a new market- can act as an effective anti-depression device when some markets
"tend to shrink temporarily as was the case during the Gulf War.
In the case of sub-contracting arid licensing, it is an established practice, particularly for well
known brands that the foreign license owner or the contractor will send a team to the recipient country
to examine the production facilities and regularly monitor the standard and the production process of,
let's say, sportswear or men's suits. It seems to have a very positive influence on quality improvement
and mutual trust.
1.2.2 At Market Level
It can be said that the comparative advantage and the profitability of the textile industry is as
much a matter of trading as of manufacturing. In that respect, Bangkok has increasingly played the role
of a hub in Southeast Asia, notwithstanding the well-established position of East Asian centers still
favoured by world buying and soureing companies.
Local entrepreneurs who have established trading companies are quick to point out that this
activity requires different skills from manufacturing. Most of them have acquired prior work experience
(as an employee in local trading or abroad) or share the knowledge of market and negotiation with a
partner who has complementary skills. In fact, for this activity, experience is all: from giving a good
quotation, to keeping a carefully selected network of local manufacturers who will supply on time and
according to the expected standard.
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It also frequently happens that the contract between local traders and suppliers is not a written
one (it is trust that matters), in order to jointly benefit from a profitable order. It also means sometimes
a duty for the trader to find ways to assist a supplyingcompany that is going through dire straits, or for
a garment manufacturerto sub-contract to other firmsor workshops in order to keep his word.
1.2.3 From Networks to Industrial Lobbying
All these elements help shape the dynamics of the industry, the organisation of the
entrepreneurs, and also their bargaining and lobbying power. Whereas this power was mostly
concentrated upstream in the 1960's and 1970's (Anek Laothamatas, 1992, p l l l ) we can see that
nowadays some powerful garment manufacturers have also established a lobby to influence and
orientate public policy.
It is a well known - if not well documented - fact that many full-size textile enterprises do not
operate as companies, with full registration as manufacturing plants at the Ministry of Industry. Two
times throughout the 80's (1981 and 1987) the Government deemed necessary to offer amnesty to
illegal firms, largely because of intense lobbying" from the private sector. In the mid-eighties the
assumption was a 30 % discrepancy in statistics, accounting for unregisteredmills and workshop not
known to the Ministry of Industry, or the Revenue Department.
From the economist's standpoint this indirect form of subsidy to start up venture is almost
desirable: it allows local entrepreneurs (with adequate information and connections with government
officials) to start a business with minimal tax burdens and administrativeprocedures. In fact, at a later
stage when the entrepreneurdecides to embarkdirectlyon an export-oriented strategy, he is forced to be
officiallyregisteredas a company.
Finally the questions of quota allocationand corruption,or falsified export declaration, are also
evidence that manipulating the market conditions is part and parcels of the entrepreneurs' strategies.
This leads them beyond the position of a factory manager, to play the role of a social actor, who will
occasionally need to bend public rules and muster some politicalpower too.
The same can be said about delays in Value Added Tax implementation, and complaints by
industrialists about its "additional cost" - in fact the debate was clearly flawed as on the one hand,
loopholes in the tax system were convenient for many companies, on the other, large firms were not
encouraged to implementofficial sub-eontracting networks becauseof the sales tax.
It could therefore be said that these horizontalcooperative linkages between companies and the
personal relationship networksof the entrepreneurs are two elements which help explain both the rapid
expansion of the industry and the flexibilityof the adjustmentof entrepreneurs' strategies to recession,
new marketopportunities, or governmentpolicy change.
To put it in a nutshell, personal relationship networks of the entrepreneurs are the key to risk
minimizing, they play a decisive part in the identification of business/profit opportunities - and they
illustrate the fact that rationalarbitration is deeply influencedby the cultural context.
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2. Competitiveness and Industrial Strategies: the Art of Survival
2.1 Markets and World Economy
Textile products represent about 25 % ofall manufactured exports from developing countries,
and they are part of the core group of manufacturing products for which these countries have enjoyed an
incresasing comparative advantage in competing with more advanced economies over the past two
decades (Yeats 1989). From this slowly expanding market (around 1% a year over the past decade) some
countries have emerged as winners by considerably increasing their market share over the past twenty
. years.- As a group, the Asian region (including Japan and China) represents 45% of world exports now
against 30 % in 1967. Big exporters like Taiwan or Korea still maintained a large share of textile
products in their exports of labour intensive manufactured goods until the late 80's (respectively 15 and
26 % in 1986). Similar figures for China (48%), Indonesia (27 %), Hong-Kong ( 39%) and Thailand
(22 %) are evidence of the strength ofthe textile industry in the region.
When it comes to Thailand, it is a striking feature indeed that the export rate was minimal until
the late 60's: around 10 % for weaving products, and 5 % for garments. Around 1973-75, major
changes took place: the total value of exports of textile products became superior to the value of
imports, and in the year 1975 the value of garment exports overtook the value of other textile products
. (yarn, material).
Since that time the sales structure has changed considerably: nowadays it is said that about 50-
60 % of garments are manufactured for exports, and about 25 % of material and yarn are sold directly on
foreign markets. But the extent to which the exports play a leading role is still debatable (Suphat
Suphachalasai, 1991). It must be added that the invisible exports on the regional or distant markets
(small quantities bought by individuals or tourists) plus the border trade exports are estimated at 20-
30% of local consumption.
When we analyse recent trends of Thai exports, another noticeable feature is the improvement of
the balance between quota markets and non-quota markets: the major expansion 'drive of garments, from
1986, was, to a large extent facilitated by easy access to quota markets. These MFA quota countries
were at the same time increasing their restrictions in the late eighties against NIC's garment export;
Since 1990, more than 50 % of exports are directed to non-quota markets - up to 54 % in 1991 -
with the following breakdown: Middle East (13% in 1990), Japan (7%) and Asean countries (6%). The
remaining 24% deserves additional explanation: Thai exporters have been quick to latch onto new
markets such as Eastern Europe - Poland was the fastest growing market over the past two years.
. . .
This shows that entrepreneurs in Thailand have demonstrated two major skills over the past
decade: one is the flexibility, to adapt their production to a wider range of world customers (children
clothes for Europe, Middle east and Japan differ widely!) to explore and conquer new markets, and
second, the awareness about the potential benefits of diversification. Actually, entrepreneurs' strategies
are determined as much by the perception of constraints as by the identification of opportunities; some
garment makers that developed their business in the late seventies declared that they opted for new'
export markets from the start in order to avoid constraints related to the export quota system.
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2.2 Competitiveness and Conditions of Maturation of Enterprises
It is frequently assumed that cheap labour is the key to textile industry development; but the
Thai case certainly shows that this is not true. In reality, the historical development of the textile
sector is markedby a much more complex series of interrelated factors, each of which in turn plays a
decisive role to incite further expansion of industrial activity. Occasional bottlenecks that.matter for
price or productqualityincitethe entrepreneurs to seekremedies - whether newsourcesof raw material
or modernized equipment, or evenincreased government regulation and support.
Indeed when we attempt to discuss production costs, and their impact on competitiveness, the
conclusions are far from straightforward in the modem industry (Narongchai Akarasanee, 1980)
The first element discussed, particularly for international comparisons, is the labour unit cost
per day in the country. Butactually, all firms surveyed pay theirproduction workers by the piece - even
in companies with 150-800 employees. Therefore, what really matters, (in addition to the wage that
workers can expect by working a reasonable length of time), is theability of the workers to fit into the
production line, and their skill in limitingthe waste of material and substandard pieces. Interestingly
enough, this seems to hold true for both formal/modern and informal enterprises as well (Voravidh
Charoenlert, 1992).
We can certainlyagree that manysmall garment" shopsand factories have a relatively easy time
recruiting temporary urban dwellers whocan be conveniently laidoff. During the first months of 1991,
several factories we visited were halfclosed due to the Gulf War. But we also know that for some, the
rice harvestseason depletes the manpower and makes it difficultto fulfill orderson time.The answer of
managers about labourturn-over wasgenerally an average 2 years spentin the plant beforeresigning.
But, as a large factory owner put it last year, "if they get decent pay and work in a clean air-
conditioned room, my workers do not want to go back to small factories neither are they keen to help
theirrelatives for harvesting in the fields - theyprefersending money homeinstead" .
Besides labour, the factors mostfrequently mentioned by theentrepreneurs are raw materials, and
equipment. Complaints from garments manufacturers about the low quality of locally produced
materials, or delays in gettingsupplies from localproducers are certainly part of normal recriminations
in a booming industry,but theyare also evidence of additional constraints on productivity, quality and
prices,beyond merewagecosts.
Anotherpiece of evidencein supportof the new awareness about competitiveness in the textile
industry, is the investment in state of the art equipment: 50 % of new loomsimported for the weaving
industry are shuttleless, and computer assisted manufacturing is catching on with leadersof the garment
production.
Several entrepreneurs in garment companies thatweresurveyed declared starting withbetween 6-
30 machines in "the 1980's - they are now thriving with more than ten times more. This should be
understood as the result of an exceptional period: 11 % annual growth in the garmentsector for 1980-
90. and 15.6 % for 1985-90 - 8 % and 11.5 % for upstream textileactivities.
This expansion pattern is very unlikely to repeat itself.Actually the textile industry will have to
face majoradjustments in the coming years:
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* At the global level, textile is unlikely to remain a labour absorbing industry, as was the case in
the past;
* The diversification of companies appears quite limited; textile entrepreneurs are very seldom the
initiators of enterprises outside the sector itself.
* The linkage with equipment manufacturers is poor- much weaker than in Korea for example,
where the machine industry followed the expansion of textiles.
* The forthcoming restructuring is a major challenge; until now the diversity of enterprises and
production forms (from shop-houses to large mills) was responsible for the dynamism and
competitiveness of the textile industry at the expansion stage.
Recession and emergence of textile activities in.neighbouring countries could harm an industrial
fabric that is a showcase of rapid industrialisation in developing countries.
Final Remarks on the Future of a Low Tech Industry
Is textile an industry of the past in Thailand, or does it hold promise for the future?
A glance at the textile activities in the old, European countries shows a wide spectrum of
structures and entrepreneurs'strategies in countries like Italy, Germany, France or Switzerland. Their
technology (from upstream synthetic fibers to garments) is upgrading, their product diversity ever-
expanding: there seems to be no end to maturation, They show convincingly that competitive
advantages have to be renewed and conquered periodically (porter 1990). The experience of East Asia
Newly Industrialized Economies also shows that considerable adjustment in productivity and reduction
of protection took place in a span of 20 years in their development process (LallI990).
Even more than in the 70's at the take off stage, we could say that the answers for Thailand lie
.in the hands of local entrepreneurs.
One could have anxieties about the local tendency to want to make fast money - it is very
seldom that industrial activity can plough back investment in two years - it requires an exceptional
period of growth - like the one we have monitored in Thailand over the past decade. The expectation of
profitability in the context of a booming economy has spoiled many investors - who tend to treat
industrial investment like a game.
To make money in industry, particularly in textile, requires dedication and willingness to adapt
through hard times and indeed entrepreneurs may indeed be tempted to put their money elsewhere. In
interviews we have met with industrialists who favoured land and property investment rather than
expansion of their original activity. As a matter of fact this is true in Korea (and probably Taiwan too)
because of the tremendous speculation that is associated with sustained economic growth.
But we can also see several reasons why Thai entrepreneurs - in the textile sector as well as
other similar manufacturing activities- may play their cards well in the future: One is the willingness
to adapt and improve productive activities. This has been demonstrated in the past.
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Secondly, the family business structure of many companies; although its brings with it
problems of generation and conservative attitudes, brings stability and commitment. It may also be a
strength in terms of creating a climate of emulation with other relatives' businesses.
FinalIy, the forward looking attitude of many entrepreneurs, is promising for an industry that
will have to combine more software orientation with hardware investment. As actors of an industry
which is part of a regional hub in Asia, the Thai entrepreneurs will have to demonstrate that textile is
not a "high tech" sector but a "high ingenuity" one.
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High Technology Entrepreneurship: Strategies for
"Catch-Up" for Newly Industrializing Countries
N. Danaraj
1. High Technology Defined
A rigorous definition of high technology may not be a meaningful exercise as there are
considerable variations in its definition. For the purpose of this paper, high technology is defined as
advanced technology requiring an intensive research and development (R&D) effort. High technology
products are increasingly characterized by short product cycles and decreasing unit costs. Recently,
high technology has been conceptualized to be system oriented, where individual elements of the
technology are combined into a system. In the new generation of high technologies based on
microelectronics, new materials, and bio-technology, it is a package of technologies rather than
individual technologies that is important. " r
The classification - industries of whether one is high technology or not - is also subject to
controversy. In the US, high technology seems to have been used as a generic term for information and
communications technology covering semiconductors, computers, and communications. Often
included are a list of industries such as pharmaceuticals, robotics, aircraft, bio technology, space,
optical fibre, computers (including hardware and software), and machinery. In Japan, microelectronics
and new materials (ceramics, ete) are normally included in high technology.
2. Conceptualizing Entrepreneurship Producer Maximizing Model Versus
Profit Maximizing Entrepreneur Model
Conceptualizing the entrepreneur is an equally difficult task. In economic analysis, firms'
actions are assumed to be undertaken to maximize profits, and who makes that decision is irrelevant.
Hence, entrepreneurs"and managers do not enter explicitly into the analysis. Similarly in economics,
the profit maximizing firm is derived from the rational utility maximizing individual where more"
consumption and more leisure are sole elements of higher individual motivation. Every individual's
goal is to maximize the net present value of his consumption. The profit maximizing individual or the
firm is based on the Anglo-Saxon model.
Lester Thurow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has suggested an alternative
theory of the firm based on producer economics rather than consumer economics. As opposed to
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maximizing consumption, the individual is not just a consumption maximizer but a producer or
builder. In Thurow's producer economics model, the individual wants to build an empire to which he
can belong and from which he can gain esteem (Thurow, 1989). Empire's exist because people want to
be part of a group. Viewed from the perspective of producer economics, everyone is an entrepreneur
and can become so by tapping universal human desires to build and belong to an empire. Human
instincts cannot becompletely submerged in the calculus of income and profit maxirnization alone.
An economy interested in producer economics will organize itself to lower consumption and
raise investment beyond maximizing consumption. Entrepreneurs existing in a producer economics
environment will still have profit maximization as an objective function for the firm. However, he will
devote higher profits to investment in expanding his empire, future productive capacity, and market
share.
In the aggregate, the evidence suggests that Japanese entrepreneurs build, to a much greater
extent than American entrepreneurs, on the producer maxirnization model rather than the consumption
profit maximizing model. Of course, no entrepreneur is a pure builder or a pure profit maximizer,
Profits are important to every entrepreneur, but the role of profits is different. Japanese entrepreneurs
have accepted lower profits to buy market share. They have preferred debt to equity, a source of
.capital that does not depend on immediate profits. Higher investments cannot occur unless
entrepreneurs are willing to accept lower rates of return. Many successful Japanese firms in the past
two decades have made rates of return that are much lower than they could have made by simply
investing in Government bonds. For 15 years, from 1965 to 1980, Honda's rate of return on
automobiles was 3 percent compared to 9 percent in manufacturing. Honda did not divert their
investments into higher rate of return riskless opportunities. It is estimated that 47 percent of all
American firms will not invest unless profits start within the first three years. Only 10 percent of
Japanese firms set a similar target (Tsurume and Tsurumi, 1985). Interestingly the Japanese see the
American desire for profits as a major cause of America's weakness in international competition
(Yamamoto, 1989).
3. Characteristics of HighTechnology
The characteristics of high technology are such that entrepreneurship based on the producer
maximizing model is most suitable, although a variety of hi-tech entrepreneurship does exist. The
three phase model of technological development suggested by Abernathy (1978) is still valid in
explaining the high technology life cycle.
Table 1: Phase of Technological Development
Technolozv phase Innovation is Innovation is in Innovation comes from
I Fluid Products Diverse sources
II Specific Processes Competition in production processes
III Re-Fluidised Systems Integration
Source: Abernathy (1978)
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At the initial phase (phase I), the technology (nature of the product) is still fluid and
innovations are centeredon defining theproduct. Innovations can appearfrom diverse sources,such as
universities and new firms. In Phase11, the markethasbeendefined by theestablishment of standards,
either set by a dominantproduceror one agreed to by a numberof participants (usersand makers). At
this stage, attention turns to carving, out market niches through minor innovations and more
importantly to production efficiency (process innovations). In Phase Ill, the industry maturesand the
product technology again becomes fluidas innovation again takesplace.
In high technology industries, the cyclebetween Phase I to III is short.Furthennore, becauseof
the higher technological intensity, it will frequently revert to'Phase I. In view of this, there is an
importantrole for government to fosterhigh technology industries and to prevent market failures. The
immense uncertainties lead to under investment of resources. Left to market forces alone, sufficient
, amounts of funds will not be invested in suchactivities, even if R&Dactivity itself is highlydesirable,
unless thereis a way to shift the risk completely. Furthermore, the minimum optimum scale that
characterizes R&D in high-tech industries impliesexclusion of firms below a certain minimum size
from this activity, resulting in under investment of resources. As the allocation of resources to R&D
falls short of the sociallyoptimum level, government support is deemed necessary. This is especially
so as R&D in high technology may requirea greater amount of basic research as opposed to applied
'research.
Despite the special government support needed in high technology, government support in
R&D for high tech industries is beset with a host of problems, Market failures do not necessarily
justify government intervention. Just as a marketmayfail so a government may also fail. Public R&D
with the absenceof competition does notensureresults.
4. Dynamics of Competition in High Tech Industries
In anaIyzing global trends in hi-tech industrialisation, this paper will focus on the experiences
of the US and Japan. The US was the birth place of most at the high tech industries such as
semiconductors, computers, aerospace, telecommunications, new materials, and bio technology. The
US was also the source of most of the radical innovations such as integrated circuit vacuum tube
computers, microprocessors, digital switching equipment, fibre optics, nuclear fission, and
biotechnology. Only 30 years ago, the Japanese advanced technology industries were almost not in
existent. Nearly all computers were imported and Japanese industry was far smaller and more
fragmented than that in the US and European. However by 1970,theJapanesehad caught up with and
overtaken the US in a number of high tech industries. By 1986, Japan had surpassed the US to become
the world's largestproducerof semiconductors, with45.5 percentof the worldmarket share compared
to the US's 44 percent. (Japan only held 28 percent in 1978.)Of the world's top ten semiconductor
companies, six, including the top three, wereJapanese. In random excess memory chips (DRAMS),
theJapanesehad come to command 90 percentof the worldmarket share.
The competitive parameters in high technology differs from mass production assembly
industries. Competitiveness in semiconductors, computers and other high tech industries depends on
new product innovation, state of the art design, creative software applications, and complex systems
241
integration. The scope of technological change, the uncertainties, risks, costs of R&D, short product
cycles, and close producer-user interaction exist to a greater degree. In older industries, the chances of
developing revolutionary 'products that transform the very nature of competition is low. In high tech
industries, major new products, such as the microprocessors that have emerged at fairly regular
intervals, alter the basic direction of an industry. Despite this, there can be entry points for small,
entrepreneurial firms that can find and exploit a niche market that is opening up.
5. What MarketStructure for HighTech Industries?
Itis not clear which type of industrial structure is most suitable for high technology
industrialisation. In the US, a ~ulti-Iayered structure of firms has emerged. It consist of giant
corporations, like IBM and AT&T, with full down stream capabilities; diversified merchant
companies, like Texas Instruments and Motorola, which sell their products to other manufacturers; and
non diversified producers such as, Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, and National Semiconductor.
Table 2: Technology and Organization Characteristics of US and Japanese Industries
United States Japan
Size and
Entrepreneurship
Small ~yindependententrepreneurs Few independent entrepreneurs with
many small companies semidependent
upon suppliers to larger corporations
Large Large corporations, including some Many successful intrapreneurial
successful intrapreneurs corporations, especially using
technology transferred from
suppliers and others
Technology
Product Innovatively new, occasionally radical Many enhancements, few breakthroughs
Process Medium cost, medium quality High quality, low cost
Organization
Type Mechanic bureaucracy or Mixed mechanistic/organic
organic-professional .
Normalization Contractual, with specific centralized Negotiable, flexible, with centralized
and control authority concentrated at top of authority mitigated by participatory
hierarchy influence of lower-ranking personnel
Interorganisational
Relationships
Number Few Many, especially suppliers
Type Contractual, short-term contractual Informal and implicit as well as
exchange (such as competitive bidding) contractual exchanges, as with a
trusted family member in long-term
relationshio
Source: Hull, Slowinski, Wharton and Azumi(1990)
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There are also a number of small and specialized niche producers. The multitiered market
structure in the US has met the imperatives of innovation in high technology.
The market structure of Japanese high technology industry is in contrast to that of the US (see
Table 2) the largest producers are big, vertically integrated systems oriented corporations such as
NEe, Toshiba, Sony, Sanyo,and Sharp. Medium size producers do not exist as in the US. Many of the
smaller firms are tied through some subcontracting network or equity holdings to large companies.
Just as the heterogeneous industrial structure has helped to develop the US high industries, a more
vertically integrated structure has met Japan's needs in catching up.
6. Strategies for High Tech "Catch-Up"
A number of analytical frameworks can be employed to examine national and corporate
strategies for this purpose; Itami's concepts of resource fit and competitive fit will be used (Itami,
1987). According to this framework, three criteria can be used to evaluate national strategies from the
perspective of resource fit: the level of resources a country has which can be devoted to developing its
strategic sectors, the effectiveness of a country's policy for developing and utilizing its current
resources, and finally the adequacy of policies and activities aimed at accumulating resources for the
future. From the perspective of competitive fit the competitors will be placed in the global market
place, as will a country's location. Second, a concrete evaluation of national assets, how to deploy and
improve them so as to create a competitive edge, is also necessary. Innovation is a threshold
phenomena and it fails when creativity and energy cannot cross the threshold. A key issue for national
and corporate strategies is how to cross the threshold and embark on a cumulative process of
innovation.
Strategies relating to optimizing a nation's resources to enter high technology industrialisation
can be classified into two broad categories. First, there are policies that are meant primarily to achieve
some other policy objectives but have a far reaching impact on high technology industries. Second,
there are policies thatare targeted at high tech industries and advanced technological progress.
Technological progress demands a suitable environment, and macro policies like fiscal and
monetary policies, human resources policy, etc. have an important role in building an environment
conducive to technical progress. Although a set of policies can not be examined because of space and
other considerations, two important policy issues will be highlighted. The first is related to investment
and the second to human resource development.
In high technology development, entrepreneurs must have the ability to invest and borrow
cheap capital to clear the initial threshold in commercializing innovations. The Japanese government
lightened the burden of high-tech firms by making low cost capital available and high priority
industries r~ceived favourable capital allocation. The Japanese high savings ratio provided sufficient
financial resources for new investments. Long term bank loans by major banks have also been
important. In comparison, in the US, the venture capital market has financed high tech industries. This.
is attributable to a combination of factors: the relative scarcity of capital supply to the business sector,
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the relative risk taking attitude of investors, and the tax structure that views capital gain relatively
favourably (AOKI).
High technology industries are dependent on the quality and quantity of technical human .
resources. An international comparison of researchers per 10,000 workers indicates that Japan has the
highest number.
. The best and brightest from Japan's finest institutions of higher learning have tended to join
rapidly growing industries, especially high tech related industries, since the 1970s. The strong
foundations in math and scienceGat the high school level have ensured a good supply of quality
technicians and production workers. Life time employment as well as job rotation has lead to a strong
human resource foundation. By contrast, in the United States, the best and brightest are scattered in all
sectors, due partly to the mobile labour market.
The experiences ofboth Japan and US reveal that specific industrial and R&D policies targeted
at high tech industries can have a profound effect on industry structure. A number of countries
engaged in this practice have had varying degrees of success. Even Japan, regarded as the most
successful, has made its share of mistakes.
The orientation of national R&D systems is important. The emphasis in Japan is purely on
applied and development research compared to basic research. Furthermore, Japan's purely
commercial orientation ensures the cost effective use of R&D resources. Meanwhile, US military
oriented R&D has nurtured high technology industries. However, the inefficiencies and rigidities built
into the US military R&D system has rendered it less adaptable than Japan's, especially in the
commercial realm. The amount spent on industrial R&D is also growing much faster in Japan than in
other countries, and many high tech companies invest more in R&D than on plant and development.
National research projects have been initiated in a number of high tech industries in Japan as a
means of leapfrogging. Few countries are capable of organizing them effectively. The national projects
were able to harness the leading firms and government laboratories through a crash program for
catching-up. The focus of all national research projects in Japan was on basic pre-commercial
technologies. Thus, Japan has organized a number of national projects from opto electronics to bio
electronic engineering. An important element of this initiative is the participation of firms that will
commercialize the innovations once they are discovered. These projects have also helped intensify the
race to catch-up with the US.
The technopolises network is based on the notion that there are advantages to be gained from
concentrating facilities for R&D, manufacturing, marketing, and service in centres of high technology.
Many countries have many such centres: Silicon Valley in the US and Japan's Tsukuba Research Park
are two examples. The technology park is geared towards knowledge oriented R&D with the goal of
designing new paradigms or making breakthroughs in existing systems. These technology centres give
cohesion to technology diffusion policies. However, it is difficult to assess whether the technopolis
networks and science cities are enhancing the competitiveness of high technology firms located within
them.
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Most governments use a variety of policy instruments to stimulate high tech development:
direct subsidies to R&D activities, and reductions and exemptions from tax payments for R&D, etc.
All advanced industrial countries subsidize their high technology industry in one form or another, only
the nature and scope of the subsidization varies.
7. Nichie and Overall Cost Leadership Strategy for Newly Industrializing
Countries: Some Possibilities for Malaysia
The conclusions of Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER) projections to the year
2020 indicate that the manufacturing sector's share of GDP is expected to be40 percent while that of
. services 44 percent. This requires a quantum jump in manufacturing activities from the 27 percent of
GDP in 1990. To achieve this, the GDP growth rates are projected to grow at 7.2 percent in this
decade, and 8.2 percent and 4 percent in the subsequent two decades respectively. In the next 20 years,
manufacturing must grow at double-digit levels, at 13.8 percent and 16.3 percent respectively..
Furthermore, the services sector is projected to have a major impact on the other sectors. As expected,
agriculture, while declining, will be more integrated with the other sectors as well as diversified more
into food production. The electronics and automobile sectors are expected to continue to be vertically-
integrated with small- and medium-scale industries more specialized into mass manufacturing of
standardized products.
In view of the significant first mover advantages enjoyed by industry leaders, especially in
scale economies and the required complimentary assets in the high technology industries, head-on
competition may be an unwise strategy for latecomers, such as Malaysia. Hence, the only choice is to
employ a niche strategy based primarily on overall cost leadership. The strategic analysis should focus
on the choice of product, the targeted market, the point of entry, and the complementary assets
requiredto grow in that market segment. In order to overcome the lack of cumulative know-how,
long-term experience and technological strength, technological discontinuities and change provide
market opportunities for new start-up firms and.followers in general. As Perez (1989) has asserted, the
relevant unit considered is not the isolated product but a whole family or system, The entry point
should be in selected product families or technological sub-systems that are in an early enough phase
of development to allow time for technologicalleaming.
In most of the new high technology industries, the involvement of Malaysian-owned companies
is negligible. Hence, in order to enter this market, Malaysia has to adopt factor creating strategies.
This, in effect, means aborting the strategy of industrialisation based on the neo-classical economic
theory of conforming to factor endowments and getting the prices right. Some of the important factors
(i.e., scientific based and supporting industries) needed to enter the new industries do not exist in
Malaysia. Having a large pool of labour and raw material resources do not constitute an advantage.
However, accepting this disadvantage is a static view of competition. The only possibility for
Malaysia to enter new industries based on the microelectronics paradigm is to be particularly good at
factor creation by turning disadvantages into advantages.
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Table 4: The Electronics and Electrical Sectors in Malaysia
Sectors Number of Establishment Gross Value of Output
Number % Share $000 % Share
1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988
Electrical 145 147 58 51.58 1299466 2316182 53.3. 16.75
Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery & apparatus 30 21 12 7.37 121394 198964 4.9~ 1.44
Manufacture of electrical appliances & housewares 18 13 7.2 4.56 152022 173122 6.2<1 1.25
Manufacture of cables & wires 19 22 7.6 7.72 461560 602756 18.9<1 4.36
Manufacture of dry cells & storage batteries 14 11 5.6 3.86 98659 129450 4.05 0.94
Manufacture of electric lamps & tubes 5 5 2 1.75 17813 16816 0.73 0.12
Manufacture of miscellaneous electrical apparatus & supplies, n.e.c. 32 32 12.8 11.23 75025 274468 3.08 1.99
Manufacture of refrigerating, exhaust, ventilating & air-conditioning macho 27 43 10.8 15.09 372993 920606 15.31 6.66
Electronics' 105 138 42 48.42 1137418 11508429 46.68 83.25
Radio & television sets, sound reproducing & equipment 24 37 9.6 12.98 702442 2836471 28.83 20.52
Gramophone records & prerecorded magnetic tape 6 5 2.4 1.75 9214 10802 0.38 0.08
Semi-conductors & other electronic components and communication equip. 75 96 30 33.68 425762 8661156 17.41 62.65
Total Electrical and Electronics 250 285 100 100 2436884 138246JJ 100 100
Value Added Fixed Assets
$000 % Share $000 % Share
Sectors 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988
Electrical Sub-sectors 393198 575381 20.17 19.72 594816 814392 30.94 28.22
Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery & apparatus 49108 67376 2.52 2.31 50191 48030 2.61 1.66
Manufacture of electrical appliances & housewares . 36566 45324 1.88 1.55 73486 80146 3.82 '2.78
Manufactures of cables & wires 113987 133850 5.85 4.59 248886 294910 12.95 10.22
Manufacture of dry cells & storage batteries 42240 43338 2.17 1.49 38720 37822 2.01 1.31
Manufacture of electric lamps & tubes 9157 5761 0.47 0.20 6119 4827 0.32 0.17
Manufacture of miscellaneous electrical apparatus & supplies, n.e.c. 24810 76436 1.27 2.62 22864 126805 1.19 4.39
Manufacture of refrigerating, exhaust, ventilating & air-cond. mach 117330 203296 6.02 6.97 154550. 221852 8.04 7.69
Electronics Sub-sectors 1556601 2342059 79.83 80.28 1327682 207JJ26 69.06 71.78
Radio & Television sets, sound reproducing & recording equipment 161450 394727 8.28 13.53 179119 394754 9.32 13.68
Gramophone records & prerecorded magnetic tape 3042 2304 0.16 0.08 7762 3407 0.40 0.12
Semi-conductors & other electronic components and comm. equip. 1392109 1945028 71.40 66.67 1140801 1672965 59.34 57.98
Total Electrical and Electronics 1949799 2917440 100.00 100.00 1922498 2885518 100.00 100.00
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics. Industrial Survey, Vanous Issues.
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Table 5: The Machinery Sector in Malaysia
Sectors Number of Establishment Gross Value of Output
Number % Share $000 % Share
1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery 493 522 100.00 00.00 1165737 1846280 lOO lOO
Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware except tinsmithing 27 29 5.48 5.56 17906 . 34330 1.5<1 1.86
Blaksmithing & Tinsmithing - 0.00 0.00 O.OC 0.00
Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 32 27 6.49 5.17 69366 66418 5.95 3.60
Manufacture of structural metal products 204 194 41.38 37.16 215260 492927 18.4 26.70
Manufacture of tin cans and metal boxes 34 33 6.90 6.32 234977 361339 20.16 19.57
Manufacture of wire and wire products 59 58 11.97 11.11 244977 305500 21.0 I 16.55
Manufacture of brass, copper, pewter and aluminium products 70 123 14.20 23.56 176693 214949 15.16 11.64
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 67 58 13.59 11. 11 207087 370817 17.76 20.08
Manufacture of Machinery except Electrical 381 341 100.00 00.00 672098 1616525 100.OC 100.00
Manufacture of engines and turbines 6 9 1.57 2.64 4028 17163 0.6C 1.06
Manufactre of agricultural machinery and equipment 23 21 6.04 6.16 57034 67333 8.49 4.17
Manufacture of metal and wood working machinery 26 18 6.82 5.28 12000 21862 I. 79 1.35
Manufacture of special industrial machinery and equipment except metal 47 30 12.34 8.80 70041 O.OC 4.33
Manufacture of refrigerating, exhaust, ventilating and air-conditioning mach 27 43 7.09 12.61 372993 920606 55.5C 56.95
Machinerv and equipment, n.e.c, 252 220 66.14 64.52 226043 519520 33.63 3
ValueAdded Fixed Assets
Sectors· $000 % Share $000 % Share
1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988 1985 1988
Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery 365201 507161 100.00 100.00 580614 831774 100.00 100.00
Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware except tin 8222 17199 2.25 3.39 8560 9779 1.47 1.18
Manufacture of furniture and fixtures primarily of metal 26634 22735 7.29 4.48 28411 32833 4.89 3.95
Manufacture of structural metal products 81155 152238 22.22 30.02 126256 350852 21.75 42.18
Manufacture of tin cans and metal boxes 66068 83421 18.09 16.45 130384 133254 22.46 16.02
Manufacture of wire and wire products 56228 77972 15.40 15.37 132768 125379 22.87 15.07
Manufacture of brass, copper, pewter and aluminium products 60143 75444 16.47 14.88 82803 86748 14.26 10.43
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 66752 78152 18.28 15.41 71431 92929 12.30 I!. 17
Manufacture of Machinery except Electrical 227480 461202 100.00 100.00 316273 547327 100.00 100.00
Manufacture of engines and turbines 2149 5172 0.94 1.12 1661 3094 0.53 0.57
Manufactre of agricultural machinery and equipment 12854 27625 5.65 5.99 20993 17977 6.64 3.28
Manufacture of metal and wood working machinery . 5922 9795 2.60 2.12 6879 5376 2.18 0.98
Manufacture of special industrial mach.and equipment except metal 20164 0.00 4.37 20141 28001 6.37 5.12
Manuf. of refrigerating, exhaust, ventilating and air-cond, macho 117330 203296 51.58 44.08 154550 221852 48.87 40.53
Machinery and equipment, n:e.c. 89225 195150 39.22 42.31 112049 271027 35.43 49.52
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey, Various. issues.
This analysisof new industries of the future for Malaysia usesone of the more recent dynamic
. models of competition proposed by Porter (1990). According to his model, four attributes define the
dynamic of creating competitive advantage. In brief, national prosperity is created and not inherited
and firms achieve competitive advantage through acts of innovation. According to him, the answer to
the question of why certain firms are based in certain nations capable of consistent innovation lies in
four broad attributesof a nation. These include factorconditions; firm strategy, structure and rivalry,
demandconditions and related supporting industries. Weakness in anyone determinant will constrain
an industry's potential, aridas a system,constitutes national advantage.
Thereare numerous new industries of the future for Malaysia. However, this analysis is limited
to the electronics and capital goods industries. These two leading industries are critical to propel
economic growth to the year 2020. As described an earlier analysis of long waves and technological
discontinuities (Danaraj, et. al., 1992), the microelectronics related technicalchange has transformed
the entire economy through industry value-added, inter-industry linkages, and generation of generic
technologies. In particular, this has transformed the electronics andcapital goods sector.
8. Analysis of Selected High Tech Industries: Entry Strategies for Malaysia
8.1 The Electronics Industry
The electronics sector in Malaysia is positioned to accelerate. MIER's input-output analysis
indicates that this sector, togetherwith machinery and transport equipment, will becomemoreefficient
with morelinkages with other sectors. The indicators already point to this direction. The output
structure has shifted away from purely semiconductorand other component manufacturing, with a
greater share now taken by consumer electronics and industrial electronics. In 1986, electronics
components constituted 81.5 percent of total output while consumer electronics comprised 12.3
percent and industrial electronics only 6.2 percent. However, this has shifteddramatically with shares
of 57.6 percent, 23.2 percent and 19.2 percent respectively in 1990. This is against the Industrial
Master Plan (IMP) targets of 61 percent,24 percent and 15 percent respectively. The performanceof
all sectors has been creditable, especially with consumerelectronics, which surpassed the IMP target.
As observed from Table 4, the number of new entrants in the non-semiconductor industries is
\
negligible. Industry participation is still heavily focused on semiconductors and audio equipment
manufacturing, which together constitute about tllree-quarters of total output and value-added in the
electronics sector. There is, however, still tremendous scope for development of other sub-sectors. In
terms of employment, the semiconductor industry still predominates with70% of the total electronics
share. The investment trends are also similarly skewed towards semiconductors. The dominant
position of the electronics sector is reflective of its 12 percent of total employment and 47 percent
contribution to exportsof the manufacturing sector.
Despite its star status, there are several shortcomings that must be addressedat the policy and
corporatestrategy level.Someof the majorshortfalls are:
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i) Dominance by foreign direct investment, which is estimated to be over 85 percent in fixed
investments. This has implications for indigenous R&D.progress and globalisation, as well as inter-
industry linkages.
ii) High concentration of production in a few large firms, Most of the large foreign firms have
highly vertically-integrated structures and are risk averse in sourcing from iocal sub-contractors. As
such, it is no surprise that 62 percent of $10.2 billion of total electronic imports comprised of
components.
iii) Narrow product base with little R&D and systems integration ability. In the electronics
component sector, Malaysia is still only a final assembler of linear and digital IC's memories, micro
processors, optoelectronics, discrete devices, hybrids, arrays and wide range of capacitors, relays,
switches, quarts, oscillators, connectors, coils, and transformers. Consequently, 53% of electronic
exports in 1990 were components. The R&D, as well as product development, is still in the R&D
centres of MNCs abroad. Even in consumer electronics, Malaysia is still only the offshore assembly
location of MNCs in products such as colour televisions, video cassette recorders and players, audio
equipment, telephone sets, personal computers, and peripherals. Similarly, the commercialization of
innovation is done abroad.
iv) Domestic demand growing rapidly but still requiring domestic firms' participation.
Significant sales volume and market share is required by firms before they can invest in R&D and new
products iJ.I this sector. The domestic market stood at $13.6 billion in 1990 and is expected to be $22
billion in 1995. Domestic demand is expected to grow at 10 percent per annum over the next five
years. The domestic computer market was $2.2 billion in 1989 and is expected to expand by 20-30
percent per annum over the next five years.
With a global market in electronics of US $626.3 billion in 1989, global competition is
extremely intense with high barriers of entry for newcomers such as Malaysia. The electronics sector
can be classified into five categories, namely; i) semiconductors and electronic components, ii)
communication equipment, iii) office automation and computers, iv) industrial controls and
instrumentation and medical electronics, and v) consumer electronics.
Each of the five broad categories can be further segmented into specific product categories.
Given the significant diversity in the electronics sector, this paper highlights only the generic entry
'strategies for Malaysia. The industry is categorized by high entry barriers. In semiconductors,
mainframe computer and integrated telecommunication segments would be difficult for Malaysia to
enter. In these industries, first mover advantages are significant in a number of areas; in economies of
scale in production, R & D, established supplier networks for equipment, and core components and
materials. The verticaUy integrated Japanese firms have been able to develop long-term strategies and,
with captive markets, these firms are able to withstand demand fluctuations. With annual sales totaling
between US$ 9 and US$ 60 billion each, Japanese firms can afford the high development cost of the
next generation of technologies in these major electronics market segments.
However, as indicated in Table 5 there are a number of industries and entry strategies for
Malaysia. In the industries identified, the barriers of entry are lower; the technology, although mature,
offers opportunities for incremental process and product innovation. The leapfrogging in these
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products is not in an unknown technology but in technologies where the commercial applications offer
the widest possibilities for growth. As an example, microelectronics has provided new markets for
digital watches, instarnatic cameras, smaller and more efficient consumer electronics, and office
automation products. Using Porters conceptual model, Table 6 identifies some of the strategies for
creating national competitive advantages in the electronics industry.
8.2 The Capital Goods Industries
The universal historical pattern of economic development is for the capital goods sector to be
the prime mover of technological development for other user industries. The capital goods sector has
exhibited rapid diffusion of microelectronics technology. This sector consumes as well as replaces
new technology as there is considerable feedback within the machine making sector. The machine
building sector is extremely important in the initial and ongoing process of industrialisation. This
sector exhibits the new fusion type innovation model described earlier. Increasingly, this industry is a
product of the fusion of mechanics, electronics, software, new materials, optical, and system
integration technologies. The advanced capital goods sector combines discrete equipments like
robotics, computer controlled machine tools, automatic guided vehicles, and the appropriate software
to form total factory automation.
The barriers of entry are high in advanced factory automated equipment manufacturing
especially in robotics, computer numerical controlled machine tools, and general machinery. While
still populated by small and medium scale firms, the market share of the top firms in these market
segments has increased. The high concentration ratios and the technological complexity of the
products precludes Malaysia's entry into these markets.
,
The capital goods industry. in Malaysia is underdeveloped. Unliked the developedeconomies,
Malaysia does not have a strong engineering sector. Hence, there is an absence of support industries as
well as related industries such as robots, advanced machining, and other factory automation industries.
As analyzed from Table 6 almost half of the value of the industry's output is in the manufacture of
refrigeration, exhaust, ventilating and air conditioning machinery. This sector has grown out of the
strong presence of air conditioner manufacturers in Malaysia, which have captured a large global
share. The other strong sectors are structural metal products, manufacture of tin cans and metal boxes,
and wire and wire products. They constituted 27 percent, 20 percent and 17 percent of value of output.
in the machinery sector respectively in 1988.
There are several structural weaknesses in the capital goods sector in Malaysia, among which
are:
i) Absence of strong engineering firms in supporting and related industries. Most of the
metalworking firms and foundries are backyard industries, family-owned with little infusion of
new technology. Most grew out of the mining industry and demand for local fabrication of parts.
However, there is an emerging engineering and metalworking sector that is linked to the MNCs.
ii) Lack of integration between engineering and electronics technology. The diffusion of
microelectronics technology has revolutionized machinery building and utilisation. Over 50
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percent of machinery components are electronic and electrical based. Most of the buildersare still
in the mechanical era in conventional machine building.
iii) Absence of user-producer interaction. The lack of local demand has inhibited their growth.
MNCs still import most of their machinery directly and the preference is still for established.
manufacturers..
Table 6 : The Dynamic of Creating National Advantage in theElectronic Industry for Malaysia
Global Market Segments Possible New Industries
Markets i) Office automation and computers i) Personal computers. mini computers, electronic
ii) Consumer electronics typewriters. calculators; cash registers. photocopiers
iii)Electronic components and semi- ii) Colour TV. radio, watches. musical instruments and toys
iv) Industrial controls and instru- iii) Audio components such as microphones. loud speakers.
mentation and medical electronics amplifiers. accessories for consumer equipment; passive
v) Communication equipment components such as capaci-tors. resistors. printed circuits.
iv) Measuring instruments. industrial & medical equipments
v) Telephones. transmitters. receivers. switch equipment
Global Position Strategy
1) Firm i) Existence of global oligopoly i) Imitation and niche strategy in products with lower entry
strategy primarily American and Japanese. barriers with innovation thresholds.
and rivalry ii) Increasing concentration and ii) Focus lowest segment cost by altering leader's products or
globalisation, especially in process to serve particular segment more efficiently.
semiconductors. supercomputers. iii) Identify segments with domestic demand as well as low
iii) Fragmentation and specialization cost segments of developed markets.
in American firms but Japanese iv) Encourage fragmentation and specialisation and
highly diversified and vertically over time towards concentration.
integrated firms,
iv) Existence of niche players.
2) Demand i) Falling unit prices with short cycles i) Stimulate domestic demand through government
conditions ii) High complimentary assets to procurement, training equipment purchases .
compete. i.e.•R&D. distribution. ii) Facilitate leasing and financing of locally
after sales. software, etc .. manufactured products
iii) Slow growth in most segments iii) Develop products for international markets
segments that are price sensitive.
3) Related i) Except for large computers, i) Source semiconductors from domestic chip
and manufacturers assemble a variety producing MNC·s.
supporting of components produced by ii) Increasing subcontracting with local MNC·s.
industries independent vendors. iii) Expandnetwork of international subcontractors.
ii) International sourcing required. iv) Identify and develop specialized support industries.
iii) Core components produced in v) Encourage collaborative R&D between local firms,
in-house or through joint development research institutions and engaged other precommercialization
to produce differentiation strategy. activities.
iv) Strong software and distribution
services.
4) Factor i) High knowledge resources in i) Create specialized factor advantage. especially in specific
conditions R&D activities and software. skill categories.
ii) High capital resources to lower ii) Preferential lending rates to encourage investment in plant
cost of capital to invest. and equipment, R&D. etc. (low cost of entry and expansion).
iii) Excellent physical infrastructure.
especially in telecommunications
and air transport.
Source: Authors analysts
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However, there are a number of machinery segments where barriers of entry are lower and
conducive for Malaysiaentry. As in the electronics analysis, some new industries and entry strategies
are prescribed for the Capital Goods Industry in Table 7..
Table 7 : The Dynamics Of Creating National Advantage in the Capital Goods Industry for
Malaysia
Global Possible New Industries
Markets i) Plastic processing machines i) Woodworking machinery
Segments ii) Hydraulic and pneumatic equipment ii) Textile machinery
iii) Robots and material handling equipment iii)Plastic processing machinery
iv) Machine tools iv) Food processing machinery
v) Metal forming machines v) Simple NC machine tools and metal
vi) Agricultural machines andforming machines
vii) Textile machinery
viii) Food processing machinery
ix) Wood working machines
x) Bearings
xi) Precision measuring instruments
xii) CAD/CAM systems
xiii) FA factory automation related machinery
Firms i) Mostly specialized small firms with niche market i) Focused manufacturer in specialized
strategy, customisation machinery with domestic demand
structure ii) Large vertically integrated!apanese firms with ii) Compete on price and medium to upper
and rivalry mass production strategy range market segments
iii) Non price competitive factors, i.e., quality, precision ii) Encourage technology licensing and
, delivery, after sales service, etc. OEM manufacturing
Related i) Information related industries such as computers i) Source for internationally competitive
and CAD/CAM systems and electronic control devices, vendors
supporting CNCs, PCs, etc. ii) Subcontracting and component .
ii) Machinery equipment support industries such as manufacturing of machines
foundaries, steel metal processing industries, heat iii) Create specialized support especially
treatment industries, etc. those with low economies of scale and
iii) System's builders such engineering companies, investment
trading companies, andmaior user industries.
Demand i) Fluctuating demand cycles sensitive to economic trends i) Stimulate domestic demand in domestic
conditions ii) Customisation and diseconomies of scale user industries - target as close to the user
markets iii) Long product life cycles but declining with as possible
Japanesecompetition
Factor i) Availability of mechanical and electronic engineering i) Create engineering skills infrastructure
conditions manpower especially university - industry interaction
ii) Low cost of capital to encourage long term investment ii) Development banks to provide low cost
capital with appropriate repayment
schedules
Source: Authors analysis
8.3 The Steel Industry
Despite Malaysia's aggressive move towards boosting domestic steel production, it is still a
huge importer of the metal. Last year, Malaysia imported four million tones of steel products, mainly
flat products for the industrial and manufacturing sectors. During the same period, the industry
produced 4.3 million tones of steel, of which 3.3 million tones or 76.7 percent were consumed locally
and the balance exported. Export demand is expected to remain strong because the international cost
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competitiveness of traditional steel suppliers has been eroded by such factors as currency appreciation
and escalating labour costs.
At present, there are more than 140 steel manufacturing operations in Malaysia. Most of these
are small- and medium-sized, together employing a workforce of 21,300. Due to its capital intensive
nature, the steel industry has always been vulnerable to the ups and downs of economic cycles. In
times of a recession or drop in demand, the industry usually responds with hefty price cuts rather than
lower output. High fixed costs often force firms to produce as much steel as possible, even if they have
to slash prices for their entire output to sell the excess.
Malaysia's largest billets producer is the government-owned Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd. Imports of
billets are banned except with special permission from the authorities. Thus, millers who do not
produce their own billets are forced to buy them from Perwaja. This 'protection' has put a squeeze on
the local steel industry whilst eroding the profit margin of millers, tempting the more established steel
makers to produce their own billets.
The reason for increasing capacity, besides meeting increasing domestic demand, has also to do'
with export. Malaysia, essentially a low-grade steel producer, was able to boost exports in recent years
when Japan switched from producing low-grade to higher grade steel as a result of escalating costs
from the appreciating yen.
Since steel bars and rods, like steel billets, are government controlled items, prices are little
affected by surpluses although analysts believe efficient capacity utilisation is the key to surviving
unhealthy competition. During the recession from 1985 to 1987, capacity utilization was about40
percent and all millers made losses. The situation has, however, changed with the upswing in the
economy, and many steel plants are operating at well above the 50 percent level, benefiting from
economies of scale. Industry sources estimate that costs can go down by as much as 20 to 30 percent if
plant utilization increases to between 50 and 70 percent.
Industrial Niches
Market Niches Justifications Strategies to Sustain Niches
1. Steel bars, rods & billets i) Energy supply & technology needed i) Overall cost leadership
ii) Possibilities of standardisation and mass
production based on low-unit cost
2. Seamless steel pipes and tubes i) Energy supply & technology needed i) Overall cost leadership
ii) Energy supply & technology needed
8.4 The Plastics and Plastic Products Industry
The plastics industry in Malaysia is gearing for an annual growth rate of between 20 and 25
percent over the next five years, given the country's sustained buoyant economic climate and rapidly
expanding manufacturing sector. The industry's turnover for 1992 is expected to breach the RM2.0
billion mark, following strong growth in the packaging as well as electrical and electronics sectors.
Last year alone, the industry achieved a turnover of RM1.8 billion, contributing 2.1 percent to the
country's gross domestic domestic product (GDP).
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Malaysia's plastics industry is supported by a well established domestic petrochemical
infrastructure. Investment in this sector, which employs 60,000 workers, totaled RM1.2 billion in 1991
with exports for the year amounting to RM400 million. The annual growth rate for exports between
1988 and 1991 exceeded 30 percent with the major export markets for plastics products being the EC,
the US, Japan, and Singapore.
Currently, there are about 1,000 establishments involved in plastics fabrication and processing
in Malaysia of which more than 600 are members of the Malaysian Plastics Manufacturers Association
(MPMA). The industry is generally fragmented and dominated by small-and medium-sized
companies. About 45 percent of the 1,000 firms have fixed assets below RM5oo,OOO and only 27
percent over RM2.5 million. The majority of these firms are located in the more developed states
along the west coast, including the KlangValley, Selangor, Penang, and Johore.
Despite the rapid development of the plastics industry, Malaysia still relies heavily on imported
raw materials. In 1987, total consumption of raw materials was estimated at 150,000 tones. This
increased to 400,000 tones in 1991, reflecting an average annual growth rate of 28 percent. Of the
basic raw materials required for the downstream manufacture of plastic products, up to 80 percent
were imported last year. Only polystyrene (PS), expandable polystyrene (EPS), and polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) are produced locally.
To overcome the shortage of these raw materials or polymers, several petrochemical projects
have been scheduled for implementation between now and 1995. Over the next three years, eight
projects with a total investment of RM5 billion will be operational to produce raw materials such as
polypropylene (PP), polyethylene (PE), and polystyrene (PS) for the plastics industry. Two
consortiums, one lead by Petronas, Idemitsu Neste, and British Petroleum and the other by Titan,
Himont, Nylex, and Permodalan Nasional Berhad will undertake the projects to produce PP and PE.
Together, both projects will make some 180,000 tones of PP and 450,000 tones ofPli. With these
projects coming on stream, it is anticipated that the industry will have enough raw material even for
export by 1995.
Of late, increasing pressure from environmentally conscious groups to limit the use of non-
biodegradable materials has posed a new challenge to Malaysia's plastics industry. Issues relating to
the control and management ofwastes as well as recycling of plastic products are being increasingly
addresses even though Malaysia's per capita consumption of plastics is only 20 kg, a quarter of the 80
kg in industrialized countries. Thus, while there is a need for the industry to focus on R&D through
improving designs and manufacturing processes to upgrade its competitiveness, new technologies in
the manufacturing of plastics should be developed in order to conform to the higher standards of
environmental protection and for waste management concerns.
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Industrial Niches
Market Niches Justifications Stratezies to Sustain Niches
1.Engineering plastics for the electronics Potential availability of raw material Focus segment
& .telecommunicationsconsumer due to establishment of large feed- differentiation strategy
productsindustrv stock petrochemical plants
2. Household plastic Labour-cost advantage Focus cost leadershin
3. Industrial plastics Experience in serving MNCs Focus segment
in Malavsia differentiation strategy
8.5 The Information Technology Industry
The Information Technology (In industry is set to growby more than 20 percent in the coming
year. The 1993 budget has lowered the prices of computers and their peripherals; thus, the industry is
experiencing a tremendous increase in sales. The reduction on import duties of foreign makes has
made the IT industry more lucrative and help promote greater usage of computers in Malaysian
businesses. Cheaper prices for imported models will also make competition more intense, hopefully
enhancing better quality products and services. The incentivesgiven to R&D for the IT industry will
further boost the sector to achievegreatergrowthand contributeits share to Vision2020.
The IT industry is currently separated into two segments: hardware and information services.
The demand for hardware has risen dramatically over the years. Total imports amounted to RM865
million in 1991 for hardwareand RM476millionfor information services.
The IT industryis very competitive in both segments and most hardware producers focus on the
high end of the market, with special system designs customised according to the needs of their
customers.The low end usersare monopolised by a fewpopular softwarecompaniesthat have already
been establishedfor some time.
Given the few local manufacturers in the IT industry, the question of production efficiency or
scale economies will be an advantagous tool in global competition. The hardware has high cost
structureand focuses itself on differentsegments. This has alsocontributed to differentiation in terms
of service and quality.
Information services strive on a price competition strategy to capture the lower end of the IT
market Hardwareproducerscompete in qualityof the whole integrative and capability of the system,
as well as in providingbetter and faster servicesaccording to the customer's preferences.Software has
copyrightproblemsbecauseof extensivedistribution networksand easy access that allows duplication
of programmes and contents.
The enforcement of intellectualproperty rights (IPR) must be strictly observed. Otherwise, it
will have an adverse impact on Malaysian products and hamper the flow of trade in this segment
Inadequate patent and copyright protection will prevent better and improved programmesfrom being
marketed, thus loosing the competitive edge later. IPR includes patents, trademarks, copyrights and
trade secrets. It is difficult to define the extent of IPR coverage, but trade representatives from the
worldare conveningto introducerespectivelaws regarding this matter.
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Hardware depends on reliability and quality of service and maintenance to be able to compete
effectively. This includes providing training and upgrading services. in-house programmes. on-time
delivery and services. backup and recovery aids. practicality of networking. and integration with
. telecommunication services. Japan is leading the world in hardware sales and. with a US$ 10.6 billion
market, is also the world's second largest packaged software market. followed by Germany ($7.1
billion). France ($6.3 billion). and the United Kingdom ($5.8 billion).
Several trends will affect the domestic IT industry in the years ahead. Competition among
software vendors will be intense as system suppliers are supplementing hardware sales with software
and services. Consolidation through mergers and alliances among local and foreign firms will reduce
competition and weaken smaller firms. The movement toward standard and open systems has been
strongly advocated for better integration purposes. The current trend gearing to the use of smaller
computers. especially PCs and laptops, implies that the demand for software for smalIer systems will
increase. The software market will remain strong as one of the fastest growing segments of the IT
industry.
Industry Niches
Market Niches Justifications Strategies to Sustain Niches
1. Software specially programmes Lower cost in software engineering and Focus segments differentiation
closer to regional customers
2. Consultation on IT Cheaper cost in professional services Focus segments differentiation
3. Subcontracts in peripherals Lower production and Focus segments cost
of computers component supply cost
Conclusion
The high technology industrialisation experience of Japan and the US cannot be easily
transplanted into newly industrializing countries. Although profit maximization and return on
investments are good indicators of competitiveness, entrepreneurship based on this approach in
business may not be compatible with high technology products. Special characteristics of high
technology require entrepreneurs with long term goals. market share. and capacity building instincts.
In view of the fluid stage of innovation in high technology products. market signals alone do
not provide a guide to investment. The risk averse entrepreneur is not made for high technology. The
technologicalIy driven entrepreneur with the desire of creating market demand based on his innovation
is most suitable. In this sense. the high tech entrepreneur is pushed by technology and pulIed by
market demand.
This paper has highlighted a number of strategies that can be employed to stimulate the
development of high tech industries. Newly industrializing countries may not posses the required
resource fit to enter the core high tech industries. such as semiconductors. large Scale computers and
telecommunications industries. but the fluid nature of high technology does provide new niche
opportunities to enter high tech industries. The investment threshold in high tech industries is
significant. as are the human resource capabilities. In each of these areas. preferential targeting for
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strategic industries needs to be employed. A range of specificpolicies directed at high tech industries
mustalso be employedto compliment soundmacro-economic policies.
Newly industrializing countries have to direct their R&D systems to develop their own
competitive fits in the new generation of high tech industries. Observedfrom the strategies of Japan,
applied R&D can be a powerful instrument in establishing competitive advantage in a range of
products.Governmentintervention and subsidyis essential to foster high tech development. However,
it must be disciplined by the competitive forces of the market. For government subsidy to be
meaningful, it must be done in collaboration with private firmssince the commercialization of R&D is
critical and only firms have the capacity to engage in market driven R&D. For most developing
industries high technology industries are at an embryonic stage of development. They have to be
nurtureddifferently from other industries to succeed. (
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v. CULTURAL CONTEXT FOR ENTREPRENEURS

Presentation
The transformation of Thai society from traditional subsistent economy with Buddhistic
ideology and world view to capitalistic economy with changing world view and social values is a
process taking place during the past two centuries/The papers included in this section attempt to
provide descriptions and explanation of the process in different ways. Unfortunately, since papers
included in this volume consist of only papers presented at the CUSRI-ORSTOM conference which
arrived through open invitation, the editors have no control over the topics submitted for presentation.
The papers in this section cover only the role Of the Chinese entrepreneurs and the role of the changing
Buddhist ideology and world view being viewed as Buddhist entrepreneurs. Other types of
entrepreneurial endeavours are lacking.
Amara Pongsapich provides theoretical framework and outline of the transformation process at
the national level. She attempts to analyze the status and role of the Chinese entrepreneurs in the Thai
setting using ethnic relations theoretical concepts and shows how the Chinese entrepreneurs have been
able to penetrate into the Thai social system and become influential to government policies. The
middleman minority concept is applicable in the early stage of Chinese immigration. But after World
War 11; the paper shows how the Chinese have made "rational choices" and have been able to penetrate
and integrate into the Thai economic structure. They started as rice exporters and shifted to export other
agricultural products as well as operated banking and later real estate enterprises. She shows that at the
local levels, around Bangkok, close cooperation and collaboration between Chinese entrepreneurs and
Thai government and military officials are recorded in literature on the development of capitalism in
Thailand. At present, the government is inviting the private sector including Sino-Thai business
entrepreneurs and multinational investors to join in the development planning and implementation
activities.
Jean Baffie and Supang Chantavanich in their respective papers provide pictures of the role of
. the different Chinese families in the Thai society. They both use biographies, cremation volumes, and
interviews as their means of collecting information. Jean Baffie describes the Lamsam, Nandhabiwat,
Phornprapa, Chokwatana, Chirathivat, and Srifuengfung families while Supang Chantavanich focuses
her paper on five families from Chaozhou area covering 9 districts in Guangdong Province of Southern
China. They are Wang-Iee, Sophonphanit, Techaphaiboon, Srifuengfung, and Chiarawanon families.
Only one family is discussed by both of them and the total of 10 families are presented in both papers.
At least 5 out of 10 families discussed have been directly involved in banking in addition to other
businesses. Jean Baffie suggests that Chineseentrepreneurs who became successful usually take two or
more generations to establish the families as leaders in the specific commodity sector. They shift from
the fathers' investment in banking and import-export to establish leading specialized fields which
follow the pattern of national economic development. They are mobile geographically and .
professionally because they are willing to shift location and profession when rational choices prevail.
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Large families provide more relatives to operate the different sectionsof the business but at the same
time can create conflict and factions. Some families have been able to utilize family connections and
intermarriages to establish links for· businessexpansionand for political protections while others have
not been successfuland the Nadhabiwatfamily lost control of the Laemthong Bank because of family
conflicts.
SupangChantavanich concludesin her paper that the Chaozhoutraders/entrepreneurs used their
dialect group as their original trade network and expanded the network to other dialect groups. The
network in Thailand is connected with networks in Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam,and China. The
Chaozhou personal quality is also mentioned as being instrumental to family success. The shift from
Gong-si or family business where family expense is to be taken care of by the family budget and all
members are expected to contribute to the family business to the establishment of corporate firms by
adopting modem management is seen in all cases.
Both Jean Baffie and Supang Chantavanich agree with Amara Pongsapich in concluding that
even when they are not interested in playing politics themselves, business families associate
themselves with high-ranking army and police officers and professional politicians to obtain
government contractsand good connections. However, in presentday Thailand, the Sino-Thai business
and multinational corporations have become part and parcel of the development policy planning and
implementation process. They are invited by the government to become openly and directly involved
in Thailand's development activities.
The role of Hokkien and Teochiu Chinese entrepreneurs at local level in Trang Province in
Southern Thailand presented by Michael Montesano provides details which also support the thesis
presented by Amara in the first paper and provide data on the connection and relationship with
Bangkok, Penang, Singapore. and other Malay states. Michael Montesano demonstrates historically
how Thap Thieng Subdistrict of Trang Province has shifted from traditional subsistent society to a
more commercialized district in the pattern observedby Geertz in Indonesia.The role of Thap Thieng
which shifted from pepper production center to become a major center of rubber production and the
developmentof family enterprises to firm-type enterprises follow the pattern observed by Supang in
Bangkok areas. Local Hokkien families worked with Hokkiens who were sent from Singapore and
Bangkok in establishing para-rubber enterprises while providing strong support of education was
evident in the establishment of the Trang Association for the Support of Education. Furthermore, the
TeochiuChinese role in grocery and general storesand the introduction of other modem consumption
products lead to a morediversified pattern of trade,again already discussedin thepapers by Jean Baffie
and Supang Chantavanich. Michael Montesano describes clearly the different pattern of business
Connections observed in Trang and states "the single most important factor in the lack of sustained
. success of Thap Thieng-basedentrepreneurs and in the truncated growth of their enterprises has been
their inability to negotiate links to the nationaland international economies on favorable terms." It is
. undeniable that those with connections with Bangkok and larger networks are the ones who are
considered successful.
In contrast to the four papersdiscussed previously; GeraldFry provide interpretation of Buddhist
entrepreneurship derivedfrom earlierBuddhist ideology. Whilemanyscholars viewed Buddhistethics as
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inhibiting entrepreneurial spirits and capitalistic concept of development, the authors of this paper
succeed in presenting an alternative interpretation.
MajorBuddhistconcepts relevant to entrepreneurship, leadership, and management include.sill!
(mindfulness), illlllillil (non-self),~ (impermanence), Elbi (contentment)and~' (tranquility).
Buddhist view of work presented in case studies of modem Buddhists shows another pattern of
entrepreneurial spiritdeveloped regardless of ethnic identification. The fourThai individuals selected for
case studiesin thispaper demonstrate non-economic leadership and they includeCharnlong Srimuang,
a politician; Or. Sippanondha Ketudat, an educator-industrialist; Meechai Veeravaidya, a non-
government development worker; and Dr. Prawase Wasi, a medical doctor and social development
advocate. The entrepreneurship of the fourrepresentatives provide thereaders with another dimension of
analysis which needed to be investigated further. A more recent phenomena of the non business.
entrepreneurship is a new pattern of entrepreneurial development which will predominate Thai
developmental process in the nextdecade.
The papers presented in this section, therefore, provide the readers with two categories of
entrepreneurship, economic and non-economic. Among the first group, only Chineseentrepreneurs are
discussed. The role of non-Chinese investors are not reflected in the presentation mainly becausemost
scholars have not been giving attention to them. Information on the non-Chinese entrepreneurs is
certainly lacking. However, the non-Chinese entrepreneurs included in this section represents the group
which may beclassified as "social entrepreneurship" for lackof a betterterm.
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Some Theoretical Consideration on Chinese
Entrepreneurs and Their Dominant Role in Responding,
to the Thai Development Ideology
Amara Pongsapich
Introduction
Analysis of Thai-Chinese relations within Thailand have been made by many. However,
historical analysis shows clearly that the relationship has certainly changed with time. In studying
socio-economic change in the Central Region of Thailand up to the present, the author attempts to
look at available theoretical analysis to understand the Thai-Chinese relation more fully and finds that,
there is no one theory which can provide that function. A theory may be applicable for analysis of
conditions during certain period and not other. Furthermore the author finds that the present Thai-
Chinese relationship advances further and theories which have been used are no longer applicable..
While some Chinese have assimilated into the Thai social structure, others have not. It is the status of
the unassimilated Chinese which is the question here. Since the Thai government adopted capitalistic
development ideology, the Chinese or Thais with Chinese ancestors have been able to respond to the
government policy and become prominent and influential mechanism in the economic development .
process of the country. The status of the Chinese as an "ethnic minority" is no longer appropriate.
They are "influential ethnic group" dominating many aspects of the socio-economic and political
spheres of decision making in the development of Thailand.
1. 'Reviews of Some of the Ethnic Relations Theories and the Analysis.'·
of the Thai-Chinese Relations
Since it is not possible to separate theories of ethnic relations from theories of race relations,
they are viewed as one single set of theories on racial and ethnic relations. In this paper, the readers
should assume that the Thai-Chinese relations will be considered in terms of ethnic relations since the
phenotypic differences cannot be easily identified.
1.1 Order Model (Structural-Functional Analysis) and Conflict Model
Historical studies of the status of the Chinese in Thailand indicates that the status of the
Chinese and the inter-ethnic relations change from period to period depending on government policies
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\and the ways which the Chinese made adjustment or coped with government policies. During the
Phibun Regime when the government adopted nationalism and anti-foreigner policies ethnic conflicts
were obvious and order model and conflict model were both appropriate for analysis.
Order theorists see society as an integrated whole in which all the parts are working to maintain
some state of balance; therefore any phenomenon that upsets this balance is a problem....
Differential power is one of the key concepts in the conflict model, which views society as a
continually contested political struggle between groups with opposing goals and world views. Whereas
order theory defines social problems as pathologies, in conflict theory problems result from the failure
of the society to meet changing individual needs. Order theory requires that problems be solved by
making changes within the system, conflict theory proposes changes of the system (Leggon, 1979:
8,10).
After the Phibun regime, Thai-Chinese relations gradually improved. Later on, since 1980
when the Communist Party of Thailand was officially abolished, the Thai-Chinese inter-ethnic
relations have been quite cordial. The tendency then is to view the Thai-Chinese inter-ethnic relations
in terms of assimilation. But Leggon warns us against pre-determined analysis and suggests that other
relations may be possible. She says: .. The ethnic-bases analysis takes assimilation to be the only
possible outcome of regularized inter ethnic contact. Yet" assimilation is but one of several
possibilities. Other patterns include exclusion, symbiosis, ethnic stratification--a highly probable
outcome-and cultural pluralism. Assimilation may be the result in a given society at a given time,
but it is not necessarily a universal end-state." (Leggon 1979: 12).
1.2 MiddlemanMinority Theory
One theory which shouldbe reviewed with regard to the Chinese in Thailand is the theory of
Middleman Minorities (Bonacich, 1973). On the outset, it appears that although the theory of
middleman minority may be applied in case of the Chinese who first immigrated to Thailand, it cannot
. be applied to the second and third generation. Even among some of the ftrst generation Chinese, the
theory is not totally applicable.
The two prominent themes of middleman minorities theory are that there exist a pattern of
hostile reaction of the surrounding society to the cultural distinctiveness which pushed the ethnic
group out of desirable occupations and forced the group to marginal lines there exist "status gap" or
marked division between the elite and the mass. The argument then is that the resulted marginal groups
are able to fill the status gap through their industriousness in middleman trade. In other words
middleman minorities are seen to serve the functions because:
First, since they are not involved in the status hang-ups of the surrounding society, they are
free to trade or deal with anyone. In contrast, elites may feel that they lose status by dealing with the
masses. Second, their foreignness enables them to be "objective" in the market place; they do not have
familistic ties with the rest of the society which can intrude on, and destroy business. And third, they
act as a buffer for elites, bearing the brunt of mass hostility because they deal directly with the latter.
In other word, middleman minorities play the status gap betweenelites and masses, acting as
middlemen between the two (Bonacich, 1979: 584).
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It looks as if the middleman minority theory should be able to apply to the situation of the
Chinese in Thailand quite well. However, there are some problems. Middleman minorities theory
further states that middleman minorities begin as sojourners and have unusual attachment to their
homeland and they select occupations which do not tie them to the territory very long. Thus, they
adopt "independent profession" and in order to return home, they are known to have tendency toward
thrift. The middleman firm is labour intensive but able to cut labour costs drastically through
ethnically based paternalism and thrift. Although these characteristics are generally true of the Chinese
in Thailand prior to 1970s, they were not applicable totally and not applicable anymore. The hope for
sojourning home have been abandoned after the Chinese realized that the situation in China is not what
they would like to live in. The Chinese then decided to settle in Thailand. As will be discussed later,
.when the Thai government adopted national development policy which follows capitalistic model, the
Chinese were able to slowly work with the government and hostility with the host country slowly
disappeared. Conflicts with clientele (buyers), with competing business groups in the host country and
with the labour, were not overtly problematic. Thus the situation of the Chinese. in Thailand may fit
with the middleman minority theory during the period of 1950s and 1960s, the situation slowly
changed and the theory is no longer applicable.
1.3 Dual Labour Market Theory and Split Labour Market Theory
Since most of the Chinese are involved in business one is then tempted to look into Dual
Labour Market Theory as well as Split Labour Market Theory. The basic premise of dual labour
market theory is that the labour market in the West is segmented into two sectors: the core and
periphery, or primary and secondary sectors. These are distinguished by a host of characteristics,
including technological advance, product durability, degree of control of the market, size of firm, degree
of unionization. Generally, primary or core industries or firms are associated with capital intensity,
production of durable commodities, largeness and unionization. Workers in the secondary sector are
trapped in poor-paying jobs with no future. For various historical reasons, racial (ethnic) minorities
and women have been less stable workers than white males, the primary firm employer makes an
actuarial assessment, and prefers white male labour. (Bonacich, 1979: 36).
Split labour markettheory, on the other hand, sees the price of labour of different groups of
workers as rooted in their historical experiences. For split labour market theory, the "duality" arises
out of the dynamics of class struggle, while for dual labour market theory it appears to arise from
. technology. In dual labour market theory women and ethnic minorities are confined to secondary firms
and industries and is explained by efforts of primary workers to protect themselves and form an
inclusive group. Furthermore it was argued that ethnic minorities and women, once in the secondary
sector find it difficult to shift to the primary sector because they have poor work habits. Bonacich also
states that "simple racist practices in the primary sector make the shift difficult even if the worker
could overcome the poor habits".
The split labour market theory was conceptualized in developed countries where labour is
composed of immigrants from developing countries. Ethnic antagonism expresses class conflict
between the higher and lower-paid groups within the labour force and the origin of ethnic antagonism
in the development of capitalism. Labour is split based on race, ethnicity and sex.
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In case of the Chinese in Thailand, application of the split labour market faces difficulty. The
Chinese immigrants arrived in Thailand duringfeudal or pre-capitalistic state and thus they were lower-
paid wage labourers before the ethnic Thai enter the labour market. Now the situation has turned
around, the ethnic Thaisespeciallywomen from the Northeast Region belong to the lower paid groups
while the ethnic Chinese belong to the higherpaid groups. This theory needs to be re-examined for its
application to the Thai situation at presentand in the future to actuallyrecord whether labour market is
split along ethnic lines. The tendency is to hire labour who immigratedinto Thailand illegally along
the borders. When the situation of migrant labours become wide spread, split labour market theory
may be used for analysis. But the ethnic groups involvedwill be different groups with the Chinese in
the top echelon.
1.4 Class Theory and Pluralist Theory
Although the class theoryof racial and ethnic relations cannot be applied to the situation of the
Chinese in Thailandit needs to be mentioned herebriefly. According to Banton(1983) the theory holds
that as European capitalism expanded into territories wherenatural resources were abundant, there were
advantages in securing a source of labour power which, being, distinctive could easily be kept in a .
servile state. Within this unequal relationship beliefs justifying the inequality were developed. These
have been built into the structure of capitalist societies, dividing white workers from black. Racial
categories exist in the social life of capitalist societies because they serve the interests of the ruling
classes and the contradictions in thesesocieties have not yet reachedthe point at which the true nature
of the social system is apparent to the workers.
Class struggle in Thailandand Southeast Asia has not becomea phenomenaand a more useful
concept is "plural society" which was used by the Jamaican social anthropologist, M.G. Smith.
According to Banton, Smith harkedback to the use by J.S. Furnivalof the expression "plural society"
to identify the sort of society observable in Southeast Asia where there was a medley of peoples--
European, Chinese, Indian and various native groups (Banton, 1983: 91). However, Thailand differs
from her neighboring countries in the minor role which European or expatriate community operates.
But, with the internationalization process taking place, expatriate community will become more
prominent. Banton further describes that some writers such as Kuper think it is possible to deduce a
Pluralist Theory as presupposing the Class Theory. It explains the nature of racial categorization in
societies in which the chief forms of alignmentand conflictderive from the relations of groups to the
means of production. Other writers such as M.G. Smith favour pluralism as offering an approach to
the analysis of racial and ethnic relations but make little or no use of class explanations. M.G. Smith
revitalized the conceptof plural society basedon his Jamaican experience where there was a continuous
gradation of complexion. Phenotype, genealogy, association and culture are all important variables
determining ones ethnic identity. This is madeespecialJy difficult with the high degreeof intermarriage
in the society.
1.5 Rational Choice Theory
The last group of theory to bediscussed here in relations to the Chinese in Thailand is Rational
Choice Theory whichaccording to Hechter is an alternative to normative explanationsand structural
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explanations. Rational choice considers individual behavior to be a function of the interaction of
structural constraints and the sovereign preferences of individuals. Within these constraints, individuals
face various feasible courses of action. The course of action ultimately chosen is selected rationally.
(Hechter, 1986: 268). Along the Same line, Banton sees rational choice theory as including the family
of theories in other fields such as exchange theory discussed by Levi-Strauss and others and
transactional theory discussed by Barth. Viewed-from the study of racial and ethnic relations Banton
states: " 1. Individuals utilize physical and cultural difference in order to create groups and categories
, by the processes of inclusion and exclusion. 2. Ethnic groups result from inclusive and racial
categories from exclusive processes. 3. When group interact, processes of change affect their
boundaries in ways determined by the form and intensity of competition; and, in particular, when
people compete as individuals this tends to dissolve the boundaries that define the groups, whereas
when they compete as groups this reinforces those boundaries. (Banton 1983: 104).
The question asked here is whether the Chinese in Thailand make rational choices individually
or as groups. Certainly when the Thai-Chinese relations was poor, the Chinese formed clan
associations and started to create groups through the process of inclusion and exclusion. But when the
Thai-Chinese relations improved decisions were not made as ethnic groups but as individuals, each
wanting to become involved in profit-making market economy. Rational choices are then made
individually.
As will be evident in the discussion to follow the Chinese have been able to cope with
structural constraints and deal with the situation for their own benefit. Competition and cooperation
can be seen in the development process whereby the Chinese cooperate with the Thai elites to compete
in the economic sphere among themselves and among others in the world market.
With these five groups of theory, the situation of the Chinese in Thailand will be examined.
2. Traditional and Changing Thai Ideology
The discussion of traditional and changing values and ideology is necessary for this paper even
though it is a subject not easily tackled due to lack of an agreed upon methodology and the ambiguity
of the definition itself. If one were systematically to set out to compare "values" with other related
concepts such as "world view" and "ideology" one faces considerable difficulty. While the three words
are different they are .interrelared; world view is the cognition and perception of the world surrounding a
person, while values is the evaluative aspectconcemed with judging situational elements in terms of
some value standard of the society, and "ideology" is the value standard of the society which has been
accepted at the superstructure level to be the guiding principle to be adopted and followed.
The book Traditional and Changing Thai World View published by CUSRI and SEASP (South
East Asia Study Program of the Institute of South East Asian Studies) identifies Buddhist beliefs and
traditions to be the basis for many of the Thai beliefs and practices (Pongsapich et alii, 1985). It
discussed the impact of doctrinal Buddhist teaching, on the one hand, and of popular Buddhist beliefs ~ .
and practices, on the other, on certain aspects of the Thai social order. manifestations of Thai world
view are seen in areas such as social hierarchy, merit and demerit, bun khun, etc. Analysis of a popular
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writer of the early Bangkok period, Sunthom Phu, also indicates Buddhist world view dominating
through out the writings. The Buddhistic world view revealed in Sunthorn Phu writings was the values
shared traditionally by the people of Thailand.
Other writings of more contemporary nature showed that contemporary world view and value
systems are reflecting in folk songs, games, movies, and short stories. Furthermore surveys carried out
by Suntaree Komin shows that while the more traditional values essential for maintaining the social
order are still stable, changes are occurring among the urban Thais. The man-to-man world view seems
to be one of harmonious co-existence. It is combined with the pragmatism of adaptability and
flexibility.
Traditionally Buddhism has been treated as national religion or ideology of Thailand. In the
.article "Civic Religion and National Community in Thailand", Frank Reynolds followed the
conception of "civil religion" which was coined by Jean Jacques Rousseau in the eighteenth century,
and brought to the fore by Robert Bellah when he analyzed civil religion in America.
'Reynolds states that in Thailand in the past, the established form of Thai civic religion has
proved to be a deeply rooted and highly resilient tradition that has both influenced and adapted to the
~ .
various crises in the life of the national community. Today the resources and vitality of this tradition
are being put to the test in a variety of ways. The nation's success in these areas will depend on the
dedication and creativity of those who are responsible for nurturing and adapting the symbols,
activities, and institutions that constitute the specifically religious dimension of Thai national life.
What is happening at the superstructural slate level, is to find another national ideology which
will function as factor unifying people in the country together. What is being observed is the role
which the national development plans introduced by the government has been presenting new
developmental ideologies, mostly capitalistic in nature. While the poor farmers still have difficulty
interpreting and accepting the new ideology, the upper and middle class people consisting of Chinese
descridants have been able to make adjustment reasonably well. The question being asked at this point
is how the new capitalistic development ideology are replacing the traditional Buddhist ideology still
adhered to by most villagers.
3. Thailand National Development Ideology and the Chinese
Thailand adopted export-oriented economy since the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 1855. The
national development plans initiated in 1961 further reinforced the adoption of capitalistic development
model of the West Past development strategies of Thailand indicated that the country has gone through
many development policies including (1) agricultural, (2) agro-industries, (3) import-substituted
industries, and (4) export industries. At the moment, Thailand is in the midst of all four policies. She
has been moving forward toward industrial development while a large majority of the rural sector has
yet to cope with the rapid changes; The group of people who have.been responding to these policies'
~ more readily are the Chinese and the Sino-Thai. The role of the Chinese in the economic development
process of Thailand may be examined through their role in the industrialization activities at the macro
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and micro levels. In this section, at the macro level, the role of the Chinese in rice exports will be
examined and at the micro level, their role in local industrial development will be discussed.
3.1 Export Policies: The Connection of the Thai and ChineseElites in Paddy
Commercialization and RiceExports
The introduction-of export activities after the Bowring Treaty in 1855 did not bring about
change in production technology. The Thais practiced broadcasting and transplanting as the two
methods of production up until after World War 11 when new varieties, double cropping, and
mechanization were introduced. Changes taken place after the Bowring Treaty and before World War 11
were the commercialization processes. Rice traders set up rice mills with simple machines, invested in
the rice trade, and were the first group of entrepreneurs who became millionaire. They composed
mostly of Chinese immigrants who were wage labourers or entrepreneurs and formed an entrepreneurial
class of Chinese traders. During this period Chinese merchants could enter the noble class of the Thai
social system by bidding to become tax-farmers. As tax-farmers they had ranks and titles similar to
noblemen who were ethnically Thai composed of Cao nai (members of the royal families) and/or
khunnang (government officials).
Before 1932 "rice trade capital" was.the investment of the rice merchants who accumulated,
expanded and became very influential traders. Activities of these merchants in addition. to rice trade
include investment in rice mills, saw mills, import-export trades. Rice exporters with multiple
economic activities are Chinese ancestors of many leading merchant families in Thailand. They are for
example Wangli, Lamsam, Bunkul, families. After 1932 Chinese merchants established trade
associations including the Rice Mills Association, Rice Traders Association, Chinese Traders
Association. A new rice traders group composing of Chinese immigrants came into the rice trade
sphere at this time. This group did not have the early connection with the nobles and princes but
established new relationship with civil government officials who came into power after 1932. A form
of patron-client relations have been established.
At any rate, when the civil government adopted "nationalistic capitalism" as the economic
policy, the intention was to do away withforeign investors and set up "Thai" government enterprises.
But in practice, group of Chinese merchants, i.e., those who immigrated earlier and became tax-farmers
. and nobles, and those who immigrated later and had no titles, established close connections with Thai
government officials. Joint investments were then considered "Thai" investment. Other activities
carried out by the rice merchant groups include the establishment of other government enterprises as
well as companies. They are for example the Thai Insurance Company, the Thai Agricultural Products
Company, Bank of Asia, and the Metropolitan Bank of Thailand.
After World War 11 a shift in economic policy was made by the 1947 coup d' etat leaders.
"Government Capitalism" was announced as the policy. But in practice, the investment activities did
not differ from the practice of the "nationalistic capitalism" very much, However, the "government
capitalism" policy enabled government officials to be. members of the Board of Trustees of 2
government enterprises each. As members of the Board they were entitled to monthly salaries as well
as annual bonuses. As a result, most of the high-ranking officials (both military and civilian) and the
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business investors are incorporated into thepolitico-economic system. Again,another form of patron-
client relations is seen. (Piriyarangsan, 1983).
In 1946when the Thai government paid the warclaim in the form of 1.5 million tons of paddy
to GreatBritain,the government issued orderprohibiting private company to exportpaddy. In effect all
rice export mustbemade through government enterprise called "Rice Organization", or "RiceOffice".
Ricequotapolicywasadopted until 1955 as a means which government couldcollectrevenue.
Thus, in exporting, rice farmers in Central Region were the majority rice producers in the
country. Rice millsestablished through out the Central provinces belonged to rice merchants who had
close connections with government officials, military and civilian, in Bangkok, There were Chinese
rice merchants who were locals and had their residents in the provincial or influential rice merchants
living in Bangkok but had their clienteles supplying paddy to them. This strong links between
Bangkokand the communities had helped madeCentral Region an extension of Bangkok. The patron-
client relations established through the process of exporting rice was the relations somewhat differ
from the former two-tiered "patron-client" relations. In the export business multi-level patron-client
relations wereestablished.
In addition, during this period, competition in rice trade as well as other economic activities
becamesevere.Coping strategies of Bangkok-based-merchants were seen in the form of establishing
links with the politically powerful groups. The competition process evolved and resulted into 2
factions of political powers with their complementary subsidiaries. The Rachakhru group who were
members of the Phibun Regime and the Sisao Thewet group who were members of the rising Sarit
Regime. To survive in this fierce competition and to maintain control of national economy, holding
companies and relatedfirms wereestablished. Monetary institutions in the forms of banks and finance
companies wereinstituted andexpanded (Bualek, 1985). The fact that the Ministryof Finance became
share holders of some banks certainly had helped strengthened the bank tremendously, both
economically and politically. In addition to functioning as export agents, the banks also had control
over the transfer of remittance to China. (Tantasurarurk, 1989).
Copingstrategies of Chinese rice merchants at the middlelevel wereseen in the establishment
and expansion of holding companies with branch offices in provinces in the Centralareas. In 1955 Sun
Heng Lee Holding Company set up 3 provincial offices in Nakhon Pathom, Ayutthaya, and
Phrakhanong (the suburb of Bangkok). Anothercoping strategy was to increase capital investment
withno change in structure or technological practice. This group of merchants had connections and
workwith localmerchants quiteclosely.
The national development plan introduced the construction of many infrastructural facilities
including damsand road which shouldgreatly benefited the farmers in the Central Plain.Exportpolicy
was also includedin the first national development plan. Somerice exporters diverted their activities
into exporting other products such as cassava, maize, jute, etc. Other rice export activities took the
form of Bangkok International Rice Tradewhich was joint investment of two Thai political elites and
one Chinese company, each holding approximately 1/3 of the total shares. Privileged were given to
this company to havemorequota, and to exportinferior quality paddy without beingpunished.
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During this period it was also reported that rice exportersended up having an upper hand vis-a-
vis the government. Rice Trade Union was establishedin 1959composedof paddy and steamed paddy
exporters. Request was also made to establish a rice subcommittee to look after rice trade with
members from rice inspectioncommittee, rice price, committee,and rice quota committee-. As a result,
rice trade had been mostly controlled by merchants with representatives from the Ministry of
Commerceperformingadvisoryroles.
In effect, rice trade activitiesduring thisperiod reached its peak. Rice exporters had been able to
control the market in the country and concentrated their effort in identifying international markets for
export. Simultaneously they expanded their activities to include export of other crops. Another group
of rice exporters shifted to banking and other type of non-agricultural investment. New economic
investmentwereexploredand shiftedto bankingand other type of non-agricultural investment.
It is undeniable that rice farmers in the Central Plain areas and elsewhere had been supporting
the Chinese merchants.
In 1968, the Ministry of Commerce put qualification on rice exporters. They had to be
companies registered with 5 millionBaht investment. Many Chinesefamilies then joined together and
established trading firm to export rice. These firmsconcentrated their activities in the rice trade as well
as export of other agricultural products. Almost all of the rice trading firms had their bases in
provinces in the Central areas. An example is a family in Chachoengsao who started from rice
middleman to set up a small rice mills and joined with another family to export rice. A new firm was
registered in 1973 with 5 million Bahtcapital as requiredby the Ministryof Commerce. Later in 1974
and 1978 two other firms were registered for the same purpose. In 1982the three firms were the group
with highest rice 'export values. The family in Chachoengsao then expanded their activities and
established another Agricultural Product Company exporting rice and other products. Now it has
capital registeredat 200 millionBaht.
3.2 Industrial Development Policies: the Roleof the Chinese at LocalLevel
Development strategiesprovided in the previoussectionindicate to the readers that Thailand has
gone throughexport-oriented development strategies sincebefore WorldWar 11. Even thoughthe actual
National Development Plan was first initiated in 1961, economic development strategies promoting
agro-industries, import-substituted industries, and export industrial development have been made.
Thailand has been moving forward toward industrial development while a large portion of the rural
sector still face problems of unemployment and poverty. The questions to ask are how have the Thai
peopleacceptthe differentpoliciesand whathavebeen the lessonslearned.
Review of literatureindicatesthat in case of Thailandthe inter-relationship between the political
and economic sphere had been very close. Superficial examination of situation before World War 11
may give a picture of the political sphere being dominated by the royal Thai elites and economic
spheredominated by the Chineseentrepreneurial class. However analysispresented earlierhere provides
evidence of close relationshipbetween the ruling elite of the 1932 coup d'etat and the Chinese of both
first and secondgeneration immigrants.
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Following Gramsci, Chai-Anan described the state with the governmentas a concrete structure
as an institution which serves the ruling class but presents itself as if it is serving the people of the
nation. In effect, class distinction becameblurredand the state appears to beoperating for the people.
The State becamea sacred symbol createdby and with the integration of certain ideology and political
legitimization process. He felt that capitalist ideology together with some political factors had been
able to formalliance between the differentclassesof people(Chai-Anan, 1987).
It is undeniable from earlier discussion that capitalist ideologyin one form or ariother had been
used by the government as the development conceptfor the country.
"Nationalistcapitalism" ideology adoptedby the government during 1945-1960encouraged the
establishment of governmentand private enterprises. During this period, rice mills, sugar mills, saw
mills, and liquor factories predominated. In 1946, the Ministry of Industry took over the operation of
all sugar mills. In spite of all the assistance given by the government, the government-operated sugar
factories produced less sugar in 1950 than did the small private factories with their crude equipment
operatedby the Chinese.
, Because of close proximity and access to transport routes about half of government operated
industries and enterprises are located in the Central Region. Distilleries located in many provinces in
the country were operated by Chinese immigrants whose skills in the trade were indispensable. Thus
even though the governmentcontrol the enterprises, but in fact the operationsremained in the hands of
local Chinese operators.
Another incidence taken place in 1950 which became important is the fact that ruling elites
wereable to utilize their connections and accessibility to information to their benefit. The then Deputy
Prime Minister and Ministerof Interior established an Economic PromotionCompany when the World
Bank provided 10 million US dollars through Bank of America in Bangkok as aids to promote
economicactivitiesof privateenterprises in Thailand. The two elites wereable to use their influence to
have the newly establishedcompanyborrowedthe money with government guarantee. The funds were
used to set up Suphanburi Sugar Mill, Saraburi Marble, Bangphra Paper Mill, Chonburi Sugar Mill,
and the Northeast Gunny Sack Factory (SangsitPiriyarangsan, 1982). One needs to mention here that
the operators of these factories wereChineseand/orSino-Thais.
Becauseof government policy to controleconomic activitiesin the country, many entrepreneurs
and economic elites invited political elites to be on the Board of Directors and established close ties
between them. This practice became very much evidentand may be viewed as a form of government
intervention. But in fact, benefits from economicactivities were given to the political elites and may
also be viewedas "protection" money.
The Investment Promotion Act constituted in 1960 brought about many multi-national
investment schemes in the country. Joint-ventures between Sino-Thai and the Japanese or the
Americanfirms have been recordedand almostall of themare locatedin the CentralRegion. To obtain
government support, government employees both at the local and national levels were used as contact
points to promote investment. Trade'associations and other so-called non-profit organizations were
formed to helpestablishnetworks amongmerchants and between merchants and governmentofficers.
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At the local level. what has actually happened is the shift and change of social values.
Traditionally. a respectful person was a patron who performed the protective role for his client. He
appearedto be passiveand received income in the forms of goodsand serviceswithout havingto do the
actual work. His status was maintained because of his merit and his good deeds. One needed not be
greedy and wanted more than what one received. Buddhist ideology predominated in everyday life.When
mode of productionchanged. it was not sufficient to maintain the status quo. In the capitalistic mode
of production. there are possibilities for investments. especially wheri connections with government
personnel opensup investment channels which enables thosewithconnection to advanceforward ahead
of other ordinarypeople.To advanceforward economically and socially. one now has to invest to earn
more. A successfulperson now accumulates wealth through investment. takingopportunities to utilize
the available resources to the best of ones ability.
One way to accumulate wealth is through land ownership. Local merchants and government
officers as well as Bangkok people became land speculators. intentionally or unintentionally. Sub
districtheadmen and villageheadmen learnedto follow the practice of local merchants and government
officers and took the opportunity to buy up land from fellow villagers when they hear of future
construction projects or of new highway to be built. ManyChinesedescendants are now involved in
local politics. They establish themselves as chao pho, very influential mafia type leaders and are
powerfulboth economically and politically.
C. Szanton observed in 1974 that at local level the Chinesedescendants have adopted a Sino-
Thai mode of operation which still preservedmany features of their Chineseness, and which allowed
. them to operate well inthe urban middleclass settings where they were in large number. At the same
time. there were recurring rifts betweensegments of this middle class. mostly between Sino-Thai. as
well as between Thai and Sino-Thai within the petty bourgeoisie segment. Although Christina
Szanton indicated signs of intra-ethnic differentiation at the town level. she also stated that the Sino-
Thai certainly becamenew middle bourgeoisie which may leadto ethnic stratification.
Analysis and Synthesis
Even though in reviewing some of the ethnic relations theories and the analysis of the Thai-
Chinese relations the message not to adopt the' assimilation process of the Chinese into the Thai
society too readily was followed. the warning was not to denythat assimilation has indeed taken place
among the Chinese in Thailand. However. by not readily accepting assimilation as a given outcome. it
is useful to examine how assimilation took place or not in the light of other theories.
Certainly assimilation took place in the same process while many Chinese functioned as
middleman minority. Factors leading to assimilation include migration. Thai education. Thai
occupation and inter-marriage (Pongsapich, 1976). It is an undeniable fact that beforeand after World
War Il, the Chinese still sent back money to their families (Tantasurarurk, 1991). As is being reported
in the book titled "TwoHundred Yearsof the ChineseunderRoyal Patronage" published to celebrate
the Bicentennial of Bangkok. many elite families not only sent money to the families. but to help
built schools and support other community functions in their home towns (Economic Outlook. 1987).
Furthermore. while they were many Chinese men.who left their first wives at home. the families in
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Thailand either with Thai or Chinese wives are much more important to them. The role of Chinese
middleman was important but that was not their only function. As is evident from the earlier
discussion of this paper, the role of the Chinese in other economic sphere was much more important
to the Thai economy as well as to the Chinese merchants themselves. This is true at both the national
macro level as well as at the local level where Chinese merchants in provincial towns played very
important role in the industrialization process of the earlier times. Chinese as sojourners existed but
did not predominate the total population. Hostility with the host country if existed were also minor
hostile feelings which did not result in any mass antagonistic movement. Thus, although the author
does not deny the usefulness of the middleman minority theory, she feels that the theory cannot be
applied to overall situation of the Chinese in Thailand.
If one were to move further to view the role of the Chinese in industrial development in terms
of dual labour market and split labour market theories, one see the reverse of the situation. Instead of
the Chinese being ethnic minority being exploited by the Thai host country, the Chinese were the
ones controlling the management of the labour market in the primary or core industries of the formal
sector. Those in the informal sector are not ethnic Chinese minorities but are the Thai themselves.
.Since split labour market theory views that ethnic antagonism expresses class conflict between the
higher and lower paid groups within the labour force and the origin of ethnic antagonism is the
development of capitalism, it is possible to view the situation in reverse direction. Now the Chinese
and Sino-Thai are being blamed for controlling the higher paid labour and exploiting the lower labourer
group. However, labour disputes in Thailand have not been demonstrated to be along ethnic differences.
As Thailand will become industrialized more and more, the tendency for migrants from neighboring to .
move in and occupy the low pay labour strata is high. When that time comes, split labour market
theory will help explain the process of labour exploitation along ethnic lines.
The issue in Thailand at present is the national economic development policy which favours the
Sino-Thai population over the poor rural Thai. The Chinese or Sino-Thai have been able to fulfill the
demand for industrial development proposed by the government. "Nationalistic capitalism was designed
•for the Thai but the Chinese have come in and offer their services to make the policy operational. In
that process, the Chinese made rational choices and made themselves indispensable for the Thais. Since
historical time, Skinner made the following comments:
"The Chinese were simply too useful to the Thai ruling class to be kindred, while at the same
time the rulers perceived nothing to fear. Confident in the vitality and invulnerability of their own
civilization, the Thai elite did not hesitate to use the Chinese even though they knew the Chinese
thought they were using the Thai (Skinner, 1973:406).
And, with the introduction of the national development plans where capitalistic development
policy was adopted, the local Thai were not able to cope with this new policy or ideology and turned to
work with the Chinese. They were and many still are adhering to the Buddhist values and world view
which believe that one should not work for ones own benefit entirely, and accumulation of wealth
should not be practiced overtly. Study on coping strategies of people in the Central region of Thailand
indicates clearly that when state policies were disseminated at the local levels, those who could not
accept the new capitalistic ideology rejected the policy and either moved further into the forest areas to
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continue their subsistence way of life or remained poor and helpless. The Chinese or Sino-Thai
generally accepted the new ideology and responded readily to the policies such as cultivationof cash
crop, touristand rural industries, new "captured" fishery industry such as deep sea fishingor "cultured"
fishery usingtechnology and modern management techniques, etc. (CUSRI, 1991).
It is undeniable that the Chinesehavesocialvalues which are morecompatible with capitalistic
values. The rational choice theory seems to help explain the behavior of the Chinese in different
context quite well. Although the theory may be criticized as "loose" and not very concrete, it is a
useful theory in this case.
The questions remainedto be asked is whetherthe moreadvantageous status and role of Sino-
Thai at present will create antagonistic feelings amongthe Thai and cause class differentiation as well
as ethnic differentiation to become more distinct. If such is the case, then class and plural society
model will have to be re-examined in detail. This point will have to be juxtaposed with the
assimilation/acculturation model,
Perhaps the pattern differ between the elite class and the middle class. Among the elitist group,
industrialization and internationalization or globalization taking place all over the world pushes the
Chinese investors into the global sphere. Their investment activities become multi-national and their
Chinessness becomemore useful. The Chineseconnections could be maintained or newly established
for the sake of businessbenefits. In away, this groupof Sino-Thai stop their assimilation process and
maintain their Chinese identity together with the Sino-Thai identity. The shift in the globalization
process makes the assimilation model less useful than in the past. Now they make rational choices to
identify their ethnicidentity accordingly.
The middleclass group,on the other hand,consistmostly of secondor third generation Chinese
who have moved up the social strata and constituted a large majority of the middle strata of the Thai
social structure. The question whetherthis is a threatening phenomenon or not remainsdoubtful.Two
possibilities are envisioned here. The first possibility is that assimilation will continue and be
completed where the term Chinese or Sino-Thai will become meaningless. The second possibility is
for the group to becomemore conscious of theirChineseness and prefer to maintain the dual identity..
This process is likely to happen for the same reason which the elitist group prefers to maintain their
Chineseness for future connections. One other factor which will help strengthening this possibility is
the ethnic situation in Thailand where there are other ethnic minorities. The degree to which the
Chinese have become assimilated into the Thai social structureis phenomenal or even exceptional. It
is not possible for other ethnic minorities to assimilate into the Thai society to the same degree.
Thereforemaintaining ethnic identity will be the trend followed by most ethnic minority groups. The
Chinese descendants will then follow other groups and maintain their ethnic identity while living in
Thailand and having Thai citizenship. When this pattern takes place, Thailand will become a plural
societywithdifferentgradation of ethnicidentity depending on the degreeof assimilation takingplace.
The Chinese will be the group assimilated to the Thai society the most while the MuslimMalays will
be the group least assimilated. At the macrosocietallevel, culturalpluralism is the trend for the future
of Thailand. But at the intra-ethnic relations levels, the Chinese will assimilate and maintain their
cultural identity if and whenappropriate.
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Conclusion
From the analysis and synthesis made in the earlier section, the author proposes that the status
of the Chinese in Thailand is no longer of ethnic minority but may take the form of assimilation cum
pluralization with the Chinese adopting and making rational choice of their status and role. Those who
have assimilated became Thai or Sino-Thai. But there is a tendency for a group of Chinese to prefer to
have dual ethnic identity. Incidence of multiple ethnic identification have been recorded for hill
minority groups in Thailand by Moerman (1965) and Keyes (1979, 1982) depending on the
environment which individuals are in a particular moment. Chinese businessmen therefore can make
rational choice and identify themselves as Chinese when involved in multi-national enterprises and as
Thai when working in Thailand. This dual identification is useful both among the elite investors as
well as middle class entrepreneurs or higher-paid industrial employees working in multinational
enterprises. If the middle class Sino-Thai maintain their Chinese ethnic identity, class differentiation
and ethnic differentiation will certainly be an outcome. However, this outcome need not be destructive
and create serious conflict between ethnic groups. The government is recognizing the important role
the Chinese played in the national development process of Thailand and will not allow ethnic conflict
between Thai and Chinese to hinder or slow down the development process. The middle class are
predominantly Sino-Thai and will not create the conflict because they have economic advantage over
other groups. The poor rural ethnic Thai on the other hand, are too busy earning their living to make
an issue out of the relationship.
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From Rags to Riches: Discussing Achievements of
Some Chinese Families in Thailand
Jean Baffle
As an urban sociologist I could not ignore Chinese entrepreneurs who transform Bangkok and
other towns in Thailand. So for about 15 years I have collected all the pieces of information available,.
especially on the most powerful Chinese families of this country. Then, less than two years ago a
friend working with a printing house asked me to try to prepare a number of Chinese family histories
to bepublished as a book.
There is not such a book in any westem language at the moment. A few American and Japanese
scholars have studied some of these Chinese families and have published articles and books, but they
either used only English sources or gave only the data necessary to sustain some theoretical
construction.
In the English language very few biographies of Chinese entrepreneurs and family histories are
available. The monthly Who's Who in Thailand is quite useful for basic information, but it was only
published between 1973 and 1982. Other kinds of Who's Who published in single volumes from time
to time are just collections of short biographical notices. A remarkable exception is the publication of
Kiarti Srfuengfung: The Boy who came from Suphanburi in 1991 by Mr. Kiarti's daughter. Also, Mr.
Thawom Phomprapha had some bilingual (Thai-English) books published in 1991 to commemorate
his "75 years of Achievements", but they have been distributed only to his friends and some business
relations.
In Thai, of course, sources are more abundant. Biographies and autobiographies even seem to
have become fashionable among prominent personalities; similarly towers, real estate or golf projects
have received their owner's surname or name or both (U Chu Liang building that used to house The
Bangkok Post is an old example). Phraya Phiromphakdi's autobiography, now published by The
Teachers' Council (Khurusapha) is a classical one, even if it is more a diary than a biography. More
recent biographies include two of Mi. Thiam Chokwathana (one by Matichon in 1989, the other by
The Manager in 1990) and one of Mr. Songsak Aolan in 1990. In 1987, a high-ranking civil servant
with many business connections, Mr. Kasem Chatikawanit published an autobiography "Super K."
Biographical books generally well illustrated are distributed to friends for an important
anniversary. For example, Mr. Thawom Phomprapha published a very informative book in 1976 for
his 60th anniversary, and in 1989 Mr. Chan and Mali Itsara commemorated, at the same time, their
sixth cycle and Golden Wedding with the publication of a sumptuous book.
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Generally, you have to wait until a businessman dies to read his official biography. Since the
custom to distribute cremation books started at the beginning of this century the quantity of
information published has been fabulous (many Chinese are buried instead, but still distribute
commemorative books during funeral ceremonies). For example, probably more than 20 cremation
volumes of members of the Kannasut family have already been published, enough to try to write a
fairly complete history of this famous family.
Some families, such as the Kanchanapas or the Chiaravanon, are quite new in Thailand and you
will not find any cremation books of their members. Besides, some cremation books have been written
partly or almost entirely in Chinese and, due to my present level of knowledge of the Chinese
language, I could not read them. For instance the book distributed in July 1976 "In Memory of Mr. U
Chuliang" was in 3 languages (Thai, English and Chinese), but Chinese was largely dominant. In fact,
most prominent businessmen and founders of wealthy Chinese families are still alive. However, many
are now very old and some have already passed away these last few years. After Mr. Chin
Sophonpanich, who used to be regarded as the richest man in Thailand, died in 1988 and Mr. Thiam
Chokwathana in 1991, the two most luxurious cremation books ever published in Thailand were
distributed.
Autobiographies and cremation books are generally uncritical and often incomplete. For
example, Mr. Srifuengfung's biography in English fails to mention that, while working as a banker in
China, he married his boss' daughter, an event with many important consequences for his future.
Many collected biographies or biographical notices have been published during the last ten years
often as special publications by business periodical staffs (Prachachat Thurakit, Krungthep Thurakit,
Matuphum Thurakit, Senthang Setthakit, Phuchatkan, etc. ). On the other hand, monthly and weekly
business magazines and newspapers, such as Style, People, GM, Young Executives, Thurakit Phunam
and Phuchatkan, are among the most valuable sources of information.
Sometimes very precious, but uneasy to categorize, publications appear, such as the genealogy
of the Lamsam family (in 1967) or the Diary "bukkhon wanni" (people today) for 1988 that contained
366 biographical notices of high-ranking civil servants, politicians and businessmen.
Only a small part of these sources has been used in this paper since its only ambition is to
present a few families as examples. I will use these cases (and a few others I have presented in other
publications) to try to answer some questions: how did they start in business? How did they set up
their first big company? How do successions take place after the founder's death? To whom did they
turn to ask for help when major difficulties arose? This last question poses the particular the problem
of the types of solidarity (ethnic group, regional, school or university class) and the relations to
national politics.
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1. Some Important Families
1.1 The Lamsam Family
The Lamsam family is often considered to be one of the most Thai among Chinese families in
Thailand. It is now a very large family and some branchesmay have remained more Chinese than other
ones. For example, the cremation book published in the honour of Mr. Wu Tung Pak Lamsam, who
passed away in 1961,contained 131pages written in Chineseagainst only 51 pages in Thai (there was
also a 14 page English section.) Mr. Wu Tung Pak had been a prominent member of the Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, a benefactorof the Hakkas Associationof Thailand and even a director of the
Chinese Overseas Commissionof Taiwan.
The founder of the Lamsam family was Mr. Ung Miao Ngian, a Chinese Hakka who settled
down in Thailand at the time of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). Mr. Ung Lamsam, as he was also
known, worked in the lumber industry. He set up a company of which the trade mark was "Kwang
Ngan Long." He had two wives and six children(four sons and two daughters).
The family's most successful branch has been the one founded by the second son of the first
wife, Mr. Ung Yuk Long Lamsam (ab. 188Q..1939). Like most of the Lamsam family members at that
time, M. Ung Yuk Long had forestry and saw-milling businesses in Northern Thailand. At the
beginning of this century, this part of Thailand was largely influencedby England and from that period
the Lamsam family developed close relationship with some English companies in Thailand. Mr. Ung
Yuk Long's sons were sent to Hong Kong then to England for their education.
Mr. Ung Yuk Long had three wives (at the same time) and 12 children (six sons and six
daughters). The second wife, Mrs. ThongyuWanglee (1884-1966),daughter of Mr. Tan Su Huang, the
founder of the well-known Wanglee family, gave him the three sons who made the family famous in
the banking business. Since two children of Mrs. Thongyu married within the Wanglee family, the
bonds between the two familiesare very strong.
The Wanglee are a taechiw familyof the Tan clan name. When they came to Thailand in about
1850 they were already well-to-do because of their large properties in Southern China. They first
started businesses in rice-milling and rice-exporting. As early as 1933, they founded a bank (today the
Nakhon Thon Bank), which is the least developedof the 16 Thai banks.
In 1945 Mr. Ung Yuk Long's sons founded the Thai Farmers Bank, which is the second bank of
the country (after the Bangkok Bank). Mr. Chote managed the bank for three years until his death in
1948. It was then headed by his younger brother, Mr. Kasem Lamsam, until his death in 1963 in an
airplane accident. Since 1963, the bank has been headedby Mr. Chot's older son, Mr. Bancha Lamsam,
who is 69 years old this year. In 1987, the Thai Farmers Bank's network included 295 domestic
branches and 4 overseas offices, and employed 11,364people. A revenue of 12 billion baht gave it the
rank of the 9th company in Thailand. The Lamsam family has also businesses in the manufacturing
(cannedpineapples), insurance, real estate, dairy, and importsectors.
Mr. Bancha married M.R. Sam-angwan Thewakul,a memberof the Thai royal family, and gave
his brother-in-law, M.R. Pridiyathorn Thewakul, an important position in the top management team.
Another well-known figure from the Lamsam family is Khunying Chatchani Chatikawanit, Mr.
283
Bancha's younger sister. She married Mr. Kasem Chatikawanich, of Chinese Hokkien ancestry, who
was Minister of Industry in 1977, president of Thai Airways and president of the Krung Thai Bank,
among many other positions.
Apart from the Wanglee, Thewakul, and Chatikawanich, children of the Lamsam family have
married into other well-known business or high-ranking civil servant families (at ministerial level):
Sibunruang, Tanthasetthi, Chantrakul, Chutrakul, Amatayakul, Ungphakon, Sirisamphan, Na
Lamphun, and Na Pomphet.
1.2 The Nandhabiwat Family
Mr. Yai Nandhabiwat (or Li Hua Heng) was born in September 1899 in Bangkok's Chinatown
from Mr. Li Thai Hua and Mrs. Sin (possibly a Thai woman). The family was probably well off
already because Mr. Yai went to Suan Kularb College, where study the children of the nobility and rich
businessmen studied. His education completed, Mr. Yai Nandhabiwat started working in rice-milling,
rice-trading and mining, which were family businesses.
In 1948, a group of rich Chinese traders and industrialists (particularly rice traders and Southern
tin miners) joined with some Thai-Chinese politicians (Luang Thamrong Nawasawat) to establish the
Laem Thong Bank. M. Yai Nandhabiwat, the most presentable of. these businessmen was named
director of the bank and kept the position until his death in 1954, when he was only 55 year old.
A very active man, Mr. Yai had cardiac problems very early. It seems that heart attacks were a
traditional risk in the Nandhabiwat family. In his cremation book, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, a future party
leader and prime minister, who may already have been a friend of the family or a partner in business,
has written a 58 page article on "Commercial Banks."
I
Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat, the first of Mr. Yai's seven sons'!was born in 1920. He studied first
at St.Peter's School in Siphraya, then at Suan Kularb (it was now a family tradition, the place to meet
people who would be important in the future) before going to Thammasat University's Faculty of
Accounting. He had to leave Thammasat in 1939 when his father opened a branch in Nakhon Si
Thammarat to exploit mines in Sichon district. He was 19 years old and was put in charge of the
office.
In 1943, during the war, he married Miss Lek Hongsawat, Praniprachachon's daughter. The
marriage was presided over by Mr. Khuang Aphaiwong, who would be several times Prime Minister
after the war. '
Mr. Phaisan joined the Laem Thong Bank 'when it was founded by his father in 1948. After Mr.
Yai Nandhabiwat's death in 1954, Mr. Phaisan was designated to head the bank, a function he kept till
his own death in 1975.
The Laem Thong Bank opened in Charoen Krung Road. (in a building located in front of the
Central Post Office) in December 1948. With a capital of 12 million baht, it figured among the "big
banks" of that time. On the board of directors were seated Gen. Sarit Thanarat (Prime Minister from
1958 to 1963), Lieut.-Gen. Chai Prathipasen, Gen. Mangkon Phromyothi and phraya Prichanusat. As
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late as 1975, the president of the board was Police Maj.-Gen. Torsakdi Yomnak. The Nandhabiwat
family then held about 50% of the capital, while the Ministry of Finance had 10%.
In December 1978, other prominent personalities could be found in the 11 member board of
directors: Mr. Piya Bhirombhakdi, from Boon Rod brewery; Khunying Lursakdi Sampatisiri, from the
Nai Lert group of companies; and Mr. Nukul Prachuabmoh, from the Ministry of Finance (Mr. Nukul
later became governor of the Bank of Thailand and minister of Communications).
Laem Thong Bank developed very slowly and is now considered as one of the small Thai banks.
It opened its first branch only in 1959, the second one in 1972, then a third one in 1978. The first
provincial branch opened in Phuket a few years ago.
Mr. Phaisan was busy with numerous other positions: with the Foremost Dairy company,
Dusit Thani Hotel, Sangkasi Thai, G.S. Steel, Sahathanakit Thai, Crown Frost, Thai Tomato and D.
W. Utsahakam companies.
Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat was also interested in politics. He was a member of the Constituent
Assembly named by His Majesty the King at the end of 1973 and joined the Social Action Party the
following year, when it was founded by M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, a former banker, member of the Royal
Family and long time friend of the Nandhabiwat family.
Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat had only two sons and a daughter. Both sons received B.A.s from
American universities. The older one, Mr. Phiwat, was considered the heir and started working for
Laem Thong Bank.
Mr. Phaisan, a member of SHorn Club and Siam Country Club, played tennis and golf which
is the. banker sport. He had a heart attack during a golf contest in Pattaya in November 1975 and passed
away. In his cremation book M.R. Kukrit Pramoj published a 186 page historical novel.
The new head of Laem Thong Bank was not Mr. Phiwat Nandhabiwat but Mr. Somboon, Mr.
Phaisan's brother. Born in 1922, also educated at Suan Kularb College, then at Chulalongkorn
University, where he obtained a B.A. in Mining, Mr. Somboon had been with the bank since its
foundation in 1948. Mr. Phiwat, Mr. Phaisan's son passed away a few years later, also during a heart
attack.
Familial rivalries .and disputes then developed. Mrs. Lek, Mr. Phaisan's widow, always
considered as a stranger by members of the Nandhabiwat family, had, according to one version, too
much influence in the bank's affairs. In April 1984, Mr. Sura Chansrichawla, a Sikh real estate tycoon
who had been Mr. Phiwat's client and friend, took advantage of the family, row and bought 10% of
Laem Thong Bank. By the end of the following year he controlled 43% or 46% of the shares. Other
bankers tried to stop the take-over by Mr. Sura; who was supported by an Indonesian group. A
mediation by Mr. Chatri Sophonpanich of Bangkok Bank failed to have durable effects. Then, in
August 1986, the Union Bank of Bangkok asked Mr. Sura for 1.2 billion baht in debts.
In the end, Mr. Sura, not a Chinese himself but close enough to Mr. Boonchu Rojanasathien,
former strongman of the Bangkok Bank, a politician (formerly with the Social Action Party) and
former vice-Prime Minister, succeeded in taking over Laem Thong Bank.
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1.3 The PhornpraphaFamily
Mr. Thaworn Phornprapha or Tang Kiang is from the Tang (Chen, Tan) clan, probably the
most successful clan in Thailand (see the Sophonpanich, Sombatsiri, Phanomyong, Chan Sue,
Wangli, Rattakul, Darakanon, Tanthasetthi, and so on). Mr. Thaworn was certainly not a very poor
man at birth, but he managedto becomea multi-millionaire within 10 or 20 years.
Born in China in 1916,Thaworn was the third of eight children of M. Tang Tai Long, a scrap
merchant from Canton, who emigratedto Thailandand opened a shop house in Chinatown. At 10 the
young Thaworn had to help his parents at the shop and little time was left for a formal education.
Some biographers write that he used to attenda Chineseschool (Sun Sai) at night, then another school
in SuriwongseRoad. However, if he could not go to school more often, it was also because his father
took him along during his many business trips by boat to China.
Thaworn was far moreambitious than his father. At 15he wasci1ready an experienceddealer in
used articles, that he managed to resellat profits. He was well known by businessmen in Bangkok and
some provinces. When he reached20, in 1936,he went to Japan on a pleasurejourney and met several
Thai students in Tokyo, such as Mr. SommaiHoontrakul, who was Finance Ministera few years ago.
ThawornPhornprapha started very early to do business abroad, in Japan and Singapore. As he
could understand, read and writeChinesevery well, he wasalreadyan international figure. He was also
fluent in Thai and lateron couldeven talk in court language.
Then, in the 50's he succeededin being appointedby Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. as the first agent
for Datsun cars, trucks and pickups outside Japan and agent for Yamaha motorcycles and musical
instruments in Thailand. Besides, these were only the first of his associations with Japanese
businessmen. When it was no longer possible to import Datsun cars into Thailand, "Siam Motors,"
Mr. Thaworn's Company, startedproducing them in the country. In 1991,more than 300,000 vehicles
wereassembled in his factory.
Mr. Thaworn's business empire stretches to many fields: finance, insurance, housing estates
(muuban chatsan - Samrong), hotels, and so on. It includes over 60 companies.
Mr. Thawornalways tried to havevery good relations with high-ranking officials. The name of
his new company, Siam Motors; was given by M.L. Yuang Isarasena. During the sixties he was a
memberof the Ruam Mit Club, wherebusinessmen and government officials met and whose chairman
was Police Gen. Prasert Ruchirawong, a very influential man at that time. Anothergeneral, Gen. Kris
Sivara, the strongman of the Thai army from 1973 to 1976, agreed to be chairman of the "Siam
Country Club," an international golf course built by Mr. Thaworn. Being particularly generous when
contributing to charitable organizations, Mr. Thaworn seems to be close to the royal family. Siam
Motorshas receivedpermission to placethe Garudaemblem above thecompany's name.
Mr..Thawom is a director of Bangkok Bank(controlled by the Sophonpanich family,also from
the Tang clan). He is counselor to the Thai-Japanese Association, but also a member of many other
societies and foundations. As the young Thaworn wasa central figure in the Xiang-Kong neighborhood
of Chinatown, Mr. Thaworn occupies a similar position in Pathumwan where stands the main
286
buildings of Siam Motors Co. He is, for instance, counselor or committee member of various near-by
institutions (eg.Pathumwan Technical College and Sri Nakharinwirot University).
Mr. Thaworn Phornprapha celebrated his 75th anniversary in November 1991. He has married
four times, the last time with a Japanese woman, and has 13 children. According to the business
monthly Puchatkan (November 1986) there were 61 members in the Phornprapha family at that time.
One of his mottoes is: "Good children and grand-children are treasures of the family. Good employees
are treasures of the company. Good citizens aretreasures of the nation."
.1.4The ChokwatanaFamily
The legend tells us that Mr. Li Hok Piao was a poor peasant from a Tae Chiw district in
Canton province. He emigrated to Thailand at the beginning of this century and settled down in
Bangkok where he did several jobs for a living, such as ice-cream peddler. Then he rented a shop house
in Chinatown (Sampheng) and organized a Phoy Kwan network that permits Chinese in Thailand to
send money back to their families in China outside the banking system. Mr. Li could get as much as
30 boot a month (equivalent to about 9,000 boot today). To start a Phoy Kwan system, however, M.
Li had to be able 10 read and write Chinese and have good social connections both in Thailand and
China. He may not have been the miserable peasant that we are told about.
Mr. Li Hok Piao was also a lucky man. He won 1,300 baht in the official lottery, a large sum
equivalent to about 400,000 boot nowadays. As he did not want to renounce his job with the Phoy
Kwan network, Mr. Li gave the money 10 his six younger brothers - then in Thailand - who opened in
Chinatown a wholesale trade shop selling rice, sugar, flour, milk, etc.
Mr. Li had two Chinese wives, one in China, the other one in Thailand, both of them gave him
four children. Six of these children settled down in Thailand. Heng Thiam, the oldest son, by Mr. Li's
Thai Chinese wife was born in 1917. Heng Thiam got a short but good and very useful formal
education in two of the best Chinese schools of Bangkok. He had two friends there, Mr. Chalerm
Yongbunkoet, who was later to head a department in the Bank of Thailand, and Mr. Prasit
Kanchanawat, who became the lawyer of the Chinese, president of the Bangkok Bank (in 1984) and a
well-known politician (he was chairman. of the National Assembly, minister of Economics,
Commerce, Justice, then vice-Prime Minister).
When he was 15 years old, however, the young Heng Thiam (or just Thiam) had to help in the
family business. His uncle being the official owner of the shop, Thiam had 10 work more or less like a
coolie while his cousins could attend university. But Thiam was learning to be a good trader, and,
being probably more clever than the other family members, he was soon in charge of the whole
business.
Mr. Thiam worked in that place for about 10 years. However, there was not enough room for
the seven brothers and their families (more than 40 families in all). They quarreled quite frequently and
finally separated. Two of the brothers kept the trade shop, while the others opened other businesses
elsewhere. Except the one opened by Thiam and his father, they all went bankrupt very soon.
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Mr. Thiam's business in Yaowarat was brisk and he opened a second shop only six months after
the first one. During the Second World War, Mr. Thiarn, who took at that time the Thai family name
of Chokwathana, worked closely with large Japanese groups such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, very
powerful when Japanese troops were occupying Thailand. After the war, his best Japanese friend, Mr.
Okara, served as a useful bond with Japanese firms. From 1952, Mr. Okara was the manager of a
company that Mr. Thiam founded in Osaka to export Japanese goods toThailand.
Even before that, as early as 1946, Mr. Thiam had sent his brother to Hong Kong to found a
company specializing in exporting Chinese goods to Thailand. This brother later became a Hong Kong
citizen.
In 1953, Mr. Thiam Chokwathana changed the Chinese name of his company to Saha
PathanapibuI.
As early as 1933, when he was only 16 years old, Mr. Thiam married Miss Siwkhim Sae Tang
(or Saiphin Darakananda), the daughter of a goldsmith in the Pratunam area. She gave him eight
children, six of them being sons.
In 1953, for its first year, the Saha Pathanapibul knew true difficulties, after the baht was
devalued (the Hong Kong doUar was worth 4.15 baht instead of 2.75 baht before the devaluation). The
Thai government agreed to keep the old rate of exchange for imported goods considered indispensable.
Those imported by Saha Pathanapibul (clothes, plastic goods, canned food, electric iron, etc.) were not
"of first necessity." With the help of his friend in the Bank of Thailand, Mr. Chalerm Yongbunkoet,
and with sound advice by Mr. Chin Sophonpanich of the Bangkok Bank, a member of the Tang clan,
like Mr. Thiam's wife and brother-in-law, Mr. Damri Darakanon, who worked for Saha Pathanapibul,
he managed to survive the crisis.
From 1962, the group concentrated on setting up companies to manufacture consumer products
such as toilet soap, shampoo, detergent, lady's underwear and clothes, cosmetics, sport shoes, instant
food, and even mayonnaise. In 1974, Saha Marine Products Co. set up shrimp farms to supply both
domestic and overseas markets. Goods are now exported to Asian countries, Europe, the United States,
and even to South Africa. The group was so successful that it includes 175 companies today, A
holding company was established in 1972.
When Mr. Thiam Chokwathana passed away in June 1991, he was 76 years old.
1.5 The Chirathivat Family
The Chirathivat family belongs to the minority group among Thai Chinese that has its roots in
the island of Hainan. However, they are members of the Tae/Choeng clan, which is one of the most
powerful in Thailand. King Taksin (Choeng Chao) was a member of this clan that includes today the
Techapaibul, Srifuengfung and Chonwichan families.
The founder of the Chirathiwat family was Mr. Choeng Ni Tiang (or Tae Sim Peng in
Taechiw) who was born in 1900. A source tells us that he may have worked in the lumber business
. .
when he first arrived in Thailand before the Second World War. He went back to China to complete his
education and settled down definitively in Thailand only when he was 21 years old. He worked two
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years in his father-in-Iaw's rice-shop in Tha Chang Wang Na (Bangkok), and with some 300 boot
given by his father-in-law, a rice-miller, he opened a small grocery and coffee-house in Thonburi. Later
. he bought a little boat from which to sell goods along the canals.
"As he liked to read English books and magazines, and look at beautiful things from abroad," he
opened, in 1947, a new shop named Central on New Road near Soi Captain Bush (or on Si Phraya)
where he sold imported publications and other goods.
Business increased quickly. In 1951 it had to be relocated further along New Road near
Suriwongse Road. A few years later the place was no longer adequate and, in 1957, a larger store was
opened in Wang Burapha, a shopping area in Chinatown, where several good book shops are located.
Many other branches of what was then known as Central Department Store have been opened
since that time: Ratchaprasong in 1964, Silom in 1968, Chidlom in 1974, Wong Wian Yai
(Thonburi) in 1981, Lard Prao in 1983, then other branches on Ramkhamhaeng Road, in Chiang Mai,
on Ram-indra, and a second one on Silom. The Chirathiwat family owns the land on which all these
branches have been built, except for the Central Plaza Complex in Lard Phrao where the land had to be
leased from the State Railways of Thailand.
The family has also diversified its business. From 1987, they have managed the Central Plaza
Hotel in Lard Phrao. They now own or control hotels and resorts in Pattaya, Hua Hin, Hat Yai and
Mae Sot. In 1978, the license for Mister Donut was acquired from the USA. There were 20 Mister
Donut branches in Bangkok/Pattaya ten years later.
The Chirathiwat family is particularly large. Mr. Tiang, the founder, married for the first time
in China when 16 years old, had 26 children by three wives (14 sons and 12 daughters). According to
Phuchatkan, they were already about one hundred persons in Mr. Tiang's lineage in 1986. It is like a
company in itself and indeed many work for the Central Group. When Mr. Tiang passed away, Mr.
Samrit Chirathiwat, the oldest son from the first wife, took his place. Since Mr. Samrit's death, last
year, his brother Suthikiat is the new boss.
The Chirathiwat are the leaders of the Chinese Hainanese who represent about 12% of the
Chinese in Thailand (Teochiw 56%, Hakka 16%, Hokkien 7% and Cantonese 7%). They have begun
to invest in China, and particularly, of course, in Hainan.
The family seems to have good relations with other Chinese leaders too. When Mr. Tiang died
in 1968, the company was largely in debt. Mr. Samrit Chirathiwat met three bankers, Mr. Uthane
Techapaibul, president of the Metropolitan Bankbut also president of the Tae Clan Association of
Thailand, to which the Chirathiwat family belongs, Mr. Chin Sophonpanich and Mr. Boonchu
Rojanasathien, also a Hainanese, of the Bangkok Bank. Everything was settled at once. The three
bankers even proposed more money to Mr. Samrit.
Mr. Suthikiart Chirathivat is more interested in politics than other members of the family. His
sister-in-law, who worked for Sofitel-Central Hotel in Hua Hin, used to be an MP for the Prachakon
Thai party. He said in 1989 that he had wanted to enter politics for a long time and announced that he
would run for the Bangkok governorship the following year. For the 1992 parliamentary elections, it
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was widely reported that he was about to enter politics. Until now, however, other family members
seem to haveconvinced him that he was moreuseful in thecompany.
1.6 The Srifuengfung Family
In a 1979 ranking, Mr. Kiarti Srifuengfung was given as the 16th richest man in Thailand (l0
of the 15 men before him were bankers rather than industrialists). Mr. Kiarti considers himself as a
third generation Chinese settler in Thailand, but like many other Thai-Chinese businessmen, he is
indeed a transnational figure.He has had experiencesand relations in China, Hong Kong, Thailand,
Japan and USA and knows how to use them to their best.
Mr. Kiarti's biography is a controversial question. Some authors have written that he was born
in Canton and received all of his education in China. Another states that he is of noble ancestry.
However, since the publication in 1991 of an official biography, written in English by his daughter,
manydetailsare now available.
Kiarti was born in 1916 in Song Phi Nong district, Suphanburi province, one of the best rice-
growing provinces in Thailand. It is said that his mother was Thai while his father, Mr. Tae Tian Jui,
was a Taechiw Chinese whose father came from China in a period of famine and drought. After Mr.
Tae Tian Jui had bought a rice-mill in 1927, he was elected to be a village headman and was later
know as Phu fa; Jui. ' ,
In Thailand, the grandfatherseems to have succeededveryquickly.From Suphanburi,where he
had settled down, he exported rice to Bangkok. His son, Jui, joined him in Thailand when he was 16
years old. Jui was a tailor and his wife had a shop that sold supplies to monks. They had five sons and
six daughters.
Kiarti (Tae Liang Im) was the oldest son. He was the leader of a gang of naughty boys around
the town marketplace, stealing his mother's moneywhen he wanted to go out with his friends. On the
other hand,his grandfather decided to givehim a Chineseeducation and imported a teacherfrom China.
Then, at the age of 12, he was sent to study at two famous Chinese schools in Bangkok. However, he
was better at sports than in other subjects.
When he was 16, this paternal grandfather sent him to China to further his education. He had
also to learn "how to be a good chinaman." So first he stayed one year in the little ancestral village in
Swatow. When he was bored of the village life, he went to St. Stevens College in Hong Kong. But
grandfather was not satisfied with his grandson learningEnglish, he came himself to Hong Kong and
brought him to Canton to study in a Chinese school. Kiarti liked Canton and, after several years at
school, he continued on to Lin Nan University, which was run by Christian missionaries.
When the war with Japan broke out, he could not get money any more from Thailand, so he
wanted to join the Chinese army. Being a Thai national, he was sent with the American forces and
went to Texas to be trained as an airforce pilot. When he was back in China, he was Captain Tom
Cheng of the US Air Force. From his base in Kunming he received many assignments as a bomber
pilot or a teacherat the Chinesecadet school.
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Mr. Kiarti left the army at the end of war. He was particularly close to Dr. Sun Foo, the son of
Dr. Sun Vat Sen. So, when he asked to work in a bank, he was sent to the Canton Provincial Bank.
There, very soon, he marriedMiss Jennie, a daughterof the bankowner, a very wealthy man. At that
time, the Canton Provincial Bank was trying to obtain a license to set up a branch in Thailand. Mr.
Kiarti was sent, to do the job.
He had to convince Luang Thamrong Navasawat, the minister (he was later named Prime
Minister). It was quiteeasy becauseLuang Thamrong's fathercame from the same village in China as
Mr. Kiarti's grandfather and also belonged to the same Tae clan. In 1946,Mr. Kiarti become the first
manager of the Canton Provincial Branch, as the bank's license had been granted in his name. Two
years later, when the communists took over Canton, the bank had to close down. Since Mr. Kiarti still
had a bank license under his name he cooperated with twoalreadyveryrich Chinesebusinessmen, Mr.
UdaneTechapaibun (of the sameTae clan)and Mr. U Chu Liang,a leaderamongTaechiwChinese in
Thailand who had many anti-Japanese activities during the war. The Singkhon Bank (later to become
the Bangkok Metropolitan Bank) opened in August 1950 with Mr. Kiarti Srifuengfung as managing
director.
However, he was just an employee. So he decided to start an insurance company, Thai
MetropoleInsuranceCo. with not only Mr. UdaneTechapaibul and Mr. U Chu Liang as shareholders,
but also Maj.-Gen. Pramam Adireksan, PhrayaDonavanikmontri (former Financeminister) and Phraya
Chindarak (former Interior minister). In 1953, Kiarti set up the E.T.B. Insurance Co. Ltd., with the
same Maj.-Gen. Pramam Adireksan, son-in-law of Marshall Pin Choonhavan, one of the strongmen at
that time. In 1954, the two friends enteredthe fieldof industry by setting up the Thai Textile Industry
Co., then Thai Teijin Co., a joint venture with a Japanese company. This friendship was probably
useful when Maj.-Gen. Pramam was Communications Minister, Industry Minister (twice) and deputy
Prime Minister.
In the fifties, Kiarti opened a movie house in Chinatown and planned a chain of cinemas all
over Southeast Asia.Whenhis partnerfrom Singapore accidentally died, hedecidedto give up.
During the same period, Mr. Kiarti likedto go with his family to Pattaya Beach.There he often
noticedthat the sand seemedto be of goodquality. The ideacame that with that sand he could produce
glass. So he took samples of sand from Pattaya and Rayong to be tested. That was the beginning of
his most successfulbusinessand of his partnershipwith AsahiGlassCo. of Japan. Thus twenty years
later his enemies had becomehis best friends. A 50-50% joint venture with 12 million baht registered
capital was set up and production started in November 1965. Three other plants were opened in 1971,
1976and 1983.But in 1990,Japanesepartnersheldonly 39.6% of the sharesof Thai-Asahi Glass Co.
Ltd. while Mr. Kiarti held personally 11.47% of it, there being 6,369 shareholders in all. The group
had 88% of the glass marketin Thailand.
Mr. Kiarti could also use his Chineserelations. His Metropole Travel Service Co. was the first
agent in Thailandfor ChinaAir Travel. It organized tours inTaiwanfor Thai Chinese.
When it was permitted, Mr. Kiarti tried to work with communist China. In September 1987 he
established- with an American partner - China's first float glass company, the Guandong Float Glass
Co. Ltd. in Shekou Special Economic Zone. He was supported by. Major-Gen. Chartichai
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Choonhavan, Deputy Prime Minister. president of the Thai-Chinese Friendship Association and
brother-in-law of Mr. Kiarti's friend and partner. Maj.-Gen. Pramarn Adireksan. According to his son.
Mr. Kiarti built this plant in China because when he was a child. his father and grandfather raised him
up to be patriotic about China: This 100 million dollar plant was the largest private investment in
China at that time.
In the middle of the 1970's. Mr. Kiarti Srifuengfung sold his shares in the Bangkok
Metropolitan Bank. However. he diversified his other investments. From his war-time connections in
Texas he forged several joint-venture such as Good year (Thailand). Thai Diamond Shamrock Co. Ltd.
and Thai Occidental Chemical Co. Ltd. Lately. he has invested in real estate with Kiarti Thani Golf
and Country Club. Kiarti Thani City Mansion. and Pattaya Real Estate. (Japanese Sakata group).
Mr. Kiarti's secret. as told several times in his biography. is to be "honest and sincere and not
to take advantage of his friends". On the other hand. Mr. Kiarti does not hesitate to tell that he does
not like opposition and wants to have things his way. In the movies he prefers the role of the
godfather. He has been associated with the Soi Rachakhru clique for a long time. but never allowed
members of his family to play politics.
. Mr. Kiarti likes to tell how he could buy from Prince Chakraponse a 2.4 million baht building
in Rajawongse Road with a '$100 Parker pen. With this gift (to someone he knew to be a writer) it
was agreed that he would have to pay 2.2 million baht in 10 years with annual installments of
220.000 baht without any interest. As he himself collected a yearly rental income of 400.000 baht
from other companies. he had every year a 180.000 bonus and free use of the building for his own
companies.
Mr. Kiarti and Mrs. Janie, a Chinese from Shang Hai, have three sons and three daughters (a
son married a Karnasut, and a daughter a Sophonpanich). All of them had to work for the family
businesses. which may be a problem in the future. Mr. Kiarti's eldest son and heir-to-be finds only one
thing to say to conclude a contribution to his father's biography: "I can never compare to my Father"
(with a capital letter as for a King or a God(father).
2. Some Considerations Suggested by these Cases and a Few Other
Ones
Few start very poor. Their big challenge was to change the family line of business. Many
fathers and grandfathers were in lumbering, tin mining and rice-milling. Usually a family member
continues to manage these businesses. but the founder of the new prosperity tried other fields (banking.
import-export. manufacturing. etc.).
Leading fields change with the development of the economy. international relations and new
opportunities given by scientific and technological progress. A book on millionaires (setthi) published
in 1963 mentioned only Phraya Phiromphakdi (Boonrod Brewery). Phraya Phakdinoraset (urban mass
transportation). Mr. Sahat Mahakhun (whisky). Mr. Prayong Tangtrongchit (drugs) and Prince
Suphasawatwongsanit Sawatdiwat (land. gardens). The seventies were the decade of the bankers and the
contractors. Besides. the eighties were more the decade of the real estate developers and agro-
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businessmen. If Mr. Chin Sophonpanich, Mr. Udane Techapaibul and Mr. Bancha Lamsam were
regarded as the richest persons in Thailand in the seventies, now we are told that the richest are the
Kanchanapas and the Chiaravanont families.
These Chinese businessmen are very mobile, professionally speaking. If the largest part of the
Thai are born as farmers' children and die as farmers, Chinese change profession a number of times
during their life. They are sons of rice-millers, gardeners, miners, or shopkeepers; they started as
shopkeepers;had the opportunity to be bankers, then industrialists and spend today most of their time
working in the real estate business. Their sons sell computers or cable TV. One field, a single line of
business, is never enough. M. Kiarti Srifuengfung's father was a rice trader and a rice-miller; he
became first a banker, then an insurer, a travel agent, an importer, a movie producer, an industrialist,
and now a developer.
However, these businessmen (or entrepreneurs) are also very mobile geographically. Many from
the older generation were probably born in China, even when their father lived in Thailand, because it
seems it was a common practice for wives to go back to the ancestral village in China to give birth.
On the other hand, many well-to-do Chinese from Thailand had at least two wives, one of them living
in China. Their China-born sons joined them in Thailand when they were 10 or 12. Even those born
in Thailand traveled quite frequently. Mr. Kiarti Srifuengfung, the "boy from Suphanburi," left that
Thai province at 12 to go to Chinese schools in Bangkok, then he went to Canton in China, then to
Hong Kong, then he was sent to Texas, he came back to Kunming in China, and returned to Bangkok
when about 30 years old. As a businessman he had also many opportunities for travels when he
organized tours to Taiwan or engaged in joint ventures with companies in Singapore, Japan or the
USA. Some cremation or commemorative books published in honour of Thai-Chinese businessmen
look like travel catalogues. Mr. Thaworn Phornprapha from Siam Motors traveled around the world.
Photographies published in a commemorative book for his 60th anniversary show him in at least 22
countries in four continents. As businessmen they quickly developed international visions. Mr. Thiam
Chokwathana established a regional commercial network when he sent his brother to Hong Kong and
his brother-in-law to Japan. The Kanchanapas family used to have more businesses in Hong Kong or
.Singapore than in Thailand. Quite often they have wives, sons or brothers as citizens of another
country (eg. Hong Kong or Singapore).
They have large families. The first generations, in particular, (for the present generation rumors
of "minor wives" are not easy to verify) had many wives and children. Three wives seem to be the rule,
one of them in China. Mr. Thaworn Pornprapha's third wife is a Japanese. When you have several
wives you have generally quite a number of children. Mr. Thien Sieng Kamasuta, who set up the
Karnasuta Corporation in 1955, had 24 children, 11 of whom were sons. Mr. Tiang Chirathiwat had
26 children by three wives, while Mr. Thaworn Pornprapha's wives gave him only 13 children. Mr.
Chin Sophonpanich had seven children by two wives, Mr. Chok Wathana had eight children by his
only wife, and Mr. Siang Chinawat 12 by his. All threeof them had six sons. Sons are of course
important. Dr. Chaiyut Kannasut had five children but only two sons; it was a tragedy when the heir-
to-be died in a traffic accident in 1979. Occasionally a daughter may have the strongest personality
among the children and be the true heir: see Khunying Phornthip (pornprapha) Narongdet and
Khunying Chachani (Lamsam) Chatikavanit.
293
Large families present the risk of family rows. Not all 24 or 26 children can be close enough to
remain united when a major crisis breaks. There is quite often rumors of disputes and internal conflicts
in business families such as the Chirathivat or the Sophonpanich. More seriously, the Nandhabiwat
lost control of the Laem Thong Bank a few years ago because of a long-lasting family row. Marriage
which introduces strangers into a family may be at the origin of conflicts so the selection of the
sponses is essential.
Too large families are also an obstacle to internal promotion in a big company since executives
who are not members of the family will never occupy the top positions always reserved for sons,
daughters, sons-in-law, etc.
Ethnic community cooperation may be important among first generations. When a Sikh tried to
take over a Chinese bank the bankers opposed the move. However, they failed and the Nandhabiwat
family had to give up control of the Laem Thong Bank. On the other hand, members of large and
powerful clans, such as Tang (84,829 persons in Thailand), Lim (74,719 persons), Li (49,291 persons)
or Ung (44,291 persons), have real advantages when they need help. Mr. Udane Techapaibul of the
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank is president of the Association of the Tae Clansmen. When 'Mr. Kiarti
Srifuengfung had to contact Luang Thamrong Nawasawat in 1946 10ask for a license to open a bank,
he knew he and the minister were from the same clan (Tae) and the same village. He got all that he
asked for and this was probably the most decisive victory in his successful life.
The first generations were probably more interested in Chinese than in Thai politics. They had
little formal education and often could not speak fluent Thai and were too busy building their groups of
companies. Besides, during ultra-nationalistic periods, a Chinese trader or businessman - although a
Thai national - could not openly be active in politics. Second and third generations seem much more
interested. Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat joined the Social Action Party of M.R. Kukrit Pramoj in 1974.
Mr. Suthikiart Chirathivat is close to the Thai Citizen Party of Mr. Samark Suntharavej and Mr.
Thaksin Chinawat may be a candidate in next legislative elections. Mr. Akon Hoontrakun from the
Imperial group was elected Bangkok MP in the September 1992 poll. The largest part of the National
Assembly consists already of businessmen, but they generally manage only middle-level companies in
the provinces.
Conclusion
Everybody who has been in Thailand for a few years can tell the various psychological traits
that characterize a Chinese compared to a Thai. They cannot explain everything but give a frame and
help to understand how things are possible. For instance Chinese children like to talk and express
themselves, they dare to oppose their parents and their teachers. At home, speaking loudly is
encouraged as a value. On the contrary, Thai children have been taught to be riap roi (quiet and
respectful), they are not supposed to ask questions or talk much at home and should never interrupt
grown-ups or their elders. Thais may develop secondary and introverted personalities while Chinese are
more likely to become extrovert. The entrepreneur must be a risk taker (kla siang) according to the
Entrepreneur Handbook published in 1986 by Thammasat University and Thansetthakit; he must first
venture to speak his mind.
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Both Thais and Chinese have some sense of family, but while Chinese work hard for their
children and grandchildren, Thais seem to work to be able to take care of their parents and their young ..
brothers and sisters. Chinese look at the future and try to anticipate and improve it while Thais time
may seem more cyclic, Thai people just hope their children will do the same they do now for their
parents and will take care of them when they become too old to earn a living.
Of course, Thai people like to sing, dance and enjoy themselves while Chinese are said to think
only of working. That is the traditional view. But change may be occurring as the fast development of ..
Karaoke clubs seems to indicate. Formerly, the businessman who had really made it had his own golf-
course built (usually near the seaside just, like a Chinese cemetery). Dying while playing golf in'
Pattaya, as happened to Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat in i975, may have been the sign of a successful
'\
life. New Chinese generations may not bewillingto wait so late before enjoying themselves.
References
Banthuk khwamsongcham nuangnai okat ayu khrop 60 pi Thaworn Phornprapha, 1976.~ 16
Phrutsachikayon Phuttasakkarat 2519. Bangkok, 203 p~
BUNYATHALANG (Phichai), (editor), 1991.- 50 Nakthurakit Chin (50 Chinese Executives),
Bangkok: Khletthai, 224 p. .
CHAIYEN (Bunchai), 1990.-Ruai Baeb Chao Sua (Rich the Tyccon Style), Bangkok: Samnakphim
Bunchai Press, 2 vols.
Lob mong Thawom Phomprapha 75 pi haeng khwamphakphumchai (75 Years of Achievements Dr.
Thawom Phomprapha), 1991.- The Global Views, Bangkok n.p.
MANINOI (Chuphong), 1986.- Chi wit 25 Mahasetthi (Biographies of 25 Multimillionaires),
Bangkok Kan Ngoen Kan Thanakhan, 2: 219 p.
MATICHON and PRACHACHAT, 1989.- Thurakit Heng "Thiam" Phu Yiam Vorayut (or' Thiam
Chokwathana), Bangkok, 130 p,
Matuphum thurakit pha anachak thurakit, 1985.- 25 Trakun Mahasetthi (Business Empires of 25
Multimillionaire Families), Bangkok, 188 p., 2 editions. .
Nangsu anuson phithi ngan sop, 1954.- Commemorative Book on Cremation Ceremony Day for
Mr. Yai Nandhabiwat. 191411954,58 p.
Nangsu anuson phithi ngan sop, 1967.- Commemorative Book on Cremation Ceremony Day for
Mrs. Thongyu Lamsam. 51211967, 84 p.
Nangsu anuson phithi ngan sop, 1975.- Commemorative Book on Cremation Ceremony Day for
Mr. Phaisan Nandhabiwat. 27/1211975,187 p.
Nangsu anuson phithi ngan sop, 1966.- Commemorative Book on Cremation Ceremony Day for
Mr. Chulin Lamsam. 201211966, 200 p.
Nangsu anuson phithi ngan sop, 198·8.- Commemorative Book on Cremation Ceremony Day for
Mr. Chin Sophonpanich. 91411988,249 p.
Nangsu anuson, 1962.- Commemorative Bookfor Mr. Wu Tung Pak Lamsam 261211962, 196p.
PIDPATSERITHAM (Krirkkiat) and YOSHIHARA (K.), 1983.- Business Groups in Thailand,
Singapore: ISEAS, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No.41, 38 p.
295
PRACHACHAT THURAKIT, 1967.- Thayat Thurakit Roi Lan (Heirs of Hundreds-Million
. Businesses, Bangkok, n.d. 206 p. (special publication issued for the 12th anniversary of the
magazine.)
PRACHACHAT THURAKIT, 1983.- 100 Nakthurakit Channam Khong Muang Thai (100
Business Leaders of Thai/and), Bangkok, 2442 p.
SONSRI (S.), 1988.- Phumlang Nakthurakit Thai (Business Elites Profile Bangkok), Samakhom
Sangkhomsat Haeng Prathet Thai.
SOPITPONGSTORN (Arnee) and SRIFUENGFUNG (Kiarti), 1991.- The Boy from Suphanburi,
Bangkok: Sri Yamie Corporation Co., 88 p.
SUEHIRO (Akira), 1985,- Capital Accumulation and Industrial Development in Thailand, Bangkok:
Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute.
WIKWEKMETHAKON (Suksan), 1992,- Roi sae phan mangkon (on Chinese clan names), Bangkok
: Phuutchatkan, 310 p.
WIRIYABANDITKUL (Somchai), 1991.- Sahaphat to laew taek lae taek laew to (ups and downs of
Sahaphathanapibul company), Bangkok: Phuchatkan, 2 editions, 236 p.
THIRAPHAT (Wira) , 1989.- Koet Ma Ruai Waeksaraek 45 Trakun Setthi (45 Rich Families),
Bangkok: Dear Book Co., 252 p.
YOSHIHARA (K.), 1988.- The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in South-East Asia, Singapore: OXford
University Press, 297 p.
296
FromGonsi to Business Corporatism:
Socio-cultural and Political Conditions of .
Ethnic Chinese Big Business Families' Success
Supang Chantavanich
Since the Eighteenth Century, the Chinese junk trade between Siam and the South China Sea
(Nanyang) has given the ethnic Chinese businessmen a source of wealth and economic power. The
Chaozhou (Teochiu) Chinese who constituted the biggest dialect group became big business families
in the Pre- and Post-Second World War periods. In this article, the author will discuss the conditions of
the Chaozhou migration into Thailand, present the life history of five Chaozhou families in Thailand
and finally, attempt to explain how they became big business corporationsl.
1. Migration and Integration of the Chaozhou Chinese into Thai Society
The Chaozhou represent the largest group of Chinese settlers who came to Thailand in the
second half of the Eighteenth Century. The Chaozhou resided in Chao zhou, an area which comprises
of nine districts covering the delta of the Han River in the Guangdong Province. The area is located
next to Fujian Province (Chantanavich, 1991)
Due to geographic conditions, the Chaozhou. people became experts in the fishing and junk .
trades. However, natural disasters which occurred every year and brought about famine, floods and
epidemics forced the Chaozhou people toseek for shelter in other countries. Consequently, they decided
to embarked onto their red-head junks and sailed southwards (Zhang Inqui, 1992). Chang Lin Port in
the ChenghaiDistrict was the centre of trade and migration between 1767 to 1850. It was calculated
that 80 percent of the Chaozhou people in this area had decided to migrate despite the fact that the
Ching kings initially forbade them to do so. Later, when the Royal Court learned that Thailand
possessed an abundant supply of rice and other consuming goods which were rare in China due to
natural disasters, they changed their policy to one which gave more support to the junk trade. An
illustration of this new favourable approach by the Chinese Court was the 1772 announcement of
1- The data in this paper is derived from the research project "Sino-Thai Businessmen in Thailand: Case
Studies of Five Families", Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University. The author would like to
thank Mr. Ukrit Patamanond, Mr. Vorasak Mahatonobon and Ms. Suchada Tamsurarirk who conducted the
research on the Techaphaiboon, Sophonphanit, and Chiarawanon families respectively .. Thanks are also
extended to Ms. Pornphan Terrutgissakul who kindly compiled information for the end notes.
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rewards to Chinese junk traders who were able to bring Siamese rice to China (Xu Zhaolin, 1992).
Subsequently, the relationship between Chaozhou and Siam was strengthened which in turn encouraged
further migrations in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries.
In the Bangkok Period. there had been a shortage of manpower for the production of agricultural
commodities. especially in exports following the Bowring Treaty in 1855. The Chaozhou arrival in
Thailand at that time conveniently reinforced the labour force. Moreover, the Chaozhou people brought
with them their expertise and technologies in sugar cane and pepper plantation productions as well as
in the fishing trade. They were also skillful junk builders (Walvipha Bhururattanaphan, 1992).
The male Chaozhou migrants usually wedded Thai women after their settlement. In the
Thonburi Period, the Chaozhou were privileged and recognized as the "Royal Chinese" partly because
they had the same origins as King Taksin's ancestors and partly because they contributed significantly
to the affairs of the Thai Court (Duan Liseng, 1992).
The major Thai towns in which the Chaozhou resided were Bangkok, Chonburi, Chachoengsao,
and Chanthaburi, In Bangkok. the site of their early settlement is the present location of the Royal
Palace. After the establishment of the Royal Palace, they moved to Sampeng or the Bangkok China
Town (Sawitree Dabbhasuta, 1984). They also lived on houseboats along both sides of the Chao
Phraya River. Those who were involved in the rice trade had their mansions and warehouses on the
west bank of the river (Supang Chantavanich, 1992).
The Chaozhou Chinese in Thailand represented a productive force and thus evolved as the new
middle class in Thai society. They played a very significant role in the rice trade in the South China
Sea region and later in this area's financial business.
2. Life History of Five Chaozhou Families
Case studies of some prestigious Chaozhou families can illustrate how the Chaozhou managed
to become businessmen and took control over most of the economic activities in Thai society. All the
five families under study came from the Shantou area in Guangdong Province. they are:
The Wang-lee or Chen family from Chenghai District The Sophonphanit or Chen family from
Chaoyang District The Techaphaiboon or Zheng family from Chaoyang District. The Srifuengfung or
Zheng family from Fengsun District TheChiarawanon or Xie family from Chenghai District
2.1 Wang-lee (Chen family)2
The Wang-Iee family is a classic example of a five generation Chaozhou family in Thailand.
The first generation came from Chenghai to Thailand in 1851. got married to a Thai woman and started
the rice trade which expanded in the second generation to cover Thailand. Singapore. Saigon. Hong
Kong and Shantou. The second generation also started the financial trade business through the
2- Data on Wang-lee family are from interviews with Mr. Suvit Ang-Lee and Mr. Vuthichai Wang-lee in 1988
and 1990 respectively; and from field investigations in Chenghai, Shautou in 1987 and 1989 and at the
Wanglee Mansion at Thonburi, Thailand. in 1988.
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establishment of the Wang-lee Bank and the Insurance Company. The financial trade business proved
to be so successful that by the time of the fourth generation, Chen Shou Ming, the leader, was elected
as the President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Unfortunately, due to political conflicts in
1945 among anti-Japanese Nationalist Chinese traders and other Chinese traders, Chen Shou Ming was
assassinated at the age of 42. Chen Shou Ming had been married to his cousin (the daughter of his
aunt, a Wang-Iee lady who had married a Lumsum man). His brother Chen Shou Zhen took care of all
business after his death because his children were too young. At present, the children of both Chen
Shou Ming and Chen Shou Zhen, the fifth generation, are in control of the Wang-Iee family business
in Thailand. Their business still lies in the agro-business of cash crops, banking and insurance and real
estate. Members of the fifth generation have maintained progress and stability within the family's
enterprises. The success of their family business has been explained by the following factors: the
adequate supply of human resources, the possession of investment capital, the maintenance of the
family integrity and honesty, and the adoption of a conservative business attitude (i.e., the principle of
safety, stability, and security). Two more members of the fifth generation of the Wang-lee family have
married ladies from the Lumsum family.
2.2 Sophonphanit (Chen familyj-'
This family is well-known as a big banking family in Thailand. The ancestors of the family
came from Henan and Fujian Provinces respectively. They came to Chaoyang to resume the position
of the head of Chaoyang District in the late Seventeenth Century and stayed there for twenty
generations. Chin Sophonphanit or Chen Bi Chen is the most prominent member of the family. His
father came to Thailand in the early Twentieth Century, due to poverty in Chaozhou, but then returned
to China in 1930 after having worked as a clerk in a wood factory for a short while. Chin was born in
Thailand from a Chinese mother but grew up in China. He returned to Thailand in 1926 and like his
father worked as a labourer in a wood factory. However, he fought his way up until he became the
owner of the wood company. After the end of the Second World War, Chin got the opportunity to
establish a local bank in Thailand which he based on the modem Western Bank model. In addition, he
was one of the founders of the Bangkok Bank which was established in 1944. Further more, as a result
of his significant role as the compradore during the Second World War, he was appointed as the
General Manager of the Bank in 1952. Chin also became involved in the gold trade after the War. The
gold speculation was very profitable and made it possible for him to launch into new investment
projects. Like many overseas Chinese in the region, Chin took advantage of the post-War opportunity
to become one of the region's leading import-export traders following the arrests and departure of the
Europeans traders. This was the genesis of his wealth (pannee Bualek, 1985). Chin ran the bank
successfully until 1958, when as a result of political conflicts among Thai leaders, he was forced to
leave for Hong Kong for five years. On his return in 1964, the Bangkok Bank's capabilities became
fully operational again. Since Chin's death in 1988, his children who are the third generation have
3- Data on Sophonphanit family are from the cremation volume of Hin Sophonphanit in April. 1988;
interview with Khunying Kalaya Sophonphanit in 1990; and field investigation in Chaoyang in 1987 and
1989.
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continued the family business. The Sophonphanit family business now lies in finance, insurance and
bankingas well as other enterprises like commodity trade, import-export, textile,etc.
The Sophonphanit' successcan be explainedby the calibreof Chin's work. The glory of Chin's
business is based on the Chaozhou qualities of perseverance, hardwork,care for friends and customers,
wisdom, vision, good team work and the ability to take risks. The Sophonphanit family had also
learned from its own lesson that personal linkageswith political power is a condition for its success.
As a Buddhist whose two sons are Christians, Chin was not so influencedby Confucianism like most
Chinese. However, Chin's second wife, a well-educated lady, preserved the Chaozhouness in the
family. All the children were given Chinese names and were taught to speak and write in Chinese.
Chin himselfalways spoke to his children in the Chaozhou dialect.
2.3 Techaphaiboon (Zhengfamily)"
The Techaphaiboon family originatedfrom Chaoyang. The first generation arrived in Thailand
and opened a pawn shop and a public house. The head of the family, Zheng Zi Bin participated in the
establishment of the Chaozhou Association and the Hua Kiaw Poh Tek Tung Association which
provided social security and welfare to overseas Chinese in Thailand. With a liberal and patriotic
ideology, Zheng Zi Bin supported the KMT movement in China and thus remained an enemy of the
Japanese troop in Thailand until his death in. 1944. Uthen Techaphaiboon or Zhen Wu Lou was the
second generation leader.He was born in Thailandand went to Chineseand Jesuit schools in Bangkok.
Uthen was also anti-Japanese during the SecondWorld War. He set up an insurancecompany as well
as an import-export and remittance business. After the War, he established a company with his friends
to trade medical and chemical products which at the time were in great demand. The business was
successful. He continued his father's pawn shop and the Mae Khong distilleries. In 1950, he founded
the Sri Nakorn Bank with two other friends. The bank was essentiallya Chaozhou investment and no
politicianswere involved. Later, Uthen learnedthe way to exploitpoliticalpower and its monopolyon
the factory and the real estatebusiness.
The Techaphaiboon's significance lies in its attachment to the Chaozhou community and their
homeland. Uthen has always been the President of the Hua Kiaw Poh Teck Tung Association which
later became a Foundation. The Foundation is known amongboth Chinese and Thai people as a char-
ity-basedorganization. Although the Techaphaiboon business is not as big as other overseas Chinese's
enterprises, its integrity and influence over the Chaozhou is highly recognized. The family has con-
tributed in the rebuilding of a primary and secondary school, the construction of a concrete roadand the
developmentof a water network system in the family's hometown in Chiashan subdistrict.At the gate
of their home in Chiashan,they wrotedown two words: Hai Han (which means: our generosity is end-
less like the water in the ocean). At present, the Techaphaiboon family is undergoinga difficult transi-
tional phase, changing from the old-fashioned management structure intoa modernadministrativeunit
which involvesthe family's third generation members in the Thai parliamentary system.
4- Most data are from Uthen Techaphaibun's Biography and from an interview with him in 1991. Field
investigations were also conducted in Chaoyan in 1987 and 1989.
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The family's prestige and recognition is based on Uthen's close links with the charity based
foundation. However, the Techaphaiboon family business has to a certain extent been limited by the
inadequateadjustment to modem management techniques, the over-dependency on political patronage,
and the lack of diversification in economic investment,
2.4 Srifuengfung (Zheng familyj>
The ancestors of the Srifeungfung family migrated to Thailand and settled down in Suphanburi
Province in early Twentieth Century. The family head came from Feng-sun District in Chaozhou. He
started as a small trader but then progressedinto a successful rice trader. His son, Phuyai Jui or Zheng
Jinsui was married to a Thai-Mon woman and became a village headman in Suphanburi. He was also
the head of the anti-Japanese group among the Overseas Chinese in the central part of Thailand.
Consequently, during the Japanese occupation, he had to flee to Vietnam. The two sons, Kiarti
Srifuengfung or Zheng Ming Jie and Boonsong Srifuengfung or Zheng Ming Ru of the third
generation, became the leaders of the family. They invested in banking, insurance, goods
transportation, and import-export. The Srifeungfung family is well-connected to the Chart Thai
. politicalparty and certain political leaders. What makesthe Srifeungfung well-known and recognizedis
its involvement with transnational companies in the glass and chemical industries. The Srifeungfung
family owns the Thai-Asahi glass Company and the Thai Plastic and Chemical Products Company.
The family has a joint venture with the PPG Industryfrom the V.S. It also has a banking and financial
business. The Srifeungfung'ssuccess is the result of its well-to-doeconomic and social background at
the beginning, its talented ability in running the business with emphasis on the adoption of new
technology, its well-balanced and diversified enterprises whichcomplement each other, and its wisdom.
to cooperate with Thai politicians.
Kiat Srifeungfung passed away in 1992. He was a member and an honorary consultant of the
Association of Thai Industries. Boonsong, his younger brother is the present President of the Thai-
Chinese Chamberof Commerce.
The Srifuengfung family is closelyrelated to the Phanitchiva familyand there have been at least
two marriagesbetween members of the two families.
. 2.5 Chiarawanon (Xie familyr'
The two brothers of the family Xie in Chenghai were farmers who sold vegetable seeds. The
elder brother Xie I-chu came to Thailand in 1922and opened a shop to sell vegetable seeds and grains
called Chai-Tai or Zheng Da. The youngerbrother, Xie Shao-Huialso opened a shop in Shantou. The
. two brother produced highquality seeds through research and development in Chenghai. Their business
expandedwhen their childrenhad grownup and joined the Company after the SecondWorld War. They
set up an animal food factory which specialised in the production of fertilizer and the raising of
5- Arunee Sopitpongstorn (1991). Data are also from interview with Mr. Boonsong Srifuengfung in 1989 and
with Arunee Sopitpongstorn in 1990.
6- Suchada Tamsurarirk: Chiarawanon family, interview.
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chickens and pigs for iocal consumption as wel1 as for export. The business is now known as CP
Group or Zheng Da among Chinese people. In 1971, an American transnational company decided to
join the family's chicken industry by introducing new technology. The business expanded to
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China. During the second generation, the Chiarawanon family
became very successful. Their business expanded to carpet, motorcade, plastic and other industries in
the Special Economic Zones in China. The decision to move the venture into the newly established
agro-industry business has given the CP Group a unique position where there has been little
competition. Also, the emphasis on the use of new technology, research and development as well as
on human resource development combining with the family leased management were another key
factors contribution to their success.
It is evident that the Chiarawanon family has been very attached to their homeland and to the
Chinese traditional values as reflected in their way of life and their business conduct. The Taoist
philosophy which emphasizes the value of nature and the Confucianist beliefs in the accountability
towards subordinates are the principles of the CP Group. Attachment to kinship and the motherland in
China can been seen in their contribution in cash and in kind to their homeland in Chenghai as well as
in their business expansion in several Special Economic Zones in China. Thanin Chiarawanon, the
most prominent member of the family at present is the Vice President of the Thai- Chinese
Association. He is the first Thai businessman to receive an Honorary Doctoral Degree from the Beijing
University of Agriculture in 1992.
3. Cultural Factors Contributing to Economic Success
The life history of the five families reveals a lot about cultural influence in ethnic Chinese's
business management. Evidently, these Chaozhou traders used their dialect group as their original trade
network. Then they expanded their business to other dialect groups in Thailand. They also have their
Chaozhou network in Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam and China. Most of these families recognise
the importance of maintaining the Chaozhou identity. Chin Sophonphanit used to play cards with his
business friends in China town. He always spoke Chaozhou to his family. Uthen Techaphaiboon
always adhered to both the Chaozhou Association in Thailand and the HuaKiaw Poh Teck Tung
Foundation both of which are predominantly Chaozhou in origin and composition. Boonsong
Srifeungfung is now the President of the Thai-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, a position which has
always been reserved to a prestigious Chaozhou businessman. Only the Wang-Iee family set itself
apart from the Chaozhou network and became more assimilated into Thai culture.
Included in the Chaozhou qualities are skil1s in sailing, trading and the risk-taking and hard
working characteristics. Most of the five families are engaged in the import-export of agricultural
products, a business which requires low technology but high risk, relatively relevant to the Chaozhou
expertise and character. Only the Chiarawanon and Srifeungfung families have launched into the more
complex technological business, (i.e., in chemical and genetic engineering), but this is only a recent
phenomenon.
Marriages among certain Chaozhou or Chinese families has occurred quite often. The Wang-lee
is related to the Lumsurn. which has a Hakka origin. Members of the Srifuengfung have married
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members of the Panitcheva. Likewise, there have been marriages between the Sophonphanit and the
Srifuengfung families. The practice of endogamy ensures stability and ramification within the family
business. Occasionally, members of Chinese business families have married the children of military
heads and political leaders. However, in most cases, these marriages have taken place among. the third
generation. In addition to intermarriages, the family business has also been strengthened by family
management. All the five families place their children into the key positions in business. Some
families like the Wang-Iee, Sophonphanit and Srifuengfung prepared their children vigorously for
future administrative posts, in order to produce skillful young executives who would be ready to take
over from their predecessors. However, professional employees have also been employed to ensure
modernization and progress.
Like most Chinese, the Chaozhou's inheritance pattern lies heavily on the oldest or the second
sons (in case the oldest son is not available) to continue the family business. One unique pattern was
found in the Wang-Iee, Sophonphanit, and Chiarawanon families, namely, that the second son
succeeded the family business. The patrilineal system is also extended to the practice of Gong-si, i.e,
the family expense is to be taken care of by the family budget and all members are expected to
contribute to the family business. However, the Kong-si tradition has lost its strong influence due to
the adoption of modem business management and family members' marriages to Thai wives who do
not like the Chinese tradition and prefer to manage separately their own economic and social family
lives..
In late 1970s, there were 65 family group holding assets worth from 33 million to 6 billion
US$ in Thailand". This statistic indicates the level of local business dominance by large family
corporations. Not unexpectedly, most of these families had Sino-Thai origin.
4. Institutional Contexts of Family Business
For more than 200 years, the Chinese entrepreneurs in Thailand have learned to integrate
themselves with the center of political power. In the past, most Chaozhou traders had been given royal
titles and had assimilated into the Siamese Court. After the Second World War, Chaozhou
businessmen became the clients of political leaders. In the cases of Sophonphanit, Techapaiboon and
Srifuengfung, this fact is very well illustrated. Chin and Chatri Sophonphanit, Uthen Techapaiboon
and Kiat and Boonsong Srifuengfung cooperated or approached political leaders, royal household
members, and military heads, in particular, as their main patrons. The Wang-Iee seems to be have been
less influenced by clientelism while Chiarawanon is paving to obtain patronage within Thai society.
Clientelism, as a functional condition for survival and maintenance of business worked when
the Thai bureaucratic policy was powerful. The alliance of ethnic Chinese business and the military
finally strengthened the former in their economic and political power. The growing number of local
businesses owned by Sino-Thai entrepreneurs gave rise to business associations and other kinds of
alliance among businessmen. The Association of Thai Bankers, the Thai Industry Council and other
7- Krikkiat Phipatseritham and Yoshihara Kunio (1982). See also Suehiro Akira (1989).
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forms of business coalitions are examples of recent developments in business corporation (Anek
Laothamatas, 1992). These business associations started to have some roles in the political arena.
Most leading figures from the five families are members of the main associations like Thai
Bankers Association (TBA), Association of Thai Industries (ATI) and Federation of Thai Industries
(FTI).
Foreign investment in the form of joint-ventures and multinational corporations is another kind
of business alignment which Sino-Thai entrepreneurs are seeking for. Surprisingly, although some
families continue to have bad memories of and have been threatened by the Japanese occupation in
Thailand during the Second World War, they are now cooperating with Japanese businessmen in many
joint-venture projects. The-expansion of the multinational corporations enhanced these entrepreneurs
into becoming more established. Finally, the Thai public has to recognise the role of the private sector
which mainly comprises of Sino-Thai businessmen. The Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative
Committee (JPPCC) was founded in 1981 as the banner of the leading business associations especially
the TBA, ATI and the Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC). The JPPCC has become the linking
agency between the government and the businessmen and assisted the government in several economic
crises. Thus, Sino-Thai businessmen have institutionalized themselves successfully into Thai
economic and political development
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Thap Thieng and the Wider World: Six Decades of
Entrepreneurship and Economic Change in Trang Town
Michael J. Montesano!
Introduction
On Sunday morning, 3 January 1993, a group of Thai laborers and their foremen arrived at Saha
Trang Withaya School on the Huey Yod Road in Thap Thieng sub-district, Trang City district. In one
corner of the football field that had, until that day, occupied the road-side half of the school's eleven-
and-a-half-rat property (0,08 hectare), part of the group set speedily to work on two-by-fours, ply-
wood, and roof-tiles. Within four or five hours they had nearly completed a structure intended,
unmistakably, to serve as the on-site office for a long-term construction project. At the same time, the
remainder of their group had begun surveying the football field and setting down markers to divide it
into smaller parcels.
As all this work progressed, cars and motorcycles continued to move by along the Huey Yod
Road, some heading out past the Teck Bee Hang rubber factory as far as Khlong Teng or even across
the range of hills that formed the natural border between Trang and Huey Yod. Others moved toward
the center of Trang town, as if drawn by some sort of commercial gravity to the coffee shops and retail
stores crowded along lower Ratchadamnern Road and the various streets radiating out from the Thap
Thieng market, officially Trang's food market. Whether because of the wall separating Saha Trang
Withaya from the road or because of their determination to enjoy the remaining hours of the four-day
New Year's holiday to the fullest, these vehicles' passengers seemed oblivious to the changes that the
morning had set into motion.
But such oblivion was in large part illusory. The same forces that had led those laborers to that
site on this morning also confronted each farmer, merchant, and civil servant, street vendor,
accountant, and insurance agent, student and factory worker in Trang every day. They marked a
particular, sharply defined, but doubtless impermanent crystallization in the patterns and processes that
have defined the economic history of Thap Thieng in the last century or so. What follows is a crude
outline of the main contours of that history and a preliminary analysis of its salient structural
1- The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Fulbright-Hayes Doctoral Dissertation
Abroad program of the United States Department of Education, Washington, and the sponsorship and
facilities of the Chulalongkorn University Social Research Insitute, Bangkok.
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characteristics in the period dating roughly from the end of the absolute monarchy in Siam. Focus falls
on the position and activity of local commercial elites which, both in the continuity they have
displayed and in the change they have fostered and accommodated, have never failed to exhibit those
characteristics commonly associated with the entrepreneur.
Unless otherwise noted, the historical data presented in the pages that follow come from detailed
interviews with some forty informants- The author chose these informants on the basis of their own
or their families' prominent roles in Thap Thieng commerce at some point in or throughout the period
under study, for their positions in Trang's thriving complex of voluntary organizations, or for their
reputations as well informed and skilled conversationalists. With the exception of three or four
interviews conducted in Bangkok and during a five-day visit to Trang in August 1992, these interviews
took place during the author's extended stay in Trang between November 1992 and January 19933.
In approaching schematically commercial developments in a mid-sized Southeast Asian town,
the analysis that follows can benefit from reference to a similar, earlier effort, undertaken in the
Indonesian context. Some three decades ago, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz energetically set out to
understand the historical and prospective relationship between social and economic change in a
Javanese town that he called Modjokuto (Geertz, 1963a, 1963b, 19654).
Above all, Geertz sought to determine the place of local entrepreneurs in laying the foundations
for a now rather quaint- sounding Rostovian "take-off' or "transition from stagnancy to sustained
growth" (Geertz, 1963, p.l). Describing Indonesia in the late 1950s as"weU into that no man's land of
transition which lies between a peasant society past and an industrial society future," (ibid. p.140)
Geertz wrote that "progress toward more effective patterns of economic activity" in places like
Modjokuto depended on "movement ... away from a bazaar-type economy toward a firm-type econ-
omy" (ibid. p.29). Entrepreneurs therefore faced no problem greater than the "organizational one"
(Ibid., pp. 28 & 74) of establishing and managing firms, both commercial and industrial, which effi-
ciently combined available resources in response to the demands of the market (Ibid., pp. 28 & 140).
Among the Modjokuto merchants to have made promising starts along this path, Geertz
identified a number of common characteristics. First, long-standing patterns of supra-village trade
constituted the basis for the activities of members of this group, though newer distribution
arrangements with firms based in large cities often also played an important role (Ibid., pp. 74, 148,
58). Second, while they might be in business on their own, the entrepreneurs displayed common
membership in a proudly "solidary and self- conscious group" (Ibid., pp. 140-141, 147, 150). Third,
recent changes in values and tastes in the broader society made possible the sorts of commercial
2- Exceptions to this generalization are three or four instances in the pages which follow in which the
author's conclusions reflect his scrutiny of several thousand pages of the files on locally registered limited
corporations and limited partnerships maintained by the Trang Provincial Commercial Office.
3- The author anticipates citing his informants by name in future, less tentative and schematic treatments of
the commercial and economic history of Trang since 1932.
4- Though these three volumes share many of the same concerns, it is in the second that Geertz addresses
himself most directly to understanding the role of entrepreneurs in 'economic change in the period since the
years after the First World War.
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activities that they undertook (Ibid., pp. 75-76); increasing numbers of Javanese, including many
outsideof theentrepreneurial group, werebecoming consumers, even in ruralareas.
Generalizations drawn from the inflation-tom, socially tense Indonesiaof the 1950s may hold
little apparent relevance the for booming, tentatively democratic Thailandof the 1990s. Certainly, the
Thai economy has, in the last decade, "taken off' into rapid growth. And little room remains for doubt
that the country's entrepreneurial elements have worked out stunningly effective solutions to the
"organizational problem" identified by Geertz in Modjokuto (Mac Vey, 1992,pp. 7-34)5. At the same
time, however, neither the historical experiences of other countries nor current uncertainties over such
issuesas humancapitalformation and technological dependence leave thecontemporary observermuch
choicebesidesplacingThailandin thatGeertzian "no man'sland"between a predominantly agricultural
economy and some other kind-Further, little scholarship on entrepreneurs in Thailand reflects the
scholarly attention to the historical environmentof or setting for entrepreneurship characteristic of
Geertz's work, especially at the sub-national level. And yet it is precisely at that level that individual
cases display sufficient varianceto inform a rigorousconceptualization of the role of entrepreneurship
in the Thai economy,past, present,and future.
1. Commerce in Thap Thieng before the Fall of Singapore
The consequencesof King Vachiravudh's visit to variousof the monthon (region) of southern
Siam in 1916 includedhis approvalof the transferof Trang from modemKantang to Thap Thieng, in
what was then Bang Rak Districts, At a point in that districtdirectly up the Trang river from the city
was a site locally known as Tha Chin, or "Chinese landing." For a period stretching back at least to
the first half of the nineteenth century, Tha Chin had servedas pointof debarkation for a steadystream
of new immigrants to the area. Predominantly Hokkien, but including Cantonese, Hakka, and a
number of Hainanese, these settlers arrived in Siam by way of Malaya". Most often, they h~d come
from Penang to Trang by sea before traveling up-river. From Tha Chin, they spread out to settle in
such nearby localeson the east side of the Trangriver as NamPhut,Thai Phru, Na Taluang, and Thap
Thieng.
5- Mac Vey gives an elegant theoretical treatment of this issue. See also Suehiro Akiro (1989), for an
exhaustive empirical one.
6- Prawatisat mahathai suan phumiphak (Trang: Samnakngan changwat, 1985), p. 57.
7· Hokkien were the most heavily represented speech-group among Chinese arriving in the Straits
Settlements through at least the time of the First World War. And, above all to about 1890, onward
migration from Malaya to southern Siam proceeded at a significant rate. Skinner specifically notes Trang
among the destinations for such migrants. Cf. G. William Skinner, (1957), p. 51. In designating Chinese
speech-groups, the author has opted for the familiar Hokkien, Cantonese, Hainanese, Hakka, and Teochiu.
The first of these terms remains both current and particularly evocative in the English-language literature
on Southeast Asia. But the events of the last half-decade in the coastal provinces of South China mean that
.one does well to consider the change in perspective that might result from the replacement of Hokkien
with Fujienese. As for the fifth term, it is doubtful that many readers would recognize the pin-yin
Chaozhou. And the author uses Teochiu rather than Teochew, the spelling most common in Malaysia, both
in deference to Skinner and in the belief that it is orthographicaIly preferable.
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The years after 1910 had seen the completion of the ninety- three-kilometer-Iong Thung Song-
Trang spur of the southern line of the Siamese State Railway and the construction of a station at Thap
Thieng, twenty-one kilometers short of the terminus of the spur at Trang City. Roads from that Trang,
from Phatthalung, and from Nakhon Sri Thammarat and Suratthani met there, in what a contemporary
observer described as "the most important place on the Trang-Thung Song line, being a centre of a rich
agricultural district and well populated." The Thai version of these same observations renders "well
populated" (mee phonlamuang nanaen) evidently in contrast with much of the rest of the territory
traversed by this section of the railroad. The area was also said to be suitable for the cultivation of para
rubber'',
At that time, however, tin, timber, luk chang (small elephants), cattle, oxen, pigs, ducks, and
chickens still figured more importantly in the exports of the province, sent principally to Penang''.
And none of these compared in local economic significance to pepper, reported to be "of good quality
and favourably known on the London market as Trang pepper"lO. It is, in fact, not at all inappropriate
)
to attribute to the pepper economy the role of "cultural core"ll in the settlements that had grown up
within five to eight kilometers to the northeast and northwest of Tha Chin. For example, the
prominence on the local landscape of the large wells absolutely necessary for the cultivation of the
thirsty pepper vine characterized the area as late as the years just before the Japanese occupation. One
informant recalls from her childhood looking on as laborers onerously drew water from those wells and
watered the vines belonging to members of the most renowned Cantonese family in the district. And
irrigation hardly represented the only such laborious task involved: cutting and placing thick wooden
stakes for the vines to climb as they grew and of course picking ripe clusters of pepper also were
highly labor-intensivel/.
Labor arrangements and immigration practices served, in part, to complement each other. Early
arrivals from China and Malaya took later arrivals on as indentured laborers, often by "buying" their
obligation to repay the cost of their passage to Trang City or to Tha Chin. The obligation repaid,
these laborers were likely, in their turn, to claim land and undertake pepper cultivation on their own 13.
8- Thiraluk haeng kanpert thangrotfailuang saitai 2459/Souvenir of the Opening of the Royal Siamese State
Railway Southern Line 1917 (Bangkok: Krasuang khamanakhom, 1917), p. 55(E) and pp. 54-55(T).
English and Thai editions of this book, both with bilingual titles, appeared simultaneously. While their
contents are generally similar, the two editions differ in respect to specific details. Here and below,
citations to the Thai and English texts are indicated by (T) and (E), respectively.
9- Ibid., p. 55(E) and p. 53(T).
10- Ibid., p. 55(E); cf., too, p. 53(T).
11- Though this term is Julian Steward's coinage, interested readers are directed to Geertz, Agricultural
Involution, pp. 6- 11, for background on its use here.
12- Skinner comments that, through at least 1910, pepper cultivation was perhaps the most important single
source of agricultural employment for the Chinese in Siam. It was concentrated above all in the provinces
of Chanthaburi, Trat, Satun, and Trang. Interestingly, he also notes that rising labor costs, as well as low
prices on the London market, may have accounted for its eventual decline. Cf. Skinner, p. 112.
13- "Slaves" (that) and ex-"slaves" also fur~ished some part of the labor requirements of pepper cultivation.
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Pepper small-holdings thus multiplied and local society, the Tha Chin-centered creation of
immigrants from and markets to the south, took on the essential characteristics of an economic
outpost of British Malaya. King Vachiravudh's decision to move Trang to Thap Thieng during the
First World War. had no direct effect on these basic characteristics. Still, in physically shifting the
center of this local economy from Tha Chin to Thap Thieng, that decision did create a fresh settingfor
commerce, a new point of concentration for activities that may be fairly termed entrepreneurial. And,
by the 19308, when the trends of concern here began to emerge more clearly, the Hokkien, Cantonese,
. Hakka, and Hainanese whose backgrounds have been so briefly sketched out above had made Thap
Thieng the center of a range of economic activities about which fairly precise information is available.
A number of informants, including especially those from the Hokkien and Cantonese families
that would furnish Trang with its socio-economic elite in the middle decades of this century, told the
author quite explicitly that their families had moved from Tha Chin to Thap Thieng when "prosperity"
(khwamcharoen) made the same move or when the city came to that latter site. By 1929, that site
stretched, southeast to northwest, the better part of a kilometer from the Iow ground on which what
was now called Trang Station stood to the series of low hills, holding various government buildings.
As an observer looked back down from the court house, the provincial hall, the police station, or the
governor's residence, his most direct lines of sight were down the broad Rama VI Road and the
narrower, bent Ratchadamnern Road. It was around and just beyond the bend in that latter avenue,
where it changed direction from northeast- southwest to southeast-northwest, that the commercial
center of the new Trang lay. Other indications of this prosperity lay in the small Sin Wa Hok Kao
Chinese school along the railroad tracks, the electricity generating plant at the base of Rama VI Road,
the cinema opposite the court house, the spacious American missionary hospital and church on either
side of the first stretch of the road to Huey Yod, and the "Penang-style" homes of several wealthy
Cantonese merchants just off the lower end of Ratchadamnern Road l4.
On most days that latter neighborhood, in which many of the residents also conducted their
business, must have seemed the busiest place in Thap Thieng. Though Hokkien constituted the
dominant group in the area as a whole, some .combination of chance and inclination led to an
important Cantonese role in what was, in effect, Trang's downtown. The role of chance lay in the
circumstance that a single Cantonese family held ownership rights to much of the land that had
become the core of the new city. The role of inclination was that, as the recollections of informants
make clear, Cantonese were simply more likely to be found primarily engaged in commerce than the
more agriculturally oriented Hokkien,
In the case of the land-rich family alluded to in the preceding paragraph, we find a good example
of the leading entrepreneurs in Trang in this era before the arrival of the Second World War in
Southeast Asia. A small saw-mill, a government sanctioned opium den, and exports of pigs to Penang
and imports of Shell kerosene from Singapore illustrate, respectively, the Saingam family's
14- Phaenphang sadaeng kanpaksao phatsaifaifa paitam thanon .changwat trang, National Archives (Map
Room); P. R. VII P.Sl Trang. For the name of the Chinese school, Rongrien thap thieng hua chiaw sia
siaw: ruam sailuat khiaw khao lueng trang (Trang: Samakhom barnrung kansuksa trang, 1986)..
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involvement in the local economy, in the acquisition of economic privileges granted by the Siamese
state, and above all in the trade that continuedto holdTrang in the economic orbit of Malaya.
When every third day saw the Thap Thieng market open for business and local commercial
energy concentrated in and around the big complex of stalls fronting on Ratchadamnern Road and
backed by a series of streets running off at odd angles toward Rama VI Roadl 5, the commercial
acumen of the Cantonese was likewisevery much in evidence.At the same time, Hokkien and Hakka
vendors and merchants played a role both in this market and in the smaller satellite markets held in
regular rotation in the outlyingdistrictand sub-district of the province.
The broad variety of goods for sale at the Thap Thieng market by the end of the 1930s makes
clear both its role as the heart of a retail economy of some sophistication and the scope of the
commercial possibilities that it presented to the enterprising. In addition to such bulk goods, staples,
and hardware as cloth, rice, coconut oil, betel, lime, timber, and axes, its vendors also offered such
fresh goods as fish, meat, fruit, eggs, and sugar cane juice l 6• Choice for buyers also meant
opportunity for sellers. And such opportunity, enhancedby one Siamese state policy that would come
to alter the basic characteristicsof commerce in Thap Thieng, drew to Trang the vanguard of a new
groupof entrepreneurs.
In Trang as in other parts of in Siam to which the stale extended rail lines, their construction
brought with it local people's exposure to Teochiu laborers often freshly recruited from China
(Skinner, 1957, p. 114). Among those in this group who worked on the Thung Song-Trang spur of
the southern line of the railroad in the years after 1910, few would seem to have remained in the
provinceafter the completionof this work. At most, they appear to have left behind them the memory
of unpropertied coolies whose lot in life contrastedstarkly with that of the prosperous small-holders
and traders of the area. Whether this memory or one of much longer standing accounted for local
Hokkien and Cantonese hostility to Teochiu remains unclear. Whatever the case, an informant who
calls his own the first Teochiu family to settle in Thap Thieng, in the late 1920s, remembers this
hostility as having been potentially murderous!". Nevertheless, by the 1930s ease of access and
magnitude of opportunity had begun to draw Teochiu to Thap Thieng. Rail and rich markets led one
informant's mother, a Siam-born Teochiu married to an immigrant from Swatow, to begin to make
short-term trips with goods to sell in Trang from her home in Phetchaburi. Before many years had
passed, she had moved her family to Trang. And, again in this last decade before the Second World
15- In addition to the map cited in note 22 above, cf. Phaenthi sadaeng tho rabai nam, National Archives,
MT. 5.16.7jBox I/Folder 4. This latter map dates from 1934.
16- Banchi atrakep ngeunkhasingkhong phanpradu talatnat thap thieng (1939), National Archives, MT.
5.16/Box 5/Folder 110.
17- Two informants--one a Hokkien, the other a Teochiu, and both among Chinese Trang'srnost respected
citizens--confirm the virulence of this former hostility. Interestingly, the father of the Teochiu came to
Thap Thieng with his family from Penang. He later sent at least one of his sons to complete his education
there, as did many local families of some means. This family was, then, much more a part of the Straits-
oriented segment of Trang society than other Teochiu discussed or alluded to in this paper; even in 1993,
this distinction remains evident in a number of subtle ways.
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War, other Teochiu--like the informant who came with her mother from NakhonPathom to sell salt,
onions, dried peppers, and garlic from a stall in the Thap Thieng market after her father returned to
China and remarried--were making similar moves.
Arrival by way of sojourns in other towns along the railway between Bangkok and Trang was
not rare; Suratthani, or "Ban Don," came up frequently in conversation with informants. Nor was
deciding to come to Thap Thieng in order to join relatives or merely Teochiu of the same surname
uncommon. And yet it is following the railroad to Trang and engaging in petty trade in staples or such
bulk goods as cloth once there that one must take as the most noteworthy constants in this initial
wave of Teochiu migration into the area18. To contemporary observers the arrival of Teochiu petty
traders could hardly have seemed terribly noteworthy relative to another aspect of these same pre- war
years. The Trang Hokkien were laying the foundations of a new "cultural core." And at the center of
this reorganized economy would be the cultivation of para rubber.
Rubber not only eclipsed but actually replaced pepper as the focus of Hokkien agricultural
activity in Thap Thieng proper and in the surroundingsub-district during the 1930s. Perhaps as a result
of this crop's lower relative labor requirements, at least some Hokkien planters began to manage
holdings of an unprecedented scale, sometimes scattered across a number of widely separated sites.
These consequential internal changes worked, however, only to reinforce Thap Thieng's patterns of
contact with wider markets. Local traders-Hokkien, Cantonese, and Hakka alike-- remained active in
the Penang trade. Now, though, raw rubber comprised an increasing share of that trade's volume. And
this shift in the Thap Thieng-to-Penang trade engendered in its turn certain changes in the composition
of the flow of goods in the other direction. The local market for kerosene noted above was, for
example, to no little degree a function of rubber cultivators' need for a source of light as they worked
their trees in the pre-dawn hours19.
18- Skinner (1957, p. 51) takes earlier difficulties in overland communication between Bangkok and the
south of Siam as the prime determinant of the peopling of that latter part of the country by Chinese who
arrived by way of Penang, Singapore, and Songkhla. As noted above, this pattern would have had very
specific consequences for the resultant speech-group balance. One wonders, however, whether Skinner
would today, after devoting several decades of scholarship to the development and elaboration of theories
_of regional systems, still view matters quite so unproblematically. In a sense, however, he anticipates
some of the broadest implications of his later work in viewing, Chinese Society in Thailand. p. 255,
southern Siam before the Second World War as a zone of high Hokkien prestige and power and Bangkok
and most of the rest of the country as basically Teochiu-influenced and -dominated in that same period. All
this is fruitfully considered in light of G. William Skinner (1985): 271-292.
19- Skinner relates that the period to the outbreak of the Second World War saw all segments of the rubber
industry in Siam in Chinese hands. Production in this period was concentrated on small-holdings, mostly
belonging to settlers from Malaya. And the rubber trade in Siam was a largely Hokkien preserve from its
very earliest years. Cf. Skinner (1957, p. 216). Laurence D. Stifel (1973, p. 108) casts some light on the
timing of the emergence of rubber as the leading crop in Trang's agricultural economy. in noting that the
increases in Siamese rubber production in the 1930 were due to the high prices of the 1920s. These had
stimulated a burst of new planting.
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The emergence of rubber as a major element in the economy centered on Thap Thieng had come
about with remarkable speed. But, as noted just above, Trang rubber relied initially on long-
established patterns of trade for access to outside markets. In this earliest phase in the history of the
Trang rubber economy, then, the importance of Penang as the market of first instance meant that the
dramatic rise of this new commodity required no fundamental re-ordering of commerce. At the same
time, the nascent rubber economy offered greatest returns to assets in land on which one could plant
para rubber trees rather than to pioneering drive or commercial acumen. It has been noted above that in
Thap Thieng these assets lay largely in the hands of Hokkien planters rather than Cantonese
merchants. The new "cultural core" thus came to bolster the elite status of a group of Hokkien whose
wel1 developed sense of their own identity included sentiments very similar to an aversion to
commerce.
2. The Post-War, Pre-NIC Decades
Between economy and society in the Trang of the late 1930s and those of the late 1940s
continuity proved far stronger than change. Commerce in Thap Thieng recovered quickly from the
inactivity and dislocation that had accompanied war and occupation. A strong rubber market explained
much of the pace of that recovery. Still, while basic internal socio-economic configurations remained
largely unchanged, their dependence on external markets required a certain process of
institutionalization before they were secure. One may view this process as the completion of a
sequence of developments arrested by the onset of the Pacific War.
The essentially ad hoc arrangements characteristic of the export of Trang para rubber in the
19308 had sufficed in an era ofrelatively low volume. Now, however, as large numbers of Thai small-
holders joined their Hokkien predecessors in rubber cultivation, the greatly increased volume of the
country's production 20 of and trade in this commodity called for new, more sophisticated channels of
access to the world market. In response. the Singapore-based firms Tai Tong21 and Teck Bee Hang.
had, by the early 1950s, established local facilities to purchase, grade, smoke, and ship rubber. Sin
Thai Mining and Rubber, managed from Hat Yai, and Huey Chuan, based in Bangkok, soon fol1owed
these first two firms into Trang with operations of their own.
The latter three of these four first big rubber companies to arrive on the Thap Thieng
commercial scene still maintained their operations there into the 1990s22. Over the four decades since
those operations opened, a series of other firms would establish local presences to purchase and smoke
para rubber. In the late 1960s, B. U. Commercial and Far East Rubber shared the market with Krung
20- Stifel (1973, pp. 120-121). On the increased role of ethnic Thai small-holders in rubber cultivation
during this period, cf. Skinner (1957, p. 350).
21- Later called "Krung Saeng."
22- Teck Bee Hang in Thailand is now independent of Singapore; it also uses the Thai name "Yang Thai Phak
Tai."
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Saeng, Teck Bee Hang, Sin Thai, and Huey Chuan23. By the early 1990s, the Rubber Merchants
Association grouping all rubber-exporting companies with facilities in Trang included, in addition to
those latter three firms, United Trang Rubber, Thai Union Rubber, Unimac, Thawee Sap Rubber, and
Sri Trang Agro- Industry.
The structure of the local para rubber business changed far less in the 1950-1990 period than the
above lists might seem to indicate. For one, a single firm, Teck Bee Hang, dominated the market for
most of the period. Further, firms often changed names or saw groups of their local employees resign
in order to establish competing firms on their. own. Most striking, however, is the lack of
participation of local entrepreneurs in the establishment and growth of any of these companies.
Early on, a number of prominent local figures operated small rubber-smoking plants of their
own, and the Rubber Merchants Association included them as well as the big firms and a number of
rubber-buying middlemen among its members. And many well known local Hokkien worked for and
even managed the Trang operations of the big rubber companies24. But this sector never saw a local
entrepreneur move on from planting or trading rubber-or, for that matter, from any other pursuit-to
establishing his own smoking and exporting firm in competition with outside capital. Of the firms
active today, United Trang Rubber, Thawee Sap Rubber, Thai Union Rubber, and Unimac are all based
in Trang. The latter company is a joint venture between Thai Union Rubber and Japanese interests.
Hat Yai-based Sri Trang Agro-Industry, listed on the Securities Exchange of Thailand, is actually run
from Trang. Each of these five firms represents a case, however, of the aforementioned pattern of the
local personnel of a given rubber company leaving that company and pooling their resources to
establish a new firm.
In fact, many local figures have today, as they have had historically, access to resources
comparable to those of the local branches of the big rubber exporters operating in the Trang market.
But, in 1990 no less than in 1950, relationships with overseas buyers--principally American,
European, and Japanese tire manufacturers--have been more essential assets for these firms than capital
or even skill in trading. This reality certainly explained the pioneering role of Singapore-based firms in
Trang in the years after the Second World War. It also appears more than any other single factor to
account for the specific form of the links between Thap Thieng and world para rubber markets in the
four ensuing decades.
The Hokkien from Singapore or Bangkok sent out to run the local branches of the firms that
embodied those links must have found themselves very much at home in Trang25. And, as noted
above, they hired numerous Thap Thieng Hokkien to fill management positions in those branches.
But, nothing illustrates the integration of the big rubber companies-fundamental to the local economy
23- Thamnieb rongngan utsahakam phaktai (Songkhla: Sun setthakit utsahakam phaktai, 2520), p. 49.
24- Skinner (1957. pp. 315 & 351) notes continued Hokkien dominance of the rubber trade, including
processing and export, in the post-war period.
25- Skinner (1957, p. 211) confirms, too, that Hokkien comprised the predominant group in Trang town at
least through the mid-1950s.
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yet not locally owned--into the town's society so clearly as their relationship with the Trang
Association for the Supportof Education.
Led by Nai Man Sinchai, the central figure in ThapThiengChinesesociety in the post-war era,
until his death in i97026, the association established and ran a system of schools including Thap
Thieng Hua Chiaw Sia Siaw School,Trang WithayaSchool, and Satri Trang Withaya School27. The
first of these schools still exists. In 1985, the association merged the latter two into Saha Trang
WithayaSchool; it occupies the site on the Huey YodRoad thatNai Man purchased for 3,000 baht at
the time of the establishment of Trang Withaya28. These schools, which initially served principally
children whose homes were "in the market," enjoyed the consistent financial support of commercial
interests of all kinds in ThapThieng. But a very special relationship characterized the supportextended
to the Association for the Support of Education by the Rubber Merchants Association and by its
individual members29.
Just as the rubber companies did so much to sustain privateeducation in Thap Thieng, so para
rubber itself brought previously unknown prosperity to Trang in the early 1950s. This prosperity
intensified a pre-war pattern: the migration to Trang of traders, most notably Teochiu, from Bangkok
and other points along the rail line to Trang30. Informants remember the decade after 1945as a time
when Teochiu businessfirst achievedvisibility in Trang, when merchants of other speech-groups just
could not manage offer goodsas cheaply as theTeochiu, and when spoken "Chinese" effectively came
to meanTeochiu in the Thap Thieng market.
Significantly, these years werealso a time in which Trang saw itself very favorably positioned
in the regional transportation system. Local merchants who took delivery of goods by rail could
exploit this advantage by engaging in wholesale tradewith Phuket,Krabi,and other parts of southern
Thailandstill neglected by the national transportation grid.Trang was, in regional terms, "a big city."
The four principal grocery and general stores in Thap Thieng during this time exemplified
Teochiu commerce in its period of ascendancy. Though their proprietors had in fact come to Trang
either before or early in the Second World War, they only really graduated out of the stalls in the
marketand into the shop- houses surrounding it in the several yearsafter thatconflict'send31. And the
26- Cf. Anusorn Nai Man Sinchai (Hat Yai, 1970).
27- Established, respectively in 1947, 1951, and 1953. Cf. Rongrien thap thieng hua chiaw sia siaw: ruam
sailuat khiaw khao lueng trang (Trang: Samakhom bamrung kansuksa trang, 1986), p. 13.
28- Ibid., pp. 13 and 19. \ -
. \
29- Nai Man was succeeded as chairman of the Association for the Support of Education by Sun-t~k I
Chanlongbutr, a Hokkien from Saraburi who had come to Trang with Sin Thai Mining and Rubber.
30- The experience of Trang, in terms of Teochiu migration, would seem to fit a national pattern. Skinner
(1957, pp. 89 and 209) points out that this group spread into sub-regions of Thailand with the
development of transportation infrastructure, first rail and then roads.
31- Chia Huey Liak and Tou Nguan Ki first worked for or with Chia Meng Huat and 'Tou Nguan Thai,
respectively, before starting their own businesses. In each case, an earlier migrant to Trang took in and
employed a later migrant of the same surname at the time of the latter's arrival.
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goods that they handled, which fell into two basic categories, reflected those origins. On the one hand,
they engaged in both wholesale and retail trade in such bulk staples as rice, salt, sugar, onions, and
various varieties of beans and other field crops. At the same time, they also sold such packaged, brand-
name goods as flour, canned milk, matches, cement, canned fish, and detergent.
Common to both these sorts of merchandise, however, was their source: Bangkok32. In the
case of the often large quantities of the bulk staples that they handled, these merchants relied on long-
term credit relationships with fellow Teochiu brokers in the capital. Access to such reliable sources of
goods of this sort facilitated price arbitraging and other forms of commercial speculation. Potential .
returns were enormous, but so were potential losses. The commerce in branded goods helped stabilize
income. Among the branded goods, the proprietors of the four large Teochiu groceries sought and
secured exclusive distribution rights, or "agencies," from the Bangkok-based producers or importers of
at least flour, canned milk, matches, arid detergent. Given their extreme profitability, these agencies
were particularly valued illlil particularly difficult to secure. A merchant had to convince a manufacturer
. that his store could move a large enough volume of the product in question for the latter to be willing
to forego contact with any other distributor in the territory to be covered by the arrangement. Often
enough, it appears, Thap Thieng-based Teochiu were sufficiently convincing.
Nor were such arrangements limited to the grocery and general merchandise trade. As the
spending power of local consumers increased, other markets displayed a similar pattern of development.
By the late 1950s, the son of the Teochiu trader who had moved her family to Thap Thieng from
Phetehaburi before the Second World War had secured the Honda motorcycle agency for all of southern
Thailand from the Bangkok firm that was the exclusive Thai importer. And this pattern reflected the
essential economic role of the newly prominent Trang Teochiu in the long three or four decades after
the end of the Second World War. They served above all as local distributors of goods from Bangkok,
often obtained through fellow Teochiu based in that city.
The prosperity characteristic of Trang in the first two decades following the conclusion.of the
Second World War revealed a very sharp commercial contrast. It rested on the production of a
commodity whose delivery to wider markets proved beyond the capacity of local entrepreneurs. At the
same time, that prosperity created strong demand at both the wholesale and retail levels for goods
available only on the national consumer market then emerging in Thailand. And one group of Thap
Thieng entrepreneurs seemed to have mastered the channels of access to that national market on the
most favorable terms.
3. Entrepreneurial Trends in Contemporary Trang
While their position in national commercial networks brought great prosperity to many Trang
Teochiu, the.possibility of business failure always remained. The mid-1960s saw a series of financial
32- Skinner's observation (1957, p. 318) that the years after the end of the Second World War saw Teochiu
move into what he calls "the sundry-goods trade" at Hakka expense helps put developments in Trang into a
broader perspective.
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setbacks for the proprietor of one of the groceries discussed above. By the time of Tou Nguan Ki's
death toward the end of the decade, his older sons faced the prospect of repaying his debts with the
proceeds of a much smaller operation than that run by their father in his prime. And so, while one of
them devoted himself to strictly local trade in rice, another accepted employment as a salesman for a
Bangkok-based manufacturer of f1avor-enhancing seasoning powder. Before long, his travels led to a
network of contacts among the rice mills of northern and northeastern Thailand. These contacts in turn
assured his Thap Thieng-based brother earlier and cheaper access to large quantities of rice for wholesale
not only in Trang but also, before long, in Nakhon ~ri Thammarat, Phatthalung, Hat Yai, and even
Sungai Golok on the Malaysian border. Of course, as Trang lay far off the rail lines linking many of
these markets with the rest of the country, much of the rice so supplied never passed through Thap
Thieng at all33. That Tou Nguan Ki's sons continued to base themselves there in their new, very
lucrative role as regional middlemen trading a good neither produced nor for the most part sold in Trang
must be attributed to inertia, sentiment, or perhaps some combination of the two.
Among Teochiu merchants who kept their businesses essentially local these years proved far
less happy. Infrastructural development reduced Trang's role as a regional commercial center. Honda
soon granted distributorships to dealers in other southern provinces. In time, it would supply two or
three dealers in Trang alone. The manufacturers of many lines of packaged goods also terminated
agency-type relationships with local traders. The response of the families of the other three prominent
Teochiu grocers to the changed, more difficult local commercial environment lay, first, in resigning
themselves to lower profit rates in the grocery business. Second, two of the three families also
diversified into bottled water and ice production, oil palm cultivation and crushing, and the distribution
of imported liquor. These undertakings met with considerable success. They represented, however, their
owners' acceptance of their status as purely local- or perhaps provincial-level businessmen. Bangkok-
based firms had made use of the ability of merchants in Thap Thieng to facilitate market penetration
for a period lasting several decades. In the end, however, those firms found that they could market their
products without the sorts of relationships with local merchants that an earlier period had required. And
so these merchants saw themselves essentially re-absorbed into the great bulk of Teochiu traders in
Trang, who had always been primarily engaged in retail commerce-'".
In the 1980s, the sons of Tou Nguan Ki continued to resist such re-absorption. Their Trang-
based canned fish firm became nationally famous through an intensive advertising campaign conducted
by their Bangkok -based marketing arm. Diversifying into other lines of processed foods, they
established a distribution system hardly different from those of the firms whose products their father
had sold during the age of agencies. In Khlong Teng, on the road to Huey Yod, they established-with
technical help from Japan--a modem facility for the production of surimi and frozen sea-food. And, on
33- Skinner (1957, pp. 136 and 315) notes both the long history of Teochiu primacy in rice-milling in
Thailand and also continued Teochiu dominance in the rice trade after 1945. Here again, then, Trang
Teochiu could draw on a speech-group-based network of commercial ties.
34- The termination of "agent"- or "compradore"-style commercial banking in Trang showed very close
parallels to the end of commercial agencies described in the preceding paragraph. Though beyond the
scope of this paper, that former story supports many of the conclusions proposed in this section.
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the site where their rice business had once stood at the major Thap Thieng intersection of Rama VI
Road and the Kantang Road, they built the biggest, finest hotel that Trang had ever seen. Most
recently, having paid 120 million baht for the site that Nai Man Sinchai originally bought for Trang
Withaya School on the Huey Yod Road, they have undertaken to construct modem commercial space at
the front of the property and, at the back, an even larger, grander hotel35• And, from very early on,
they courted and won the friendship and even patronage of nationally prominent and well connected
business figures. In all of these activities, they were utterly exceptional among the entrepreneurs of
Thap Thieng.
Of the basic common characteristics that Clifford Geertz observed among the entrepreneurs of
Modjokuto, all three are relevant to the merchants of Thap Thieng whose story this essay has sketched
out First, trade, initially with Malaya and later with Bangkok and other regions of Thailand, has given
each of Thap Thieng's economic elites in the last six decades its initial advantage. In the middle third
of that period, also, particular relationships with firms in the country's one large urbancenter were
central to success in that trade. Second, in Thap Thieng as in Modjokuto, the commercial elite has
shared membership in a cohesive, self-conscious group. Its members were, after all, exclusively
Chinese, united for a long time by associational and educational activities. Even in 1993 Thap Thieng-
-and Trang as a whole--rernains an essentially "plural society." Thai and Sino- Thai do meet largely "in
the market-place" (Cf. John Sydenham Fumivall, 1948, p. 304). And pride and confidence bordering
on feelings of superiority characterize the self-consciousness of local Chinese36. Third, patterns of
increased consumption, accompanied by changes in taste, have fueled the economic success of Trang
entrepreneurs, above all in the period since the late 1940s.
Yet for all the similarities between patterns of entrepreneurial development in Modjokuto and
Thap Thieng, the essential challenge facing entrepreneurs in the two settings is nowise the same.
From the early days of Hokkien and Cantonese dominance in the years just following the end of the
absolute monarchy and certainly during the ascendancy of dynamic Teochiu entrepreneurs in the period
after the end of the Second World War, the economically active in Thap Thieng have never lacked the
ability to organize their activities on the basis of the firm. For that "organizational problem,"
solutions have been readily at hand.
In the event, a different sort of organizational problem has most inhibited the economically
active in Thap Thieng since Trang's integration into the Thai national economy and re- integration into
the world economy in the late 1940s and early the 19508.This problem has concerned the relationship
between local commerce and wider markets. The single most important factor in the lack of sustained
success of Thap Thieng-based entrepreneurs and in the truncated growth of their enterprises has been
35- The Association for the Support of Education has purchased a large new site for Saha Trang Withaya two
kilometers out of town on the road to Phatthalung.
36- Though speech-group rivalries can be as strong in Trang as is implied in the contrasts between Teochiu
on the one hand and Hokkien and Cantonese on the other repeatedly suggested in this essay, there is at the
same time no doubt that, vis-a-vis the Thai majority, the Chinese of ·Thap Thieng feel cohesion and
solidarity.
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their inability to negotiate links to the national and international economies on favorable terms, As the
cases of the big para rubber concerns and even of the Teochiu grocery stores indicate, one would err on
the side of oversimplification to view this problem in terms of a contest between local and outside
capital. After all, the rubber firms have never been particularly capital-intensive undertakings. And it is
the sons of the least rather than the most successful of the four principal Teochiu grocers who seem to
have solved this problem most advantageously. But their "solution" has basically required that they
become national-level businessmen, far more in their element in Bangkok than in Trang.
Much of the experience of the merchants of Thap Thieng suggests, in fact, strong parallels with .
that of their fellow ethnic Chinese on the opposite side of the Malaysian border. The analysis of Heng
Peck Koon notes the failure of many Malaysian Chinese businessmen to develop ties to the national
economy as re-ordered by the state under the New Economic Policy (Heng Peck Koon, 1992,pp 127-
144). This failure has condemned them to just the sort of exclusively local pursuits that characterize
much contemporary economic activity in Trang. The present essay has not followed Heng Peck Koon's
lead in laying stress on the importance of relationships with politically powerful patrons as the forms
which such ties often take. But neither should it be read to deny the importance of that kind of link,
especially in more recent decades.
The purpose of the foregoing account has been neither to offer helpful hints to prospective
provincial entrepreneurs nor to engage in debates in the comparative political economy of Southeast
Asia. This treatment of a number of themes in the commercial history of Thap Thieng has aimed,
rather, to make use of a rather drastically unconventional perspective to call attention to a specific
structural characteristic of the economy of modern Thailand. Taken as groups, both the early Hokkien
and Cantonese khahabodi (high ranked officers) and the more recently arrived Teochiu traders stumbled
before the specific entrepreneurial problem characterizing the Thap Thieng economy. It is useful to
recall that these groups are in a number of important ways more representative proxies for Thai
business--both in the provinces.and in Bangkok--as a whole than relatively narrow group of large and
well connected enterprises that have attracted most scholarly attention. One wonders, then, whether
their stumbling does not prefigure the nation's, as it seeks a path out of the economic "no man's land"
it currently wanders.
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The Buddhist Entrepreneur
Gerald W. Fry
The Master in the art of living makes little distinction between his work and his play, his labor
and his leisure, his mind and his body, his education and his recreation, his love and his religion. He
hardly knows which is which. He simply pursues his vision of excellence in whatever he does, leaving
others to decide whether he is working or playing. To him he is always doing both.
--Zen Buddhist text (L. Thurow 1992: 113)
He was not well educated, but he loved his work. He brought perfection to even the smallest
tasks, down to how he cleaned the ball and the mill when he was mixing ceramics. There was a purity
to his actions, a love of working as an end in itself. This man is like a Zen monk, thought Inamori.
The art is in the doing, in the making. 'I watched him day after day and saw the pleasure that even the
tiniest detail gave him. Suddenly I realized that the pleasure was in.the doing ...
"In Japanese, the generic word for 'craftsmanship,' saiku, translates literally as 'delicate
workmanship.' In other words, to craft something is to make it much smaller and fashion it delicately.
And besides, the prefix ko (small) can be attached to form the word kosaiku, 'small, delicate
workmanship.' Conversely, something which is large and ungainlyis called busaiku (not delicately
crafted). In Japan things that have been reduced in scale and minutely crafted are not mere miniatures.
They are more charming and more powerful than their larger counterparts, and there is something of a
mysterious aura to them" (David Halberstam, 1992: 91).
"In the 1960s, much of the world looked to the United States as a model of management
efficiency" (0- Young Lee, 1982: 19-20). Reflecting this admiration, Servan-Schreiber (1968) wrote
The American Challenge, urging Europeans to reform their management system by drawing upon
America's success (see also Hockel 1967). In the subsequent two decades leading into the 1990s,
America's leadership has waned, and there is talk of "the Pacific Century" (see Macrae 1975; Hofheinz
and Calder 1982; Linder 1986; Kotkin and Kishimoto 1988; Kovalenko 1988; Goureviteh 1989; Chan
1990; Clark and Chan 1992). Despite initial successes in the microprocessing industry, U.S.
productivity has stagnated and its international competitiveness has been challenged even in a number
of high technology areas (see Scherer 1992; Thurow 1992). During the 1970s, the U.S. was last
among industrial countries in productivity increases. Increasing costs also characterize the public sector
(particularly in health services and education), while the quality of public services has frequently
deteriorated. The poor performance of American students on standard international tests of science and
mathematics mirrors the low productivity gains of industry and the public sector. In an influential new
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volume, Reinventing Government, David Osborne (1992) makes a call for major reform in the
organization and delivery of public services.
The French sociologist, Michael Crozier, long an admirer of America's emphasis on
innovation, is a1anned by the situation, as illustrated by these remarks: "I have just spent four months
in the United States. I was struck by the extraordinary loss of vitality, which seemed to me to be a
serious and worrying phenomenon... Everyone is waiting, while continuing to act as they did in the
past. The crisis that is now upon America goes beyond business, the university and the intellectual
world. It is a moral problem... The Americans now fear change, and they are bewildered. There is no
longer any enthusiasm for undertaking new things." (cited in Servan-Schreiber, 1981: 235-236).
Related to the European reaction is the persistent phenomenon of bureaucratic pathology. Burns
and Stalker (1961) first introduced the notion of pathology in discussing resistance to change and
technical progress in the electronics industry. They even spoke of organization for resistance to
change. Bureaucratic pathology is also characterized by individuals who are indifferent towards their
jobs and public or private clients. Pathological organizations resist change, are disabled by excessive
conflict, and are unable to deliver quality services to the larger community. Finally, bureaucratic
pathology is characterized by rigid and overly hierarchical authority structures. Such pathology appears
to a major problem in a number of the former communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. The Swedish entrepreneur, Percy Barnewick, CEO of ABB Asea Brown Boveri (based in
Zurich), is one of the world's most insistent enemies of bureaucracy and has organized his company in
a highly decentralized way to minimize bureaucracy (peters 1992: 44-55).
In response to this malaise, the U.S. electorate went to the polls in record numbers in 1992 and
voted for a major political change. Like Thailand, the U.S. elected its first Democratic Party president
since 1976. In his December 1992 two-day economic summit ("search conference") Clinton brought
together a highly diverse group of intellectuals, business leaders, Iabor leaders, community activists,
and ordinary citizens to address the extremely serious economic and bureaucratic problems facing the
US. as it approaches the next century.
There have been four other major reactions to America's crisis in management. First, there is a
growing interest in industrial democracy and the related experiences of Scandinavia (Carnoy and Shearer
1980). Second, there is a movement towards anarchy and escape from formal organizational life, as
exemplified by Richard Cornuelle's (1975) De-Managing America: The Final Revolution. Third,
among some American organizations there appears to be a growing interest in introducing major
changes and innovations (see Peters 1992; Strasser and Becklund 1991). The investment by General
Motors in computers and robotics and Ford's new approach to job security are relevant examples.
Fourth, related to the above changes at General Motors and Ford and most relevant to this paper is the
growth of interest in Asian management practices (Aamo 1985; Everett et al. 1984), particularly those
of Japan, as illustrated by the current popularity of studies of Japanese management, industry, and
organization (see, e.g., Vogel 1979; Deming 1982: 99-110; Lee 1982; Schonberger 1982; Halberstam
1986; Aoki 1988; Kline 1990; Fujimoto 1991; Kodama 1991; Ziemba and Schwartz 1992). Given
Japan's economic problems at this time and dramatic stock market decline, a pessimistic literature on
the Japanese economy is also attracting attention currently (see, e.g., Wood 1992 and Reading 1992).
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Back in 1970, Anders Richter wrote an intriguing article entitled, "The Existential Executive".
Drawing on existential philosophy, he infers implications for executives. Buddhist philosophy also
has importance for the applied social sciences as illustrated by Schumacher's (1975; 1979) previous
work on the development of Buddhist economics. Similarly Buddhism contains many insights directly
relevant to entrepreneurship and leadership. The objective of this paper is to outline major Buddhist
concepts relevant to entrepreneurial behavior and performance.
Many of the countries in the dynamic Pacific Basin which have become or are becoming im-
pressive economic success stories are part of the Buddhist cultural area (see Vogel 1991). While the
Protestant ethic may have underpinned the Industrial Revolution, the Buddhist ethic may be more rele-
vant to the rapidly changing world of the teletronic revolution. By teletronic revolution, I refer to the
rapid changes in both the microprocessing and telecommunications revolutions and their integration.
Given the limited carrying capacity of the planet and the impossibility of maximum industrialization,
the Buddhist ethic of modest consumption is likely to become increasingly influential.
Reflective of the teletronic revolution is the new Iridium Project recently approved in Spain by
the International Telecommunications Union. This project, which involves the launching of 66
satellites, will make possible direct communication between any two people anywhere in the world,
without knowledge of their location at the time. Of special interest to the Buddhist entrepreneur are
technologies which are both convivial and which encourage intellectual cooperation and collaboration
(see llIich 1973; Schrage 1990).
1. Major Buddhist Concepts Relevant to Entrepreneurship, Leadership,
and Management
There is an extensive literature on Buddhist thought, philosophy, and practice (see e.g., '
Buddhadasa 1971, 1979, 1980, 1986; Siri 1965; Phra Rajavaramuni 1987; Suzuki 1973; Dumoulin
1992). The Buddhist concepts introduced here derive primarily from the thinking of Buddhadasa
Bhikku, a Theravada Buddhist scholar residing in Chaiya, Thailand (see Jackson 1988; 1989). A major
concern of Buddhadasa has been to suggest how Buddhist principles can be applied in secular settings.
The key Buddhist concepts discussed here are as follows:
Sati (Mindfulness)
Annata (Non-self)
Anicca (Impermanence)
Wabi (Contentment)
Upekkha (Tranquility)
Also discussed are a Buddhist conception of work and the Buddhist-related khit-pen approach to
analytical thinking (Kowit 1975).
The profile of the Buddhist entrepreneur presented here is, of course, an ideal type. No actual
individual entrepreneur may conform perfectly with the ideals presented. The intention is primarily to
stimulate thinking about how Buddhist philosophy may contribute to more effective, happier, and
playful entrepreneurship.
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Several qualifications are necessary. The conception of the Buddhist leader is not limited to
Asian thought. Writers such as Cleveland, Gross, Drucker, Argyris, and even great Iiterati such as
Tolstoy echo a number of Buddhist themes in their creative thoughts on leadership. Also other
religions such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Judaism similarly contain valuable insights
related to entrepreneurship and leadership (Burki 1986).
1.1 Sati (Mindfulness)
Sati, meaning rnindfulness, is an important concept in Buddhism (see Thich 1991). The basic
argument is that much human suffering results from a failure to be mindful. A lack of mindfulness is
the source of many problems for the entrepreneur. Even if they are ever mindful, leaders will face
difficult problems. Many potential problems, however, can be avoided by being mindful, particularly,
of time constraints, important deadlines, the effects of actions on diverse groups, and the need for
appropriate and inclusive participation. Procrastination is another example of a failure to be mindful.
Mindfulness is also a major element in being a foresighted planner who can overcome tempocentrism
(that is, an excessive reliance on contemporary perspectives and values) (see Sippanondha 1990).
Mindful of the long term, Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of the Japanese Matsushita Corporation,
had a 25Q-yearplan for his organization. The Harvard social psychologist, Ellen J. Langer (1989), has
written a whole volume devoted to the important concept of mindfulness.
The Korean scholar, O-Young Lee (1982: 57) elegantly describes the mindful attitude in his
study of miniaturization in Japan: "The concept of attitude can be found in daily life as well as the
arts, and it manifests itself in individual and group behavior. It can be seen in the meticulous planning
of responses to possible future occurrences, in the concentration of mental energies, and, in general, in
the mental outlook of the Japanese. The word here is kokorogamae, which means 'mental attitude' and
suggests readiness or preparedness".
For centuries in rural Thai villages, particularly in the north and northeast, there has been a
vibrant tradition of silk weaving, the products of which the entrepreneur, Jim Thompson, popularized
around the world. The production of silk and other textiles reflects an important aesthetic tradition
mirroring that of Buddhism with its elegant temples and exquisite Buddha images. Such artistic and
. aesthetic talents developed over the centuries in traditional settings ironically prepare individuals for
the world of high technology miniaturization. Thailand, for example, is now becoming a major
producer of the tiny bearings needed in various electronic goods such as the automatic window openers
in automobiles. Thus, Thailand appears to have similar synergies between traditional culture and high
technology noted by Lee in his study of miniaturization in Japan.
1.2 Annata (Non - Self)
This is a concept central to Buddhism and refers to the illusionary nature of the ego or self.
.Preoccupation with ego or self is considered by Buddhists to be the major source of human suffering.
Non-self is certainly the most crucial trait for a Buddhist entrepreneur. Non-self, that is, the absence of
self, is important for several reasons:
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First, effective leaders must encourage criticism and feedback. Leaders with a strong ego
orientation fear criticism for it may tarnish their self and public image (cf. Bums 1978: 449,457).
Leaders who are "selfless" should be able to tolerate and even encourage criticism of their actions and
performance. They are open to learning from failure. John Kennedy's quick acceptance of his
responsibility for the Bay of Pigs failure exemplifies this trait.
Second, effective entrepreneurs choose and. select highly capable subordinates. In fact, such
leaders try to surround themselves with brighter individuals. In contrast, ego oriented leaders tend to
fear competent subordinates and surround themselves with yes-men and cronies.
Third, ego-oriented leaders want everyone to like them, and they seek to please all. Such
"affiliative" leaders tend not to be effective (McClellandand Burnham 1976: 100-110). Effective leaders
must have the courage to say no and to make decisions which may in fact antagonize or displease
specific groups. Selfless leaders without tender egos should be able to make such hard decisions more
easily. They realize that it is impossible to be liked by all, if they are to carry out their duties
responsibly and creatively.
Fourth, effective leaders give credit to their subordinates and praise their efforts. They share
status, power, and rewards. They delegate authority and responsibility. In his new volume on
liberation management, Tom Peters (1992: 466) places special stress on the need for entrepreneurs to
delegate. In contrast, ego-oriented managers want to claim credit for themselves and use their
subordinates' efforts only to enhance their own image and prestige. Being overly concerned with
individual achievement, the self-oriented leaders tend to do too many things themselves and, thus, fail
to "know the time" (Drucker 1967: 25).
Fifth, self-oriented leaders are interested in personal aggrandizement. They tend to exercise
power impulsively and lack self-control. As McClelland and Burnham (1976: 103) put it, "they are
more rude to other people, they drink too much, they try to exploit others sexually, and they collect
symbols of personal prestige such as fancy cars or big offices" .The recent problems of Senator Bob
Packwood in Oregon related to sexual abuses and excessive drinking are a vivid example of such faults
of leaders.
Sixth, the wise and astute leader is willing to "exchange status for substance" (Cohen and
March 1974: 208-209). Again the selfless leader should be more willing to give up some of the
pleasures of self-importance. As Cohen and March (p. 209) aptly state: "Since leaders receive credit for
may things over which they have little control and to which they contribute little, they should find it
possible to accomplish some of the things they want by allowing others to savor the victories, enjoy
the pleasures of involvement, and receive the profits of public importance".
Finally, selfless entrepreneurs can devote themselves to the crucial matters that extend beyond
the self, that is, the super ordinate goals of the organizations and society, including the effective
fulfillment of broader responsibilities. The self-oriented leader, preoccupied with individual concerns,
too often neglects the organization and its fundamental purposes.
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1.3 Wabi (Contentment)
The Japanese Buddhist writer,Daisetz Suzuki, discusses the importantconcept of wabi, which
refers to a type of Buddhist contentment. It is being: satisfied with a little hut, a room of two or three
tatami (mats),like the log cabin of Thoreau, and with a dish of vegetables picked in the neighboring
\
fields and perhaps listening to the patteringof a gentle spring rain (Suzuki 1973:23)..
In both Chinese and Japanese organizational life, there is an emphasis on modesty and self-re-
straint (Pascale and Athos 1981: 130).Buddhist leadersare content with a modest life style. They rec-
ognize a worldof limits.Theycan not persuadetheir citizensor staff to have more realistic and limited
aspirations if they themselves live extravagantly and ostentatiously. California's former governor and
recent presidential candidate, Jerry Brown, perhaps best reflects this type of leadership style among
Western politicians (Bollens and WiIliams 1978). The rather discouraging irony is that Brown's em-
phasis on personal modesty wasridiculed by the American mediaas being "flaky"and frivolous.
1.4Annica(Impermanence)
This fundamental Buddhist principle stresses the impermanence of all things and the
inevitability of change. The effective entrepreneur recognizes and accepts this principle. The
subordinate you step on today may be your superior tomorrow. Buddhist leaders, conscious of
impermanence, should be open to constructive change and innovation. They should not cling to old
ways of doing things. Since leaderscome and go, they should also not be overly attached to their own
positions. The more they cling to their jobs, the more likely they are to lose them. The dramatic fall
of Richard Nixon is a classic exampleof excessiveattachmentto position.
RG.H. Siu (1975: 637), in discussing Chinese baseball and public administration, notes that
"in the ball game of public administration, everything is flux and all systems are open". The
importance of impermanence in the private sector is similarly echoed by Masatoshi Naito, chief of
design at the well-known MatsushitaCorporation: "You in the West think of [consumer electronics]
products as consumer durables, things whichlast. For you consumption is an act which you undertake
in bursts, periodically. Japanese consumption is a continuous cycle of new products replacing old
products,everything is in a processof change,nothing endures.We do not seek permanence.3 (cited in
Peters 1992: 3).
1.5 Ubekkha (Tranquility)
As Kauss (1974) points out, leaders live withcrises.Tranquility is one of the cardinal virtues of
Buddhism. Individuals respond to crises in different manners. We all know through personal
experiences of leaders and athletes who "choked" understress. They lacked that grace under pressure
which reveals the great leader. Leaders with a non-self orientation are likely to display an ability to
remain tranquil in crisis. The coolnessdisplayedby both sides in the abortive April 1981 coup attempt
in Thailand illustrates Buddhistcalm under tensionand pressure. The quick return to tranquillity after
the king's intervention following the dramatic May 1992 violence in Thailand is another classic
.example of this principle. In a non-Buddhist culture, it is hard to imagine that such tensions and
polarization could havebeen so quicklydissolved.
328
2. A Buddhist View of Work.
Buddhadasa (1975: 20-26) has described a Buddhist view of work. He categorizes work in four ways:
1.Working for one's own selfish desires.
2. Working for the sake of working.
3. Work that doesn't feel like being work.
4. There is no work; it is not work.
The first category connotes working for extrinsic rewards such as money and prestige. The
second category implies work as a form of duty. The third category suggests that work is seen as a
natural part of life. In the final conception, life and work are fundamentally integrated so that there is
no awareness of work being work. Obviously, this final category is the ideal of Buddhist leaders. They
and their subordinates seek to integrate life and work. If an entrepreneur can foster this kind of
orientation in an organization, its potential for success and effectiveness is enhanced. Such an
atmosphere discourages individuals from viewing their work routinely and not caring about the quality
of services rendered to others. It is not surprising that the concept of quality control circles originated
in Japan (see Deming 1982: 99-110).
For the true Buddhist entrepreneur and executive, life and work become one. The saying, "to
love one's work and to work for the ones we love, "would have appeal to the committed Buddhist
leader. The integration of work and life is characteristic of much organizational life in Buddhist Asia.
The important Japanese concept of i.e. emphasizing group consciousness and membership rather that
individualism similarly reflects the Japanese capability to integrate work and life (Nakane 1973: 4).
The Buddhist concept of work is also well articulated in the poetry of Kowit Khemananda (1983: 63),
a protegeof Buddhadasa:
One must work individually, but not for the individual
One must work willingly, but not for one's wiIJ
When one lives wholey, one feels with one Be-ing.
Cohen and March (1974) are also sensitive to these kinds of concerns. They stress the need to
accept playfulness in social organizations. The arbitrary segmentation of work and play that typifies
far too many organizations seriously inhibits overall organizational effectiveness, harmony, and
creativity. The new Nike world campus in Beaverton, Oregon, in its design stresses the integration of
work and play.
The Buddhist concept of work so lucidity articulated by Buddhadasa is clearly validated by the
empirical work of the University of Chicago psychologist, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1989), whose
research focuses on flow and the nature of optimal human experience. Csikszentmihalyi defines flow
as "joy, creativity, and the process of total involvement with life". He is critical of both executives
and labor leaders for ignoring the importance of flow and its relationship to efficiency and long-term
productivity. Another important finding of such research on flow is that it is most often associated
with work rather than leisure, which tends to often be passive and unchallenging. Thus, U.S. criticism
of the Japanese, for example, of "overworking" may be unfounded not only economically, but also
psychologically.
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3. Khit-Pen or Buddhist Analytical Thinking and Buddhist
Communication
This concept has been developed by Kowit (1975) and derives from a Buddhist orientation to
critical thinking.The Buddha taught that individuals should not accept things uncritically (Chayanon
1977:95-96). But instead peopleshouldjudge ideasby themselves afterseeking relevantreal experience
to test a notion or thought for its 'validity. The following quotation of the Buddha illustrates this
orientation:
Yes. you may well doubt. you may well be uncertain... Do not accept anything because it is
theauthoritative tradition, becauseit is often said. because of rumouror hearsay, because it is found in
the scriptures, because it agrees with a theory of which one is already convinced, because of the
reputation of an individual, or because a teacher said it is thus and thus... But experience it for
yourself. [Kalama Sutta, (Khantipalo 1975)]
Entrepreneur should be analytical and critical, fostering these attitudes among their
subordinates. Thus, Buddhist leaders are thinkers whoare quick to question ideasand assumptions, and
who enthusiastically seek to test out their hunches empirically, ever ready to reject those which turn
out to be invalid. Assumption drag (Ascher 1978), that is, continuedbelief in assumptions which are
no longervalid,shouldnot be a problem for the Buddhist entrepreneur. In contrast, ego-oriented leaders
cling to ideas because they are personally identified with them, even when their actual merits or
effectiveness no longerexist.
The emphasis of Buddhist epistemology on critical thinking and experiential learning makes
this philosophical system highly compatible wi!h high technology and modern science. Mori (1981)
in his fascinating volume, The Buddha in the Robot, discusses these linkages in depth. The Thai
entrepreneur, SippanondhaKetudat, discussed belowepitomizes such compatibilities. Sippanondha,
.who has a doctorate in nuclearphysics, is a former Buddhist monkand Buddhism and holism strongly
influence his thinking about industry and development (Sippanondha 1990).
The Buddhist ideal communicative style is well articulated by Raymond Tang (Bochner 1982:
99):
Whatgreatlyattracts me to the Buddha is thecivilized
concern which he showsfor the temperate useof language...
To attain this right wayall lies, all bitter and double-tongued
words,all idle babbling, mustbe avoided.
So equallymustharshabusivespeech, arrogant usage heeding
only itself,and crudeexpression tending to corrupt.
Stylealso is important, and bombastic inflatedlanguage is
condemned no less than gentility and plausible fine words.
Aboveall the Buddhavaluesrestraint with words, knowing
that silence is often moreexpressive than the finished poem.
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4. Taoist Concepts Related to Effective Entrepreneurship
The ancient literature of Taoism (see Deng 1992, Mair 1990, Watson 1964) is also relevant to
the modem entrepreneur. As Mair points out there are also close relations between Taoism and ancient
Indian philosophical thought, the source of both Yoga and Buddhism. The Yu concept in Taoism is
also directly related to the flow phenomenon described above. Yu which is highly analogous to flow
refers to the right way of the following the path, or Tao.
The inherent ambiguity of Taoism allows for a wide range of interpretations. Nevertheless,
there are a number of recurring themes in Taoism' which are highly relevant to the entrepreneur who
seeks to be socially and environmentally responsible. Taoism, for example, stresses reverence for
nature and harmony with nature. It also stresses humility and self-effacement. Deng (1992: 17)
succinctly synthesizes the Taoist concept of leadership:
True leadership is a combination of initiative and humility.
The best leader remains obscure, leading but drawing no
personal attention. As long as the collective has direction,
the leader is satisfied. Credit is not to be taken, it will be
awarded when the people realize that is was the subtle influence of
the leader that brought them success.
Taoism also emphasizes the cultivation of creativity, knowledge, and flexibility (both physical
and mental). Holistic thinking is still another aspect emphasized in Taoism and again Deng (1992:
358) is critical of the overspecialization of modem times:
The specialization of modem times calls for individual roles
that do not necessarily form a whole. We often lose sight
even of what the whole is. We have commentators, we have
critics, but we do not have leaders....
The holistic intellectual framework of Taoism is consistent with Kline's (1990: 34) emphasis
on the interdisciplinary foundations of technological innovation. There is also in Taoism an emphasis
on reliance on the minds of the common people (Mair 1990: 17), highly consistent with Deming's
(1982) emphasis on the empowerment of the ordinary workers through their participation in quality
control circles and in suggesting innovations.
s. Real World Examples of Buddhist Entrepreneurs
5.1 Mohandas K. Gandhi
Mohandas, the father of Indian nationalism, in a number of ways reflects the ideals of the
Buddhist entrepreneur. In pursuing his goal of an independent India, he was totally committed to
passive resistance and nonviolent social and political change. It was a tragic irony that he died by an
assassin's bullet. Gandhi was also concerned about excessive materialism and sexual vices and
advocated a life of modesty and simple living. His philosophy is succinctly summarized in a pithy
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statement: "The world has enough resources to satisfy everyone's needs but not his greed" (cited in
Sippanondha 1990: 10).
Gandhi also gave considerable thought to industrialization and its threats to traditional Indian
village life. Thus, he advocated the encouragement and promotion of village and home industries.
Through such a process, important skills passed down through the centuries would be preserved and
individuals would avoid the dehumanizing aspects of life in modem cities and factories. Thus, Gandhi
was an advocate of local rice roots entrepreneurship, related self-reliance, and the satisfaction of basic
needs (in Buddhism they are food, clothing, medicine, and shelter). The Thai King in his visits to
remote rural areas of Thailand has noticed that the children seem to have the highest well-being in
those villages oriented toward subsistence rather than in those oriented toward exports. This
observation is consistent with Gandhian thought and philosophy.
5.2 Maha Chamlong Srimuang, Thai Pro-Democracy Leader
In Thailand, the pro-democracy leader, Maha Chamlong Srimuang, reflects a Buddhist style of
leadership. He places a strong emphasis on personal modesty. As governor of Bangkok, he did not take
his salary. He is vegetarian, does not drink, and does not engage in sex with his wife. Chamlong's
unusual style has attracted considerable attention (Thinakorn 1992; Thongchai 1992) and he has
published numerous volumes articulating his political philosophy and approach to leadership and
management (1983; 1986; 1989; 1990a; 1990b; 1992a; 1992b). Chamlong is the de-facto leader of the
Moral Force Party in Thailand which has steadily gained in popularity and is currently part of the
governing coalition. The party's philosophy is reflected in the terms "clean and green" and Chamlong
has tried to attract to the party only those of high integrity and ability.
In his two terms of being governor of Bangkok, Chamlong developed impressive popularity
despite the inherent difficulties of managing a hyperurbanized Bangkok. Chamlong was particularly
noted for his personal attention to and concern for ordinary city workers such as street cleaners. He also
was an innovator promoting various ideas to improve the quality of life of the ordinary citizen of
Bangkok (e.g., the Rama IX public park in Bangna and the people's store at the weekend market).
5.3 Dr. Sippanondha Ketudat
Dr. Sippanondha, currently chairing four major corporations including the Petroleum Authority
of Thailand, has had a remarkable career of public and private entrepreneurship. A former Buddhist
monk, he received a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from Harvard and became a professor of physics at
Chulalongkorn University.
He subsequently became involved in university planning and later was appointed deputy
secretary-general of the National Education Commission, Office of the Prime Minister. Following the
October 14, 1973~ student "revolution" he became chair of the important Education Reform
Committee, which played an important role in introducing a number of important changes in the Thai
educational system, which facilitated Thailand's rapid economic growth in the '80s.
Though not a partisan politician, he has served in five cabinets under three prime ministers,
most recently as minister of industry in Anand 11. As minister of education under Prem, he orchestrated
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a change in the basic structure of Thai education, which many judged to be politically impossible
because of many vested interests involved.
In his private sector work, Dr. Sippanondha was the first president of the National
Petrochemical Corporation of Thailand and as such was a major player in the development of the
Eastern Seaboard Project, an innovative development project to help divert development away from
Bangkok and to achieve a fonn of development more in harmony with culture and development. .
Dr. Sippanondha's (1990) philosophy of entrepreneurship and leadership is well articulated in
his recent book on the future of Thailand published by the East-West Center. A major theme of Dr.
Sippanondha's philosophy is the Gandhian, Buddhist philosophy of "eat sufficiently, live sufficiently"
(kin phau dii.juu phau dii). As an entrepreneur, Dr. Sippanondha is noted for his integrity, discipline,
commitment and innovativeness.
5.4 Dr. MeechaiVeeravaidya
One individual, who was an outspoken cabinet minister in both of Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun's interim governments, Dr. Meechai Veeravaidya stands out among many as being a
particularly innovative social entrepreneur in his approach to dealing with and solving social
problems.
From the first modem census in 1911 which showed a population of 8.3 million, the number
of people in Thailand had increased to a level of 44.8 million by 1980. During the two-decade period
from 1950, the rate of population growth was over three percent per year.
The innovator, Dr. Meechai Veeravaidya, whose name "Meechai" is now synonymous with the
condom, began serious efforts towards reducing the Thai population growth rates in the 1970s. Dr.
Meechai, responsible for establishing the Population and Community Development Association,
began moving around the country handing out his business card with condoms attached. He even
involved children who blew up the condoms as balloons. Even local grocers began to supply condoms
to the people when they bought vegetables. Through extensive community education and related
efforts, Dr. Meechai began the challenging task of helping his country reduce its high rate of
population growth. Thailand's population growth rate has dropped from 3.2 percent in 1970 to the low
rate of 1.5 percent in 1991. Thailand's dramatic success in reducing fertility has attracted the attention
of demographers around the world (Cochrane 1979).
In the late 1980s, Dr. Meechai became alarmed by the number of children from the poor
outlying villages moving to the cities in search of work. Frequently these children were encouraged by
their parents to leave the villages because there was little hope of any meaningful employment at
home. Many of these young girls and boys were lured into prostitution in the cities or into
underground "sweat factories". To reduce this migration flow and to improve the quality of life in the
poorer villages, Dr. Meechai enlisted the assistance of corporations in Thailand to help in his efforts to
improve the quality of life in remote villages. The approach used by Dr. Meechai has been to
encourage corporations to "sponsor" a village. In doing so, the company will make a no-interest loan
available to the village to improve its water and sanitation facilities, generally under the direction of
the company personnel. Secondly, the sponsoring corporation will help the village to develop an
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industryor trade which will providejobs, income, and an improvement in village conditions. As an
example,a German glass manufacturer requires a long handled cottonyarn brush to clean out the dies
in which bottles are manufactured. In the past, these brushes have been purchased from outside
Thailand. In this particularcase, the German employees met with the villagepeople and taught them
howto make the brushes, using onlyhandmanufacturing techniques and appropriate local technology.
The fabrication of this brush has been so successful that the German company is now
purchasing large numbers to ship to its other manufacturing companies in Germany and other parts of
Europe.This simple manufacturing example is only an illustration of the type of basic manufacturing
task that is beingcarriedout by localrural people. Yet the incomefrom this and other similar projects
is sufficientto makea markedimprovement in the employment of the peopleand increased incomeof
the village.
AIDS has become a serious problem in Thailand since its first apparentintroduction several
years ago. Here again, Dr. Meechai has been an outspoken advocate for AIDS education and
instrumental in developing unique andinnovative programs which encourage safe sex.
5.5 Dr. Prawase Wasi
Another prominent Thai socialentrepreneur alsoactive in the health field is Dr. Prawase Wasi,
winner of the Magsaysay Award (theAsian equivalent of theNobel Prize) in 1981 for his dedicated and
committed workto improve the quality of ruralhealth care in Thailand. He convinced the government,
for example, to build 370 new hospitals in Thailand's rural districts. He has also been an active
promoter of "thebarefootdoctor" conceptwithan emphasis on indigenous healthcare. He has worked
against the excessive useof unnecessary imported drugsand their possible adverseeffects.One of his
most innovative projects has been the involvement of the highly respected Buddhistpriests in efforts
to improve health and the qualityof life in remote rural areas (Esterline 1990: 165-178). Finally, Dr..
Prawasehas beena strong advocate of the ideaof Thailand establishing a new international university
to promote peace, harmony, and worldcitizenship. To secure the funding and support to accomplish
this loftyidealrepresents a genuine entrepreneurial challenge.
6. The Need for Buddhist Entrepreneurs and Leaders
The.resolution of the management crisis in many parts of the world in both the public and
private sectors requiresa fresh look at organizational life. Over time, increasing numbersof creative
individuals, particularly in industrial societies, are opting to demanage alternative life styles. To go
beyondthe currenteconomic crisisof stagnation and bureaucratic pathology will require leadership of
imagination and creativity, open to newvisions and approaches. America canexperience eitherentropy
and stagnate in terms of re industrialization and excessivematerialism or become the leader of the
teletronic revolution and genuinely assist less technologically advanced nations to progress by
concentrating on the development and sharing of appropriate high technology to build human
capacities, to promote sustainable development, and to meetuniversal humanneeds. To do so, Clinton
and the new political administration in the D.S. must overcome vast vested economic interests to
realize a genuine peacedividend (seeTextor1991).
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Crucial here is the concept of integrated industrial development (Fry and Martin 1991: 244-245)
suggested by the work of Sippanondha Ketudat (1990), which calls for industry and technology in
harmony with culture and the environment. A major concept in Buddhism is reverence for life in all its
forms (Davies 1987).Thus, the genuinely Buddhist entrepreneur should have a deep commitment to
improving the human condition and quality of life. The most successful entrepreneurs have flexible.
fmancial resources which can be used to promote corporate social and environmental responsibility.
The Buddhist entrepreneur by definition is open to change and innovation. The Buddhist
emphasis on contentment is directly relevant to long-term ecological concerns related to global
carrying capacity and the need for sustainable development. Thus, the Buddhist entrepreneur has the
Taoist flexibility to promote the ecotopian vision (see Callenbach 1975; Maser 1992; Thompson
1992) and not to resist change by clinging to hierarchy, symbols of status differentiation, and
excessive materialism. Given their openness to change, Buddhist leaders are more likely to be able to
overcome the tempocentrism which threatens global survival. Given their non-self orientation, they
should also be open to the growing demands fOr popular participation, empowerment, democratization,
cultural democracy, and economic democracy.
Since compassion has a central importance in Buddhism, Buddhist entrepreneurs can never
forget the poor, the sick, the alienated, and the un-employed, wherever they may be. Their
organizations will not be stuffy, fear-ridden, unnatural, and cold, but instead changing, playful,
enthusiastic, and exciting. Their organizations will demonstrate a deep commitment and dedication to
serve consumers with excellence and respect. Their goal is not profit maximization, but instead the
optimization of human welfare, for the worker and employee as well as the consumer and larger
society. For the Buddhist entrepreneur; administration is not power, but service to humanity in its
broadest sense.
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